JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Amit holding brief of Sri Sanjay Kumar Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Patanjali Mishra, learned A.G.A. for the State-respondents and Sri Rajesh Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the informant - respondent No.4. 2. With the consent of learned counsels for the parties, this writ petition is being finally heard. 3. This writ petition has been filed praying for the following relief: “(i) issue a writ order or direction in nature of certiorari for - dated 14-05-2021 which was registered as Case Crime No.244 of 2021, U/S- 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 I.P.C., Police Station – Chhibramau, District Kannauj (Annexure no.1) to this writ petition. (ii) issue a writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to not to arrest the petitioner in Case Crime No.244 of 2021, U/S- 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 I.P.C., Police Station – Chhibramau, District Kannauj.” 4. The impugned first information report lodged by the informant – respondent No.4 and filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition is being reproduced below: N.C.R.B. ¼,uålhåvkjåchå½ I.I.F.-1 ¼,dhÑr tk¡p QkeZ&1½ FIRST INFORMATION REPORT (Under Section 154 Cr.P.C.) çFke lwpuk fjiksVZ 1-District ¼ftyk½% dUUkkSt P.S. ¼Fkkuk½% dksrokyh fNcjkeÅ Year ¼o"kZ½ 2021 F.I.R. No. ¼ç-lw-fj-la-½% 0244 Date fnukad% 14@05@2021 16%21 cts Øålaå Acts vf/kfu;e Sections ¼/kkjk,a½ 1- Hkkånaålaå 1860 420 2- Hkkånaålaå 1860 467 3- Hkkånaålaå 1860 468 4- Hkkånaålaå 1860 471 5- Hkkånaålaå 1860 506 3. (a) Occurrence of offence ¼vijk/k dh ?kVuk½% 1. Day ¼fnu½% From Date ¼fnukad ls½% Date To ¼fnukad rd½ Time Period ¼le; vof/k½% Time From ¼le; ls½% Time to ¼le; rd½% (b) Information received at P.S. ¼Fkkuk tgk¡ lwpuk çkIr gqý% Date ¼fnukad½% Time ¼le;½% 14/05/2021 16:21 cts (c) General Diary Reference ¼jkstukepk lanHkZ½% Entry No. ¼Áfof"V la0½% 037 Date & Time ¼fnukad vkSj le;½% 14@05@2021 16%21 cts 4. Type of Information ¼lwpuk dk Ádkj½% fyf[kr 5. Place of Occurrence ¼?kVuk LFky½ 1.(a) Direction and distance from P.S ¼Fkkuk ls nwjh vkSj fn'kk½% Beat No. ¼chV l0½% (b) Address ¼irk½% vne rgjhjA (c) In case, outside the limit of this police Station, then ( ;fn Fkkuk lhek ds ckgj gS rks½% Name of P.S. ( Fkkuk dk uke½ District (State) ( ftyk ¼jkT;½ % ¼mRrj Áns'k½ 6. Place of Occurrence ¼?kVuk LFky½ 1.(a) Direction and distance from P.S ¼Fkkuk ls nwjh vkSj fn'kk½% Beat No. ¼chV l0½% (b) Address ¼irk½% vne rgjhjA (c) In case, outside the limit of this police Station, then ( ;fn Fkkuk lhek ds ckgj gS rks½% Name of P.S. ( Fkkuk dk uke½ District (State) ( ftyk ¼jkT;½ % ¼mRrj Áns'k½ 6. Complainant/Informant ( f'kdk;rdrkZ@lwpukdrkZ½% (a) Name ( uke½% cztfd'kksj 'kkD; (b) Father's/Husband's Name ( firk dk uke½% lqesj 'kkD; (c) Date/Year of Birth ( tUe frfFk@o"kZ½% 2001 (d) Nationality ( jk"Vªh;rk½% Hkkjr (e) UID No. ( ;w0vkbZ0Mh0 la[;k½% (f) Passport No. ( ikliksVZ la[;k½% Date of Issue ( tkjh djus dh frfFk½% Place of Issue ( tkjh djus dk LFkku½% (g) Occupation ( O;olk;½% (h) Address ( irk½% S.No. ¼Øålaå½ Address Type ¼irk dk çdkj½ Address ¼irk½ 1. orZeku irk cgoyiqj] dksrokyh fNcjkeÅ] dUUkkSt] mRRkj çns'k] Hkkjr 2. LFkk;h irk cgoyiqj] dksrokyh fNcjkeÅ] dUUkkSt] mRRkj çns'k] Hkkjr (i) Phone number ¼nwjHkk"k la0½% Mobile ¼eksckby la0½% 7. Details of known/ suspected/ unknown accused with full particulars ¼Kkr@lafnX/k@vKkr vfHk;qDr dk iwjs fooj.k lfgr o.kZu½% S.No. ¼Ø0la0½ Name ¼uke½ Relative's Name ¼fj'rsnkj dk uke½ Address ¼irk½ 1 xksfoUn mQZ jk/ksyky firk&Lo0&egkjke 1- cgoyiqj] dksrokyh fNcjkeÅ] dUukSt] mRrj Áns'k] Hkkjr 8. Reasons for delay in reporting by the complainant/ informant ¼f'kdk;drkZ@lwpukdrkZ }kjk fjiksVZ nsjh ls ntZ djkus ds dkj.k½% 9. Particulars of properties of interest ¼lEcfU/kr lEifr dk fooj.k½% S. No. ¼Ø0 la0½ Property Type ¼lEifRr ds Ádkj½ Sub-Type ¼mi&Ádkj½ Value (In Rs/- ¼ewY;½ ¼#0 esa½ 10. Total value of property stolen (In Rs/-) ¼pksjh gqbZ lEifRr dk dqy ewY; ¼#0 esa½% 11. Inquest Report/U.D. Case No. if any ¼e`R;q leh{kk fjiksVZ@;w0Mh0 Ádj.k la0 ;fn dksbZ gks½% S. No. ¼Ø0la0½ UIDB Number ¼;w0Mh0Ádj.k la0½ 12. Total value of property stolen (In Rs/-) ¼pksjh gqbZ lEifRr dk dqy ewY; ¼#0 esa½% 11. Inquest Report/U.D. Case No. if any ¼e`R;q leh{kk fjiksVZ@;w0Mh0 Ádj.k la0 ;fn dksbZ gks½% S. No. ¼Ø0la0½ UIDB Number ¼;w0Mh0Ádj.k la0½ 12. First Information Contents ¼ÁFke lwpuk rF;½% udy rgjhj fgUnh oknh Vkbi 'kqnk U;k;ky; ,slhts,e fNcjkeÅ] tuin dUukSt Ák0i0la0 200@11 lu~ 2019 lqesj 'kkD; iq= Lo0 eaxyh Álkn fuoklh cgoyiqj Fkkuk fNcjkeÅ tuin dUukSt ÁkFkhZ cuke xksfoUn mQZ jk/ksyky iq+= Lo0 egkjke fuoklh xzke cgoyiqj Fkkuk fNcjkeÅ tuin dUukSt&foi{kh@vfHk;qDr Fkkuk&fNcjkeÅ ÁkFkZuk i= vUrxZr /kkjk 156¼3½ lhvkjihlh egksn;] fuosnu gS fd ÁkFkhZ lqesj 'kkD; iq= LoxhZ; Jh eaxyh Álkn mez 76 o"kZ fuoklh xzke cgoyiqj Fkkuk fNcjkeÅ tuin dUukSt dk gSA ÁkFkhZ dh iRuh LoxhZ; jkeorh iq=h yky lgk; fuoklh cgcyiqj dks xzke fo'kquiqj gkflyiqj ijxuk o rglhy fNcjkeÅ tuin dUukSt esa vius firk yky lgk; ls 3-52 ,dM+ vkjkth fojklru ÁkIr gq;h FkhA xkao ds gh xksfoUn mQZ jk/ksyky iq= egkjke us yky lgk; ds lxs rkÅ fNn~nu ls ,d QthZ xksnukek fnukafdr 05-12-1959 bZ0 dks vius gd esa fy[kk tkuk fn[kkdj Á'uxr vkjkth ds Hkkx ij vius fojklr djk;h xksfoUn mQZ jk/ksyky us lgh rF;ksa dks fNikdj dwV jpuk djds ,d QthZ vkns'k eq0ua0 339@09-09-1960 rglhynkj fNcjkeÅ U;k;ky; ls ÁkIr dj fy;kA okn la0 339 dh vfHkys[kkxkj jktLo esa ukekUrj.k i=koyh miyC/k ugha gSA uk gh rglhynkj fNcjkeÅ ds U;k;ky; esa dksbZ ukekUrj.k dk;Zokgh lEiUu dh x;hA mDr xksfoUn mQZ jk/ksyky dk dksbZ vf/kdkj ÁkFkhZ dh vkjkth esa ugha gSA xksfoUn mQZ jk/ksyky QthZckM+k djds csbZekuh ls dwVjfpr nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij ÁkFkhZ dh cs'kdherh vkjkth gM+iuk pkgrk gS vkSj tcfj;k yM+kbZ >xM+k djds lEifRr gfFk;kuk pkgrk gSA ÁkFkhZ dh iRuh jkeorh dk LoxZokl fnukad 01-11-2018 dks gks x;k gSA fnukad 22-10-2019 dks 06 cts 'kke xksfoUn us /kedh nh fd vxj [ksrh ds lEcU/k esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh djsxk rks rq>s tku ls ekj nsaxsA ÁkFkhZ us Fkkuk fNcjkeÅ o iqfyl ds mPpf/kdkfj;ksa dks ÁkFkZuk i= fn;k ysfdu dksbZ lquokbZ ugha gqbZA vr% Jheku~ th ls ÁkFkZuk gS fd vfHk;qDr xksfoUn mQZ jk/ksyky ds f[kykQ eqdnek dk;e dj foospuk fd;s tkus dk vkns'k djus dk d`ik djsaA ,lMh vaxzsth viBuh; ,lMh lqesj 'kkD; ÁkFkhZ lqesj 'kkD; iq= LoxhZ; Jh eaxyh Álkn fuoklh xzke cgcyiqj Fkkuk fNcjkeÅ tuin dUukSt fnukad 06-11-2019- uksV%& eSa gs0 dka0 52 pUnzHkku xqIrk ;g Áekf.kr djrk gw¡ fd rgjhj dh udy esjs }kjk 'kCn o 'kCn cksy cksydj v{kj'k% dka0 433 jkgqy dqekj }kjk dEI;wVj ij fdrk djk;h x;hA** 5. Respondent No.4 is the son of the informant. The informant has died. Ramawati is the mother of the respondent No.4. Perusal of the impugned first information report shows that as per own allegation of the informant, his wife Ramwati, was daughter of one Sri Lal Sahai. Real uncle of Lal Sahai was Sri Chhiddan. It has been alleged that a forged adoption deed dated 05.12.1959 was executed by Sri Chhiddan in favour of the petitioner namely Govind @ Radhe Lal and on the basis of that adoption deed, a mutation order in Case No.339/09.09.1960 was passed by the Tehsildar, Chhibramau in respect of the disputed land belonging to Chiddan. Thus, admittedly as per FIR version, the disputed land was owned by Chhidan who adopted the petitioner by a registered adoption deed dated 05.12.1959. A copy of the registered adoption deed dated 05.12.1959 has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition which has not been disputed before us by the respondent No.4. The mother of the respondent No.4 neither succeeded the disputed land nor it has been alleged in the impugned first information report that she could succeed the disputed land. Thus, the allegation of the informant that the petitioner has fraudulently got his name mutated in the revenue records on the basis of the alleged adoption deed dated 05.12.1959, is totally baseless. In fact, the informant / respondent No.4 has abused the process of law by lodging the first information report. We are surprised that the concerned Judicial Magistrate has passed the order on application under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C. without due application of mind. 6. It shall not be out of place to mention that when the village was under consolidation, the wife of the informant namely Smt. Ramwati had filed an objection under Section 9A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 making a claim over the disputed property but she could not succeed. Thereafter, she filed a Revision No.550 (Ramwati vs. Govind @ Radhe Lal) under Section 48, which was dismissed by the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation, Farrukhabad vide order dated 22.06.1990. Thereafter, she filed a Revision No.550 (Ramwati vs. Govind @ Radhe Lal) under Section 48, which was dismissed by the court of Deputy Director of Consolidation, Farrukhabad vide order dated 22.06.1990. It further appears that the Consolidation Officer had passed an order dated 11.09.1986 in Case No.741 under Section 12 of the Act, 1953 against which the wife of the informant had filed an Appeal No.744 under Section 11(1) of the Act, which was dismissed vide order dated 22.09.1989 and against which she filed a Revision No.142/550 under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, which was dismissed by order dated 27.01.1993 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Farrukhabad. In the said order, it has been mentioned that a Case No.48/1960 was also filed in the court of Munsif, Kannauj in which a compromise was also filed and the petitioner was admitted as adopted son. 7. Thus, the dispute, if any, between the informant and the petitioner is purely of civil nature which has been attempted to be converted by the informant / respondent No.4 in a criminal case, which is not permissible as per settled law. 8. In the case of State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, Hon’ble Supreme Court has illustrated certain circumstances, in which FIR can be interfered with in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said illustrations crystallized by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and others (supra), are reproduced below: “(i) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (ii) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (iii) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (iv) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (vii) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 9. The principles of law laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal and others (supra) has been reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1918 (Para-23) and it has been held as under:- “Conclusions:- 23. The principles of law laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal and others (supra) has been reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1918 (Para-23) and it has been held as under:- “Conclusions:- 23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: (i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; (ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; (iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; (iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). (v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; (vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; (vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; (viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; (ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; (x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; (xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; (xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; (xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; (xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/ complaint; (xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; (xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. (xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.” 10. The allegations made by the informant in the impugned F.I.R. are absurd and the proceeding has been instituted maliciously to convert a purely civil or revenue dispute in proceeding under the criminal law. 11. In view of the aforesaid and respectfully following the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Bhajan Lal and others (supra) and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the impugned first information report No.0244/2021 dated 14.05.2021, P.S. Chhibramau, District Kannauj under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 I.P.C. lodged by the informant – respondent No.4 against the petitioner, cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed to secure the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court. 12. It is made clear that any observation made in the body of this order shall not adversely affect any civil or revenue proceedings pending today or which may be initiated by the respondent No.4. In other words, if the informant – respondent No.4 initiates any civil or revenue proceedings in accordance with law and as permissible under law, the same shall be decided by the competent court/ Authority in accordance with law, without being influenced by any of the observations made in the body of this order. 13. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed. The aforesaid impugned first information report is hereby quashed.