ORDER: The petitioner challenges the award dated 14.07.2021 in Case No.21C/IFC/2018/5318 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council / 2nd respondent directing the petitioner to pay principal amount of Rs.84,45,275/- with interest to 7th respondent herein on the ground that principles of natural justice are violated inasmuch as the 2nd respondent Council declined to receive the statement of defence of the writ petitioner and thereby the petitioner is severely prejudiced. 2. The petitioner’s case succinctly is thus : The petitioner Corporation is a nodal agency working under the aegis of Education, Minorities, B.C. Welfare and Social Welfare Department and engaged in construction and procurement of infrastructure etc., for its user departments. In that process, the petitioner short-listed the 7th respondent for supply of furniture items to various Government Polytechnic Colleges in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Agreements were entered into by the petitioner with 7th respondent. While so, the 7th respondent approached the 2nd respondent Council under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (for short ‘MSMED Act’) for conciliation and arbitration in respect of the payment of its dues. Conciliation proceedings failed and arbitration proceedings were taken up and held before the 2nd respondent on 29.09.2020, 23.03.2021 and 22.06.2021. As per Section 18 of the MSMED Act, the petitioner received notices both in conciliation as well as arbitration proceedings. However, due to bona fide mistake, it could not make appearance in the conciliation proceedings, but appeared in the arbitration proceedings on aforesaid three dates, the arbitration proceedings were listed before the 2nd respondent for filing defence statement. The petitioner entered appearance on 07.06.2021 through its Standing Council Sri G.V.S. Kishore Kumar and filed memo seeking time for submitting the defence statement. When the matter came up for hearing on 22.06.2021, the petitioner filed its defence statement before the 2nd respondent. However, the 7th respondent as well as 2nd respondent refused to receive the defence statement without any plausible reason and ultimately the impugned award came to be passed on 14.07.2021. The petitioner has strong case inasmuch as, the amounts claimed in claim statement by the 7th respondent are not owed by the petitioner. The 2nd respondent ought to have perused the defence statement for better appreciation of the facts. Hence, the writ petition. 3. The 7th respondent filed counter opposing the writ petition. The petitioner has strong case inasmuch as, the amounts claimed in claim statement by the 7th respondent are not owed by the petitioner. The 2nd respondent ought to have perused the defence statement for better appreciation of the facts. Hence, the writ petition. 3. The 7th respondent filed counter opposing the writ petition. Its main contention is that despite the supply of furniture as ordered, the writ petitioner did not make payments. Hence, the 7th respondent filed claim on 14.11.2018 before 2nd respondent for realization of the due amount with interest. While things stood thus, the Chief Engineer, APEWIDC given completion certificate dated 14.12.2018 stating that the supplies were completed and bills of Rs.3,36,26,880/- have to be paid. The 2nd respondent has taken up the claim of 7th respondent for conciliation after giving notices to both parties on 10.01.2020, 31.01.2020 and 28.02.2020. However, the petitioner failed to attend meetings despite receiving notices. On the aforesaid dates of meetings, the 2nd respondent directed the petitioner to file defence statement and also to pay its share of arbitration fee. However, there was no response from the petitioner and therefore, the 2nd respondent was constrained to note that the conciliation failed and posted the matter for arbitration under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act. (a) Arbitration was held on 29.09.2020. On that day, the petitioner remained absent and did not file the statement either. After that notices were issued to both the parties, the matter was again taken on 18.02.2021 and on that day also the petitioner was absent. The 7th respondent filed details of the payment received from the petitioner and meeting was postponed to 23.02.2021. On that day, the petitioner was present represented by D. Shiva Prasad, In-charge Executive Engineer. However, the statement of defence was not filed. Again the 2nd respondent issued notice dated 19.05.2021 for holding meeting on 15.06.2021. However, the said meeting was postponed to 22.06.2021 in view of the extension of curfew upto 20.06.2021 by Andhra Pradesh State Government. (b) Thereafter the last arbitration meeting took place on 22.06.2021 and on that day the statement of defence was submitted but the Council opined that sufficient time was already given to the writ petitioner for submission of records, but still they were seeking time for extension repeatedly and hence, the case was to be closed basing on the evidence before the Council. Thereafter the Council has thoroughly examined the proceedings of the case and passed the award. From the aforesaid proceedings, it is clear that despite giving ample opportunity, the petitioner has not filed statement of defence. The 2nd respondent has passed a reasoned order for not accepting the statement of defence and refusing to allow further time. Hence, the petitioner has no case on facts. (c) It is further contended that as against the impugned award, there is an efficacious and alternative remedy available to the petitioner under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Arbitration Act, 1996’) r/w Section 19 of the MSMED Act. Hence, the writ petition is not maintainable. He thus prayed to dismiss the writ petition. 4. Heard Sri G.V.S. Kishore Kumar, learned counsel for petitioner, and Sri Ramachandra Rao Gurram, learned counsel for the 7th respondent. 5. Severely fulminating the award, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner could not file its defence statement within the time granted by 2nd respondent in view of COVID-19 pandemic, but however, he filed the defence statement on 22.06.2021 to which date the arbitration proceedings were posted. However, the Council refused to receive the defence statement on the sole ground that the claimant/7th respondent objected on the pretext that the arbitration proceedings should be completed within 90 days and already an enormous delay was occurred in the matter. Learned counsel argued that 2nd respondent was carried away by the submission of 7th respondent and passed the award accepting his claim. In the process severe injustice was done to the writ petitioner inasmuch as, in the defence statement, the writ petitioner took a strong plea that it did not owe any amount to 7th respondent as claimed in its claim statement. The writ petitioner has furnished the details of the furniture supplied district-wise by 7th respondent and the amounts already paid to him. If the defence statement of the writ petitioner was taken into consideration by the Council in right perspective, it would not have approved the claim of the 7th respondent. He thus prayed to allow the writ petition. The writ petitioner has furnished the details of the furniture supplied district-wise by 7th respondent and the amounts already paid to him. If the defence statement of the writ petitioner was taken into consideration by the Council in right perspective, it would not have approved the claim of the 7th respondent. He thus prayed to allow the writ petition. Nextly, he argued that availability of alternative remedy under Section 19 of the MSMED Act is not a bar to entertain the writ petition because of violation of principles of natural justice being occasioned in this case as the statement of defence of the petitioner was not at all considered by the Council and his statement contains crucial pleas which would establish that the petitioner did not owe any amount to respondent No.7. He relied on Magadh Sugar & Energy Limited v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC Online SC 801. 6. Per contra, Sri Ramachanra Rao Gurram, learned counsel for 7th respondent, argued that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limini, for, the same is not maintainable in view of the availability of efficacious and alternative remedy to the petitioner under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 r/w Section 19 of the MSMED Act. On this aspect, he placed reliance on SBP & Co v. Patel Engineering Limited, (2005) 8 SCC 618 . He further argued that the Council has given sufficient time to the petitioner to file the statement of defence, but the petitioner did not avail the opportunity and therefore, the Council was constrained to foreclose the defence and passed the award. He thus contended that the petitioner has no case on either facts or in law. 7. On perusal of the facts and consideration of rival submissions of learned counsel, the point that arises for consideration is: Whether the plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India can be exercised to set aside the award passed by 2nd respondent Council under the provisions of the MSMED Act r/w the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996? 8. Point: As can be seen, with a view to facilitate promotion and development and enhancing competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises in the country, the Parliament has enacted the MSMED Act. 8. Point: As can be seen, with a view to facilitate promotion and development and enhancing competitiveness of micro, small and medium enterprises in the country, the Parliament has enacted the MSMED Act. As per Section 7 of the said Act, an enterprise engaged in the manufacture or production of goods pertaining to any industry specified in the First Schedule to the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 is classified as a micro enterprise where the investment in plant and machinery does not exceed Rs.25.00 lakh; a small enterprise where the investment exceeds Rs.25.00 lakhs but does not exceed Rs.5.00 Crore; and as medium enterprise where the investment is more than Rs.5.00 Crore but does not exceed Rs.10.00 Crores. Similarly, in case of an enterprise engaged in providing or rendering services, the classification is such that a micro enterprise is one where the investment in equipment does not exceed Rs.10.00 lakhs, a small enterprise where the investment in equipment is more than Rs.10.00 lakhs but does not exceed Rs.2.00 Crore; and a medium enterprise where the investment in equipment is more than Rs.2.00 Crore but does not exceed Rs.5.00 Crore. (a) Be that it may, Section 3 of the MSMED Act lays down that the Central Government by notification establishes a Board called as National Board for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises for the purpose of this Act. As per Section 5, the Board shall perform functions such as examining the factors affecting the promotion and development of micro, small and medium enterprises and review the policies and programs of the Central Government in regard to facilitating the promotion and development and enhancing the competitiveness of such enterprises and the impact thereof on such enterprises. The Board also make recommendations on various matters referred to it by the Central Government. It also advises the Central Government on the use of Fund constituted under Section 12. This is precisely about the objectives and scheme of the MSMED Act. (b) Be that it may, Sections 15 to 19 of the MSMED Act are germane for the purpose of our case. Chapter V of the MSMED Act deals with delayed payments to micro and small enterprises. This is precisely about the objectives and scheme of the MSMED Act. (b) Be that it may, Sections 15 to 19 of the MSMED Act are germane for the purpose of our case. Chapter V of the MSMED Act deals with delayed payments to micro and small enterprises. Section 15 says that where any supplier supplies any goods or renders any services to any buyer, the buyer shall make the payment on or before the date agreed upon between them or where there is no such agreement, before the appointed day (which means immediately after expiry of 15 days from the date of acceptance). Provided that in no case the period agreed upon shall exceed 45 days from the date of acceptance or deemed acceptance. Section 16 lays down that when the buyer fails to make payment as stipulated in Section 15, the buyer will be liable to pay compound interest with monthly rests to the supplier on the due amount from the appointed day. (c) Then Section 18 (1) says that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any party to a dispute may, with regard to any amount due under Section 17, make a reference to the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (for short, ‘the Council’). Section 18(2) says that on receipt of reference, the Council shall either itself conduct conciliation or seek the assistance of any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services by making a reference to such an institution, in which case the provisions of Sections 65 to 81 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply as if the conciliation was initiated under Part III of said Act. Section 18(3) lays down that where conciliation was not successful and terminated without any settlement between the parties, the Council shall either itself take up the dispute for arbitration or refer it to any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall then apply to the dispute as if the arbitration was conducted pursuant to an arbitration agreement as per Section 7(1) of the said Act. Sub-section (4) deals with the jurisdiction of the Council. Sub-section (5) says that the reference shall be decided within a period of 90 days from the date of such reference. Sub-section (4) deals with the jurisdiction of the Council. Sub-section (5) says that the reference shall be decided within a period of 90 days from the date of such reference. (d) Then Section 19 speaks about the provision for appeal and prerequisite of deposit of amount. It says that no application for setting aside decree, award or order made by the Council or any institution or Centre to which reference is made shall be entertained by any Court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) deposited with it 75% of the amount in terms of the decree, award or order. Provided, pending disposal of the said application, the Court shall order that such percentage of the amount deposited shall be paid to the supplier as it considers reasonable under the circumstance of the case. (e) Thus, a close scrutiny of Sections 18 & 19 of the MSMED Act would tell us that they are intertwined with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since Section 18(3) lays down that the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply to the dispute referred for arbitration to the Council or to any institution or Centre as if the said arbitration was referred pursuant to an arbitration agreement in terms of Section 7(1) of that Act, it can be inferred from Section 18(3) that the application filed under Section 19 to set aside decree, award or other order passed by the Council or the institution shall have to be dealt with under Sections 34 or 37, as the case may be, of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is in this context, the contention of respondent No.7 that the alternative remedy provided under Section 19 of the MSMED Act read with Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 creates an embargo on the plenary jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be examined. (f) The law on the application of writ jurisdiction against the arbitration proceedings is no more res integra as we have a thicket of decisions. One of which was rendered in SBP & Co. case (supra). A Seven Judge Bench of the Apex Court was confronted with the question as to what is the nature of function of Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 – whether purely an administrative function or judicial or quasi-judicial. One of which was rendered in SBP & Co. case (supra). A Seven Judge Bench of the Apex Court was confronted with the question as to what is the nature of function of Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 – whether purely an administrative function or judicial or quasi-judicial. The majority view was that the proceeding under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 before the Chief Justice is a judicial proceeding. It is in that context, the Apex Court happened to discuss about the plenary jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution in respect of the award or order passed by the Arbitral Tribunals. It was held thus: “45. It is seen that some High Courts have proceeded on the basis that any order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during arbitration, would be capable of being challenged under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. We see no warrant for such an approach. Section 37 makes certain orders of the Arbitral Tribunal appealable. Under Section 34, the aggrieved party has an avenue for ventilating its grievances against the award including any in-between orders that might have been passed by the Arbitral Tribunal acting under Section 16 of the Act. The party aggrieved by any order of the Arbitral Tribunal, unless has a right of appeal under Section 37 of the Act, has to wait until the award is passed by the Tribunal. This appears to be the scheme of the Act. The Arbitral Tribunal is, after all, a creature of a contract between the parties, the arbitration agreement, even though, if the occasion arises, the Chief Justice may constitute it based on the contract between the parties. But that would not alter the status of the Arbitral Tribunal. It will still be a forum chosen by the parties by agreement. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible. 46. We, therefore, disapprove of the stand adopted by some of the High Courts that any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is capable of being corrected by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. Such an intervention by the High Courts is not permissible. 46. The object of minimising judicial intervention while the matter is in the process of being arbitrated upon, will certainly be defeated if the High Court could be approached under Article 227 or under Article 226 of the Constitution against every order made by the Arbitral Tribunal. Therefore, it is necessary to indicate that once the arbitration has commenced in the Arbitral Tribunal, parties have to wait until the award is pronounced unless, of course, a right of appeal is available to them under Section 37 of the Act even at an earlier stage.” Thus, the Apex Court in clear tone reiterated that exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227, as the case may be, against the awards or orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunals would defeat the object of minimizing the judicial intervention in the arbitration process. (g) The above decision was relied upon by the Apex Court in its subsequent judgment in Sterling Industries v. Jayprakash Associates Ltd., MANU/SC/1229/2019 = AIR 2019 SC 3558 and held that writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable in the High Court as against an order of learned District Judge passed under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 read with Section 19 of the MSMED Act. The said application was made to District Judge against a partial award made under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Since interim orders of the Council were not appealable before the District Judge in view of the judgment in SBP & Co. case (supra), the Apex Court held that consequently, the writ petition is also not maintainable against the order of the District Judge. (h) In Ballapur Industries Limited v. Andhra Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, MANU/AP/2738/2014 = 2015 (2) ARBLR 203 (AP), the writ petitioners challenged the awards passed by the Council under the MSMED Act. case (supra), the Apex Court held that consequently, the writ petition is also not maintainable against the order of the District Judge. (h) In Ballapur Industries Limited v. Andhra Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, MANU/AP/2738/2014 = 2015 (2) ARBLR 203 (AP), the writ petitioners challenged the awards passed by the Council under the MSMED Act. They argued that though appeal is provided in terms of Section 19 of the MSMED Act read with Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, however, the grounds raised by them are of serious nature which would go to the root of the matter i.e., with regard to the jurisdiction of the Council and therefore, writs can be entertained. Negativing their plea, learned single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh held as follows: “16. In these cases, the petitioner ought to have availed the remedy of appeal under the Arbitration Act, if the petitioner had any grievance with regard to the awards passed against it by the Council. But the petitioner filed the present writ petitions on the plea that the grounds raised in the writ petitions challenging the award go to the root of the matter. Even if the grounds raised against the award go to the root of the matter, the provisions of the Arbitration Act are self-contained and deal with all situations in relation to arbitration proceedings (emphasis supplied). When a self-contained statute is available in a particular situation as an alternate remedy, invocation of extraordinary jurisdiction of this court cannot be encouraged and accordingly the present writ petitions are not maintainable. In view of this, these writ petitions challenging the awards of the Council passed in Case Nos.80, 81, 82 and 83 of 2003, dated 07.11.2009 are dismissed. However, the petitioner is given liberty to avail the remedy of appeal, if it is so advised, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” (i) In Gulf Oil Corporation (New GOCL), rep. by its Managing Director v. A.P. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, rep. However, the petitioner is given liberty to avail the remedy of appeal, if it is so advised, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.” (i) In Gulf Oil Corporation (New GOCL), rep. by its Managing Director v. A.P. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, rep. by its Chairman/Commissioner of Industries, 2020 SCC Online AP 9 = (2020) 6 ALT 116, a learned Judge of the High Court of A.P. has dealt with the question whether the High Court can exercise power under Article 226 to set aside the award passed by the Council under MSMED Act. Referring to several decisions, he observed thus: 37. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that a conciliator cannot act as an arbitrator, in view of Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and this view is fortified by several judgments referred supra, but still, the judgment of Full Bench of the Apex Court in Sterling Industries v. Jayprakash Associates Limited (referred supra) is binding and such lacking power or violation of any of the provisions of Arbitration Act can also be decided by a competent court in an application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act or under Section 19 of MSMED Act. If, the authorities under Section 19 of MSMED Act or under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act concludes that the order is illegal and without any authority or against the principles of natural justice, the authorities may exercise power as conferred on them and decide the issue and set-aside the award. Therefore, when an efficacious alternative remedy is available in the statute itself, exercise of judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, though limitations are self imposed, it is difficult to accept the contention of this petitioner, in view of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Genpact India Private Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (referred supra), where the Apex Court candidly held that the writ petition is not maintainable when alternative efficacious remedy is available under the statute. 38. 38. Though the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed by the Council is contrary to the provisions of procedure prescribed under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, such issue can be decided by the statutory authority provided under Section 19 of MSMED Act or under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is rejected, while upholding the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, giving liberty to raise issue before the competent statutory authority under Section 19 of MSMED Act or under Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act.” 9. The above jurimetrical jurisprudence sheds the light that the efficacious and alternative remedy against the award passed by the Council is under Section 19 of the MSMED Act read with Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 but not the one under Article 226 of Constitution of India and the aforesaid appellate authority can consider and adjudicate upon all the pleas including the plea of jurisdiction of the Council and its smothering of principles of natural justice. In the light of this jurisprudence, I am unable to countenance the argument of learned counsel for petitioner that the writ can be entertained because the Council had grossly violated the principles of natural justice by not referring its statement of defence, which contains very intricate pleas concerning the maintainability of the claim, for the reason, all such pleas can as well be agitated before the appellate authority under Section 19 of the MSMED Act read with Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996. It is true that power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in its nature and not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution and the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions to exercise this discretion against the cases where alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the party. It is also true that availability of alternative remedy is not a bar in certain circumstances, one of which is the violation of the principles of natural justice [Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 )]. It is also true that availability of alternative remedy is not a bar in certain circumstances, one of which is the violation of the principles of natural justice [Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1 )]. In Magadh Sugar & Energy Limited case (supra), the Apex Court considering several decisions held that in spite of availability of alternate remedy the High Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction if the order of authority is challenged for want of authority and jurisdiction which is a pure question of law. There can be no demur about this principle with regard to the exercise of writ jurisdiction in spite of availability of alternative remedy. However, such exercise of writ jurisdiction as against the arbitral award is concerned, there is a clear embargo imposed in SBP & Co case (supra) by the Seven Judge Bench of the Apex Court which is binding on us in the instant case. 10. In the light of the above discussion, the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, considering the facts of the case, the writ petitioner is given liberty to avail the remedy of appeal, if it is so advised, within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.