JUDGMENT : 1. With consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing. They have no complaint whatsoever about any audio and video quality. I.A. No.2725 of 2019: 2. The instant interlocutory application is under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 102 days in preferring the instant appeal. 3. This Court, after taking into consideration the reason assigned in the instant application as also considering the fact that instead of dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation it would be appropriate in the ends of justice to decide the appeal on its merit, accordingly, the delay of 102 days in filing the appeal, is condoned. 4. In the result, the instant interlocutory application is disposed of. L.P.A. No.235 of 2019: 5. The instant appeal preferred under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 23.08.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(L) No.2143 of 2012 whereby and whereunder the writ petition has been allowed by quashing and setting aside the order dated 28.02.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in B.S. Case No.01/2002 with a liberty upon the appellant-respondent to search out his remedies as provided under the law. 6. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition which require to be enumerated read as hereunder: The appellant-respondent was appointed as an Engineer (Design) in M/s Telco Limited and at the relevant point of time, he was a Deputy Manager in the Axle Division (Planning) of M/s Telco. The respondent/petitioner-company was constituted w.e.f 31.03.2000 and on the basis of an agreement, the ownership and the management of Axles Division of M/s Telco Limited alongwith services of all its employees including the appellant-respondent was transferred to the respondent/petitioner. The service conditions of the employees of Axles Division of M/s Telco Limited on their transfer to the respondent-petitioner remained undisturbed. The Management on transfer of services of its employees, started scrutinizing their performance and in course thereof, it was observed that the performance of the appellant-respondent was poor and his continuation in service would be detrimental to the interest of the Company due to his consistent low level of efficiency and therefore, the respondent/petitioner-company decided to separate his service as per the conditions of appointment mentioned in the appointment letter. The management vide letter no. HRD/Est/05299 dated 15.12.2001 informed the appellant-respondent that his service is no longer required and offered him three months? salary. The appellant-respondent was also requested to submit clearance certificate for other statutory dues. Another letter was issued on 20.12.2001 alongwith a cheque for an amount of Rs.59,762/- to be paid in favour of the appellant-respondent against three months’ salary. The appellant-respondent requested the management not to give effect to the said letter and sought permission to resign. He also returned the cheque with the endorsement that he would be resigning from the company w.e.f 15.03.2002 which was accepted by the petitioner-company. The appellant-respondent was informed about the acceptance of his letter of resignation on 07.01.2002 and was further advised to take his salary for the period from the date of his letter of resignation till 15.03.2002 and the appellant-respondent was accordingly paid an amount of Rs.59,762/- against the salary for the said period through cheque. The appellant-respondent made an application requesting inter alia for permission to stay in the quarter allotted to him beyond the period of his eligibility and vide letter dated 08.04.2002, he was permitted to stay in the quarter at an enhanced rate of rent and electricity charges for a period of three months. The appellant-respondent, thereafter, made a complaint under Bihar Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1953) alleging that his resignation letter was procured forcibly and against his will. The said case was registered as B.S. case No. 01/2002. The respondent/petitioner appeared before the Labour court and challenged the proceeding contending that the appellant-respondent is not an employee of the respondent/petitioner-company and as such the proceeding under the Act, 1953 is not maintainable. The learned Labour Court vide order dated 28.02.2012 held that the appellant-respondent had withdrawn the resignation before its acceptance and as such his termination is illegal and accordingly, direction was issued to reinstate the appellant-respondent in service with 50% back wages and consequential benefits. 7. The aforesaid award has been questioned before this Court by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the award dated 28.02.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in B.S. Case No.01/2002, which is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 8. Mr. 7. The aforesaid award has been questioned before this Court by filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the award dated 28.02.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in B.S. Case No.01/2002, which is the subject matter of the instant intra-court appeal. 8. Mr. Manish Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant-respondent submits that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact by holding the appellant-respondent not an employee within the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Act, 1953 basis upon which the writ petition has been allowed. It has further been submitted that the learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact that on coercion the appellant-respondent was asked to resign and when it was not accepted, he had been terminated, therefore, it is a clear cut case of unfair labour practice. 9. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Amit Kumar Das and Mrs. Rashmi Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent-petitioner submits that there is no error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge because the appellant-respondent has rightly not been considered to be an worker within the meaning of sub-section (I) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 and further even the management is not coming under the fold of establishment as per the definition under sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the Act, 1953 and taking into consideration these aspect of the matter, the learned Single Judge has rightly quashed and set aside the award dated 28.02.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in B.S. Case No.01/2002. 10. It has been submitted that the Labour court ought not have entertained the said reference on the ground that the appellant-respondent was not coming under the fold of employee within the meaning of Act, 1953. 11. This Court, before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, deem it fit and proper to refer certain admitted facts for better appreciation of the issue involved in this case. 11. This Court, before entering into the legality and propriety of the impugned order, deem it fit and proper to refer certain admitted facts for better appreciation of the issue involved in this case. When the service of the appellant-respondent was found to be not satisfactory, decision was taken for his termination from service in pursuance to the terms of offer of appointment which provides that the services of one or the other employees can be dispensed with after giving three months advance notice or in lieu thereof, salary for three months. The appellant-respondent was terminated on 15.12.2001 but he showed his wish before the management for his resignation, accordingly, he had tendered his resignation sent through registered post which was received by the management on 07.01.2002 with a request to recall the order of termination dated 15.12.2001. The management, accordingly, considered such desire of the appellant-respondent and cancelled the order of termination and accepted the resignation on 29.12.2001. The appellant-respondent filed an application under Section 26(2) of the Act, 1953 to set aside the order of termination and direct the management to reinstate the appellant-respondent with full back wages. The Labour court had interfered with the order of termination with a direction for his reinstatement with 50% back wages. 12. It is evident from the impugned order that the issue of merit of the dispute has not been raised rather only the issue of maintainability has been agitated and pressed before the learned Single Judge and on the basis of such submission, the learned writ Court has passed an order setting aside the award on the ground of its maintainability reserving liberty to the appellant-respondent to search out his remedies as provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, as such, learned counsel for the appellant-respondent has also insisted by making submission about the maintainability of the issue without going into the merit of the lis, therefore, this Court is not entering into the merit of the issue in view of the submission made on behalf of the appellant-respondent. 13. The submission has been made before the learned writ court on behalf of the management that the appellant-respondent was neither an employee as per the Act, 1953 nor the respondent-petitioner is an establishment as defined under the Act, 1953. 14. 13. The submission has been made before the learned writ court on behalf of the management that the appellant-respondent was neither an employee as per the Act, 1953 nor the respondent-petitioner is an establishment as defined under the Act, 1953. 14. On the contrary, the appellant-respondent has contended that at the time of termination he was doing clerical work in the management related to manufacturing of axles. This Court, in order to appreciate the issue of maintainability, deem it fit and proper to consider the definition of employee as defined under sub-section (4) of Section 2 of the Act, 1953, which read as under: “2. …… (4) “employee” means a person wholly or partially employed for hire, waged including salary, reward, or commission in and in connection with any establishment and includes ‘apprentice’ but does not include member of the employer’s family. It also includes person employed in a factory who are not worker within the meaning of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948), and for the purpose of proceeding under this Act, include an employee, who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched for any reason whatsoever.” It is evident from the definition of “employee” which means a person wholly or partially employed for hire, waged including salary, reward, or commission in and in connection with any establishment and includes ‘apprentice’ but does not include member of the employer’s family. It also includes person employed in a factory who are not worker within the meaning of the Factories Act, 1948, and for the purpose of proceeding under this Act, include an employee, who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched for any reason whatsoever. 15. The word “establishment” has been defined under sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the Act, 1953, which read as under: “2. ………. 15. The word “establishment” has been defined under sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the Act, 1953, which read as under: “2. ………. (6) “establishment” means an establishment which carries on any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to any business, trade or profession and includes – (i) administrative or clerical service appertaining to such establishment; (ii) a shop, restaurant, residential hotel, eating house, theatre or any place of public amusement or entertainment; and (iii) such other establishment as the State Government may, by notification, declare to be an establishment to which the Act applies; but does not include a ‘motor transport undertaking’ as defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (27 of 1961).” It is evident from the definition of “establishment” which means an establishment which carries on any business, trade or profession or any work in connection with, or incidental or ancillary to any business, trade or profession and includes – (i) administrative or clerical service appertaining to such establishment; (ii) a shop, restaurant, residential hotel, eating house, theatre or any place of public amusement or entertainment; and (iii) such other establishment as the State Government may, by notification, declare to be an establishment to which the Act applies; but does not include a ‘motor transport undertaking’ as defined in clause (g) of section 2 of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (27 of 1961). 16. Sub-Section (l) Section 2 of the factories Act, 1948 reads as under:- “2. ………. 16. Sub-Section (l) Section 2 of the factories Act, 1948 reads as under:- “2. ………. (l) ‘worker’ means a person employed, directly or by or through any agency including a contractor with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, whether for remuneration or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process but does not include any member of the armed forces of the Union.” It is evident from the definition of “worker” within the meaning of the Factories Act, 1948 which means a person employed, directly or by or through any agency including a contractor with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, whether for remuneration or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process but does not include any member of the armed forces of the Union. 17. This Court, after considering the aforesaid statutory provision, has gone across the nature of appointment of the appellant-respondent as per the document and evidence brought on record wherefrom it transpires that the appellant-respondent was working in Axle Division (Planning) as Deputy Manager and his wages was Rs.16,070/- per month and he was to work within the premises but applicant has stated that he doing clerical work which means that he was doing remote work in the company and was never in connection with manufacturing process and designated as Deputy Manager in the Planning Division who used to work with the planning of making axles. 18. It further appears that the labour court basis upon such documentary evidence, came to the conclusion holding therein that the applicant was not a workmen at the relevant time and thus, he was an employee within the meaning of the Act and as such the case of the applicant is maintainable. 19. 18. It further appears that the labour court basis upon such documentary evidence, came to the conclusion holding therein that the applicant was not a workmen at the relevant time and thus, he was an employee within the meaning of the Act and as such the case of the applicant is maintainable. 19. It further appears from the evidence which has been discussed by the labour court in the award wherein it has been reflected that the appellant-respondent was not doing the managerial work rather contention before the labour court was that he was doing work of planning of axles which was purely a clerical work. Further, it was also not the case of the petitioner-company that the appellant-respondent was engaged in the manufacturing process rather it was contended that the work of the appellant-respondent was connected with the manufacturing process, therefore, issuing which requires consideration is as to whether the work of the appellant-respondent was ‘incidental to’ or ‘connected with’ the manufacturing process. 20. The appellant-respondent has not come out with any cogent evidence substantiating the fact that he was not doing the work of planning and designing of the company rather he was doing clerical work and further he has not disclosed in his deposition as to what exact work he was doing. It would be evident from the deposition of one B.B. Singh who was examined as which reads as under: “3. Telco amongst others had an axle division in which axles for heavy vehicles used to be manufactured. The Planning Section in which the complainant was employed was to make planning for various products/components and axles on the basis of which axles were made/manufactured. The complainant was employed in the Axles Division of Telco Ltd. in making planning or production of axles which planning making work was the work of manufacturing process and or work connected with or incidental or manufacturing process or subject of manufacturing process. The place of work of the complainant was inside the factory of Telco Ltd. in the Planning Section of Axles division.” 21. The place of work of the complainant was inside the factory of Telco Ltd. in the Planning Section of Axles division.” 21. It further requires to refer herein that maintaining an application under the provision of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 the applicant has to establish that he is coming under the fold of definition of ‘employee’ but as we have found from the material available on record that the appellant-respondent was engaged in the Planning Division of HV Axles which comes under the fold of factory where the design of axles were made and subsequently the axles used to be manufactured. It further appears that the work of the appellant-respondent was connected with incidental manufacturing process because the manufacturing of axles cannot be done without planning of the same, therefore, the work of the appellant-respondent cannot be segregated from the manufacturing process, hence, if the appellant-respondent was doing clerical work, he falls under the definition of the ‘worker’ as the job was associated with the manufacturing of axles and admittedly he will not come under the fold of employee, therefore, application under Section 26(2) of the Act will not be maintainable. 22. The learned Single Judge has relied upon certain judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, i.e., M/s Rohtas Industries Ltd. vs. Shri Ramlakhan Singh and Ors., (1978) 2 SCC 140 wherein at paragraph-7 it has been laid down, which reads as under: “7. The respondent was not employed “in any manufacturing process or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process”. But the question for consideration is whether he was employed in “any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process or the subject of the manufacturing process”. This Court in State of U.P. v. M.P. Singh did not decide as to what was the precise meaning of the expression “subject of the manufacturing process” in Section 2 clause (l) of the Factories Act. We are called upon to decide this question in this appeal. Raw materials used in the manufacturing process for producing paper and its various products, undoubtedly, will be a “subject of the manufacturing process”, whatever else may or may not be such subject. If that be so, the respondent was engaged in a work which was connected with the subject of the manufacturing process. Raw materials used in the manufacturing process for producing paper and its various products, undoubtedly, will be a “subject of the manufacturing process”, whatever else may or may not be such subject. If that be so, the respondent was engaged in a work which was connected with the subject of the manufacturing process. And as we see the evidence discussed in the order of the Labour Court, there cannot be any doubt that he was working in the factory premises or its precincts in connection with the work of the subject of the manufacturing process namely, the raw materials. In our judgment, therefore, he was a factory worker within the meaning of clause (l) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948. Hence he was not an employee within the meaning of the Bihar Act and the petition of complaint filed by him under Section 26(2) was not maintainable.” Works Manager, Central Rly. Workshop, Jhansi vs. Vishwanath and Ors., (1969) 3 SCC 95 . At paragraph-11, the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold which reads as under: “11. The Factories Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law regulating labour in factories. It is probably true that all legislation in a welfare State is enacted with the object of promoting general welfare; but certain types of enactments are more responsive to some urgent social demands and also have more immediate and visible impact on social vices by operating more directly to achieve social reforms The enactments with which we are concerned, in our view, belong to this category and, therefore, demand an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the legislative purpose, without doing violence to the language. The definition of “worker” in the Factories Act, therefore, does not seem to us to exclude those employees who are entrusted solely with clerical duties, if they otherwise fall within the definition of the word “worker”. Keeping in view the duties and functions of the respondents as found by the learned Additional District Judge, we are unable to find anything legally wrong with the view taken by the High Court that they fall within the definition of the word “worker”. Keeping in view the duties and functions of the respondents as found by the learned Additional District Judge, we are unable to find anything legally wrong with the view taken by the High Court that they fall within the definition of the word “worker”. Deletion of the word “whatsoever” on which the appellant's counsel has placed reliance does not seem to make much difference because that word was, in our view, redundant.” Thus, the learned Single Judge considering all these aspects of the matter and putting reliance on the above judgments has quashed and set aside the award. 23. It is the settled position of law that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not required to interfere with the award which is based upon fact finding. Interference can be made if the award suffers from perversity of finding or has been passed having jurisdictional error as has been laid down in Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 477. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being reproduced hereinbelow: “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : ( AIR 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as hereunder in paragraph no.21: “With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as hereunder: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” In Thansingh Nathmal vs. Supdt. of Taxes, A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. vs. Krishna Kant Pandey, (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships, while discussing the scope of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference into the finding of the Tribunal, has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para-17 as hereinbelow: “17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath that the …...... power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and Others vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 has delved upon the issue about scope of issuance of writ of certiorari by the High Court and has laid down that, if the finding recorded by the court is erroneous and based upon perversity, the order is fit to be quashed/set aside. 24. Thus, it is evident from the proposition of law as has been settled in the judgments referred above followed by recent judgment in General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydra Electric Project, Orissa and Ors. vs. Giridhari Sahu and Ors., (2019) 10 SCC 695 wherein the award passed by the Tribunal affirmed by the High Court of Orissa has been reversed by going into the perversity of finding and as such, applying the aforesaid position of law, since we have come to conclusion that the appellant-respondent is not coming within the employee to maintain an application under Section 26(2) of the Act, therefore, acceptance of such application by the Tribunal is held to be without jurisdiction and if in such circumstances the learned Single Judge has reversed the award, the same according to our view, cannot be said to suffer from any error. 25. Accordingly, the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference, as such, deserves to be dismissed. In the result, the instant appeal stands dismissed.