ORDER : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. Both these writ petitions arise out of judgment dated 14.8.2014, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench in OA No.904/PB/2013, titled Jiwan Kumar Versus Prasar Bharti Broadcasting Corporation of India and others. Being interconnected, these are taken up together for decision. CWP No.1006 of 2015 Whether learned Tribunal was justified in not considering the impact of Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 to the facts of the case and whether learned Tribunal erred in law in granting benefit of past service for releasing pro-rata pension in favour of the original applicant, are the points falling for consideration in the instant petition. 2. Facts :- 2(i). The applicant was appointed as Technician in the year 1986 in Doordarshan Relay Centre, Pathankot. He was promoted as Senior Technician on 12.01.1990. 2(ii). The applicant proceeded on leave in September, 1999 and sought extension of the same from time to time. He never joined his duties thereafter and remained unauthorizedly absent from duties. 2(iii). On 27.03.2008, the applicant submitted his resignation to the respondents. His resignation letter reads as under :- “Subject : Three month’s notice to resign from the post of Sr. Technician. Sir, Respectfully, it is submitted to your kind notice that I have made up my mind to resign from government service due to the following compelling domestic grounds. 1. That I originally belong to Jalandhar District (Punjab). 2. That due to some homely circumstances, my domestic life has been badly disturbed and due to this reason, I was away from my official duties and could not join my duties. This has badly affected my financial position and mental peace. In view of the circumstances stated above, it is requested that this application may kindly be treated as my “NOTICE PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS” w.e.f. dated 1.4.08 to 1.7.08 be accepted and I may be relieved of my duties at D.DK. Shimla, accordingly. 3. Through this, I thank you and all my seniors for all the co-operation and encouragement extended to me during the short span of my service in the Department. Thanking you, Yours faithfully Dated March 27, 2008 Sd/- (JIWAN KUMAR) SR. TECH DDK, SHIMLA” 2(iv). The respondents accepted applicant’s resignation on 31.10.2008. The office order accepting his resignation, reads as under :- “The resignation of Sh. Jiwan Kumar, Sr. Thanking you, Yours faithfully Dated March 27, 2008 Sd/- (JIWAN KUMAR) SR. TECH DDK, SHIMLA” 2(iv). The respondents accepted applicant’s resignation on 31.10.2008. The office order accepting his resignation, reads as under :- “The resignation of Sh. Jiwan Kumar, Sr. Technician, Doordarshan Kendra, Shimla is accepted on his request w.e.f. 14/10/2008.” As per endorsement on it, a copy of the communication was sent to the applicant. Vide another office order issued on 31.10.2008, applicant’s unauthorized absence from duties for the period 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008 was ordered to be treated as ‘Diesnon’. The absence period was not to be counted as duty for any purpose. The office order is extracted hereinafter :- “Sh. Jiwan Kumar, Sr. Technician on his transfer from Doordarshan Kendra, Jalandhar to Doordarshan Kendra, Shimla remained unauthorisedly absent from duty till 14.10.2008 after relieving from Doordarshan Kendra Jalandhar on 30.06.2000 (AN). His absence from 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008 was treated as “Dies-non”. The absence period as shown above will not be counted as duty for any purpose.” 2(v). On 09.07.2012, the applicant issued a legal notice to the respondents that he had resigned on 27.03.2008 due to domestic compulsions and now wanted to continue in service by withdrawing the resignation. The respondents responded to the legal notice on 17.09.2012. It was stated that applicant’s resignation was accepted on 14.10.2008. Intimation regarding this had been sent to him. Therefore, applicant’s prayer cannot be accepted. 2(vi). The applicant thereafter filed original application before the learned Central Administrative Tribunal (in short ‘Tribunal’), seeking quashing of order dated 31.10.2008 with an alternative prayer that even if his case was to be taken as that of resignation, then also the resignation will not entail forfeiture of applicant’s past service. 2(vii). Learned Tribunal allowed the original application with a direction to the respondents to grant pro-rata pension to the applicant under Rule 49(2)(b) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. The operative part of the judgment reads as under:- “10. Having perused the material on record, we observe that the applicant had been away from his duty during the period 1.7.2000 to 14.10.2008. In fact, he was absent from the very date when he was relieved from the Doordarshan, Jalandhar, on account of being posted out from there. The operative part of the judgment reads as under:- “10. Having perused the material on record, we observe that the applicant had been away from his duty during the period 1.7.2000 to 14.10.2008. In fact, he was absent from the very date when he was relieved from the Doordarshan, Jalandhar, on account of being posted out from there. Respondents appear to have taken a very lenient view in the matter as no action was taken regarding the absence of employee till he submitted his request for voluntary resignation on 27.3.2008. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the applicant had served for over 14 years till he absented from duty w.e.f. 1.7.2000 to 14.10.2008 which period has been treated as “Dies-non” as per order dated 31.10.2008 (Annexure A-5). Hence, keeping in view judicial pronouncements referred above, the applicant may be treated as having voluntarily retired from service. The applicant is thereby entitled to pro-rata pension as per Rule 49(2)(b) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 and the same may be released to him within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.” Aggrieved against the above judgment passed by the learned Tribunal, instant writ petition has been preferred by the original respondents (employer). 3. Contentions:- Learned Assistant Solicitor General of India for the original respondents (employer) and present petitioners contends that once an employee resigns from a post, then Rule 26 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 (in short ‘Rules’) gets attracted. Under Rule 26(1) of the Rules, in case of resignation from a service, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in public interest by the Appointing Authority, the past service gets forfeited. Learned ASGI further submitted that the applicant had resigned on 27.03.2008. His resignation was accepted on 31.10.2008. Rule 26(1) of the Rules comes into play. In terms of this Rule, past service of the applicant is liable to be forfeited. The judgment passed by the learned Tribunal, allowing the benefit of past service to the applicant for the purpose of granting him pro-rata pension is, therefore, not in consonance with the Rules. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant (respondent herein) argued that the applicant cannot be treated to have resigned on 27.03.2008 as the acceptance of his resignation was never conveyed to him. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant (respondent herein) argued that the applicant cannot be treated to have resigned on 27.03.2008 as the acceptance of his resignation was never conveyed to him. Placing reliance upon certain judgments, it was also contended that past service of the applicant cannot be forfeited. Learned Senior Counsel argued that the applicant was entitled to pro-rata pension on the basis of 14 years of his past service. 4. Observations :- We have considered the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties and gone through the case file. 4(i). There is no dispute that the applicant remained unauthorizedly absent from duties w.e.f. 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008. It is very astonishing that no action, whatsoever, was taken by his employer (present petitioners) for eight years for such a derelict and indisciplined act of the applicant. 4(ii). After remaining on blissful unauthorized absence from duties for a long period of eight years, the applicant resurfaced in the year 2008. On 27.03.2008, he submitted his resignation from service. This resignation was accepted on 31.10.2008. The acceptance of resignation, as per the endorsement in the communication, was conveyed to him. In light of these facts, there is no escape from the conclusion that Rule 26(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules had come into play. The rule reads as under :- “(1) Resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing Authority, entails forfeiture of past service.” The past service of the applicant is, therefore, liable to be forfeited. Neither any pension nor pro-rata pension can be granted to the applicant in these facts. Mandatory provision of Rule 26(1) of the Rules cannot be given a go bye. In the impugned judgment passed by learned Tribunal, there is no reference to Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules. 4(iii). The contention raised by learned Senior Counsel for the applicant that the acceptance of resignation was not conveyed to the applicant by the Department is misplaced. The office order dated 31.10.2008, accepting applicant’s resignation, as per the endorsement on it, was also sent to the applicant. It is not the case of the applicant that he did not remain on unauthorized absence from duties w.e.f. 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008. It is admitted case of the applicant that he never joined his duties after September, 1999. The office order dated 31.10.2008, accepting applicant’s resignation, as per the endorsement on it, was also sent to the applicant. It is not the case of the applicant that he did not remain on unauthorized absence from duties w.e.f. 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008. It is admitted case of the applicant that he never joined his duties after September, 1999. It is not the case of the applicant that he did not tender resignation to his employer on 27.03.2008. It is also not the case of the applicant that he desired to resign from the services on expiry of three months from 27.03.2008. It cannot be believed that acceptance of applicant’s resignation by the Department on 31.10.2008 had not been conveyed to him. It is also the pleaded case of the applicant that in the year 2012, he had prayed for withdrawal of his resignation. It is thus established on record that the applicant had resigned on 27.03.2008 and was conveyed acceptance of his resignation by the Department on 31.10.2008. 4(iv)(a). Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant in support of his prayer for counting the benefit of applicant’s past service in order to release pro-rata pension to him, also placed reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Sheelkumar Jain Versus New India Assurance Company Limited and others, (2011) 12 SCC 197 . The question for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court as formulated in paragraph 16 of the judgment was:- “In these two decisions, Sanwar Mal [ (2004) 4 SCC 412 ] and Cecil Dennis Solomon [ (2004) 9 SCC 461 ], the Courts were not called upon to decide whether the termination of services of the employee was by way of resignation or voluntary retirement. In this case, on the other hand, we are called upon to decide the issue whether the termination of the services of the appellant in 1991 amounted to resignation or voluntary retirement.” In the instant case, we are not called upon to decide as to whether the communication dated 27.03.2008, sent by the applicant, was his resignation or voluntary retirement. Undeniably, it was a case of resignation. In terms of his letter dated 27.03.2008, the applicant wanted to resign from service and accordingly submitted his resignation. His resignation was accepted on 31.10.2008. The period of his unauthorized absence from duties w.e.f. 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008 was ordered to be treated as ‘Dies-non’. Undeniably, it was a case of resignation. In terms of his letter dated 27.03.2008, the applicant wanted to resign from service and accordingly submitted his resignation. His resignation was accepted on 31.10.2008. The period of his unauthorized absence from duties w.e.f. 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008 was ordered to be treated as ‘Dies-non’. This period was not to be counted as duty for any purpose. The applicant was well aware that he had resigned from service on 27.03.2008. In the year 2012, he had requested the employer to permit him to withdraw his resignation. Thus, to contend that the applicant had voluntarily retired and not resigned, is a plea de-hors the pleaded case of the applicant. This plea even otherwise does not reconcile to the factual position of the case and the orders passed by the employer. The judgment cited by learned Senior Counsel is not applicable to the facts of the case. 4(iv)(b). Second judgment relied upon by learned Senior Counsel, rendered in Asger Ibrahim Amin Versus Life Insurance Corporation of India, (2016) 13 SCC 797 , also does not advance the applicant’s case. Learned counsel has referred to following para of the judgment:- “17. The Appellant ought not to be deprived of pension benefits merely because he styled his termination of services as “resignation” or because there was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. The commendable objective of the Pension Rules is to extend benefits to a class of people to tide over the crisis and vicissitudes of old age, and if there are some inconsistencies between the statutory provisions and the avowed objective of the statute so as to discriminate between the beneficiaries within the class, the end of justice obligates us to palliate the differences between the two and reconcile them as far as possible. We would be failing in our duty, if we go by the letter and not by the laudatory spirit of statutory provisions and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.” The judgment was rendered in the facts of the case, where the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the appellant (therein) ought not to be deprived of pensionary benefits merely because he styled his termination of services as resignation or because there was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. The facts in the instant case are different. The facts in the instant case are different. The applicant had remained on unauthorized absence from duties w.e.f. the year 2000 onwards. Unfortunately, the Department did not take any action for his indiscipline. After about eight years, i.e. on 27.03.2008, the applicant chose to resign from service. We have already held earlier that it was a case of resignation and not that of voluntary retirement. The applicant was also all along aware that he had resigned from service and not voluntarily retired. It is not the case of the applicant that he was eligible for voluntary retirement or that he had applied for voluntary retirement or he was allowed to retire voluntarily from service. It is also pertinent to notice that the decision in Asger Ibrahim Amin’s case (supra), relied upon by learned Senior Counsel, was questioned in LIC v. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479 . In Shree Lal Meena’s case, larger bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court was called upon to determine whether respondent’s resignation amounted to forfeiture of his past service, disentitling him from pension or was in fact voluntary retirement. While referring the matter to larger bench, the Hon’ble Apex Court in LIC v. Shree Lal Meena, (2015) 17 SCC 43, observed that the decision in Asger Ibrahim Amin Versus LIC obliterated the distinction between resignation and retirement. The Court noted that there is a “real difference between resignation and retirement”. They cannot be used interchangeably, and the court cannot substitute one for the other merely because the employee has completed the requisite number of years to qualify for voluntary retirement. The larger bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in LIC v. Shree Lal Meena, (2019) 4 SCC 479 , elucidated the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement in following manner:- “22. … [quoting RBI v. Cecil Dennis Solomon, SCC pp. 467-68, para 10] ‘10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions “superannuation”, “voluntary retirement”, “compulsory retirement” and “resignation” convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service. Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for after rendering the prescribed period of qualifying service. Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for after rendering the prescribed period of qualifying service. Another fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not mandated, while in the case of the latter, permission of the employer concerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateral concept, and becomes effective on acceptance by the competent authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express provisions to the contrary.” The above observations highlighted the material distinction between the concept of resignation and voluntary retirement. The Court also observed that while pension schemes do form beneficial legislation in a delegated form, a beneficial construction cannot run contrary to the express terms of the provisions: “26. There are some observations on the principles of public sectors being model employers and provisions of pension being beneficial legislations. We may, however, note that as per what we have opined aforesaid, the issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by implication.” All the above judgments were noticed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in BSES Yamuna Power Limited Versus Ghanshyam Chand Sharma and another, (2020) 3 SCC 346 , wherein it was observed that the decision to resign is materially distinct from a decision to seek voluntary retirement. The decision to resign results in the legal consequences that flow from a resignation under the applicable provisions. These consequences are distinct from the consequences flowing from voluntary retirement and the two may not be substituted for each other based on the length of an employee’s tenure. Rule 26 states that upon resignation, an employee forfeits past service. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:- “13. The view in Asger Ibrahim Amin was disapproved and the court held that the provisions providing for voluntary retirement would not apply retrospectively by implication. Rule 26 states that upon resignation, an employee forfeits past service. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:- “13. The view in Asger Ibrahim Amin was disapproved and the court held that the provisions providing for voluntary retirement would not apply retrospectively by implication. In this view, where an employee has resigned from service, there arises no question of whether he has in fact “voluntarily retired” or “resigned”. The decision to resign is materially distinct from a decision to seek voluntary retirement. The decision to resign results in the legal consequences that flow from a resignation under the applicable provisions. These consequences are distinct from the consequences flowing from voluntary retirement and the two may not be substituted for each other based on the length of an employee’s tenure. 14. In the present case, the first respondent resigned on 7-7-1990 with effect from 10-7-1990. By resigning, the first respondent submitted himself to the legal consequences that flow from a resignation under the provisions applicable to his service. Rule 26 of the Central Civil Service Pension Rules 1972 (the CCS Pension Rules) states that: “26. Forfeiture of service on resignation (1) Resignation from a service or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in the public interest by the Appointing Authority, entails a forfeiture of past service.” Rule 26 states that upon resignation, an employee forfeits past service. We have noted above that the approach adopted by the court in Asger Ibrahim Amin has been held to be erroneous since it removes the important distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement. Irrespective of whether the first respondent had completed the requisite years of service to apply for voluntary retirement, his was a decision to resign and not a decision to seek voluntary retirement. If this court were to re-classify his resignation as a case of voluntary retirement, this would obfuscate the distinction between the concepts of resignation and CCS Pension Rules voluntary retirement and render the operation of Rule 26 nugatory. Such an approach cannot be adopted. Accordingly, the finding of the Single Judge that the first respondent “voluntarily retired” is set aside.” 5. In view of the above discussion, we hold that after remaining unauthorizedly absent from duties w.e.f. 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008, the applicant had sent a communication to the respondents for resigning from service on 27.03.2008. His resignation was accepted on 31.10.2008. Accordingly, the finding of the Single Judge that the first respondent “voluntarily retired” is set aside.” 5. In view of the above discussion, we hold that after remaining unauthorizedly absent from duties w.e.f. 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008, the applicant had sent a communication to the respondents for resigning from service on 27.03.2008. His resignation was accepted on 31.10.2008. The applicant was made aware of acceptance of his resignation. The period of his unauthorized absence w.e.f. 01.07.2000 to 14.10.2008 was ordered to be treated as ‘Dies-non’. It was not to be counted as duty for any purpose. In view of these facts, Rule 26(1) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, gets attracted. The Rule entails forfeiture of applicant’s past service. Learned Tribunal erred in granting the benefit of past service for releasing pro-rata pension in favour of the applicant. Instant petition is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment dated 14.8.2014, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench in OA No.904/PB/2013, titled Jiwan Kumar Versus Prasar Bharti Broadcasting Corporation of India and others, is set aside. The original application filed by the present respondent is dismissed. CWP No.2768 of 2015 In view of the order passed in CWP No.1006 of 2015, the prayer made in this petition filed by the original applicant has become redundant. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.