ORDER: 1. Both these writ petitions were heard together with the consent of all the learned counsels. 2. The prayer in W.P.No.10252 of 2019 is as follows: “….to issue a Writ or a direction more particularly one in the nature of the Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings of the 2nd respondent herein in R.C.No.703/Adm NII-1/2018-1, dated 20.11.2018, received by the petitioner on 30.04.2019, rejecting my case for appointing me as Lecturer in English in aided vacancy available in the 3rd respondent college and declare the same as illegal, arbitrary, un-constitutional, discrimination and violative of Art.14, 19 and 21 of Constitution of India and consequently direct the official respondents to appoint the petitioner as Lecturer in English in the available aided vacancy and pay all the consequential benefits and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 3. The prayer in W.P.No.10253 of 2019 is as follows: “….to issue a Writ or a direction more particularly one in the nature of the Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings of the 2nd respondent herein in R.C.NO.510/Adm.NII-1/2014, dated 30.01.2015, which was received by me on 26.06.2018, stating that it is not feasible to consider at present my case for absorption into aided post of Lecturer in Mathematics in aided vacancy available in the 3rd respondent college and declare the same as illegal, arbitrary, un-constitutional, discrimination and violative of Art.14, 19 and 21 of Constitution of India and consequently direct the official respondents to appoint the petitioner as Lecturer in Mathematics in the available aided vacancy and pay all the consequential benefits and pass such other order or orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 4. This Court has heard Sri G. Elisha, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Dasari Naveen, learned counsel appearing for the unofficial respondents and the learned Government Pleader for Higher Education for the official respondents. 5. Sri G. Elisha, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that as mentioned in W.P.No.10253 of 2019 the reason for passing the impugned order is the pendency of SLP before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. He submits that as the SLP is disposed of directing the State to consider the case of the petitioners, the petitioners case can be considered. 6. He submits that as the SLP is disposed of directing the State to consider the case of the petitioners, the petitioners case can be considered. 6. Sri Elisha points out that the submissions in both the cases are the same and the question of law and fact are common. The arguments were essentially advanced in W.P.No.10252 of 2019. Sri Elisha pointed out that the impugned order was passed refusing to consider the case of the petitioner for regularization / absorption into Grant-in- Aid. Learned counsel argued that the petitioners were fully qualified to hold the post. He submits that pursuant to a notification they were appointed. In the case of the petitioner in W.P.No.10252 of 2019, he submits that the petitioner was appointed in a part-time vacancy on 11.07.2005. Thereafter, she continued to render her services and an aided vacancy arose because of superannuation of Sujatha in January, 2006, therefore, the petitioner requested the State to consider her case. The unofficial respondents-management of the college supported the case of the petitioner, but the official respondents did not support the case. It is pointed out that the respondent’s college is a minority educational institution, which has certain privileges, and they had appointed the petitioner after following due process and by following the rules. Learned counsel drew the attention of this Court to the various documents filed and argued that the petitioner is qualified to be appointed; that the due process was followed and that similarly placed lecturers, who have gone to Court, were appointed in aided vacancies and the petitioner is also entitled to the said relief. It is also argued that there were number of orders were passed by the learned single Judges of this Court, wherein G.O.Ms.No.23 was considered and the appointments made thereunder were regularized and the lecturers so appointed were permitted to be absorbed in grant-in-aid posts. The various orders of the learned single Judges of this Court, which are filed along with written arguments, are highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioners starting from the order passed in W.P.No.20036 of 2003. All these orders are relied upon by the learned counsel to argue that the petitioner has been discriminated against and that she should also be given the appointment in the grant-in-aid. All these orders are relied upon by the learned counsel to argue that the petitioner has been discriminated against and that she should also be given the appointment in the grant-in-aid. The Staff Selection Committee that was constituted is, in the submission of the learned counsel, a duly constituted Staff Selection Committee, which has selected the petitioner. 7. In reply to this learned Government Pleader for Higher Education points out that the case of the petitioner was refused by a speaking order which contains at least 11 grounds on which petitioner’s case was negatived. He points out that the essential ground is that the appointment of the petitioner in 2005 is totally contrary to the law. Therefore, it is argued that she is not entitled to regularization. It is submitted that the appointment of the petitioner is contrary to G.O.Ms.No.23, dated 10.03.1999, G.O.Ms.No.29, dated 05.02.1985 and G.O.Ms.No.12, dated 10.01.1992 and also contrary to the Act 2 of 1994, which is passed by the State of Andhra Pradesh. Learned Government Pleader argues that the present cases are different from the other cases which are referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner and that in this case very specific and clear pleas were taken about the irregularity in the appointment made in the year 2005. In the earlier cases learned Government Pleader stated that the State had not raised many of the defenses that were raised in the present case and that, therefore, the said orders are not applicable to the facts of the present case. He points out that individual appointment orders which were issued and which are relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are issued in view of the cases pending pertaining to those lecturers and it is clearly mentioned that the order applies to the particular candidate only and shall not be treated as a precedent. Learned Government Pleader also relies upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reported in State of Rajasthan and Others v Dayalal and Others, (2011) 2 SCC 429 ; State of Bihar v Upendra Narayan Singh and Others, (2009) 5 SCC 65 and State of West Bengal v Subhas Kumar Chatterjee and Others, (2010) 11 SCC 694 . He draws the attention to Upendra Narayan Singh case (2 supra). 8. He draws the attention to Upendra Narayan Singh case (2 supra). 8. In fact, after hearing the learned counsels, this Court reopened the matter on the issue of initial appointment and heard the submissions of the learned counsels once again on this issue. In rejoinder Sri Elisha learned counsel for the petitioner reiterates what he had submitted earlier and argues that the initial appointment cannot be treated as an irregular or an illegal appointment and that the petitioner is, therefore, entitled to the relief in this case. 9. As stated earlier the crux of the issue raised by the learned Government Pleader for Higher Education in this case is about the initial appointment. The law on the subject is well settled. There are a great number of cases on the issue of absorption/regularization etc. In the case on hand learned Government Pleader essentially concentrated his submissions basing on the Upendra Narayan Singh case (2009) 5 SCC 65 supra). Paragraphs 55 to 60 of this judgment were relied upon by him. He points out that in that case also before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India the legality of the initial appointment was looked into by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. He points out that after considering the evidence introduced by both the parties the Supreme Court of India came to a conclusion that there is no “semblance of legitimacy” to the appointments of the respondents (para 60). Similarly, in paragraphs 65 and 66 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India again examined the issue of legality and the legitimacy of initial appointments. Ultimately, in paragraph 77 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held the mere fact that somebody else was given relief is not a ground to grant relief to any petitioner unless he establishes that he has a right entitling him to the relief. 10. Against this backdrop of this judgment the facts in this case are examined. 11. It is important to note that both parties agree that G.O.Ms.No.23 is applicable to the case. In fact, it is reiterated more than once and in paragraph 7 of the reply affidavit it is clearly stated that as per the said G.O.Ms.No.23, dated 10.03.1999, the management has the liberty to appoint both unaided lecturers. It is stated that the G.O. was followed scrupulously before the petitioner was appointed. 12. The appointment of the petitioner was on 05.12.2005. It is stated that the G.O. was followed scrupulously before the petitioner was appointed. 12. The appointment of the petitioner was on 05.12.2005. The minutes of the Staff Selection Committee of the respondent college are also filed as a material document. G.O.Ms.No.23 is also filed along with written arguments. The paragraph No.4 / Clause 4 of G.OMs.No.23 is as follows: “4) Staff Selection Committee: The appointment to the teaching and non-teaching posts in the institutions functioning under Minority Community managements shall be made with the candidates selected by the Staff Selection Committee constituted by the respective managements for the purpose. The candidates sponsored by the Employment Exchange alone shall be entertained for interview for selection by the Staff Selection Committee. If the Employment Exchange is unable to sponsor suitable candidates, the education; agency may make advertisements in the daily newspapers having wide circulation calling for applications from the candidates possessing requisite qualifications for appointment to various posts after subjecting them to interview and selection by the Staff Selection Committee and it is open for the educational agency to constitute staff selection committee in the liens prescribed by the Government for other private educational institutions or to adopt staff selection committee of their own choice with or without a Government representative, (however, there shall be a subject expert), in the latter case the management will not be eligible for financial aid from the Government. A bare perusal of this shows that there should be – (a) a Staff Selection Committee; (b) the candidates sponsored by employment exchange alone shall be considered for the interview; (c) if the employment exchange is unable to sponsor suitable candidate, the college should make an advertisement in two daily newspapers having wide circulation calling applications from applicants with requisite qualifications; (d) the candidates should be subjected to an interview and after verification of the qualifications they should be appointed. An exception is also given to the educational institutions to have the selection committee with or without a government expert. 13. If the appointment letters of the petitioners and available material is examined with reference to this G.O., it is clear that the petitioners are not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor were publications made in two leading newspapers as warranted. An exception is also given to the educational institutions to have the selection committee with or without a government expert. 13. If the appointment letters of the petitioners and available material is examined with reference to this G.O., it is clear that the petitioners are not sponsored by Employment Exchange nor were publications made in two leading newspapers as warranted. A reading of the minutes of the Staff Selection Committee in both the cases reveal that the Principal of the A.C. College, Guntur, has called for applications through “walk-in-interviews” to fill up the unaided posts”. Therefore, it is clear that neither of the two candidates was appointed pursuant to and in accordance with the procedure stipulated in G.O.Ms.No.23 dated 10.03.1999. 14. The next G.O. relied upon is G.O.Ms.No.29 dated 05.02.1987 also known as the AP Educational Institutions Rules, 1987. These rules are framed under A.P. Education Act and relates to establishment, administration and control of institutions of higher education. Clause 7 deals with the appointments. Particular relevance is Clause 7(b) which states that appointment of teaching staff shall be by way of recruitment through the A.P. College Service Commission or as per the procedure prescribed by the Government from time to time. 15. G.O.Ms.No.12, dated 10.01.1992 also prescribes the procedure for selection of lecturers, junior lecturers in private degree and junior colleges. This also prescribes the notification of vacancies through the Employment Exchange. An option is also given to recruit candidates after the lapse of 15 days without waiting for the Employment Exchange sponsorship to recruit candidates by notifying the vacancies in two local dailies. Rule of reservation is to be followed and selection procedure is also stipulated. 16. In addition to this, learned Government Pleader also relies upon the Act 2 of 1994 which came into force on 25.11.1993. He points out that this Act is applicable to the 4th respondent college and that in Section 4 there is a procedure prescribed for recruitment. He relies upon sub-clause 4 (a)(b)(c) to argue that – (a) the recruitment can only be made through the Public Service Commission/College Service Commission. (b) from a panel prepared by the Selection Committee for the purpose in accordance with the rules issued on the subject; and (c) if candidates are having necessary qualifications and are sponsored by the Employment Exchange. 17. (b) from a panel prepared by the Selection Committee for the purpose in accordance with the rules issued on the subject; and (c) if candidates are having necessary qualifications and are sponsored by the Employment Exchange. 17. He points out that this is only method by which an appointment could have been made. He also draws the attention to Section 7 of this Act, which clearly states that any persons who are appointed contrary to the procedure cannot be regularized. He also rightly argues that the vires of this Act were upheld by the Court. 18. This Court has to agree with the submissions of the learned Government Pleader for Higher Education that this was the prevailing rule position by the date of the appointments of the petitioners in the year December, 2005. 19. This Court also has to notice that despite the straight forward objection taken by the respondents about the irregular appointment no material is filed to show that the petitioners were “validly and properly appointed” in 2005. As pointed out both the petitioners were appointed on the same day by the same Committee. The proceedings dated 05.12.2005 issued in both the cases are identical. It is clear from the proceedings, dated 05.12.2005, that the applications were called for a “walk-in-interview” in both the cases. The order does not mention that there was a publication in local dailies nor were sponsorship invited through the Employment Exchange etc., as mentioned in various G.Os. It was also pointed out that subsequent to Act 2 of 1994 two other G.Os., were issued (G.O.Ms.No.328 dated 15.10.1997 and G.O.Ms.No.283, dated 03.11.1999). These prescribed a time bound method etc., for regularization as one-time measure by the Government. Ultimately, the time limits ceased after October, 1999. 20. In this view of the matter, this Court has to agree in this case with the submissions of the learned Government Pleader that the initial appointments itself are illegal. In the case of Dayalal case (1 supra) relied upon by the learned Government Pleader, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India condensed the case law on these issues in paragraph 12 of the judgment by considering all the leadings judgments passed till then including the judgment of the Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others vs. Umadevi and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 44 . It is clearly clarified in this judgment also in line with the earlier judgments also that unless and until the original appointment is a “regular recruitment” in accordance with “the relevant rules” in an “open competitive process” against “sanctioned posts”, the petitioners are not entitled to regularization etc. All these conditions must be simultaneously satisfied. In the case on hand, this Court finds that these four conditions are not satisfied. Once this Court finds that the initial’ appointment is irregular or improper, this Court cannot aid or assist the petitioners. In fact, in paragraph 12 (1) of the judgment mentioned above Hon’ble Supreme Court of India clearly held that the equality clause contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India should be scrupulously followed and Court should not issue directions for regulations of employees as that would be violative of the constitutional scheme. Paras 12 (1) to 12 (v) are an answer to the pleas raised. Backdoor entries and appointments contrary to the scheme cannot be regularized on the ground of sympathy, long service etc. The next judgment Subhas Kumar Chatterjee case (3 supra) cited by the learned Government Pleader for Higher Education is also applicable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India stated that in such circumstances a Mandamus cannot be granted to compel a state to act contrary to law. In fact, in Upendra Narayan singh case (2 supra) a very similar enquiry was conducted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and ultimately it was occluded that unless the petitioner establishes he has a right, he is not entitled to relief. 21. As far as the judgments of the single judges of this Court which are relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are concerned, it is clear that in those cases this sort of a defence and argument was not advanced. The first of these judgments in which G.O.Ms.No.23 was considered is W.P.No.9441 of 2005, where the learned single Judge essentially looked at the exemption provided in G.O.Ms.No.23 to a minority institution. He relied upon Clause–6 and Clause–8 of the said G.O. and held that (a) no prior permission is needed to seek appointment in unaided post and (b) that the absence of a Government representative in the Staff Selection Committee will not vitiate the proceedings. He relied upon Clause–6 and Clause–8 of the said G.O. and held that (a) no prior permission is needed to seek appointment in unaided post and (b) that the absence of a Government representative in the Staff Selection Committee will not vitiate the proceedings. The same was followed in W.P.No.20036 of 2003 and in a batch of cases W.P.No.7789 of 2012 and batch. In paragraph 14 the learned single Judge noticed that the sole objection taken by the respondent is that there was a ban on the recruitments. These orders were passed in view of the issues raised in those respective Writ Petitions and the defences raised. This Court does not find that in any of the judgments relied upon by the petitioners that the present defences were raised or considered. The case law relied upon by the learned Government Pleader is also not relied upon by the respondents, who appeared for the respondents before the other learned single Judges. The current defences based upon the individual G.Os., procedures not being followed etc, were also not argued. Therefore, this Court is of the opinion that those judgments cannot be treated as binding precedents for this court. The law is well settled that even a difference in one fact can make difference to the applicability of judgments (Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Others v State of Tamilnadu and Others, (2002) 3 SCC 533 ). Any judgment is an authoritative for what it decides the law and for not what follows is to well settled to be represented here again. The judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India are also the law of the land. This court is bound by them. The judgments in Upendra Narayan Singh case (2 supra) holds the field along with Daya Lal case (1 supra). 22. In view of the defence raised in this case, which are mentioned earlier and the case law that is now relied upon by the learned Government Pleader for Higher Education, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief. 23. Accordingly, both the Writ petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the Miscellaneous Applications, if any, pending shall also stand dismissed.