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2021 DIGILAW 688 (JHR)

Dharmendra Rajak @ Dharmendra Ram v. State of Jharkhand

2021-08-31

SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

body2021
JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Awrind Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Mr. Arup Dey, the learned State counsel and Mr. Shree Niwas Roy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.2. 2. This petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. The petitioners have filed this petition for quashing of the order dated 10.02.2016 taking cognizance and the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Dhanwar P.S.Case No.442/2013, corresponding to G.R.No.4087/2013, pending in the court of learned J.M., 1st Class, Giridih. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the case was registered under sections 498A/323/354A/34 of the I.P.C and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that except sections 498A/354A of the I.P.C and section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, all the other sections are compoundable. He further submits that now the O.P.No.2 is residing with the family members and the petitioner no.1 is the husband. He submits that in view of the compromise, one I.A., being joint compromise petition, has been filed which is numbered as I.A. No.2546/2020. 5. Mr. Shree Niwas Roy, the learned counsel for the O.P.No.2 submits that the compromise is there and the I.A. has been filed on the affidavit of O.P.No.2 as well as the pairvikar of the petitioners. Restitution of conjugal life has been stated in paragraph no.6 of the I.A. petition. 6. Mr. Shree Niwas Roy, the learned counsel appearing for the O.P.No.2 submits that the compromise has been taken place between the parties and this matter can be allowed in terms of judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “B.S.Joshi v. State of Haryana” reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 . Both the counsels have jointly submit that this case is arising out of matrimonial dispute and there is no public interest involved in this matter and no adverse inference will fall in the society in quashing of the cognizance order. Paragraph no.3 to 6 of the compromise petition is incorporated as under: “3. Both the counsels have jointly submit that this case is arising out of matrimonial dispute and there is no public interest involved in this matter and no adverse inference will fall in the society in quashing of the cognizance order. Paragraph no.3 to 6 of the compromise petition is incorporated as under: “3. That O.P.No.2 has compromised this case outside of the court with consultation and advice of their well wishers and common relative with mutual understanding and now there is cordial relationship has restored and good sense has been prevailed between the parties. 4. That there is no public policy involved in the present case as such dispute personal in nature as the dispute involved is of matrimonial/personal nature. 5. That the O.P.No.2 does not want to proceed with the case since cordial relationship is prevailed between her and accused persons. 6. That O.P.No.2 is living in the house of her Husband Dharmendra Rajak and their matrimonial/conjugal life has restored.” 7. He submits that in the case of “B.S.Joshi” (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the complaint filed under Sections 498A, 323,406 of the IPC quashed the F.I.R for the ends of justice. Paragraph no.8, 10, 11, 12 and 15 of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow : “8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. 10. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so require. 10. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this Court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. This Court said that the compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence. What would happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier noticed, now she has filed an affidavit that the FIR was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied imputations. There may be many reasons for not supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved disputes with her husband and his other family members and as a result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom she earlier had differences or she has willingly parted company and is living happily on her own or has married someone else on the earlier marriage having been dissolved by divorce on consent of parties or fails to support the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to compound non-compoundable offences? The answer clearly has to be in the “negative”. In such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to compound non-compoundable offences? The answer clearly has to be in the “negative”. It would, however, be a different matter if the High Court on facts declines the prayer for quashing for any valid reasons including lack of bona fides. 11. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre it was held that while exercising inherent power of quashing under Section 482, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Where, in the opinion of the court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the proceedings. 12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.” 8. In view of the above facts, and considering the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “B.S.Joshi” (Supra) and the interlocutory application, where compromise has been entered into between the parties, the order dated 10.02.2016 taking cognizance and the entire criminal proceeding arising out of Dhanwar P.S.Case No.442/2013, corresponding to G.R.No.4087/2013, pending in the court of learned J.M., 1st Class, Giridih is hereby quashed. 9. Accordingly, the instant petition [Cr.M.P. No.3363 of 2019] stands allowed and disposed of. 10. I.A. No.2546/2020 stands allowed and disposed of.