JUDGMENT : SHAJI P. CHALY, J. 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner Corporation i.e. the Kerala State Development Corporation for Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes Ltd. seeking to quash Exhibits P3, P8, P14, P16 and P17 proceedings, by which, 28 shop rooms purchased by the petitioner from the Kerala Film Development Corporation were imposed with property tax liability by the Corporation of Thrissur. According to the petitioner, 28 shop rooms in question were transferred much later in the year 2007, though the construction was completed by the Kerala Film Development Corporation in the year 2001 and therefore, property tax liability can never be imposed on the petitioner prior to the transfer of the property to the Corporation for legal prescriptions and factual reasons. Brief material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows. 2. As per Government Order No. (Rt.) 294/2002/SCSTDD/TVPM dated 27.3.2003, the State Government permitted the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Development Corporation to purchase shop rooms belonging to the Kerala State Film Development Corporation, Thiruvananthapuram - 2nd respondent, situated in the first floor of the Kairali Sree Theater Complex Thrissur. Case of the petitioner is that, petitioner came into possession of 20 shop rooms within the limits of 2nd respondent by Exhibit P2 Government Order dated 11.12.2007 only, however, the Corporation of Thrissur has demanded property tax for the period from 1.4.2001 to 31.3.2008. Based on the demand, the petitioner was forced to remit the tax demanded by the Corporation. It was also required as per the demand notice dated 5.2.2009 to pay penalty for the period from 1.4.2001 to 31.3.2008 and to pay building tax for the period from 2008-2009. Though petitioner preferred an appeal before the Standing Committee for Taxes, it was dismissed and being aggrieved, an appeal was preferred before the Corporation Council, which was returned directing the petitioner to move the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions - the 1st respondent. Accordingly, petitioner filed Exhibit P13 revision petition and Exhibit P13(a) delay condonation petition before the Tribunal. Since there was a delay in representing the revision after curing the defects, a petition was moved for condoning the delay in representation, which was dismissed by the Tribunal by Exhibit P14 order holding that it has no power to condone the delay exceeding 30 days and therefore, the interlocutory application is not maintainable. 3. Since there was a delay in representing the revision after curing the defects, a petition was moved for condoning the delay in representation, which was dismissed by the Tribunal by Exhibit P14 order holding that it has no power to condone the delay exceeding 30 days and therefore, the interlocutory application is not maintainable. 3. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, petitioner filed W.P. (C) No. 30584/2010 before this Court and accordingly this Court directed the 1st respondent Tribunal to consider and pass appropriate orders with respect to the question regarding re-presenting the revision petition and the Tribunal condoned the delay in re-presentation of the revision as per Exhibit P17 order, however, the revision petition was dismissed as per Exhibit P16 order on the ground of delay. It is thus challenging the order of the Tribunal and seeking to quash the demand notices raised by the Corporation to recover property tax, this writ petition is filed. 4. The paramount contention advanced by the petitioner was that even though as per Government Order dated 27.3.2003 petitioner was permitted to purchase 28 shop rooms petitioner came into possession of the shop rooms only on 1.12.2007 and therefore, the property tax liability cannot be imposed on the petitioner. It was also contended that when the shop rooms came into the possession of the petitioner, petitioner had submitted an application seeking vacancy remission from the year 2001, it was rejected by the Corporation assigning the reason that the vacancy remission has to be given in accordance with section 239 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, and a belated application seeking vacancy remission cannot be entertained by the Corporation. Yet another contention advanced is that since the property tax is relating to the year 2001, the demand notices and consequential recovery is barred by limitation in accordance with the provisions of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994 since three years have elapsed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the Corporation and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner has addressed arguments on the basis of the pleadings discussed above. The primary question raised by the petitioner in regard to vacancy remission is guided by section 239 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, which reads thus: “239. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner has addressed arguments on the basis of the pleadings discussed above. The primary question raised by the petitioner in regard to vacancy remission is guided by section 239 of the Kerala Municipality Act, 1994, which reads thus: “239. Vacancy remission: (1) When any building whether ordinarily let or occupied by the owner himself has been vacant and unlet for a half-year, the owner shall be entitled to a remission of tax for that half-year. (2) If the owner had already paid the tax in respect of a half-year in which a remission is due, he shall be entitled to get either refund or shall be entitled to get the amount adjusted in the tax for the succeeding half-year. (3)(a) No such remission shall be admissible unless the owner of the building or his agent has previously thereto delivered notice to the Secretary: (i) that the building is vacant and unlet. (ii) that the building will be vacant and unlet from a specified date either in the half-year in which notice is delivered or in the succeeding half-year. (b) Every notice under clause (a) shall expire with the half-year succeeding the half-year during which it is so delivered and shall have no effect thereafter.” 7. Therefore, on an analysis of section 239 of Act, 1994, it is clear that no such remission shall be admissible, unless the owner of the building or his agent has previously thereto delivered notice to the Secretary; that the building is vacant and unlet, or that the building will be vacant and unlet from a specified date either in the half-year in which notice is delivered or in the succeeding half year. It is also clear that every notice under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 239 shall expire with the half-year succeeding the half-year during which it is so delivered and shall have no effect thereafter. There is also no case for the petitioner that transfer was intimated by the petitioner in time to the Secretary of the Municipality. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the case put forth by the petitioner that it is entitled to get vacancy remission since the building was not occupied ever since its construction, cannot be sustained under law for the basic reason that no suitable application was filed by the petitioner to secure vacancy remission in contemplation of section 239 of Act, 1994. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the case put forth by the petitioner that it is entitled to get vacancy remission since the building was not occupied ever since its construction, cannot be sustained under law for the basic reason that no suitable application was filed by the petitioner to secure vacancy remission in contemplation of section 239 of Act, 1994. Yet another question raised by the petitioner is that recovery initiated in regard to the property tax liability from the year 2001 is barred by section 539 of Act, 1994. 8. I am of the considered opinion that the argument advanced in that regard has no basis for the basic reason that assessment was made, even according to the petitioner, by the Secretary of the Corporation only in the year 2007 after the shop rooms were handed over and taken possession by the petitioner. It is quite clear and evident from the demand notices produced by the petitioner that the demand notices are issued within three years from the date of the assessment of the shop rooms. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that the demand raised for recovering the property tax is bad in any manner. Section 539 of Act, 1994 dealing with limitation would make the situation more clear, which reads thus: “539. Limitation for recovery of dues: (1) No distraint shall be made, no suit shall be instituted and no prosecution shall be commenced in respect of any sum due to a Municipality under this Act after the expiration of a period of three years from the date on which distraint might first have been made, suit might first have been instituted, or prosecution might first have been commenced, as the case may be, in respect of such sum: Provided that in the case of assessments made under section 282 the said period of three years shall be computed from the date on which distraint might have been made, suit instituted, or prosecution commenced, after the assessment under the said section shall have been made.......” 9. It is an admitted fact that petitioner has paid the property tax without any protest and therefore, petitioner cannot resile from its action and seeks to quash the demand notices raised on the ground of limitation because even if it is found that demand notices for recovery of the amount is bad the recovery alone is barred by the law of limitation but the debt can never be said to be bad which was paid by the petitioner when the demand was raised. 10. It is clear from the above proviso that the three years would be computed from the date on which distraint might have been made, suit instituted or prosecution commenced, after the assessment under the said section shall have been made. It is clear from the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner that the assessment was made only in the year 2007 and therefore the aforesaid provisions of Act, 1994 would not inure to the benefit of the petitioner. 11. Also, I do not think petitioner has made out any case to interfere with Exhibit P16 order passed by the Tribunal in I.A. No. 672/2011 for the basic reason that the Tribunal is vested with powers only to condone the delay up to 30 days, if it is properly explained. Admittedly, the revision was filed after the limitation period prescribed under rule 8 of the Tribunal for Kerala Local Self Government Institutions Rules, 1999, which reads thus: “8. Petitions to the Tribunal: (1) A petition submitted to the Tribunal shall be an appeal or revision against a notice, order or proceedings of the Village Panchayat or Municipality or its Standing Committee for Finance or the Secretary in respect of any matter specified in the schedule appended to these rules or added to the said schedule by the Government from time to tire by notification. (2) If the concerned Village Panchayat or the Municipality or the Standing Committee for Finance or the Secretary has not taken decision within the prescribed time limit in cases where time limit has been prescribed in the Panchayat Act or the Municipality Act or in the Rules, the affected party may, in this respect, file appeal before the Tribunal. (2) If the concerned Village Panchayat or the Municipality or the Standing Committee for Finance or the Secretary has not taken decision within the prescribed time limit in cases where time limit has been prescribed in the Panchayat Act or the Municipality Act or in the Rules, the affected party may, in this respect, file appeal before the Tribunal. (3) Petitions under sub-rules (1) and (2) shall be in form ‘C’ and the same shall be submitted before the Tribunal within thirty days from the date of the notice or order or proceedings against which the petition is filed or within ninety days in cases where decision has not been taken within sixty days of filing appeal before the Local Self Government Institutions: Provided that the Tribunal may admit a petition submitted within one month after the said time limit, if the Tribunal is satisfied that there is sufficient reason for not submitting the petition within the time limit.” 12. The said aspect is clearly explained by a Division Bench of this Court in Rermal Padmanabhan vs. Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions, 2015 (3) KLT 201 . The provisions as above would make it clear that there is no case made out by the petitioner against the dismissal of the delay condonation petition by the Tribunal and the consequential dismissal of the revision. 13. Upshot of the above discussion is that petitioner has not made out any case for interference as are sought for in the writ petition and accordingly it is dismissed.