JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Mritunjay Choudhary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. Suraj Verma, the learned State counsel and Mr. Venkatesh Gopal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.2. 2. This petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. This petition has been filed for quashing of the order dated 07.01.2020 arising out of Complaint Case No.201/2019 whereby cognizance has been taken under sections 498A/323/406/504 read with section 34 of the I.P.C as well as section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and to quash the entire criminal proceeding, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that on the basis of mutual settlement, an application was moved before the competent court under section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act which was numbered as Original Suit No.484/2020 which has been decreed on 24.07.2021 by which the decree of divorce has been passed. The one-time alumini has already been allowed in favour of the O.P.No.2. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the O.P.No.2 accepts the submission of Mr. Mritunjay Choudhary, the learned counsel for the petitioners. 6. Both the counsels submit that a joint-compromise petition being I.A. No.3695/2021 has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding, which has been supported by the affidavit of both the petitioner no.1 and petitioner no.3 of the original suit and the said joint petition has also been supported by the affidavit by the O.P.No.2 namely, Anuja Kumari. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners and the O.P.No.2 jointly submit that except section 498A of the IPC and sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, all other sections are compoundable. 8. The learned counsels appearing for the parties submit that the joint compromise has been taken place between the parties and this matter can be allowed in terms of judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana” reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 as well as in the case of “Gain Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr.” reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 . 9. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of ”B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr.” reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 at Paragraph nos.8, 10, 11, 12 and 15 of the said judgment has held as under: “8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. 10. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that the compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence. What would happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier noticed, now she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied imputations. What would happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier noticed, now she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied imputations. There may be many reasons for not supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved disputes with her husband and his other family members and as a result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom she earlier had differences or she has willingly parted company and is living happily on her own or has married someone else on the earlier marriage having been dissolved by divorce on consent of parties or fails to support the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to compound non-compoundable offences? The answer clearly has to be in the “negative”. It would, however, be a different matter if the High Court on facts declines the prayer for quashing for any valid reasons including lack of bona fides. 11. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.” 10. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.” 10. In view of the above facts and considering that rest of the sections, except section 498A of the IPC and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, are compoundable, as the complaint case is arising out of matrimonial dispute and both the parties have separated by way of obtaining decree of divorce, no purpose will be served in allowing to continue the criminal proceeding and also in view of the judgments rendered, as relied by both the parties, in the cases of ”B.S. Joshi” (Supra) and “Gain Singh v. State of Punjab and Anr.” (Supra), the order 07.01.2020 arising out of Complaint Case No.201/2019, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad and the entire criminal proceeding arising thereof is hereby quashed. 11. Accordingly, the instant petition [Cr.M.P. No.137 of 2021] stands allowed and disposed of. 12. I.A. No.3695/2021 stands allowed and disposed of.