ORDER : 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant/respondent No. 2 seeking to set aside the order and decree passed in M.V.O.P. No. 267 of 2013 on the file of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional District Judge, Tirupati, dated 03.10.2016. 2. Along with the appeal, the appellant filed I.A. No. 1 of 2021 seeking to condone the delay of 757 days in filing the appeal. The appellant also filed I.A. No. 2 of 2021 seeking to condone the delay of 674 days in re-presenting the above said appeal. 3. The petitioner is the Insurance Company/Appellant and the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are the petitioners/claimants in M.V.O.P. No. 267 of 2013. The parties hereinafter will be referred to as arrayed in the M.V.O.P. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Perused the material available on record. 5. Brief facts of the case are that: (i) The claimants filed M.V.O.P. No. 267 of 2013, on the file of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional District Judge, Tirupati, claiming compensation of Rs. 7,50,000/- for the death of the deceased (i.e.) A. Govinda Reddy, who died in a motor accident that took place on 27.06.2012. The 1st claimant is wife, claimants 2 and 3 are children and 4th claimant is mother of the deceased. (ii) The Tribunal after hearing both sides and upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, was pleased to allow the claim application awarding compensation of Rs. 6,68,500/- along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of petition to till the date of deposit into Court with proportionate costs. (iii) The Tribunal held that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 therein are directed to deposit the compensation awarded in the Court within a month from the date of the award. The Tribunal held that on such deposit, the 1st petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- each and the 4th petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,18,500/-. (iv) The Tribunal further held that on making such deposit, the petitioners 1 to 4 are permitted to withdraw a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-, Rs. 75,000/-, Rs. 75,000/- and Rs. 2,50,000/- the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- each and the 4th petitioner is entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,18,500/-. (iv) The Tribunal further held that on making such deposit, the petitioners 1 to 4 are permitted to withdraw a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/-, Rs. 75,000/-, Rs. 75,000/- and Rs. 43,500/- respectively and rest of the amount ordered to be deposited in State Bank of India, Main Branch, Tirupati for a period of two years. 6. Against the decree and award, dated 03.10.2016 in M.V.O.P. No. 267 of 2013 passed by the Tribunal, the Insurance Company/Appellant, who is the 2nd respondent therein, filed the present appeal. Along with the appeal, the Insurance Company/ Appellant filed I.A. No. 1 of 2021 seeking to condone the delay of 757 days in filing the appeal and also filed I.A. No. 2 of 2021 seeking to condone the delay of 674 days in re-presenting the said appeal. 7. In the affidavit filed along with I.A. No. 1 of 2021, the reasons stated by the appellant at Para No. 3 for the delay occurred in filing the appeal as extracted hereunder: “Para No. 3: I submit that, the order in question was pronounced on 03.10.2016 in copy application was filed on 11.10.2016. The same was delivered on 14.09.2017. The certified copies of the subject matter of the order and decree were mixed with other records at our office. In spite of our best efforts we could not trace the same till today, thus there was a delay of 757 days in the above said appeal. Thus there is no absolutely willful latches on my part in the above matter.” 8. In the affidavit filed along with I.A. No. 2 of 2021, the reasons stated by the appellant at Para No. 4 for the delay occurred in re-presenting the appeal as extracted hereunder: “Para No. 4: I submit that, at the time of shifting of the office, the bundle of this case mixed with some other files at our office. Later, due to the blow out of Covid-19 pandemic situation, I could not represent the file, in time i.e. 01.12.2019. Thus, there was a delay of 674 days was occurred in re-presenting the matter. Thus, there is no absolutely willful latches on my part in the above matter.” 9. Later, due to the blow out of Covid-19 pandemic situation, I could not represent the file, in time i.e. 01.12.2019. Thus, there was a delay of 674 days was occurred in re-presenting the matter. Thus, there is no absolutely willful latches on my part in the above matter.” 9. Upon perusal of the certified copy of the decree and award, dated 03.10.2016 in M.V.O.P. No. 267 of 2013 issued by the Tribunal, it appears that the petitioner made application for certified copy on 11.10.2016. The Tribunal delivered the certified copy on 14.09.2017. The present appeal is filed on 20.11.2019. The same was returned by the Registry of High Court on 22.11.2019. The appeal was resubmitted on 06.10.2021. As such, it is clear that from the date of delivering the certified copy of the decree and award (i.e.) on 14.09.2017, the petitioner did not choose to file appeal till 20.11.2019 (i.e.) for a period of more than two years. Even after filing the appeal, when it is returned by the Registry of High Court with certain objections on 22.11.2019, it is re-submitted only on 06.10.2021 (i.e.) after nearly two years from the date of return. As seen from these factual aspects, there is a delay of 757 days in filing the appeal in the High Court against the decree and award of the Tribunal below and there is a delay of 674 days in re-presenting the said appeal after complying certain objections raised by Registry of High Court. 10. As per admitted facts of the case, the accident was occurred on 27.06.2016 wherein the husband of the 1st claimant, father of the claimants 2 and 3 and son of the 4th claimant died. The deceased was aged 40 years at the time of accident. He is the sole breadwinner of the family. The claim application was filed before the Tribunal below in the year 2013. The Tribunal passed award on 03.10.2016. Though the Tribunal awarded compensation on appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence available on record and after hearing both sides, the claimants could not get the compensation amount to till date. Though the Tribunal directed the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 therein to deposit the awarded compensation amount into the Court within a month from the date of award, it was not deposited till date. Though the Tribunal directed the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 therein to deposit the awarded compensation amount into the Court within a month from the date of award, it was not deposited till date. In view of the same, the claimants would have suffered irreparable loss and hardships due to sudden demise of the breadwinner of the family and they might be no support to sustain themselves. They did not get any benefit out of the decree and award passed by the Tribunal for all these years, due to action of the Insurance Company in not depositing the award amount within the time stipulated as directed by the Tribunal below. 11. The Motor Vehicles Act enacted to provide for expeditious relief to the victims of accident. The intention of the Parliament to enact the Motor Vehicles Act is to provide just and reasonable compensation for the victims and to protect their substantive rights. The loss or damage caused to the victims and their families has to be compensated within a reasonable time to entitle the victims to come out of the grief. 12. Upon perusal of the above averments, in the considered opinion of the Court, the said affidavits are filed in a routine manner and the reasons stated for the delay are vague. It is clear that the appellant failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay of 757 days in filing the appeal and delay of 674 days in re-presenting the said appeal. The appellant miserably failed to submit plausible, cogent and acceptable reasons sufficient to condone such a huge and inordinate delay. 13. The reasons mentioned in the affidavit which were already extracted as above, clearly establish that there was abnormal delay in filing appeal and there is no proper explanation, as to why such huge delay had occurred. Though it was stated by the petitioner that the delay was neither willful nor wanton, but due to the reasons stated in the affidavit the fact remains that the concerned officers are failed in taking appropriate steps to file the appeal within the time by following due procedure as provided under law. Though it was stated by the petitioner that the delay was neither willful nor wanton, but due to the reasons stated in the affidavit the fact remains that the concerned officers are failed in taking appropriate steps to file the appeal within the time by following due procedure as provided under law. Filing this appeal with a delay of 757 days and re-presenting the appeal with a delay of 674 days without showing any sufficient cause is nothing but abusing the process of law and it will effect the substantive rights of the claimants who are not in a position to get single rupee from the Insurance Company/Appellant even after 5 years after passing order in favour of the claimants by the Tribunal on 03.10.2016. 14. In the present case, the breadwinner of the family died in a motor vehicle accident on 27.06.2016. But, till date even after Nine (9) years the claimants/victims did not get any compensation from the wrongdoers, who are responsible for the accident and who are liable to pay the compensation as determined by the Tribunal. It is to be noted that the Tribunal while passing the decree and award, dated 03.10.2016 directed the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 therein (i.e.) Insurance Company/appellant and another to deposit the award amount along with interest and costs within a month. But, till date the said amount is not deposited in the Tribunal below. 15. For the afore mentioned reasons, in the considered opinion of this Court, there is no sufficient cause shown by the petitioner/appellant to condone the delay of 757 days in filing appeal and 674 days in re-presenting the appeal and as such I.A. No. 1 of 2021 and I.A. No. 2 of 2021 are liable to be dismissed. 16. The view of this Court is fortified by the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following rulings. 17. In the case of Balwant Singh (Died) vs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 537 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as hereunder: “25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 18. In the case of Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as hereunder: “23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona-fides, then it may condone the delay. 24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona-fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 19. In the case of Brahampal @ Sammay and Another vs. National Insurance Company, (2021) 6 SCC 512 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering Sec.173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, interpreted the words “may” and “sufficient cause” used in the Second proviso of Section 173(1) and observed at Para Nos. 18 and 22 as extracted hereunder: 18. The Court in the abovementioned cases, highlighted upon the importance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while giving the clause “sufficient cause” a liberal interpretation. In furtherance of the same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishing cases where delay is of few days, as against the cases where the delay is inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other party. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same is attributable to the party’s inaction and negligence, the Courts have to take a strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties. 22. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient cause.” Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief. 20. In the case of Office of Chief Post Master General and Others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Another, 2012 Law Suit (SC) 124 the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with a petition filed for condonation of delay of 427 days after considering various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, observed as extracted hereunder: 12. It is not in dispute that the persons concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona-fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona-fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. 21. In another case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others vs. Bherulal, 2020 SCC Online SC 849 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with an application to condone the delay of 663 days, came down heavily, while dismissing the said application in as extracted hereunder: 6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorized earlier as “certificate cases.” The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the concerned officer responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation. 7. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straight away counsels appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation. 7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible. 8. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, we consider appropriate to impose costs on the petitioner-State of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand) to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited in four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officers responsible for the delay in filing the special leave petition and a certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Postmaster General and Others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and Others, 1992 (3) SCC 563 wherein it is held as hereunder: “28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while dealing with an application to condone the delay of 916 days caused in preferring an appeal in case of University of Delhi vs. Union of India and Others, 2020 (1) ALT 230 held as hereunder: 20. From a consideration of the view taken by this Court through the decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the status of the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply a different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to render even handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent. 21. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. 21. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation noticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law. 24. By following the proposition of law of the Hon’ble Apex Court, this High Court in Tahsildar, Mangalagiri Mandal vs. Mangalagiri Pattana Padmasali Bahutama Sangham, Rep. by its President, Mandru Venkateswara Rao and Another, (2021) 2 ALD 57 dismissed the application filed seeking condonation of delay of 1016 days holding that there is no sufficient cause for the condonation of such a huge delay. 25. This High Court in the case of M/s. Shriram General Insurance Company Limited vs. Gubbala Harish and Others in M.A.C.M.A. No. 440 of 2021 dismissed the application filed seeking condonation of delay of 1977 days holding that there is no sufficient cause for the condonation of such a huge delay. 26. This High Court in the case of M/s. Shriram General Insurance Company Limited vs. Papaganti Anusha and Others in M.A.C.M.A. No. 445 of 2021, dismissed the application filed seeking condonation of delay of 652 days holding that there is no sufficient cause for the condonation of such a huge delay. 27. For the above mentioned reasons, this Court holds that there is no any “sufficient cause” for the condonation of delay of 757 days in filing the appeal and 674 days in representing the said appeal. 28. Accordingly, I.A. No. 1 of 2021 and I.A. No. 2 of 2021 filed for condonation of delay of 757 days in filing the MACMA and 674 days in re-presenting the said MACMA are hereby dismissed. 29. In view of the dismissal of I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2021, the main MACMA No. 513 of 2021 shall stand dismissed. 30. There shall be no order as to costs. 31. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this petition shall stand closed.