JUDGMENT : 1. With consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing. They have no complaint whatsoever about any audio and video quality. 2. The instant appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 09.12.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(L) No.3729 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the writ petition has been dismissed refusing to interfere with the award dated 16.01.2018 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad in Reference No.27 of 2015 whereby and whereunder it has been held that action of the management of SAIL Refractory Unit, Bhandaridah in not regularizing services of Punit Mahto and 44 other Badli Workers who were doing permanent and perennial nature of job since long, is not fair and justified and hence they be regularized in service within 30 days from the date of publication of the award in the Gazette of India. 3. The brief facts of the case which require to be enumerated read as hereunder: As per the pleading, it is the case of the workmen that they have been appointed in pursuance to the tripartite agreement dated 15.09.1985 entered in between Bokaro Steel City, Bharat Refractories Limited and Subsidiary India Firebricks and Insulation Company Limited. The workmen were working in the material handling section of Bharat Refractories Limited, Bhandaridah since long under the direct supervision and control of the management in permanent and perennial nature of job. The engagement of worker was through contractor as unskilled worker but the same was abolished w.e.f. 31.03.1989 and thereafter a settlement (agreement) was arrived between the Management of Bharat Refractories Limited, Bhandaridah and their workmen on 01.04.1989 whereby and whereunder the management agreed to provide employment to Punit Mahto and others as Badli workmen and also agreed to pay them wages at par with permanent employees of R-1 category, therefore, all the Badli workers came under the direct control of the then management of Bharat Refractories Limited, Bhandaridah which subsequently was implemented by the management w.e.f. 07.04.1989, 14.04.1989, 13.04.1989, 15.04.1989, 16.04.1989 and 17.04.1989 and were employed in regular manner and started paying wages of R-1 categories regularly. Some of the Badli workers died in harness, as such, the management provided employment to their dependent according to the provision of employment w.e.f. 01.10.1993, 16.06.1993, 16.12.2003, 16.12.2008 and 25.11.2008 and since then they are also working in Mudgunmass section and have completed more than 240 days attendance. It has further been pleaded that on 10.12.1996 the management Bharat Refractories Limited, Bhandaridah entered into settlement with the Union and agreed to regularize the workmen concerned as permanent employee phase wise. But in violation of the aforesaid settlement dated 10.12.1996, the management did not regularize them as permanent employee and hence, a dispute was raised by the workmen, conciliation having failed, the matter was sent before the appropriate authority who had made reference for its adjudication before the competent Industrial Tribunal having its jurisdiction by making reference to the effect that: “Whether the action of the management of SAIL Refractory Unit, Bhandaridah in not regularizing the service of Sri Punit Mahato and 44 other Badli workers (list enclosed) who were doing the permanent and Perennial nature of job since long is fair and justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled?” The Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad initiated a proceeding by calling upon the management for their appearance so that they may contest the case. In view thereof, the management appeared, filed written statement and thereafter the award had been passed on 16.01.2018 to the effect that: “……. 18. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, I hold that the action of the management of SAIL Refractory Unit, Bhandaridah in not regularizing the service of Sri Punit Mahto and 44 other Badli workers (list enclosed) who were doing the permanent and Perennial nature of job since long is not fair and justified. Hence they be regularized in service within 30 days from the date of publication of the award in Gazette of India. This is my award. Sd/- (R.K. Saran) Presiding Officer” 4. The Management, being aggrieved with the same, approached to this Court by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the aforesaid award but the writ petition has been dismissed, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 5. Mr. This is my award. Sd/- (R.K. Saran) Presiding Officer” 4. The Management, being aggrieved with the same, approached to this Court by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the aforesaid award but the writ petition has been dismissed, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that there is no proper adjudication of the issue raised by the parties before the Tribunal in passing the award. According to him, the reference is to the effect that, “whether the action of the management of SAIL Refractory Unit, Bhandaridah in not regularizing the service of Sri Punit Mahato and 44 other Badli workers (list enclosed) who were doing the permanent and Perennial nature of job since long is fair and justified? If not, to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled?”, but without recording any finding in the award, the order for regularization has been passed while according to him, the post is not sanctioned and in absence thereof, there should not be an order of regularization as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Umadevi (3) and others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , even the same has not been appreciated while affirming the award. It has further been submitted that with respect to the applicability of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Umadevi (3) and others (supra), although there is a divergent view, the matter been referred before the larger bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs. Krishan Gopal and Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 150, therefore, this Court may also consider the fact about applicability of the judgment rendered in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Umadevi (3) and others (supra) and taking into consideration the aforesaid fact and in absence of the sanctioned post as has been laid down in the aforesaid case, there cannot be any regularization, as such, the award as also the order passed by the learned Single Judge which is impugned in the writ petition, may be held to be unsustainable in the eye of law by quashing and setting it aside. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Sinha, in order to buttress his argument has relied upon certain judgments passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Hari Nandan Prasad and Anr. vs. Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and Anr., (2014) 7 SCC 190 ; Sudarshan Rajpoot vs. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, (2015) 2 SCC 317 ; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Petroleum Coal Labour Union and Ors., (2015) 6 SCC 494 ; Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and Ors., (2019) 13 SCC 82 and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs. Krishan Gopal and Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 150. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, gone across the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. This Court, before proceeding to scrutinize the legality and propriety of the impugned order, deems it fit and proper to refer certain admitted facts in this case. The workmen have been appointed in pursuance to the tripartite agreement dated 15.09.1985 entered in between Bokaro Steel City, Bharat Refractories Limited and Subsidiary India Firebricks and Insulation Company Limited. The workmen were working in the raw material handling section of Bharat Refractories Limited, Bhandaridah since long under the direct supervision and control of the management in permanent and perennial nature of job. The engagement of worker was through contractor as unskilled worker but the same was abolished w.e.f. 31.03.1989 and thereafter a settlement (agreement) was arrived between the Management of Bharat Refractories Limited, Bhandaridah and their workmen on 01.04.1989 whereby and whereunder the management agreed to provide employment to Punit Mahto and others as Badli workmen and also agreed to pay them wages at par with permanent employees of R-1 category, therefore, all the Badli workers came under the direct control of the then management of Bharat Refractories Limited, Bhandaridah which subsequently was implemented by the management w.e.f. 07.04.1989, 14.04.1989, 13.04.1989, 15.04.1989, 16.04.1989 and 17.04.1989 and were employed in regular manner and started paying wages of R-1 categories regularly. Some of the Badli workers died in harness, as such, the management provided employment to their dependent according to the provision of employment w.e.f. 01.10.1993, 16.06.1993, 16.12.2003, 16.12.2008 and 25.11.2008 and since then they are also working in Mudgunmass section and have completed more than 240 days attendance. Some of the Badli workers died in harness, as such, the management provided employment to their dependent according to the provision of employment w.e.f. 01.10.1993, 16.06.1993, 16.12.2003, 16.12.2008 and 25.11.2008 and since then they are also working in Mudgunmass section and have completed more than 240 days attendance. It has further been pleaded that on 10.12.1996 the management Bharat Refractories Limited, Bhandaridah entered into settlement with Union and agreed to regularize the workmen concerned as permanent employee phase wise. But in violation of the aforesaid settlement dated 10.12.1996, the management did not regularize them as permanent employee and hence, a dispute was raised by the workmen, conciliation having failed the matter was sent before the appropriate authority who had made reference for its adjudication before the competent Industrial Tribunal having its jurisdiction The Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1, Dhanbad initiated a proceeding by calling upon the management for their appearance so that they may contest the case. In view thereof, the management appeared, filed written statement and thereafter the award has been passed on 16.01.2018 The Management, being aggrieved with the same, approached to this Court by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the aforesaid award but the writ petition has been dismissed. 8. In view thereof, the management appeared, filed written statement and thereafter the award has been passed on 16.01.2018 The Management, being aggrieved with the same, approached to this Court by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India assailing the aforesaid award but the writ petition has been dismissed. 8. This Court has also considered the order dated 28.07.2009 passed by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs which pertains to amalgamation of M/s Bharat Refractories Limited, a Government of India undertaking with M/s Steel Authority of India Limited, a Government of India undertaking as has been brought on record in the rejoinder to counter affidavit dated 26.08.2020 wherefrom it is evident that the transferor company, i.e., M/s Bharat Refractories Limited was referred to Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction on the erosion of its networth mainly due to technological obsolescence, ageing of plant and equipments, low capacity utilization, lower price realization of finished products and lack of necessary capital investments and on the basis of the recommendation of the BIFR three revival packages were implemented in the years 1996, 1999 and 2002 but the transferor company could not be revived and continued to incur losses and had a negative networth and in consequence thereof, a decision was taken for amalgamation of the transferor company, i.e., of M/s Bharat Refractories Limited, a Government of India undertaking with the transferee company, i.e., M/s Steel Authority of India Limited by virtue of the decision taken by the Government of India Ministry of Steel dated 02.05.2008 whereby the permission had been accorded to initiate the process of amalgamation under Section 396 of the Companies Act, 1956 on certain terms and conditions. One of the conditions also pertains to the cases of staffs, employees and the workmen. One of the conditions also pertains to the cases of staffs, employees and the workmen. The condition stipulated therein is being referred as under: “PROVISIONS REGARDING EXISTING OFFICERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES OF THE TRANSFEROR COMPANY All the staff, workmen or employees, in the service of the transferor company, on the date immediately preceding the appointed date shall become the employees of the transferee company on the basis that : (i) their service shall have been continuous and shall not have been interrupted by reason of the amalgamation of the transferor company; (ii) every whole time officer, including whole time Director (employee) or other employees of the transferor company immediately before the appointed date shall become an officer, employee, as the case may be, of the transferee company and upon implementation of the Scheme from the appointed date the scheme, all the conditions of service and employment of the transferee company would be applicable to the employees of the transferor company. In order to bring uniformity, the employees of the transferor company shall be absorbed on equivalent scales of pay, taking scales prior to salary/wage revision effective from January 1, 1997 in the transferee company with protection of pay (Basic + Dearness Allowance). While doing so, care would be taken not to disturb both the transferee company’s and the transferor company’s internal seniority and to ensure that employees are not lowered by more than one grade and under no circumstances, E-0 scale would become non-executive scale; (iii) section 396 of Companies Act, 1956 casts an obligation on the Central Government to satisfy itself that the scheme for amalgamation or merger is not contrary to public interest. The basic principle of such satisfaction is to observe that the interests of the employees of the transferor company are protected by the scheme of amalgamation which should not be unfair to them; (iv) powers under Section 396 can be exercised only amalgamation is in public interest. The word “public interest” assumes the interest of the employees also. The basic principle of such satisfaction is to observe that the interests of the employees of the transferor company are protected by the scheme of amalgamation which should not be unfair to them; (iv) powers under Section 396 can be exercised only amalgamation is in public interest. The word “public interest” assumes the interest of the employees also. To take into account only the interest of the shareholders and not to consider the interest of employees is to completely go against the mandate of section 396 of the Companies Act; (v) the amalgamation arrangement should take care of the interest of the employees of the Transferor Company and the service conditions of the employees of the transferor company should not be worse than the existing service conditions by implementing the scheme of amalgamation. From the various judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts, it can be concluded that in scheme of amalgamation the interest of employees of transferor company has to be protected. All benefits which are available to the employees of the transferee company shall be available to the employees of the transferor company from the appointed date including those of medical benefits. In the larger interest of the employees, ten thousand rupees which has been given as an advance to the employees of the transferor company in anticipation of revised pay scales, shall not be recovered from them by the transferee company as a good will gesture. The grievances in respect of Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) and medical benefits of the ex-employee of the transferor company may be suitably addressed by the Ministry of Steel.” 9. The specific case of the workmen as per the pleading made by them in the counter affidavit which was filed before the writ Court is that they are working through the contractor w.e.f. January, 1985 in pursuance to a tripartite agreement dated 15.09.1985 and after amalgamation by virtue of the direction of the BIFR their services have been merged with the services of the transferee company, i.e., Steel Authority of India Limited and thereby, they claim to have continued in service regularly since the year 1985. Further case is that some of the workmen died in harness, in consequence thereof, their dependents have been engaged on compassionate ground under the provision of employment w.e.f. 01.10.1993, 16.06.1993, 16.12.2003, 16.12.2008 and 25.11.2008. Further case is that some of the workmen died in harness, in consequence thereof, their dependents have been engaged on compassionate ground under the provision of employment w.e.f. 01.10.1993, 16.06.1993, 16.12.2003, 16.12.2008 and 25.11.2008. Their grievance before the concerned management was that there is no pay at par with the transferee company as also they raised the issue of regularization in service on the ground of being in service right from the year 1985 and when their grievance had not been redressed, they raised the issue before the appropriate authority wherein the conciliation failed, in consequence thereof, failure report has been referred before the competent authority of the Central Government by whom reference has been made for adjudication of the competent Industrial Tribunal as referred above. 10. The case of the workmen, in turn thereof, as per the written statement filed on their behalf is that the management is paying wages to the Badli workmen as per the settlement in R-1 category but never provided employment to the dependent of the badli workers after their death. Further, the management was never agreed to regularize the services of the badli workers concerned as permanent employees phase wise which appears from the agreement dated 24.04.1997 between both the parties and as such, management has violated the settlement dated 10.12.1996. 11. So far as the NJCS agreement is concerned, it has been stated that the NJCS agreement cover only permanent employees of SAIL accordingly, the same is applicable to only permanent employees of SAIL, SRU Bhandaridah and not this Badli workers. Hence, they are not entitled of wages under S-1 of SAIL category as the Badli workers are not the employees of SAIL so they are not covered under NJCS agreement hence, they have been denied aforesaid wages of SAIL. The Tribunal after considering the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, had passed the award by holding therein that the workmen are rendering service to the management continuously in lower wage. Submission made on behalf of the representative of the SAIL has been taken into consideration pertaining to bipartite agreement between the SAIL management and the workmen concerned which was filed before the Court containing a clause therein that Badli workmen can be regularized as per the order of the Court and now the workmen approached the Court and they are rendering services like SAIL employees. The Tribunal has also considered the Fifth Schedule of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the effect that “To employ workmen as badlis, casual, temporaries and to continue them as such for years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen.” Further admission of the management is that the workmen are working since 1989 continuously, therefore, the award for regularization has been passed considering the fact that they were doing permanent and perennial nature of job since long. 12. The aforesaid award has been questioned by the Management by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the learned Single Judge after considering the factual aspect about the settlement enriched in between the Management and the Union and also considering the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ as long continuation in service, has refused to interfere with the award holding therein that nothing has been argued nor brought on record to show that the order passed by the Tribunal is without jurisdiction and suffers from illegality and perversity, therefore, sitting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, since only interference can be made in case the award is passed without jurisdiction or suffers from perversity. 13. Mr. Sinha has also argued that in the matter or regularization of the workers appointed on contractual basis the requirement of law as per the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court in Steel Authority of India Limited and Ors. vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1 that a finding to the effect that transaction being sham and camouflage has to be recorded but in the award there is no such finding. 14. So far as the argument advanced on behalf of Mr. Sinha to the effect that there is no finding in the award about the transaction being sham and camouflage by taking work from the workmen through the contractor, therefore, the award is not sustainable in the eye of law is concerned, we are not in agreement for the reason that there is no stipulation made by the appropriate authority in the reference for giving a finding to the effect that any transaction being sham and camouflage rather reference is that as to why the services of the workmen be not regularized. It is the settled position of law that once the reference has been made by the appropriate authority referring it before the Tribunal or Labour Court, as the case may be, the same is to be answered by the concerned forum without any deviation therefrom since it would be evident from the terms of reference, there is no reference to that effect for declaration of engagement of the workmen to be sham and camouflage transaction and since the said reference has not been questioned by the management, as such, at this juncture, no such point is available to be raised on behalf of the management. 15. It is further settled position of law that if there is any grievance of the parties with respect to the terms of reference, the same has to be questioned at the threshold but herein the terms of the reference has been accepted by the management and there is no finding to the effect that the transaction is sham and camouflage in taking work from the concerned workmen, which cannot be allowed to be agitated at this juncture, as such, the aforesaid argument is not worth to be considered, accordingly, rejected. 16. Mr. Indrajit Sinha has relied upon a judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Hari Nandan Prasad and Anr. vs. Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and Anr. (supra), paragraph-39 thereof. We have considered the factual aspect involved in the said case as also the observation made at paragraph-39. The observation made at paragraph-39 pertains to answering the issue : (i) whether termination of services of the appellants was illegal? The related issue herein would be if it is illegal, then whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the appellants would be entitled to reinstatement in service or and monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement would be justified? (ii) whether the appellants are entitled to regularization of their services? The Hon’ble Apex Court by answering the aforesaid issue has considered the provision of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for coming to the conclusion that if there is termination on the ground of violation of the condition stipulated under Section 25-F of the Act, in that circumstances, can the order of reinstatement be passed in spite of passing of order of compensation. It has been held that the retrenched person in violation of Section 25-F of the Act in spite of order for reinstatement may be compensated by passing order of compensation in order to fulfill the condition stipulated under Section 25-F of the Act, 1947. Further, it has been answered so far as regularization is concerned, holding therein that there cannot be an order of regularization if a person has been terminated from service under the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, 1947 on the basis of the principle laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Umadevi (3) and others (supra). Further, at paragraph-39 it has been observed that the Labour Court cannot give direction for regularization only because a worker has continued as daily-wage worker/ad hoc/temporary worker for number of years. Further, if there are no posts available, such a direction for regularization would be impermissible. We have examined the factual aspect involved in this case in order to scrutinize about the applicability of the judgment rendered in Hari Nandan Prasad and Anr. vs. Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and Anr. (supra), the written statement filed on behalf of the management in order to verify as to whether the plea about non-applicability of posts has ever been taken before the Tribunal but we have found that no such plea has been taken. Further the fact of the case of Hari Nandan Prasad and Anr. vs. Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and Anr. (supra) would not be applicable because in pursuance to the agreement the workmen are working since 1989 and even on the ground of an order passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, BIFR dated 26.08.2020, the services of the workmen have been merged with the services of the transferee company, i.e., Steel Authority of India Limited, the appellant herein and also it is not the case of termination under the provision of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 rather the workmen are continuing in service without any order of termination under the provision of Section 25-F of the Act, therefore, the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Hari Nandan Prasad and Anr. vs. Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and Anr. (supra) is not applicable in the facts of this case. 17. Mr. vs. Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and Anr. (supra) is not applicable in the facts of this case. 17. Mr. Sinha, has further argued in view of the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Umadevi (3) and others (supra) that the order of regularization can only be passed if the post is sanctioned and in view thereof, the Tribunal ought not to have passed an order for regularization since no post is sanctioned but as we have discussed hereinabove that the fact about the post having been sanctioned or not is not part of the pleading of the management before the Tribunal but apart from that it requires to refer herein that the applicability of the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Secretary, State of Karnataka and others vs. Umadevi (3) and others (supra) in the Labour dispute fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in UP Power Corporation Ltd. and Anr. vs. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh and Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 755 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased hold that the law propounded in Umadevi (supra) was applicable also to Industrial Tribunals and Labour Courts. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held at paragraph 6 & 7 which read as hereunder: “6. It is true as contended by learned counsel for the respondent that the question as regards the effect of the industrial adjudicators' powers was not directly in issue in Umadevi (3) case [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753]. But the foundational logic in Umadevi (3) case [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is based on Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Though the industrial adjudicator can vary the terms of the contract of the employment, it cannot do something which is violative of Article 14. If the case is one which is covered by the concept of regularisation, the same cannot be viewed differently. 7. The plea of learned counsel for the respondent that at the time the High Court decided the matter, decision in Umadevi (3) case [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was not rendered is really of no consequence. There cannot be a case for regularisation without there being employee-employer relationship. 7. The plea of learned counsel for the respondent that at the time the High Court decided the matter, decision in Umadevi (3) case [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] was not rendered is really of no consequence. There cannot be a case for regularisation without there being employee-employer relationship. As noted above the concept of regularisation is clearly linked with Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if in a case the fact situation is covered by what is stated in para 45 of Umadevi (3) case [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] the industrial adjudicator can modify the relief, but that does not dilute the observations made by this Court in Umadevi (3) case [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] about the regularisation.” Subsequently, in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. vs. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 it was held that the Industrial and Labour Courts under Section 30(1)(b) of MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 have wide powers to direct the employer to take action in affirmative in a case of unfair labour practice including the power to order regularization or permanency. The decision in Umadevi was held to limit the scope of powers under Articles 32 and 226 to issue directions for regularization in a matter of public employment. However, the power to take affirmative action under Section 30(1)(b) was held to remain intact even after the judgment of the Hon’ble Constitution Bench. At paragraphs 35 and 36, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold as hereunder: “35. Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] is an authoritative pronouncement for the proposition that the Supreme Court (Article 32) and the High Courts (Article 226) should not issue directions of absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily wage or ad hoc employees unless the recruitment itself was made regularly in terms of the constitutional scheme. 36. 36. Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] does not denude the Industrial and Labour Courts of their statutory power under Section 30 read with Section 32 of the MRTU and PULP Act to order permanency of the workers who have been victims of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV where the posts on which they have been working exist. Umadevi (3) [ (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] cannot be held to have overridden the powers of the Industrial and Labour Courts in passing appropriate order under Section 30 of the MRTU and PULP Act, once unfair labour practice on the part of the employer under Item 6 of Schedule IV is established.” Further, in Hari Nandan Prasad and Anr. vs. Employer I/R to Management of Food Corporation of India and Anr. (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold at paragraph-39 thereof, which read as hereunder: “39. On a harmonious reading of the two judgments discussed in detail above, we are of the opinion that when there are posts available, in the absence of any unfair labour practice the Labour Court would not give direction for regularisation only because a worker has continued as daily-wage worker/ad hoc/temporary worker for number of years. Further, if there are no posts available, such a direction for regularisation would be impermissible. In the aforesaid circumstances giving of direction to regularise such a person, only on the basis of number of years put in by such a worker as daily-wager, etc. may amount to back door entry into the service which is an anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution. Further, such a direction would not be given when the worker concerned does not meet the eligibility requirement of the post in question as per the recruitment rules. However, wherever it is found that similarly situated workmen are regularised by the employer itself under some scheme or otherwise and the workmen in question who have approached the Industrial/Labour Court are on a par with them, direction of regularisation in such cases may be legally justified, otherwise, non-regularisation of the left-over workers itself would amount to invidious discrimination qua them in such cases and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Thus, the industrial adjudicator would be achieving the equality by upholding Article 14, rather than violating this constitutional provision.” In Food Corporation of India, the grievance of the appellants was that in terms of a scheme contained in a circular, similarly placed workmen had been regularized on the completion of 240 days’ service. While dealing with the case of two workmen, it was found that one of them had been dispensed with four years prior to the date of the circular as a result of which the workman would only be entitled to monetary compensation. On the other hand, the second workman was in service on the date of the circular and completed 240 days of service within a few months. The Court held that the failure to regularize his services was discriminatory. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs. Krishna Gopal and Others, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 150, after taking into consideration the ratio laid down in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. The Court held that the failure to regularize his services was discriminatory. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs. Krishna Gopal and Others, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 150, after taking into consideration the ratio laid down in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. vs. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana (supra), has formulated the following proposition: (i) Wide as they are, the powers of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court cannot extend to a direction to order regularisation, where such a direction would in the context of public employment offend the provisions contained in Article 14 of the Constitution; (ii) The statutory power of the Labour Court or Industrial Court to grant relief to workmen including the status of permanency continues to exist in circumstances where the employer has indulged in an unfair labour practice by not filling up permanent posts even though such posts are available and by continuing to employ workmen as temporary or daily wage employees despite their performing the same work as regular workmen on lower wages; (iii) The power to create permanent or sanctioned posts lies outside the judicial domain and where no posts are available, a direction to grant regularisation would be impermissible merely on the basis of the number of years of service; (iv) Where an employer has regularised similarly situated workmen either in a scheme or otherwise, it would be open to workmen who have been deprived of the same benefit at par with the workmen who have been regularised to make a complaint before the Labour or Industrial Court, since the deprivation of the benefit would amount to a violation of Article 14; and (v) In order to constitute an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the ID Act, the employer should be engaging workmen as badlis, temporaries or casuals, and continuing them for years, with the object of depriving them of the benefits payable to permanent workmen. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case has also considered the decision rendered in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Petroleum Coal Labour Union and Ors. (supra) wherein the law has been laid down that the workmen upon completion of 240 days’ service in a period of 12 calendar months are entitled for regularization of their services into permanent posts of the corporation. (supra) wherein the law has been laid down that the workmen upon completion of 240 days’ service in a period of 12 calendar months are entitled for regularization of their services into permanent posts of the corporation. It has also been held therein that under Clause 2(ii), upon completion of 240 days of service in a calendar year, the workmen have acquired valid statutory right and ought to have been granted the status of regular employees, therefore, it has been considered by the Larger Bench about the requirement of revisiting the decision rendered in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Petroleum Coal Labour Union and Ors. (supra) for its consideration on the following facts: (i) The interpretation placed on the provisions of clause 2(ii) of the Certified Standing Orders; (ii) The meaning and content of an unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) read with Item 10 of the Vth Schedule of the ID Act; and (iii) The limitations, if any, on the power of the Labour and Industrial Courts to order regularisation in the absence of sanctioned posts. The decision in PCLU would, in our view, require reconsideration in view of the above decisions of this Court and for the reasons which we have noted above. 19. Now the question is that although the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court has been referred before the larger Bench for its reconsideration but can this Court now ignore or not put reliance upon the ratio already laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court till its reversal by the larger Bench and as to whether the judgment rendered in those cases is having binding precedence in view of the provision of Article 141 of the Constitution or not. 20. It is the settled position of law that the Hon’ble Apex Court while rendering judgment laying down ratio either under Article 32 or under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is having binding precedence under Article 141 of the Constitution of India so long as the said ratio is not being reversed by the larger forum. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in Union of India and Anr. vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRS. Etc., (1989) 2 SCC 754 . Paragraph-7 of the said judgment is referred as hereunder: “7. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in Union of India and Anr. vs. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRS. Etc., (1989) 2 SCC 754 . Paragraph-7 of the said judgment is referred as hereunder: “7. India is governed by a judicial system identified by a hierarchy of courts, where the doctrine of binding precedent is a cardinal feature of its jurisprudence. It used to be disputed that Judges make law. Today, it is no longer a matter of doubt that a substantial volume of the law governing the lives of citizens and regulating the functions of the State flows from the decisions of the superior courts. “There was a time,” observed Lord Reid, “When it was thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law — they only declare it.... But we do not believe in fairy tales any more”. [The Judge as Law Maker, p. 22] In countries such as the United Kingdom, where Parliament as the legislative organ is supreme and stands at the apex of the constitutional structure of the State, the role played by judicial law making is limited. In the first place the function of the courts is restricted to the interpretation of laws made by Parliament, and the courts have no power to question the validity of Parliamentary statutes, the Diceyan dictum holding true that the British Parliament is paramount and all powerful. In the second place, the law enunciated in every decision of the courts in England can be superseded by an Act of Parliament. As Cockburn, C.J., observed in Ex parte Canon Selwyn [(1872) 36 JP 54] : “There is no judicial body in the country by which the validity of an Act of Parliament could be questioned. An act of the legislature is superior in authority to any court of law.” And Ungoed Thomas, J. in Cheney v. Conn [(1968) 1 All ER 779] referred to a Parliamentary statute as “the highest form of law.... which prevails over every other form of law”. The position is substantially different under a written Constitution such as the one which governs us. The Constitution of India, which represents the Supreme Law of the land, envisages three distinct organs of the State, each with its own distinctive functions, each a pillar of the State. which prevails over every other form of law”. The position is substantially different under a written Constitution such as the one which governs us. The Constitution of India, which represents the Supreme Law of the land, envisages three distinct organs of the State, each with its own distinctive functions, each a pillar of the State. Broadly, while Parliament and the State Legislature in India enact the law and the Executive Government implements it, the Judiciary sits in judgment not only on the implementation of the law by the Executive but also on the validity of the legislation sought to be implemented. One of the functions of the superior judiciary in India is to examine the competence and validity of legislation, both in point of legislative competence as well as its consistency with the Fundamental Rights. In this regard, the courts in India possess a power not known to the English Courts. Where a statute is declared invalid in India it cannot be reinstated unless constitutional sanction is obtained therefore by a constitutional amendment or an appropriately modified version of the statute is enacted which accords with constitutional prescription. The range of judicial review recognised in the superior judiciary of India is perhaps the widest and the most extensive known to the world of law. The power extends to examining the validity of even an amendment to the Constitution, for now it has been repeatedly held that no constitutional amendment can be sustained which violates the basic structure of the Constitution. (See Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [ (1973) 4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1], Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1975 Supp SCC 1 : (1976) 2 SCR 347 ], Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [ (1980) 2 SCC 591 ] and recently in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India [ (1987) 1 SCC 124 : (1987) 1 SCR 435 : (1987) 2 ATC 82].) With this impressive expanse of judicial power, it is only right that the superior courts in India should be conscious of the enormous responsibility which rest on them. This is specially true of the Supreme Court, for as the highest Court in the entire judicial system the law declared by it is, by Article 141 of the Constitution, binding on all courts within the territory of India. 21. This Court has considered the submission made on behalf of Mr. This is specially true of the Supreme Court, for as the highest Court in the entire judicial system the law declared by it is, by Article 141 of the Constitution, binding on all courts within the territory of India. 21. This Court has considered the submission made on behalf of Mr. Sinha on this issue on the basis of the settled position of law about the applicability of the judgment as on date under Article 141 of the Constitution of India and is of the view that the law as is existing today is having binding precedence, as such, has to be relied upon. In view thereof, the question about applicability of the case of judgment rendered in Uma Devi (supra) since has been considered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation vs. Krishna Gopal and Others (supra) and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. vs. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana (supra) as per which law as on today is that the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Uma Devi (supra) will not be applicable in the labour dispute, however, we are discussing the aforesaid fact since it has been raised by Mr. Sinha but even the fact about non-availability of sanctioned post is not part of the pleading before the Tribunal, therefore, contention of applicability of the judgment rendered in Uma Devi (supra) is also not applicable in the facts of the instant case. Since this point has been raised, therefore, this Court has answered the issue as above. 22. This Court, further is of the view that the Tribunal on the basis of the factual aspect as also taking into consideration the deposition of the management witnesses about continuity in service since long, disparity in pay scale contrary to the bipartite agreement, has considered the fact while answering the issue which has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge after appreciating the fact in detail. Now, in such circumstances, can this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India interfere with the fact finding recorded by the Tribunal in the award impugned. The law is very clear as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 477. Now, in such circumstances, can this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India interfere with the fact finding recorded by the Tribunal in the award impugned. The law is very clear as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 SC 477. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 SC 233 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as hereunder in paragraph no.21: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as hereunder: “66. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as hereunder: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh Nathmal vs. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1419, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-17 as hereinbelow: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. 23. Thus, it is evident from the above settled position of law that the scope of this Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of writ of certiorari showing interference in the award is very limited and according to the considered view which we have gathered by going through the factual aspect, it cannot be said that there is any perversity in the finding rather the Tribunal has gone across the factual aspect, i.e., continuity in service since 1989, earlier award passed in reference No.02/2005, management having not taken the point of non-availability of sanctioned post, has passed the award while answering the reference in favour of the workmen and as such, we have not found any ground to interfere with the award sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as such, according to our view requires no interference. 24. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed. 25. I.A. No.3146 of 2021 also stands disposed of.