JUDGMENT : 1. With consent of the parties, hearing of the matter has been done through video conferencing and there is no complaint whatsoever regarding audio and visual quality. 2. This instant intra-court appeal under Clause 10 of the letters patent, is directed against the order/judgment dated 27.03.2019 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.5233 of 2004, whereby and whereunder the writ Court has refused to interfere with the original order dated 29.09.1999 and the appellate order dated 11.09.2003 whereby the punishment of censure has been inflicted upon the writ petitioner. 3. The brief fact of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition, which requires to be enumerated, reads hereunder as: The writ petitioner was appointed under the respondent management and working from one place to another. He was transferred to Topa Colliery of CCL where he took charge on 17.07.1992 and working as such, he was proceeded departmentally by issuing memorandum of charge levelling allegation of huge shortage of coal at Topa Colliery which was existing there even from April 1992 i.e. prior to joining of the writ petitioner at Topa Colliery. The writ petitioner had appeared before the enquiry officer and denied the charges. The enquiry officer submitted its report finding three charges not proved, however, the Charge No.4 was partially proved. The aforesaid enquiry report was forwarded before the disciplinary authority and after following due procedure, vide order dated 29.09.1999 the punishment of censure was inflicted upon the writ petitioner. The aforesaid order was assailed before the appellate authority but the said appeal was dismissed vide order dated 11.09.2003. The writ petitioner has approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.5233 of 2004 challenging both the orders passed by the original authority vide order dated 29.09.1999 and the order dated 11.09.2003 passed by the appellate authority. The learned Single Judge of this Court, on contest, has dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the censure being a minor punishment, has been imposed after following due procedure which is the subject matter of the instant intra-Court appeal. 4. Mr. The learned Single Judge of this Court, on contest, has dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the censure being a minor punishment, has been imposed after following due procedure which is the subject matter of the instant intra-Court appeal. 4. Mr. Deepak Kumar Sinha, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that the enquiry officer has not found three charges proved against the writ petitioner and only the Charge No.4 has been proved partially for which the punishment of censure has been imposed, which should not have been imposed because there is no laches on the part of the writ petitioner and therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be set aside. His further submission before this Court is that; it is evident from the finding recorded by the enquiry officer that apart from the writ petitioner, the allegation of irregularity has also been found to be against other officials but no departmental proceeding has been initiated against them and therefore, imposing punishment against the writ petitioner is nothing but a discriminatory attitude of the respondents and to buttress his argument, he has relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajendra Yadav vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2013) 3 SCC 73 . 5. Mr. Amit Kr. Sinha, learned counsel for the respondents-CCL and Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents-CIL have appeared and defended the order passed by the learned Single Judge. They have submitted that there is no infirmity in the impugned order as in the departmental proceeding, the writ Court is required to look into the procedural issue and the observance of the principles of natural justice and when the learned Single Judge is satisfied on this ground, has rightly not interfered with the impugned orders and therefore, there is no error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. This Court, before going through the order passed by the administrative authority in the capacity of disciplinary authority and the order passed by the learned Single Judge, deem it fit and proper to refer about the scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the scope of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has considered the same in the case of Union of India and Ors. vs. P. Gunasekaran reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 wherein at paragraph 13 thereof, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision which reads hereunder as: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. reported in (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has been laid down therein that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali reported in AIR (2017) SC 200, wherein the following guidelines have been laid down, showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, the same extract of para 8 thereof, is referred hereinbelow: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [ (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (LandS) 80: (1996) 32 ATC 44] : ( AIR 1996 SC 484 ) ; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [ (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (LandS) 1806] : ( AIR 1997 SC 3387 ) ; Bank of India v. Degala Suryanar-ayana [ (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999 SCC (LandS) 1036] : ( AIR 1999 SC 2407 ) and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil. ( AIR 2000 SC 22 )". In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 : ( AIR 2015 SC 545 , Para 13), this Court held as follows: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 : ( AIR 2015 SC 545 , Para 13), this Court held as follows: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re- appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; 13.(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." Thus, it is evident that the law has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to the scope of judicial review to be exercised by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as per the guidelines formulated as referred hereinabove. As such, we have proceeded to examine the factual aspects on the basis of the aforesaid proposition of law to look into as to whether the order passed by the disciplinary authority have to be interfered with or not, on the basis of principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is evident that altogether following four charges have been levelled against the petitioner: (i) The delinquent did not ensure proper takeover of charge of coal stock when he had taken over the charge of Topa Project on 17.07.1992. (ii) During his tenure as Project Officer at Topa Colliery, there was an over reporting of U/G production by 74105 Ton. It was found during the proceeding of enquiry that the alleged quantity of over reporting was only 67215 Ton. (iii) That while working as Project Officer at Topa Colliery a shortage of 83482 Ton was generated for which the delinquent employee is responsible. (iv)(a) The delinquent did not take any step to stop over- reporting of coal production and instead continued to over report the production himself, during his tenure as Project Officer. (b) That he connived with the members of Coal India Limited and influenced the lower level officials of the colliery to get the coal stock measured in such a way that the shortages found were within 5% of the book stocks both as on 01.04.1993 and 01.04.1994. It is evident from the enquiry report that the Charge Nos. 1 to 3 have not been found proved. However, Charge No.4 has been found to be proved in part. 7. Thus, it is evident that the writ petitioner has been provided with the opportunity of hearing before the enquiry officer and when the enquiry report was forwarded before the disciplinary authority, even there the opportunity was provided and the disciplinary authority has not found the reply satisfactory and therefore, imposed the punishment of censure. 7. Thus, it is evident that the writ petitioner has been provided with the opportunity of hearing before the enquiry officer and when the enquiry report was forwarded before the disciplinary authority, even there the opportunity was provided and the disciplinary authority has not found the reply satisfactory and therefore, imposed the punishment of censure. Admittedly, the punishment of censure is minor under the discipline of appeal rule applicable to the writ petitioner. The order passed by the original authority has been questioned before the appellate authority but the appeal has also been dismissed. Thus, none of the ground as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court showing interference with the finding given by the administrative authority, as per the judgment, is available in the instant case, and in such circumstances the decision by which the writ petition has been dismissed, according to our considered view, cannot be said to suffer from an error. However, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended about the applicability of parity in punishment with co-delinquent and has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajendra Yadav vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2013) 3 SCC 73 wherein at paragraph-9, it has been held as under: “9. The doctrine of equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of co-delinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The disciplinary authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate i.e. lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences.” (emphasis supplied) 8. We have considered the aforesaid judgment and found from the factual aspects involved therein that they are not the delinquent employees and as such, there is no question of parity in punishment since no punishment has been awarded against them being not departmentally proceeded. Therefore, the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner is not applicable in this case. 9. Therefore, the judgment relied by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner is not applicable in this case. 9. In view of the entirety of the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge, does not require any interference. 10. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.