JUDGMENT : NIRZAR S. DESAI, J. 1. Heard Mr. Vishwas K. Shah, learned advocate for Ms. Bhavna V. Shah, learned advocate for appellants and Mr. Darshan M. Parikh, learned advocate for the respondents. 2. ADMIT. Mr. Darshan M. Parikh, learned advocate for the respondents waive service of notice of admission. 3. By consent of the parties, the matter was taken up for final hearing. 4. The parties were heard at length. While keeping the matter for orders on 20.07.2021, this Court passed the following order: “1. Heard Mr. Vishwas K. Shah, learned advocate for Ms. Bhavna V. Shah, learned advocate for the appellants and Mr. Darshan M. Parikh, learned advocate for the respondents on advance copy. 2. Mr. Vishwas K. Shah, learned advocate for the appellants has candidly submitted that he does not challenge the aspect whether a person after superannuation can be subjected to major punishment or not. Mr. Shah further contended that he challenged the punishment imposed and proportionality of the same. 3. No other or further submissions, averments, grounds and/or contentions are made by Mr. Shah, learned advocate for the appellants. 4. We have extenso heard Mr. Vishwas K. Shah, learned advocate for the appellants and Mr. Darshan M. Parikh, learned advocate for the respondents. For orders.” 5. Since, Mr. Shah, learned advocate confined his argument only in respect of punishment imposed and proportionality of the same, the parties were heard only on that aspect. 6. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act are stated as under: 6.1. The present appellant / original petitioner preferred Special Civil Application No. 11869 of 2005, whereby, he had challenged the order dated 29.07.2003 passed by the Deputy General Manager, by which appellant was removed from the services. Appellant herein also challenged the order dated 27.01.2005 passed by the Executive Director, Bank of Baroda, whereby, the appeal preferred by appellant against the order of removal also came to be rejected. In the Special Civil Application, petitioner also prayed for releasing the amount of provisional pension and /or compassionate pension. 6.2. The present appellant – original petitioner was initially appointed on 04.04.1966 as a Junior Clerk and later on, promoted to the post of Officer w.e.f. 01.06.1970. In the Special Civil Application, petitioner also prayed for releasing the amount of provisional pension and /or compassionate pension. 6.2. The present appellant – original petitioner was initially appointed on 04.04.1966 as a Junior Clerk and later on, promoted to the post of Officer w.e.f. 01.06.1970. Thereafter, from time to time, he was promoted and lastly, he was promoted to the post of Senior Branch Manager at Navyug College Branch, Surat. In the meantime, appellant was transferred at Ratlam, Madhya Pradesh as Senior Manager and was put under suspension from 28.08.1998 till 31.12.2001. On attaining the age of 60 years, appellant retired as Senior Branch Manager after the office hours on 31.12.2001. After appellant retired on attaining the age of superannuation, pending the departmental inquiry, the respondent Bank also sanctioned and paid provisional pension to him vide letter dated 21.03.2002. 6.3. After appellant’s retirement, the respondent served appellant with an order of removal with retrospective effect vide order dated 29.07.2003, against which appellant preferred a Departmental Appeal, but the said Appeal was also rejected and the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of the Disciplinary Authority removing appellant from service vide order dated 27.01.2005. 6.4. Since at the time of retirement of appellant, the departmental inquiry was pending against appellant, the provisional pension of appellant was sanctioned as per Regulation 9 of the Bank of Baroda (Employees’) Pension Regulation, 1995 and on account of order of removal, appellant’s provisional pension was stopped and recovery was ordered, vide letter dated 07.01.2005, appellant was informed by the Bank that in view of removal of appellant from the service vide order dated 29.07.2003, he was not entitled for any pension. Therefore, appellant challenged the order of removal which was confirmed in appeal by the appellate authority by filing Special Civil Application No.11869 of 2005. The appellant – petitioner also prayed for provisional pension to appellant and prayed for a direction to the respondents to release the amount of provisional pension / compassionate pension / allowance, during the pendency of the main petition. 7. The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the material available on record and arguments advanced by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, dismissed the petition of appellant herein – original petitioner. 7. The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the material available on record and arguments advanced by the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, dismissed the petition of appellant herein – original petitioner. Taking into consideration the aspect of imposition of major penalty of removal on appellant, after he was permitted to retire, the learned Single Judge also considered the aspect of proprietary or proportionality of the punishment imposed upon appellant and dismissed the petition. 8. Today, as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, when the hearing of this appeal commenced, Mr. Shah, learned advocate for appellants submitted that, he is confining himself only to the punishment imposed and proportionality of the same. He further submitted that he is not challenging the findings of the learned Single Judge upto para-14 of the judgment impugned in the Letters Patent Appeal, and hence, the parties were heard only on the question of proportionality of the punishment imposed upon appellant i.e. removal from the service. 9. Mr. Shah, learned advocate for appellants submitted that it is true that the charges were levelled against appellant, in respect of serious irregularities, lapses and deviations from the laid down procedure and administrative norms of the bank in respect of opening and operation of the Fixed Deposit accounts. The aforesaid irregularities even if are admitted to have been committed by appellant then also the bank has not suffered any financial loss and in absence of their being any financial loss to the bank, a major penalty of removal was absolutely disproportionate and uncalled for, considering the facts that appellant had served the respondent bank since 1966 and a punishment of removal would wipe-out the entire hard work that appellant had put in during his service tenure of around 35 years. According to Mr. Shah, the punishment imposed upon present appellant is grossly disproportionate, considering the charges levelled against appellant, and hence, Mr. Shah, learned advocate prayed that the punishment imposed upon appellant is required to be re-considered and even if the charges are held to be proved against appellant, the punishment of removal be converted into some lessor punishment. 10. No other or further submissions were made by learned advocate Mr. Shah. 11. Per contra, Mr. Shah, learned advocate prayed that the punishment imposed upon appellant is required to be re-considered and even if the charges are held to be proved against appellant, the punishment of removal be converted into some lessor punishment. 10. No other or further submissions were made by learned advocate Mr. Shah. 11. Per contra, Mr. Darshan M. Parikh, learned advocate for the respondents submitted before us that once during the course of inquiry, charges levelled against appellant – original petitioner were held to be proved and once the punishment was imposed upon appellant – original petitioner after full-fledged inquiry, unless, the advocate for the appellant points out some perversity or lapses the procedure of inquiry, the inquiry cannot be held to be invalid. Learned advocate Mr. Parikh also submitted that based on the inquiry report, imposition of penalty purely falls within the domain of Disciplinary Authority and unless the punishment imposed upon the delinquent shocks the conscious of the Court, it cannot be said to be unreasonable and usually the Court may not interfere in the quantum of punishment imposed unless it shocks the conscious of the Court. In support of his contentions, learned advocate Mr. Parikh relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager and Others Vs. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, reported in (1996) 9 SCC 69 , and Union of India and Ors. Vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 and by reiterating the ratio of aforesaid two judgments submitted that, the punishment imposed upon the delinquent-appellant is absolutely just, legal and proper and prayed that considering the ratio of aforesaid two judgments, this Court may not interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon appellant, which is confirmed by the learned Single Judge by dismissing the petition preferred by appellant – original petitioner. 12.0. We have noticed that the submissions which Mr. Shah, learned advocate for appellants have made before us were considered in light of the judgment of Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra) as well as P. Gunasekaran (supra) by the learned Single Judge. In fact, the learned Single has observed thus: “15. The punishment, which is imposed upon the petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate to prove the misconduct. Shah, learned advocate for appellants have made before us were considered in light of the judgment of Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra) as well as P. Gunasekaran (supra) by the learned Single Judge. In fact, the learned Single has observed thus: “15. The punishment, which is imposed upon the petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate to prove the misconduct. As per the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (Supra), it is not necessary that the Bank should suffer actual loss because of the irregularities committed by its Officers/employees and if any officer/employee has acted beyond his authority in allowing the over drafts and it has become sticky to recover such amount, then such action of the officer/employee is liable to the departmental inquiry. The Apex Court has observed thus: “It is not a single act; it is a course of action spreading over a sufficiently long period and involving a large number of transactions. In the case of a Bank – for that matter, in the case of any other organization – every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/ employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear; the functioning of the Bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. Each officer of the Bank cannot be allowed to carve out his own little empire wherein he dispenses favours and largesse. No organization, more particularly, a Bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations. The very act of acting beyond authority – that too a course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances – is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses. Such adventures are not given to the employees of Banks which deal with public funds. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. If what we hear about the reasons for the collapse of Barings Bank is true, it is attributable to the acts of one of its employees, Nick Leeson, a minor officer stationed at Singapore, who was allowed by his superiors to act far beyond his authority. As mentioned hereinbefore, the very discipline of an organization and more particularly, a Bank is dependent upon each of its employees and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and over-drawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. Just because, similar acts have fetched some profit – huge profit, as the High Court characterizes it – they are no less blameworthy. It is wrong to characterize them as errors of judgment. It is not suggested that the respondent being a Class-I officer was not aware of the limits of his authority or of his powers. Indeed, Charge No.9, which has been held established in full is to the effect that inspite of instructions by the Regional Office to stop such practice, the respondent continued to indulge in such acts. The Enquiry Officer has recorded a clear finding that the respondent did flout the said instructions and has thereby committed an act of disobedience of lawful orders. Similarly, Charge No.8, which has also been established in full is to the effect that inspite of reminders, the respondent did not submit "Control Returns" to the Regional Office. We fail to understand how could all this be characterized as errors of judgment and not as misconduct as defined by the regulations. We are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a clear error in holding that the aforesaid conduct of the respondent does not amount to misconduct or that it does not constitute violation of Regulations 3 and 24.” 16. The Apex Court in the irregularities committed by the officers of the Bank has observed that just because the similar acts have fetched some profit or huge profit, it is wrong to characterize them as errors of judgment. The Apex Court in the irregularities committed by the officers of the Bank has observed that just because the similar acts have fetched some profit or huge profit, it is wrong to characterize them as errors of judgment. It is held that very act of going beyond the authority that too a course of conduct spread over a sufficiently long period and involving innumerable instances, is by itself a misconduct. Such acts, if permitted, may bring in profit in some cases but they may also lead to huge losses and such adventures are not given to the employees of the Banks, which deal with the public funds. The facts are almost similar to the facts of the present case. It is the case of the petitioner that huge amount of FDR’s are disbursed by him, which resulted into huge profit to the Bank at the relevant time. 17. The Apex Court in the case of P. Gunasekaran (Supra) has laid down the parameters with regard to the reappreciation of the evidence and interference in the punishment order imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. The Apex Court has held thus: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge no. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Article 226 /227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 18. It is specifically held by the Apex Court that under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not reappreciate the evidence and interfere with the conclusions of the inquiry and cannot go into the adequacy of the evidence or reliability of the evidence and interfere with the legal evidence on which findings can be based and correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be, and the High Court cannot go into proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 12.1. We are of the view that the learned Single Judge has taken a correct view, in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra) that it is not necessary that the Bank should suffer actual loss because of the irregularities committed by its officers / employees but what is required to be seen is whether he has acted beyond his authority or not, and therefore, in light of the aforesaid judgment, if the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in respect of P. Gunasekaran (supra), more particularly, in respect of para-37 is read that under Article 226 / 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court should not go into the proportionality of the penalty, unless it shoks its conscious is the correct view. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Gunasekaran (supra) has laid down the parameters in respect of re-appreciation of evidence and interference in punishment orders imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, one of those is that the High Court should not go into the proportionality of punishment, unless it shocks its conscious. 12.2. In the instant case, as observed by us, in our order dated 20.07.2021, learned advocate Mr. Shah has given up the challenge to the aspect as to whether a person after superannuation can be subjected to major punishment or not, as Mr. Shah has confined his arguments only to the punishment imposed and its proportionality. Now as far as these two aspects are concerned, the aforesaid two judgments in case of Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra) and P. Gunasekaran (supra) clinches the issue. The judgment in case of Nikunja Patnaik (supra) takes care of the contention of Mr. Shah in respect of the fact that bank has not suffered any actual financial loss, as the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that, what is to be seen is, whether the officer / employee has acted beyond his authority or not. As far as the procedural part of inquiry or any lapses in the inquiry is concerned, the same is taken care of, by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Gunasekaran (supra), wherein, parameters are laid down about re-appreciation of evidence of a departmental inquiry or a disciplinary proceedings. Learned advocate Mr. As far as the procedural part of inquiry or any lapses in the inquiry is concerned, the same is taken care of, by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Gunasekaran (supra), wherein, parameters are laid down about re-appreciation of evidence of a departmental inquiry or a disciplinary proceedings. Learned advocate Mr. Shah could not point out to us as to what procedural lapse, the authority has committed, which would vitiate the departmental proceedings, which would ultimately lead to quashing the order of punishment. In fact, the case of appellant does not fall within any of the parameters laid down in the aforesaid judgments, as learned advocate Mr. Shah could not point out that his case falls within any of the parameters, which would enable us to re-examine the order of punishment. 12.3. On the contrary, a full-fledged departmental inquiry was conducted and at the end of the inquiry, the punishment of removal from service was imposed upon appellant, which according to us, is not such a punishment which would shock our conscious, looking to the misconduct of the appellant-petitioner, more particularly, considering the fact that the appellant was holding a post in the managerial cadre and went upto the post of the Senior Manager in the organization. The post in the managerial cadre reflects the faith of the management in the person holding such post and the said faith is of utmost significance, when it comes to the banking industry, which deals with huge financial transactions and in a way contributes to the economy, and therefore, any breach of such faith, cannot be viewed in a lenient manner. Once such faith of management is breached or compromised by the delinquent, what is more important is to see that the faith is breached and the resultant effect of breach of faith would be of least significance, and therefore, the punishment of removal imposed upon the appellant would certainly not shock our conscious. 12.4. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the petition preferred by present appellant – original petitioner in light of the settled principles of law, and hence, the judgment dated 10.02.2020 impugned in this appeal does not call for any interference from us. 12.4. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the petition preferred by present appellant – original petitioner in light of the settled principles of law, and hence, the judgment dated 10.02.2020 impugned in this appeal does not call for any interference from us. Resultantly, this Letters Patent Appeal fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and the same is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.