JUDGMENT: Soumitra Saikia, J. This Central Excise appeal preferred by the Commissioner of Central Goods & Service Tax and Central Excise as the appellant arises out of the order dated 18.12.2019 passed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred as “CESTAT”), Eastern Regional Bench, Kolkata. 2. The brief facts necessary to decide this Appeal are as under: (i) The assessee namely the respondent herein is engaged in the manufacture of Pan Masala and Pan Masala containing tobacco classifiable under Chapters 21 and 24 of the First Schedule to the Central Tariff Act, 1985 at its factory situated at Jorhat, Assam. The appellant is availing the benefit of exemption under Notification No. 8/2004-CE dated 21.01.2004, as amended by Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004. The period in dispute in this appeal is from March 2004 to March 2005. (ii) Order dated 06.02.2007 was issued by the Commissioner whereby the direction was made for recovery of amount deposited in the Escrow account by way of forfeiture for the alleged violation of the conditions of the exemption notification availed by the appellant as aforesaid. Against the said order, in the appeal filed by the assessee, the Tribunal vide Order dated 06.08.2007 remanded the matter back to the Commissioner for fresh consideration since the aforesaid orders were issued without granting opportunity of being heard in violation of principles of natural justice. (iii) Pursuant to the Tribunal’s Order dated 06.08.2007, the Commissioner re-decided the matter in remand proceedings vide Order dated 30.01.2008, whereby it confirmed the forfeiture of amount deposited in Escrow account consequent to findings made with regard to violation of conditions of exemption notification and allowed the assessee to take the CENVAT Credit back to their account which the assessee had utilized at the time of clearance of goods during the relevant period. (iv) Thereafter, the Revenue challenged the Order dated 30.01.2008 passed by the Commissioner before the Tribunal on the ground that the same travelled beyond the scope of the directions made by the Tribunal vide previous Order dated 06.08.2007. In the said appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal in its order dated 17.03.2015 noted that the other Show Cause Notices issued for disallowing CENVAT Credit were pending in parallel proceedings which were not considered by the Commissioner. In the said appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal in its order dated 17.03.2015 noted that the other Show Cause Notices issued for disallowing CENVAT Credit were pending in parallel proceedings which were not considered by the Commissioner. On the said observations, the Tribunal again set aside the order dated 30.01.2008 passed by the Commissioner and remanded the matter for fresh consideration on the point of admissibility of CENVAT Credit. (v) The Commissioner re-decided the matter and vide Order dated 31.03.2017 held that the assessee had violated the conditions of the exemption notification as was already decided in previous Order-in-Original dated 30.01.2008 which had attained finality. He further held that the charges framed against the assessee for wrong utilization of credit during the period March 2004 to March 2005 had already been dropped by the then Addl. Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, vide Order no. 02/Addl. COMMR/ADJ/CE/DIB/09 dated 30.01.2009 and that there is no pending Show Cause Notice issued to the appellant assessee in relation to admissibility of Cenvat Credit. Based on above observation, the Commissioner had concluded that since proceedings for alleged wrong credit had already been dropped, the question of further allowing credit does not arise at all. (vi) Being aggrieved, by the order of the Commissioner, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal vide the impugned order dated 18.12.2019 held that in the earlier proceedings, the material facts that the eligibility of credit utilized by the assessee which stood decided in favour of the assessee vide Additional Commissioner’s order dated 30.01.2009 were not before the Tribunal earlier. The Tribunal held that the Commissioner was therefore, not required to re-decide the Credit Eligibility of the impugned order. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the amount paid by the assessee by Challan cannot be retained by the Department and is liable to be refunded. The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed. 3. Being aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed by the Department on the substantial questions of law urged. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that vide the Order-in-Original No. 01/COMMR/ADJ/CE/DIB/08 dated 30.01.2008, the forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 98,89,695.00 and Rs.3,88,344.65 makes the total amount forfeited as Rs. 1,02,92,040.00 (Rupees One Crore Two Lakh Seventy two Thousand Forty only). The learned counsel for the appellant submits that vide the Order-in-Original No. 01/COMMR/ADJ/CE/DIB/08 dated 30.01.2008, the forfeiture of the amount of Rs. 98,89,695.00 and Rs.3,88,344.65 makes the total amount forfeited as Rs. 1,02,92,040.00 (Rupees One Crore Two Lakh Seventy two Thousand Forty only). As such the amount being above the monetary limit prescribed by the Ministry of Finance vide instructions of Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs dated 22.08.2019 fixing the monetary limit of Rs. 1 Crore as the limit below which Appeals cannot be filed before High Court, it does not debar the Department from maintaining the present Appeal. On merits, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that in terms of Notification No. 08/2004 as amended by Notification No. 28/2004-CE dated 09.07.2004, since the amounts were not deposited by the manufacture/assessee within 60 days from the end of relevant quarter, the amounts were forfeited by the Department. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the proceedings before the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise were dropped vide its order dated 30.01.2009 by observing that payment of duty made through PLS of Rs. 1.49 Crore was as good as non-availment of CENVAT credit on the goods cleared. Therefore, the Additional Commissioner held that the CENVAT credit was not admissible on goods (Gutkha) as per Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. However, as the assessee had paid through cash, it was considered that assessee neither availed CENVAT credit nor utilized the inadmissible CENVAT credit to the tune of Rs. 1.49 Crore and accordingly, the authorities although had brought in those protective demands, the same were dropped vide the order dated 30.01.2009. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, submits that as per Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, the assessee was not eligible for availment and utilization and CENVAT credit and accordingly, question of reversal/refund of CENVAT Credit as directed by the Tribunal, does not arise as assessee did not make any double payment. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in holding that there was double payment of duty both by Challan and through CENVAT credit. Consequently it is submitted that the direction of the Tribunal to the Department to refund back the deposit made by the assessee is erroneous and contrary to law and should therefore be set aside and quashed. 4. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in holding that there was double payment of duty both by Challan and through CENVAT credit. Consequently it is submitted that the direction of the Tribunal to the Department to refund back the deposit made by the assessee is erroneous and contrary to law and should therefore be set aside and quashed. 4. The learned counsel for the assessee raised his objections to submit that this appeal is not maintainable in view of the Monetary involvement being lower than one crore as notified by a Instruction issued by Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs (CBIT&C) dated 22.08.2019. The learned Senior counsel for the assessee submitted that the monetary limit of Rs. 1 crore and above has been fixed by the Finance Department in respect of appeals to be filed by the Department/Government before the High Court. The effect of the circular is that only appeals where the financial involvement is beyond Rs. 1 Crore, can the Department prefer any appeal before the High Court. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the assessee submitted that in this appeal, the financial involvement is Rs.98,83,695.35/-only and as such in terms of the Ministry of Finance Instructions dated 22.08.2019, the monetary limit involved in this matter being below Rs. 1 Crore, the appeal is not maintainable and the same should be dismissed in Limine as not maintainable. Notwithstanding that the learned Senior counsel submits that even on merits this Appeal is not maintainable as there are no substantial questions which arises in the facts of the case which require any deliberation. The dispute sought to be agitated by the appellant relates to factual issues which have been correctly arrived at by the Tribunal. As per the mandate of Section 35G of the Central Excise Act; appeals to the High Court can be admitted only on substantial questions of law. The learned Senior counsel for the assessee submits that as there are no substantial questions of law made out, the appeal merits dismissal in Limine. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant has referred to the Judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hotel & Allied Trades Pvt.Ltd, reported in (2019) 18 SCC 735 to buttress his submissions. 5. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and we have also perused the pleadings on record. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant has referred to the Judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hotel & Allied Trades Pvt.Ltd, reported in (2019) 18 SCC 735 to buttress his submissions. 5. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and we have also perused the pleadings on record. Since the question of maintainability of the appeal is raised, we propose to examine the issue of maintainability at the outset. The objections regarding maintainability of the present appeal is raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent on the basis that where the monetary involvement is below Rs. 1 Crore as notified by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs (CBIT&C) circular dated 22.08.2019, Appeals before the High Court are not maintainable. The notification is extracted below for convenience: “F. No. 390/Misc/116/2017-JC Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs (Judicial Cell) ****** ‘B’ Wing, 4th Floor, HUDCO VISHALA Building Bhikaji Cama Place, R.K. Puram, New Delhi-66 1. All Principal Chief Commissioners/Chief Commissioners/Principal Commissioners/Commissioners of Customs/Customs (Preventive)/GST & CX; 2. All Principal Director Generals/Director Generals under CBIC; 3. Chief Commissioner (AR); Commissioner (Legal), Principal Commissioner, Directorate of Legal Affairs, CBIC; 4. webmaster.cbec@icegate.gov.in Subject: Reduction of Government Litigation -Raising of monetary limits for filing appeals by the Department before CESTAT/High Courts and Supreme Court in Legacy Central Excise and Service Tax-regarding In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35R of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and made applicable to Service Tax vide Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs fixes the following monetary limits below which appeal shall not be filed in the CESTAT, High Courts and Supreme Court. S. No. Appellate Forum Monetary Limit 1. CESTAT Rs. 50,00,000/- 2. High Courts Rs. 1,00,00,000/- 3. Supreme Court Rs. 2,00,00,000/- 2. This instruction applies only to legacy issues i.e. matters relating to Central Excise and Service Tax, and will apply to pending cases as well 3. Withdrawal process in respect of pending cases in above forums, as per the above revised limits, will follow the current practice that is being followed for the withdrawal of cases from the Supreme Court, High Courts and CESTAT. All other terms and conditions of concerned earlier instructions will continue to apply. 4. Withdrawal process in respect of pending cases in above forums, as per the above revised limits, will follow the current practice that is being followed for the withdrawal of cases from the Supreme Court, High Courts and CESTAT. All other terms and conditions of concerned earlier instructions will continue to apply. 4. It may be noted that issues involving substantial questions of law as described in para 1.3 of the instruction dt 17.08.2011 from F. No. 390/Misc/163/2010-JC would be contested irrespective of the prescribed monetary limits. 5. Since withdrawal of Departmental Appeals is a long drawn activity requiring routine and constant monitoring, formats have been introduced in the Monthly Performance Report for all field formations to send monthly reports regarding status of withdrawal of appeals in the MPR (refer table P/P-1). Details of the said cases should also be available in a separate register for further perusal by the Board as and when required. Tables are in the Annexure-A attached. The description of the Tables in brief is provided below. a) Table P: Position of withdrawal with reference to raised monetary limits SC/HC/CESTAT (as per instruction dated 22/08/2019) b) Table P-1: Remaining to be filed/withdrawn SC/HC/CESTAT. Sd/- (Rohit Singhal) Director (Review) 6. It is seen from a perusal of the circular that the monetary limit has indeed been prescribed for the Department, below which no Appeals can be filed. In so far as the High Court is concerned, the Monetary Limit prescribed is 1(one) Crore below which no Appeals can be filed before the High Court. However, Clause 4 of the said instructions prescribes that where substantial questions of law are involved, the matters will be contested irrespective of Monetary Limit prescribed. The submissions of the learned Senior counsel for the assessee that the financial involvement in the present proceedings is Rs.98,83,695.35/-is disputed by the counsel for the appellant submitting that the financial involvement in the present proceedings is beyond Rs. 1 Crore as the demand comprises of Rs.98,83,695.35/-as well as Rs.3,88,344.65/-and as such, it is not below that monetary limit of Rs. 1 Crore. Further the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned order dated 18.12.2019 of the CESTAT, if allowed to stand will have serious consequences. Considering the submissions advanced at the Bar, we find that the restrictions of “monetary limit” is not an absolute bar. 1 Crore. Further the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned order dated 18.12.2019 of the CESTAT, if allowed to stand will have serious consequences. Considering the submissions advanced at the Bar, we find that the restrictions of “monetary limit” is not an absolute bar. In matters where a common principle may be involved, the High Court can entertain appeal subject of course to the provisions of Section 35G of the Central Excise Act. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Central III vs.Surya Herbal Limited, reported in (2011) 15 SCC 482 , the Apex Court was examining the applicability of the circular dated 09.02.2011 in respect of Appeals filed by the Income Tax Department where the Tax effect was below the prescribed limit. The Apex Court held that where any matter is likely to have a cascading effect and in which a common principle may be involved in subsequent group of matters or a large numbers of matters, the embargo prescribed by the Circular dated 09.02.2011 need not be applied ipso facto. In that view of the matter, we decline to reject the present appeal at the threshold on the issue of maintainability from the point of view of being below the monetary limit prescribed. We, therefore, proceed to examine the appeal on merits. 7. The following substantial questions of law have been raised by the appellant:- A. Whether the Hon’ble CESTAT, Kolkata is correct in holding that the duty payment made by the assessee through CENVAT credit is proper and admissible ignoring the conditions stipulated in Rule 6 of CENVAT credit Rules 2004. B. Whether Hon’ble CESTAT has erred in allowing the refund of the duty paid through TR- 6 challan. C. Whether Hon’ble CESTAT has erred in setting aside the decision of the Ld. Commissioner issued vide OIO No. 07/ADJ/CE/DENOVO/CINNR/DIB/17 dated 31.03.2017 ordering not to allow further CENVAT credit for the period March, 2004 to March, 2005. D. Whether Hon’ble CESTAT, Kolkata has erred in not appreciating the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the civil appeal no. 3327/2007 in the matter of Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai –Vs Dilip Kumar and Company & Ors which is also squarely applicable in the instant case. 8. D. Whether Hon’ble CESTAT, Kolkata has erred in not appreciating the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the civil appeal no. 3327/2007 in the matter of Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai –Vs Dilip Kumar and Company & Ors which is also squarely applicable in the instant case. 8. A reference to Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 shows that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed by an appellate Tribunal provided that the High Court is satisfied that the matter involves substantial questions of law. The appeal under Section 35G is a qualified appeal and not an absolute and/or unqualified and/or unrestricted appeal. Unless, therefore, an appeal involves a substantial question of law, no appeal can be entertained by the High Court from the order passed in an appeal by an appellate Tribunal. For convenience Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is extracted below: “35G. Appeal to High Court- (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1 st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment), if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. (2) The Commissioner of Central Excise of the other party aggrieved by any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal may file an appeal to the High Court and such appeal under this sub-section shall be- (a) filed within one hundred and eighty days from the date on which the order appealed against is received by the Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party; (b) accompanied by a fee of two hundred rupees where such appeal is filed by the other party; (c) accompanied by a fee of two hundred rupees where such appeal is filed by the other party; (d) in the form of a memorandum of appeal precisely stating therein the substantial question of law involved.” 9. In so far as the finding of facts arrived at by the Tribunal is concerned, the same ordinarily cannot be gone into by the High Court as the Tribunal is the final fact finding authority. In so far as the finding of facts arrived at by the Tribunal is concerned, the same ordinarily cannot be gone into by the High Court as the Tribunal is the final fact finding authority. It is for the Tribunal to find facts and for the High Court to lay down the law as applicable to the facts found. The High Court has no jurisdiction to go behind or question the facts found by the Tribunal unless on the ground of perversity. The Apex Court in Karnani Properties Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 82 ITR 54 while examining a question under the Income Tax Act which was to the effect that whether the Tribunal was justified in arriving at a particular finding of fact held as under: “………. The question as to the correctness of the facts found by the Tribunal was not before the High Court nor is it before us. When the question referred to the High Court speaks of on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it means on the facts and circumstances found by the Tribunal and not about the facts and circumstances that may be found by the High Court. We have earlier referred to the facts found and the circumstances relied on by the Tribunal, the final fact finding authority. It is for the Tribunal to find facts and it is for the High Court and this Court to lay down the law applicable to the facts found. Neither the High Court nor this Court has jurisdiction to go behind or to question the statements of fact made by the Tribunal. The statement of the case is binding on the parties and they are not entitled to go-behind the facts found by the Tribunal in the statement.” 10. As discussed above, as per the mandate of the amended Section 35G of the Central Excise Act that there must be a substantial question of law in order to prefer an appeal before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal. As discussed above, as per the mandate of the amended Section 35G of the Central Excise Act that there must be a substantial question of law in order to prefer an appeal before the High Court against the order of the Tribunal. The Apex Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, where the provisions of appeal to the High Court are pari materia with the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act; held that the conditions mentioned in Section 260A must be strictly fulfilled before an appeal can be maintained under Section 260A. The Apex Court held that if the appellant is unable to show that a substantial question of law has arisen for determination, there is no impediment on the part of the High Court to dismiss the appeal without even admitting the appeal. The Apex Court in M. Janardana Rao vs. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in (2005) 2 SCC 324 has laid down the tests to determine as to whether a substantial question of law is involved. The Apex Court held that the High Court must make every effort to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. The Apex Court held in the context of Section 260A that the findings of fact of the Tribunal cannot be disturbed. The relevant paragraphs of the said Judgment is extracted below: “14. Without insisting on the statement of substantial question of law in the memorandum of appeal and formulating the same at the time of admission, the High Court is not empowered to generally decide the appeal under Section 260-A without adhering to the procedure prescribed under Section 260-A. Further, the High Court must make every effort to distinguish between a question of law and a substantial question of law. In exercise of powers under Section 260-A, the findings of fact of the Tribunal cannot be disturbed. It has to be kept in mind that the right of appeal is neither a natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in Section 260-A must be strictly fulfilled before an appeal can be maintained under Section 260-A. Such appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. 15. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in Section 260-A must be strictly fulfilled before an appeal can be maintained under Section 260-A. Such appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. 15. An appeal under Section 260-A can only be in respect of a “substantial question of law”. The expression “substantial question of law” has not been defined anywhere in the statute. But it has acquired a definite connotation through various judicial pronouncements. In Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] this Court laid down the following tests to determine whether a substantial question of law is involved. The tests are: (1) whether directly or indirectly it affects substantial rights of the parties, or (2) the question is of general public importance, or (3) whether it is an open question in the sense that the issue is not settled by pronouncement of this Court or Privy Council or by the Federal Court, or (4) the issue is not free from difficulty, and (5) it calls for a discussion for alternative view. There is no scope for interference by the High Court with a finding recorded when such finding could be treated to be a finding of fact.” 11. In the light of law laid down by the Apex Court, the substantial questions of law as urged by the appellant in the present proceedings will have to be examined. 12. We have carefully perused the substantial questions of law presented by the appellant. It is seen that substantial questions A, B and C pertains to allowing of CENVAT credit. A perusal of the order dated 31.03.2017 passed by the Commissioner, will reveal that the show-cause Notices which were issued against the assessee for wrong utilization of credit during the period of March, 2004 to March, 2005 has already been dropped by the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh vide order dated 30.01.2009 and there is no pending show cause Notice issued to the assessee in relation to admissibility of CENVAT credit. The findings of the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh vide order dated 30.01.2009 that the charges framed against the assessee for wrong utilization of credit during the period of March, 2004 to March, 2005 were dropped had not been challenged or questioned by the Department before CESTAT and such findings of the Addl. Commissioner having attained finality, there was no scope for the CESTAT to re-examine the issues, more particularly, in an appeal, which is preferred by the assessee. Further the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh, in its Order-in-Original dated 30.01.2009 had returned a finding that the assessee had paid duty two times-one debited from CENVAT Account and the other by Cash Deposit to the extent of Rs.1.49 Crore and which is as good as non-availment of CENVAT Credit on such goods cleared. The Additional Commissioner accepted the submissions of the assessee and came to the conclusions that penal provisions are not attracted. He, therefore, proceeded to drop the charges against the assessee and the show-cause Notices were accordingly disposed of. In the face of such findings of fact arrived at by the Addl. Commissioner in its Order-in-Original dated 30.01.2009 which had remained unassailed by the Department before a higher forum in the absence of any specific finding to the contrary, there cannot be any presumption that the CENVAT Credit claimed by the assessee was contrary to the provisions of Rule 6 of CENVAT Credit Rules, 2017 which provides for the conditions for availing CENVAT Credit. As such, there was no occasion to re-decide the credit eligibility of the assessee on the relevant period that too without issuance of fresh Show Cause Notices on the assessee. As such the Tribunal had correctly rendered a finding that the benefit of exemption has been denied to the assessee. Since, as discussed above, the findings arrived at by the Addl. Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh in its Order-in-Original dated 30.01.2009 were not challenged by the Department before any higher forum, the same had therefore attained finality. The findings of the Tribunal in allowing the refund of duty paid through TR-6 challan is not in conflict with the conditions mentioned in the exemption Notification No. 08/2004 dated 21.01.2004 issued by the CBIT&C read with Notification No. 28/2004 dated 09.07.2004 and Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004. Accordingly, we do not find any substantial questions of law in respect of Question Nos. Accordingly, we do not find any substantial questions of law in respect of Question Nos. A , B and C as sought to be raised by the appellant. 13. In so far as the substantial question ‘D ’ is concerned, the appellant has referred to the Judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Customs (Imports), Mumbai-Vs-Dilip Kumar and Company and Ors, reported in (2018) 9 SCC 1 to submit that the impugned order of Judgment of the CESTAT/Tribunal is in violation of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in this case . 14. We have carefully perused the Judgment of the Apex Court in Dilip Kumar(Supra), the ratio in the said Judgment lays down the principle for interpretation of taxing statute as well as the exemption provisions or exemption notification. The Apex Court has held that the question whether the assessee falls within the notification or the exemption clause, has to be strictly construed and when once the ambiguity or doubt is resolved by interpreting the applicability of exemption clause strictly, the Court may construe the notification by giving full play bestowing wider and liberal construction. We respectfully agree with the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Dilip Kumar(Supra)as there is no quarrel with the proposition laid down in the said matter. However, in view of the peculiar facts involved in the present proceedings, the appellant cannot draw any support from the said case cited. In the present proceedings as already discussed above, there are findings of fact arrived at by the Addl. Commissioner vide its Order-in-Original dated 30.01.2009 whereby a finding was returned that assessee had paid the duty two times-one debited from CENVAT Account and other by Cash Deposit to the extent of Rs. 1.49 Crore and which is as good as non-availment of CENVAT Credit on such goods cleared. On the basis of the such clear findings of fact arrived at by the Addl. Commissioner, Central Excise, the Show Cause Notices issued to the assessee were dropped and the matter was accordingly disposed of. The said findings of the Addl. Commissioner was never assailed before the appropriate forum by the Department. Consequently, the same having attained finality, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to interpret as to whether the assessee was nor was not entitled to CENVAT Credit in an appeal preferred by the assessee. The said findings of the Addl. Commissioner was never assailed before the appropriate forum by the Department. Consequently, the same having attained finality, there was no occasion for the Tribunal to interpret as to whether the assessee was nor was not entitled to CENVAT Credit in an appeal preferred by the assessee. Furthermore, there are no averments or submissions made by the appellant as to how the exemption notifications were misinterpreted by the Tribunal contrary to the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Dilip Kumar(Supra). We therefore hold that the question ‘D’ also does not raise any substantial question of law. 15. The issue of wrong utilization of credit by the assessee during the period of March, 2004 to March, 2005 having been already dropped by the Additional Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh vide order dated 30.01.2009 and no appeal having been preferred by the Department against such finding, the matter has attained finality. The said finding of fact is also accepted by the Commissioner, Central Excise as is seen in the order dated 31.03.2017. The Tribunal, therefore, recorded such a finding and held that the Commissioner, Central Excise, Dibrugarh instead of arriving at the conclusion that the credit cannot be further allowed, which was never before him, ought to have appreciated the fact of payment of amount by challan as well as by credit utilization has been made by the appellant. Consequently, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal and we are therefore, not persuaded to accept this appeal in view of the mandate of Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1985. 16. Before parting, we would like to observe that although it was not pleaded specifically in the appeal that the Judgment of the Tribunal suffered from perversity because of wrong appreciation of facts, however it was orally submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Judgment of the Tribunal is perverse and should be therefore suitably interfered with. 17. The provisions of Section 35G mandates that an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act can only be admitted/heard by the High Court only on the substantial question of law framed. However, in the present proceedings, there was no substantial question of law framed by the appellant with regard to the ‘perversity’ as raised by the appellant. 17. The provisions of Section 35G mandates that an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act can only be admitted/heard by the High Court only on the substantial question of law framed. However, in the present proceedings, there was no substantial question of law framed by the appellant with regard to the ‘perversity’ as raised by the appellant. Notwithstanding such a question not being specifically framed by the appellant, it is certainly open for the Court to frame such substantial question of law subject, however, to such pleadings being available to demonstrate as to how the impugned order of the Tribunal suffers from perversity. In the absence of such specific pleadings or reference to such facts to demonstrate as to how the facts were not appreciated or wrongly appreciated by the Tribunal, there cannot be any substantial question of law with regard to the perversity framed. The findings of fact recorded by the Court can be held to be perverse if such findings have been arrived at by wrong appreciation of facts and ignoring relevant materials or taking into consideration irrelevant materials. The Apex Court in S.R. Tewari–Vs-Union of India, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 602 held that if the decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. The Apex Court held that if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the finding would not be interfered with. 18. In view of all the above discussions, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. 19. No order as to costs.