JUDGMENT 1. During the pendency of this appeal, appellant Govind Singh Yadav has expired and his LRs have been brought on record. 2. This first appeal is filed by the appellant (original defendant No.1) under section 96 of the C.P.C. challenging the judgment and decree dated 5.2.2010 passed in Civil Suit No.7-A/2007 by the First Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Panna. 3. The facts leading to the present appeal lie in a narrow compass. Suffice it to say that plaintiff (respondent No.1 herein) filed a suit for declaration, partition and possession claiming that the land of survey Nos.1771, 2552, 2553, 2554, 3293, 3295, 3297, 3298, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3304 total area 160.75 acre was a joint family property of the plaintiff & defendants No.1 to 5 (respondents No. 2 to 5 & appellant herein). The land of survey No.2553 area 0.2 acre, survey No.2552 area 0.10 acre and survey No.2554 area 0.18 acre was within Dham Mohalla, Panna, which was being used for cultivating vegetables and remaining land was agricultural land and was being used for agriculture purpose. On the land situated in Dham Mohalla, houses bearing Nos.526 and 530 were constructed by defendant Govind Singh Yadav, but that property was also of undivided parental property. Shankar Singh in his life time executed a gift-deed by which 25 acre of land Araji No.3302 was given to Dilip Singh (plaintiff) and 25 acre to Govind Singh (defendant No.1). In pursuance to the said gift-deed, the said land gifted to Dilip Singh and Govind Singh was mutated in the year 1970-71 and possession of the land was accordingly handed over to them. Since then the plaintiff and defendant No.1 have been cultivating the land and possessed the same. The government record was accordingly corrected showing the name of plaintiff and defendant No.1. Area measuring 16.91 out of the said land, got affected in the Ceiling and as such in the year 1970-71 the State Government was recorded as owner. The land measuring 3.48 hectare was sold to one Jagprasad in the year 1973-74 and land measuring 1.48 hectare was sold to one Hazari in the year 1973-74 by Shankar Singh and possession was also given to them. After this sale, only 6.595 hectare land was remaining out of survey No.3302 and the said land recorded in the name of Shankar Singh. After this sale, only 6.595 hectare land was remaining out of survey No.3302 and the said land recorded in the name of Shankar Singh. After Shankar Singh breathed his last, his remaining disputed land got recorded in the name of Rudra Singh in the year 1977-78. Rudra Singh died on 5.2.1979 then the land got jointly recorded in the name of plaintiff & defendants No.1 to 5 alongwith the name of wife of Rudra Singh namely Tarabai. Tarabai also died in the year 1991 and thereafter the disputed land recorded jointly in the name of plaintiff & defendants No.1 to 5 in government record. It is claimed that the land as also houses situated over the land, are undivided joint family property of the plaintiff & defendants No.1 to 5; no partition till date has taken place and at the time of death of Shankar Singh, total land was 23.389 hectare recorded in the name of plaintiff and defendants. Defendant No.1 Govind Singh being an elder son and head of the family was looking after the property and got power of attorney executed in his favour by other persons of the family. The power of attorney was executed by plaintiff on 11.8.1982 in favour of defendant No.1 in which all rights related to property were given to defendant No.1 including right of sale. The power of attorney also got executed by defendants No.2 to 5 in favour of defendant No.1 and out of the sale executed by defendant No.1 by virtue of power of attorney, the amount received got used by defendant No.1 for his personal use. The plaintiff raised objection about the selling of the joint family property by defendant No.1 then only he came to know that the sale was being executed in pursuance to power of attorney dated 11.08.1982, then the plaintiff got the said power of attorney cancelled on 4.5.2000 and defendant No.1 even then sold the property saying that those land belonging to the share of defendants No.1 to 5. Defendant No.1 executed total 120 sale-deeds and only land measuring 13.723 hectare remained and the land measuring 10.249 hectare was already sold. The plaintiff also executed sale-deed and sold the land to Taukir Ahmed and Mehboob Kabari. Defendant No.1 executed total 120 sale-deeds and only land measuring 13.723 hectare remained and the land measuring 10.249 hectare was already sold. The plaintiff also executed sale-deed and sold the land to Taukir Ahmed and Mehboob Kabari. The plaintiff filed a suit claiming his share to the extent of 2/5th share, as according to him, the land in dispute was a parental property and no partition took place between the plaintiff and defendants. The total land measuring 23.389 hectare was said to be disputed land out of which the plaintiff claiming his share 9.096 hectare, therefore, he claimed that he may be given 2/5th share in the property and as such he claimed partition and sought possession over the said land. During the trial, defendants No.2, 4, 5 and 6 were proceeded ex parte because despite notice they did not appear in the Court. Defendant No.1 filed written-statement and also counter claim. Defendant No.1 denied the fact that the land measuring 160.75 acre is parental property of Shankar Singh, but he claimed that said property was self-acquired of Shankar Singh. He also claimed that some of the portion has been constructed by him spending an amount of Rs.10 lac and in that property, the plaintiff has no right. He has also claimed that house No.526 is his exclusive property because same got acquired by him with the consensus of parties given by them before the Panchas. He has denied the averment made by the plaintiff that the power of attorney executed by the plaintiff in his favour and he was fully aware of the said fact whatever the land sold by him was in the knowledge of plaintiff and he has also denied that any proceeding for cancellation of power of attorney was ever initiated by the plaintiff. He has also stated that the saledeeds executed by him were never challenged and no proceeding initiated by the plaintiff for cancellation of those sale-deeds. He has also taken a stand that the suit is barred by time and the land sold by him was in the interest and benefit of the family to meet out their needs and the sale consideration received by him was utilized in the interest and catering the need of the family. The sale-deeds, according to him, are binding upon the plaintiff and also disputed that atpresent 13.723 hectare land existed on record and also on spot. The sale-deeds, according to him, are binding upon the plaintiff and also disputed that atpresent 13.723 hectare land existed on record and also on spot. He has also disputed that cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff in the month of May 2006, but claimed that suit is barred by time. Defendant No.3 filed a written-statement and also taken a stand that the disputed land was self-acquired property of Shankar Singh. It is also stated that defendant No.1 is owner of that property in which the plaintiff has no share. As per defendant No.3, after the death of Shankar Singh, his son Rudra Singh became exclusive owner of the said property out of which he sold some of the land on behalf of other legal heirs and money received out of the sale was used for the maintenance of joint family. The counter claim was answered by the plaintiff thereby denied the stand taken by defendant No.1 stating that the claim of defendant No.1 for declaration and permanent injunction was also not maintainable. 4. The trial Court after considering the pleadings of the parties, framed as many as 11 issues. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit in favour of plaintiff, found him entitled to get 7/18th share in the suit property and entitlement of the plaintiff was based upon the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum v. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and others [ (1978) 3 SCC 383 ]. Considering the finding of the trial Court and the arguments advanced by the parties, the core question emerges for determination is “as to whether the trial Court has properly determined the share of the plaintiff in pursuance to the finding saying that the said property was self-acquired property of Shankar Singh and under such circumstances distribution of share was to be done as per section 6 or section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?” 6. The trial Court after considering the pleadings and evidence led by the parties, in paragraphs 19 and 25 has given finding that the land in dispute was self-acquired property of Shankar Singh. In paragraph 20 of judgment, the trial Court has observed and given finding that entire disputed land is of Shankar Singh and there is no dispute in that regard. In paragraph 20 of judgment, the trial Court has observed and given finding that entire disputed land is of Shankar Singh and there is no dispute in that regard. Shankar Singh was the exclusive owner and Rudra Singh was the only legal heir of Shankar Singh and as such, he acquired the same under succession after the death of Shankar Singh. 7. Rudra Singh had two sons and four daughters and wife Tarabai, who died in the year 1991. For the purpose of convenience, genealogical tree is articulated hereinbelow;- Shankar Singh PW1/21 (Died 1977) (Trial Court/24) Rudra Singh (Died 5.2.1979) =Tara Bai (Died 1991) Govind Singh (D1) Dilip Singh (plff) Jeena (D2) Vijay (D3) Vandana (D4) Sushila (D5) Mohini (D3a) Mohita (D3b) Ashish (D3c) 8. The trial Court in paragraph 19 of its judgment has held that the suit property was self-acquired property of Shankar Singh. In paragraph 20, the trial Court has given finding that Govind Singh being head of the family maintaining the family and took care of purposes like education, marriage and maintenance of his sisters and family members. For maintaining the sisters and for their marriage, all arrangements were made after selling the land of their respective share. It is also mentioned that the plaintiff has also admitted about the power of attorney executed on 11.8.1982 in favour of the appellant namely Govind Singh. The said power of attorney got cancelled vide Ex.P/3 on 4.5.2000, but according to the appellant, he had no knowledge about the said cancellation. From the findings and observations made by the trial Court, there is nothing on record to indicate that the power of attorney executed by the plaintiff was fraudulent and the plaintiff had no knowledge about the same. As such, the plaintiff was bound by the action taken by defendant No.1 (present appellant) in pursuance to the power of attorney dated 11.8.1982. The plaintiff and defendant No.1 both have admitted the partition dated 14/15.8.1998 (Ex.D/1). It is also an admitted position according to the said partition they put in possession of the property. Ex.D/1 also contained the division of movable property. The plaintiff was held entitled to get 7/18th share in the land remaining as on 15.8.1998 of survey No.1771, 2552, 2553, 2554, 3293, 3295, 3297, 3298, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3304. It is also an admitted position according to the said partition they put in possession of the property. Ex.D/1 also contained the division of movable property. The plaintiff was held entitled to get 7/18th share in the land remaining as on 15.8.1998 of survey No.1771, 2552, 2553, 2554, 3293, 3295, 3297, 3298, 3299, 3301, 3302, 3304. He was also held entitled to get 7/18th share of 21 shops situated over land bearing survey No.2552, 2553, 2554 at Gandhi Chowki, Kacheri Road, Panna and further 7/18th share in house No.526 situated at Dham Mohalla, Panna. From perusal of the judgment passed by the trial Court, it is clear that the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff giving him share in the suit land in the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum (supra). 9. The appeal has been preferred by the appellant challenging the decree passed by the trial Court on the ground that the trial Court has committed an error while computing the share of the plaintiff as per section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for brevity “Act, 1956”) relying upon the decision in case of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum (supra), and according to the learned senior counsel for the appellant, section 6 relates to co-parcenary property, whereas finding in paragraphs 19 and 25 that the suit property was self-acquired property of Shankar Singh, thus, applying section 6 is against the settled legal position. 10. The learned senior counsel for the appellant submits that the trial Court on the one hand specifically observed in paragraphs 19 and 25 of the judgment that the property in question was self-acquired property of Shankar Singh but on the other hand computed the share of the plaintiff applying section 6 of the Act, 1956 which relates to co-parcenary property and as such share determined by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiff ought to have been computed by applying section 8 of the Act, 1956. 11. 11. Shri Ravish Agrawal, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits that after the death of Shankar Singh in 1977, his son Rudra Singh had inherited its estate under section 8 of the Act, 1956 to the exclusion of his sons and after the death of Rudra Singh in 1979, his widow; two sons and four daughters inherited the property under section 8 of the Act, 1956. Upon death of Tarabai w/o Rudra Singh her two sons and four daughters inherited her share under section 15(1)(a) of the Act, 1956 and accordingly share so computed would come 1/6th in favour of the plaintiff over the suit property as it has to be divided among two sons and four daughters. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon various decisions of the Supreme Court in re Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Kanpur, etc. etc. v. Chander Sen etc. AIR 1986 SC 1753 ; Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar AIR 1987 SC 558 ; Commissioner of Income Tax v. P.L. Karuppan Chettiar 1993 Supp.(1) SCC 580; Additional Commissioner of Income Tax v. M. Karthikeyan 1994 Supp.(2) SCC 112; Appropriate Authority (IT Deptt.) and others v. M. Arifulla and others (2002) 10 SCC 342 ; Chandrakanta and another v. Ashok Kumar and others (2002) 3 MPLJ 576 ; Hardeo Rai v. Sakuntala Devi and others 2008 (7) SCC 46 ; M. Yogendra and others v. Leelamma N. and others (2009) 15 SCC 184 ; Radha Bai v. Ram Narayan and Ors. in Civil Appeal No.5889/2009 on 22.11.2019 and M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal and others [ (2020) 11 SCC 103 ]. 12. Per contra, Shri Naveen Dubey, Advocate appearing for respondent No.1/plaintiff has opposed the submission made on behalf of the appellant and supported the impugned judgment passed by the trial Court contending that the trial Court did not commit any error in computing the share of the plaintiff over the suit property and further submits that in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma and Ors. [ 2021 (1) MPLJ 209 ] it is clear that the trial Court did not commit any error and the impugned judgment is well reasoned and needs no interference. 13. [ 2021 (1) MPLJ 209 ] it is clear that the trial Court did not commit any error and the impugned judgment is well reasoned and needs no interference. 13. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of the record, I am also of the opinion that the trial Court on the one hand has observed the status of the property as self-acquired property of Shankar Singh but on the other hand relied upon decision in the case of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum (supra), and computed the share as if the property in question is a co-parcenary property. Determination of the share by the trial Court as per section 6 of the Act, 1956 is not proper, whereas the same ought to have been computed as per section 8 of the Act, 1956. In self-acquired property since the grandson and granddaughter are excluded from heir in Class-1, therefore, the share in the property ought to have been determined among Class-1 heir. 14. The Supreme Court in the case of Radha Bai (supra), has very categorically laid down that in self-acquired property, Class-1 heir has only interest in the property but none-else. In the said case, the question was “the heirs mentioned in Class-1 of the Schedule are son, daughters etc. including the son of a predeceased son but does not include specifically the grandson, being, a son of a son living. Therefore, the short question, is, when the son as heir of Class-1 of the Schedule inherits the property, does he do so in his individual capacity or does he do so as karta of his own undivided family? In the said case, the genealogical tree was as under :-- Sukhdeo (Shahdeo) Expired in 1965 Janakram Son of Sukhdeo Expired in 1982 Pilaram Son of Sukhdeo Expired in 1967 Sonu Defendant No.4 Saheblal Expired in 1957 Laxmibai Expired in 1984(Wife) Radha Bai (Plaintiff (Daughter) Ram Narayan Defendant No.1 Jaya Narayan Defendant No.2 Rohit Kumar Defendant No.3 The facts of the said case were thus:- “3. The Appellant filed suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Class – First, Shakti – District Bilaspur being Civil Suit No.31/A of 1985 asserting that the land situated in Village Barra, Tehsil Shakti, more particularly described in Schedule A of the plaint, was owned and possessed by Sukhdeo Chhannahu son of Sardha Chhannahu. The Appellant filed suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Class – First, Shakti – District Bilaspur being Civil Suit No.31/A of 1985 asserting that the land situated in Village Barra, Tehsil Shakti, more particularly described in Schedule A of the plaint, was owned and possessed by Sukhdeo Chhannahu son of Sardha Chhannahu. Sukhdeo was a Hindu and governed by the Mitakshra Laws. The suit land came in the hands of Sukhdeo as ancestral property, in which Sukhdeo and his sons Janakram and Pilaram were having joint shares being coparceners. The appellant’s father Saheblal was the son of Janakram, who had another son by name Sonu (original defendant No. 4, who has died during the pendency of the present appeal). The appellant’s father Saheblal predeceased Janakram (his father) and Sukhdeo (his grandfather). He died in 1957, whereas Janakram died in 1982 and Sukhdeo, in 1965. Saheblal left behind Laxminbai, his wife and their daughter Radhabai (appellant/plaintiff). In this backdrop, the appellant asserted that she was entitled to a share in the suit property, claiming through her father Saheblal. The appellant’s mother had already expired in 1984 before filing of the suit in 1985. 4. It is the case of the appellant that after the death of her mother, the appellant came to village Barra and requested the Patwari of the village to mutate the land in her name. In response, she was told that the land had already been mutated in the name of Ram Narayan (defendant No.1), Jaya Narayan (defendant No. 2) and Rohit Kumar (defendant No.3) three sons of Sonu (deceased defendant No. 4), by virtue of the registered sale deed executed in their favour by Janakram on 21 st July, 1979. It was further revealed that after the demise of Sukhdeo in 1965, his two sons Janakram and Pilaram partitioned the suit property in or around the year 1967, as a result of which, the suit property came to the exclusive share of Janakram and he had become absolute owner thereof, on the basis of which right, he executed registered sale deed in favour of his three grandsons (sons of his son Sonu (now deceased) defendant Nos.1 to 3 respectively).” and then the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 has observed as under :-- “10. After analysing the factual matrix and the evidence on record, the High Court opined that the Appellate Court committed manifest error and misapplied the settled legal position. The High Court considered the matter in the following words : “8. The sole point which thus arises for determination in the Second Appeal is whether the suit property was held by Janak Ram in his own right to the exclusion of Pila Ram, and whether the rule of succession or the rule of survivorship shall apply. It has been pleaded in the plaint that three years after the death of Sukhdeo, a partition took place in which the suit properties had fallen to the share of Janak Ram. Once a partition of the coparcenary property takes place and the coparcener is put in exclusive possession of the property falling to his share to the exclusion of others he acquires an absolute right over the property. The plaintiff Radha Bai had a mere spes successionis and would have been entitled to a share by succession which would have opened only after the death of Janak Ram. In this view of the matter, since Janak Ram, prior to his death in 1982, had sold the suit lands to the defendants No.1 to 3 by executing a registered sale deed, the plaintiff Radha Bai could question the same only on the limited ground of fraud or being without consideration. During life time of Janak Ram, Radha Bai, being the daughter of a predeceased son Saheblal, had merely a spes successionis to the suit property and nothing more. There is no material on record to show that the defendant No.4 – Sonu had got the sale deed dated 21.7.1979 executed from Janak Ram perforce or without consideration. In this view of the matter, Janak Ram who, after partition, held the suit property to the exclusion of the other coparcener had an absolute right to sell it to the defendants No.1 to 3. Radha Bai, the plaintiff, having failed to prove that the sale deed was without consideration or was executed perforce could not challenge the said transaction on any ground. The evidence led by Radha Bai itself shows that she had full knowledge of the sale deed executed by Janak Ram in favour of defendants No.1 to 3. Radha Bai, the plaintiff, having failed to prove that the sale deed was without consideration or was executed perforce could not challenge the said transaction on any ground. The evidence led by Radha Bai itself shows that she had full knowledge of the sale deed executed by Janak Ram in favour of defendants No.1 to 3. Radha bai, the plaintiff, did not enter the witness box despite present in Court and having been asked to do so. In this view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the suit filed by Radha Bai must fail because the rule of succession applied to the facts of the case and succession would have opened only after the death of Janak Ram, who was the exclusive owner of the share received by him in partition with Pilaram. The substantial question No.1 is thus answered in negative that Janak Ram being the exclusive owner of the suit property, during his life time Radha Bai had acquired no right to the suit properties and to file a suit for partition and possession of the suit lands which had already been sold by Janak Ram during his life time by executing a sale deed in favour of defendants No.1 to 3. Question No.2 is answered that after death of Sukhdeo, there was a partition of coparcenary property in which Janak Ram had received the suit lands as his share and was therefore, the absolute owner of the suit property. In this view of the matter, rule of survivorship does not apply to the facts of the present case, since suit property, after partition, was held by Janak Ram in his own right and to the exclusion of the other coparcener. Thus, the suit property had, after partition effected between Janak Ram and Pila Ram, ceased to be ancestral property and was held by Janak Ram as exclusive owner thereof. The rule of succession would thus apply to the present case and succession would have opened only after the death of Janak Ram. Therefore, Radha Bai, who had a mere spes successionis could succeed only by proving that the sale deed executed by Janak Ram was without consideration or was got executed by defendant No.4 – Sonu perforce. Having failed to do so, the suit must fail. 9. Having answered both the substantial questions of law, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Therefore, Radha Bai, who had a mere spes successionis could succeed only by proving that the sale deed executed by Janak Ram was without consideration or was got executed by defendant No.4 – Sonu perforce. Having failed to do so, the suit must fail. 9. Having answered both the substantial questions of law, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated 22.1.2002 passed by Additional District Judge, Sakti, District Bilaspur in Civil Appeal No.5A/2001 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by Civil Judge, Class-II, Sakti dated 24.11.2000 in Civil Suit No.90- A/88 is affirmed. There shall be no order as to costs.”” Further, the Supreme Court in paragraphs 19 and 20 has finally observed as under :-- “19. Reverting to the factual matrix of the present case, it is noticed that Sukhdeo had inherited ancestral property and was alive till 1965. The father of appellant, Saheblal, predeceased him in 1957. Saheblal was the son of Janakram. Janakram died in 1982. During the life time of Janakram, in terms of section 6 of the 1956 Act, Saheblal could not have succeeded to the property as he could claim only through Janakram. Janakram, however, was alive till 1982. If Saheblal himself had no claim in his own rights, the question of appellant, being his daughter, succeeding to the property does not arise. 20. The consistent view of this Court, including of three Judge Bench, is that the grand son or grand daughter is clearly excluded from heirs in Class-I. Saheblal himself was grand son of Sukhdeo, who predeceased Sukhdeo. After the demise of Sukhdeo in 1965, therefore, the ancestral suit property could be and came to be partitioned between Janakram and Pilaram in 1967. As a result of that partition, the suit property came to the exclusive share of Janakram in his individual capacity. He could, therefore, legitimately dispose of the same in the manner he desired and which he did in favour of his grandsons (defendant Nos.1 to 3 respectively) vide registered sale deed dated 21st July, 1979. Neither the stated partition of 1967 nor the registered sale deed in favour of respondents (defendant Nos.1 to 3) dated 21st July, 1979 has been challenged. The relief sought in the suit as filed by the appellant/plaintiff is only for partition and awarding share to the appellant/plaintiff alongwith possession. Neither the stated partition of 1967 nor the registered sale deed in favour of respondents (defendant Nos.1 to 3) dated 21st July, 1979 has been challenged. The relief sought in the suit as filed by the appellant/plaintiff is only for partition and awarding share to the appellant/plaintiff alongwith possession. Suffice it to observe that, the granddaughter of Janakram (appellant herein) could not have claimed a higher right than the right of her father Saheblal.” 15. In the case of Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Kanpur v. Chander Sen (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under :-- “Under the Hindu Law the son would inherit the property of his father as karta of his own family. But the Hindu Succession Act has modified the rule of succession. The Act lays down the general rules of succession in the case of males. The first rule is that the property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of Chapter II and Class 1 of the Schedule provides that if there is a male heir of Class 1 then upon the heirs mentioned in Class 1 of the Schedule. In interpreting provisions of Act it is necessary to bear in mind the Preamble to the Hindu Succession Act. The Preamble states that it was an Act to amend and codify the law relating to intestate succession among Hindus. In view of the Preamble to the Act i.e., that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in Class 1 and only includes son and does not include son’s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by S.8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. If a contrary view is taken it would mean that though the son of a predeceased son and not the son of a son who is intended to be excluded under S. 8 to inherit, the latter would by applying the old Hindu Law get a right by birth of the said property contrary to the scheme outlined in S.8. Furthermore the Act makes it clear by S. 4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. Furthermore the Act makes it clear by S. 4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. It would be difficult to hold today that the property which devolved on a Hindu under S.8 of the Hindu Succession Act would be HUF in his hand vis-a-vis and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class 1 of Schedule under S.8 of the Hindu Succession Act cannot be ignored and must prevail. The preamble of the Act reiterates that the Act is, inter alia, to ‘amend’ the law. With that background the express language which excludes son’s son but included son of a predeceased son cannot be ignored.” 16. The view taken by the Supreme Court is very clear that the son would inherit the property of his father as karta of his own family and that becomes his individual property and if male Hindu dying intestate, it shall devolve according to the provision of Chapter II and Class 1 of the Schedule, according to which, if there is a male heir of Class 1, then upon the heirs mentioned in Class 1 of the Schedule. Class 1 of the Schedule reads as under :-- "Son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a pre-deceased son; daughter of a predeceased son; son of a pre-deceased daughter, daughter of a pre-deceased daughter; widow of a pre-deceased son; son of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son; widow of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son." It has been observed by the Supreme Court that if a property is self-acquired property, share in the said property would be of heirs of Class 1 equally. 17. Further in the case of Yudhishter (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that whenever the father gets a property from whatever source from the grandfather or from any other sources and also observed when son inherited the property in the situation contemplated by section 8, he does take it as a karta of his own undivided family but takes it in its individual capacity. 18. 18. In the case of P.L. Karuppan Chettiar (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that the properties inherited by the son has to be treated as his individual property and section 8 of Hindu Succession Act would apply for determining the share over the said property. 19. In the case of M. Karthikeyan (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that partition among father and sons followed by father’s death, in such circumstance, the share inherited by a son out of the father’s separate property becomes separate property of the son and not the property of joint family of the son and son’s son as per section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. 20. In the case of M. Yogendra (supra), the Supreme Court has dealt with the applicability of sections 6 and 8 of Hindu Succession Act and has observed that the share inherited by son even as a co-parcener, that shall be treated to be his separate property and in the said property, daughters and sons will take equal share being Class 1 heirs. 21. However, the trial Court misread the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum (supra), and applied the same in the case at hand treating the property in dispute as co-parcenary property. The case of Gurupad Khandappa Magdum (supra), deals with the co-parcenary property and application of section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, whereas in the present case, it was a finding given by the trial Court that the property in question was self-acquired property and therefore section 6 has no application but share in the said property would devolve according to section 8 of Hindu Succession Act that too among the heirs of Class 1 equally. The case of Vineeta Sharma (supra), on which counsel for the respondent has placed reliance, has no application in the case at hand for the reason that the Supreme Court in the said case has dealt with the scope of amendment of section 6 of the Act, 1956, which deals with the co-parcenary property and share of the daughter in the co-parcenary property, whereas, the facts of this case are altogether different as has been discussed hereinabove. 22. 22. In view of the above discussion, it is clear that the share of the parties in the suit property have been miscalculated by the trial Court wrongly applying the provisions of Hindu Law and Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Since it was a self-acquired property of Shankar Singh and after his death, the property was inherited by Rudra Singh alone, who was its sole owner. After the death of Rudra Singh, the suit property was inherited by his wife and children in equal share. Upon the death of his wife Tarabai, the property devolved upon her children. Thus, at best, the plaintiff can claim to get 1/6th share in the suit property and not 7/18th share as held by the trial Court. Since wife of Rudra Singh got the share in the property after the death of Rudra Singh and wife also died in the year 1991, therefore, her share would also devolve in her children. Accordingly, 1/6th share of each child of Rudra Singh has to be worked out. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is therefore defective, not computing the proper share of the plaintiff and as such the said decree is modified to the extent that instead 7/18th share, the plaintiff would be entitled to get 1/6th share in the suit property. 23. The decree be therefore modified to the above extent. 24. The first appeal is accordingly allowed to the above extent.