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2021 DIGILAW 694 (GUJ)

Narenbhai Gunvantlal Jayaswal v. State Of Gujarat

2021-08-17

SANGEETA K.VISHEN

body2021
JUDGMENT : 1. With the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties, the captioned writ petition has been taken up for final disposal. 2. Issue Rule. Mr.Bharat Vyas, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of Rule on behalf respondent Nos.1 and 3. Learned advocate Mr.C.P. Champaneri waives service of Rule on behalf of respondent No.5. Though served, respondent Nos.2 and 4 have chosen not to enter appearance. 3. By this petition, the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for quashing and setting aside the requisition dated 18.01.2021 whereby, the elected members of the Chhota Udepur Nagarpalika have forwarded a requisition for moving motion of no confidence against the petitioner. 4. The edifice on which, the requisition dated 18.01.2021 has been challenged, is, it being unconstitutional and ultra-vires Articles 14, 16 and 243 of the Constitution of India as well as against the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary vs. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Limited reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 and in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel vs. State of Gujarat reported in 2019 (2) GLR 865 . 5. The facts of the case are that the petitioner came to be elected as the member of ward no.7 in the election of Chhota Udepur Nagarpalika held on 17.02.2018 and was elected as the President of the Municipality for the second term of two and half years in the meeting held on 24.08.2020. The petitioner took over the charge as per the said mandate and according to him he has been efficiently discharging the duties as the President. Within a span of less than six months, a motion came to be requested by the elected members on 18.01.2021 on the ground that the petitioner is acting single handedly in his own manner. Accordingly, the requisition was forwarded to the Director of Municipalities, Collector, Prant Officer and the Chief Officer. Being aggrieved by the said requisition moved by the members of the Municipality, the petitioner has approached this Court with the aforementioned prayers. 6. Accordingly, the requisition was forwarded to the Director of Municipalities, Collector, Prant Officer and the Chief Officer. Being aggrieved by the said requisition moved by the members of the Municipality, the petitioner has approached this Court with the aforementioned prayers. 6. Mr.Vikas Nair, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that Section 36 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1963') envisages that any councilor of a municipality, who intends to move a motion of no confidence against its president or vice-president may give a notice thereof in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government to the municipality and if the notice is supported by not less than one third of the total number of the councilors of the municipality, the motion may be moved. It is submitted that however, there is no time limit provided for moving the motion of no confidence. It is submitted that the petitioner was elected as the President in the meeting held on 24.08.2020 and within a span of less than six months, on 18.01.2021, the requisition has been moved by the members of the Municipality for the motion of no confidence. It is submitted that the said requisition dated 18.01.2021 is against the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra). It is submitted that this Court was dealing with the provisions of Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1993), which is in pari-materia with the provisions of Section 36 of the Act of 1963. 6.1. It is submitted that Section 56 of the Act of 1993 also provides for motion of no confidence. Sub-section (1) of Section 56 of the Act of 1993 contemplates that any member, who intends to move a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch or the Upa-Sarpanch, may give notice thereof in the prescribed form to the panchayat concerned and if the notice is supported by one half of the total number of members of the panchayat concerned, the motion may be moved. It is submitted that a bare perusal of the provisions of Section 56 of the Act of 1993 and the other provisions suggests that there is no reasonable time provided for moving the proposal for motion of no confidence. 6.2. It is submitted that a bare perusal of the provisions of Section 56 of the Act of 1993 and the other provisions suggests that there is no reasonable time provided for moving the proposal for motion of no confidence. 6.2. It is further submitted that Section 56 of the Act of 1993 had fallen for consideration in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) and the issue, inter alia, was as to what should be the reasonable time to move the motion of no confidence. It has been held that reasonable time is nothing but a time that is fairly required to do what is required to be done, conveniently under the permitted circumstances. The reasonable time varies from the contextual meaning, under which it is used. This Court, therefore, held that reasonable time is any time which is not manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances. This Court has held that as per Section 13 of the Act of 1993, every panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under the Act, shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. It has been held that keeping such provisions in mind and executive functions entrusted to the elected Sarpanch under Section 55 of the Act of 1993 and object of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 i.e. continuity and stability of Panchayati Raj institutions, a time of one year should be considered as a reasonable time, within which time, no motion could be permitted for removal of the elected Sarpanch by way of no confidence motion, as contemplated under Section 56 of the Act of 1993 from the date of declaration of the result. It is further submitted that the provisions of the Act of 1963 are very much in pari-materia with the provisions of the Act of 1993, namely, election to the post of President of Taluka Panchayat; tenure of office and motion of no confidence against the President and therefore, the decision of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) applies on all fours to the facts of the present case. 6.3. It is further submitted that Section 31 of the Act of 1963 provides that a municipality shall be presided over by a president or vice-president elected by the councilors from amongst themselves. 6.3. It is further submitted that Section 31 of the Act of 1963 provides that a municipality shall be presided over by a president or vice-president elected by the councilors from amongst themselves. Section 33 of the Act of 1963 provides for the term of office of the President and vice-president to be of two and half years and Section 36 provides for moving of the motion of no confidence against the president or vice-president after giving notice and in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government to the municipality. It is submitted that similar provisions with respect to Taluka Panchayats are there in the Act of 1993, namely, Section 75, which provides for filling up of a vacancy in the office of Sarpanch or Upa-Sarpanch or the member of the panchayat, Section 63 provides for first meeting of the panchayat and election of the President and Vice-President and Section 70 provides for motion of no confidence by intended member, against the President or Vice-President after giving notice thereof, in the prescribed form and supported by the required number of members, as prescribed. 6.4. While referring to the provisions of Section 36 of the Act of 1963, it is submitted that it may not provide for any restriction to bring the motion but, the action to bring the motion needs to be reasonable, requiring the restrictions to be placed on exercise of such powers in an unreasonable manner. It is submitted that Section 36 of the Act of 1963 is enabling provision and it cannot be permitted to operate in an unreasonable manner and within unreasonable time and not permitting the elected president to work for a reasonable time. It is submitted that reasonableness is an essential ingredient of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and hence, any action, if is unreasonable, the same is required to be curbed at the threshold. It is submitted that the essential element of reasonableness under Article 14 is invoked by the applicability of the doctrine of silence in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra). It is submitted that the Apex Court has held that when the Constitution is eloquent, the laws made thereunder cannot be silent. If the statute is silent or imprecise on the requirements under the Constitution, it is for the Court to read the Constitutional mandate into the provisions concerned and declare it accordingly. It is submitted that the Apex Court has held that when the Constitution is eloquent, the laws made thereunder cannot be silent. If the statute is silent or imprecise on the requirements under the Constitution, it is for the Court to read the Constitutional mandate into the provisions concerned and declare it accordingly. It is submitted that the aspect of silence in Constitution and abeyance as well has been dealt with extensively by the Apex Court in the said judgment. 6.5. It is submitted that continuity and stability are the ingredients of the rule of law governed by the Constitution and are not merely restricted to the 73rd Constitutional Amendment. It is submitted that the continuity and stability are essential in a parliamentary democracy and the same is an essential element as a governing principle under the Constitution. It is submitted that it is always open to the Court to test the operation of the provision so as to achieve the constitutional goal. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. Appa Balu Ingale reported in AIR 1993 SC 1126 . It is submitted that the Apex Court has held that common sense is always served in the court's ceaseless striving as a voice of reason to maintain the blend of change and continuity of order which is sine quo non for stability in the process of change in a parliamentary democracy. It has also been held that in interpreting the Act, the judge should be cognizant to and always keep at the back of his/her mind the constitutional goals and the purpose of the Act and interpret the provisions of the Act. It is therefore, submitted that certainty is an essential ingredient of the rule of law and the applicability of the principles of the purposive construction as held by the Division Bench of this Court, cannot be disputed by the respondents merely on the ground that the present proceedings are under a different statute providing for a different authority. 6.6. It is therefore, submitted that certainty is an essential ingredient of the rule of law and the applicability of the principles of the purposive construction as held by the Division Bench of this Court, cannot be disputed by the respondents merely on the ground that the present proceedings are under a different statute providing for a different authority. 6.6. It is next submitted that 73rd Constitutional Amendment was brought into force to raise the bar for Panchayati Raj Institutions so as to bring the same in consonance with the Constitution due to its rural impact whereas, the said element is already present in the case of Municipalities and hence, the elements for the same would be applicable in the case of 74th Constitutional Amendment also. It is submitted that the principles governing 73rd, 74th and 97th amendment would be the same and hence, reliance of the different enactments pertaining to different local self governments, namely, Municipalities, Panchayats etc. was taken up while laying down reasonable period for the Co-operative Societies Act in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra). It is therefore, submitted that the applicability as laid down in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) by relying upon the judgment in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra) supports the submissions of the petitioner about the inter-connected principles of different enactments governing the local self governments. 6.7. It is submitted that so far as the provision of motion of no confidence is concerned, though the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act is silent; however, the Apex Court has read the power to bring no confidence motion and also restriction to bring no confidence motion within a reasonable period. 6.8. It is further submitted that the judgment in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), having delivered by the Division Bench of this Court, is binding on this Court as the principles are laid down with respect to pari-materia provisions. As an extension to the aforesaid submissions, it is contended that there is no tangible difference between the operation of the Taluka Panchayats and the Municipalities, except that one is a local self Government for rural areas, while the latter is for urban areas. It is merely the different local bodies but, the governing principles are the same. As an extension to the aforesaid submissions, it is contended that there is no tangible difference between the operation of the Taluka Panchayats and the Municipalities, except that one is a local self Government for rural areas, while the latter is for urban areas. It is merely the different local bodies but, the governing principles are the same. It is therefore, submitted that the difference between the provisions of the Municipality and Taluka Panchayat is not of such a nature, so as to permit deviation from the binding decision of this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra). It is also submitted that the Division Bench of this Court has, in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), while dealing with the provisions of the Act of 1993, taken into consideration Part IX, IXA and IXB of the Constitution of India and hence, it would not be open to separate the principles governing the said parts. 6.9. It is further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) had applied the doctrine of purposive construction with regard to pari-materia provisions in the case of local self government by negating the submissions of the respondent as to necessity of vagueness in the provision as a pre - condition for purposive construction and hence, the same principle applies in the present case also because, parimateria provisions are there. It is therefore, submitted that the law on the issue is no more res-integra. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1962 SC 955 . The Apex Court has held that the doctrine of purposive construction is required to be made applicable in the case where, the legislation may also provide for mischief by the operation of the provisions and therefore, it is submitted that the action of the members to bring the motion in an unreasonable period of four and half months from being elected to the office is clearly a mischief which needs to be rectified by applying the principles of the purposive construction. It is emphasized that even if the provisions are not challenged, it would be permissible for the Court to interpret the provisions so as to make it constitutionally viable by applying the principles of purposive construction. 6.10. It is emphasized that even if the provisions are not challenged, it would be permissible for the Court to interpret the provisions so as to make it constitutionally viable by applying the principles of purposive construction. 6.10. It is therefore, submitted that moving of requisition dated 18.01.2021 for no confidence motion in an unreasonable period and proposed in a period less than one year of the first meeting is unconstitutional and against the principles of the democratic process so also, against the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) and in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra). It is therefore, urged that the requisition dated 18.01.2021 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. Per contra, Mr.Champaneri, learned advocate for the respondent No.5, while taking this Court to the various provisions of the Act of 1993, has submitted that the provisions of the Act of 1993 have been enacted in exercise of powers flowing from the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act and one of the objects was to bring continuity and stability; however, the provisions relating to the Act of 1963, provided by 74th Constitutional Amendment, have no such object. It is further submitted that Statement of Objects and Reasons of 74th Amendment states that local bodies in many States have become weak and ineffective on account of variety of reasons and, as a result, urban local bodies are not able to perform effectively as viable democratic units of the self government whereas, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of 73rd Amendment, inter alia, provides that though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have been in existence for a long time, it has been observed that the institutions have not been able to acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive people's bodies due to number of reasons, therefore, both the Amendments are with different objects and purpose. Hence, the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) with reference to the provisions of the Act of 1993 cannot be made applicable while dealing with the provisions of the Act of 1963. 7.1. It is submitted that the Act of 1993 is providing for three tier, namely, Gram Panchayat, Taluka Panchayat and District Panchayat. It is submitted that Section 9 of the Act of 1993 provides for constitution of the village panchayats. 7.1. It is submitted that the Act of 1993 is providing for three tier, namely, Gram Panchayat, Taluka Panchayat and District Panchayat. It is submitted that Section 9 of the Act of 1993 provides for constitution of the village panchayats. So far as the Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch of the village panchayat are concerned, they are elected by the qualified voters of the village from amongst themselves. It is submitted that Part-III of the Act of 1993 provides for election of the members. So far as the election of the Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch is concerned, the same is governed by the provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1993. While inviting the attention of this Court to Section 63 of the Act of 1993, it is submitted that the President and Vice-President are elected members of the Taluka Panchayat and not the electorate. Section 67 of the Act of 1993 provides for term of the President and Vice- President to be of two and half years. 7.2. It is submitted that so far as the Act of 1963 is concerned, Section 32 provides for election of the President and Vice-President and the term of the office of the President and Vice-President is provided under Section 33 of the Act of 1963 to be of two and half years. It is submitted that the provisions of Sections 9, 63 and 67 of the Act of 1993, on one hand, and Sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1963, on the other, clearly bring out that the provisions under both the Acts operate in different field. 7.3. It is submitted that the concept of panchayats will have no application to the Municipalities. 7.3. It is submitted that the concept of panchayats will have no application to the Municipalities. The attention is invited to Section 175 of the Act of 1993 to submit that the provision starts with non obstante clause, empowering the State Government, subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose, transfer by an order published in the Official Gazette to a district panchayat any such powers, functions and duties relating to any matter as are exercised or performed by the State Government under any enactment which, the State Legislature is competent to enact, or otherwise in the executive power of the State and appear to relate to matters arising within a district and to be of an administrative character and shall on such transfer, allot to the district panchayat such fund and personnel as may be necessary to enable the district panchayat to exercise the powers and discharge the functions and duties so transferred. It is submitted that vide 73rd Constitutional Amendment, to bring uniformity, the Panchayat Act has been enacted to achieve the object of 73rd Amendment. However, the municipal organ is a different organ and therefore, 74th Constitutional Amendment came to be introduced. Amendment of Constitution and object of the provisions are different and distinct and there is no such provision like Section 175 of the Act of 1993 available under the Act of 1963. 7.4. It is submitted that so far as the judgment of this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) is concerned, it deals with the provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1993, which is the result of the object of 73rd Constitutional Amendment. By applying the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), the petitioner proposes to re-write the provisions of Section 36 of the Act of 1963 by reading into provisions, the scope and object of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment though, the Act of 1963 has been enacted by virtue of 74th Constitutional Amendment. It is well settled that purposive interpretation can only be resorted to when any statute provides more than one meaning to any provision or the same fails to achieve the scope and object of the legislation. However, when the language of the statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, the Court may apply the rule of literal interpretation and not the purposive interpretation. 7.5. However, when the language of the statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, the Court may apply the rule of literal interpretation and not the purposive interpretation. 7.5. It is submitted that the provisions have been interpreted by the Court, keeping in view the object of 73rd Amendment inasmuch as, in para 43 of the judgment, it has been observed that keeping in mind the provisions of the Act of 1993, the executive functions entrusted to the elected Sarpanch under Section 55 of the Act and object of 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, i.e. continuity and stability of the Panchayati Raj Institutions that the Court has deemed it appropriate for providing reasonable time of one year. It is submitted that the stability is looking to the functions entrusted i.e. the provisions of Section 175 of the Act of 1993. 7.6. Referring to para 91 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bhanumati vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 2010 SC 3796 , it is submitted that it has been held that vote of no-confidence against elected representative is direct check flowing from accountability. Recall of elected representative is advancement of political democracy ensuring true, fair, honest and just representation of the electorate. It has been held that therefore, the provision in a statute for recall of an elected representative has to be tested, not on general or vague notions but, on practical possibility and electoral feasibility of entrusting the power of recall to a body, which is representative in character and is capable of projecting views of the electorate. It is submitted that the will of the electorate has to be reflected inasmuch as, entire village is the electorate. 7.7. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society vs. Director of Public Instructions reported in (2019)9 SCC 185 . It is submitted that the Apex Court has held and observed that the principle of purposive construction of a statute is a well-recognized principle which has been incorporated in our jurisprudence. It has been held that while giving purposive interpretation, a Court is required to place itself in the chair of the legislature or the author of the statute. The provision should be construed in such a manner as to ensure that the object of the Act is fulfilled. It has been held that while giving purposive interpretation, a Court is required to place itself in the chair of the legislature or the author of the statute. The provision should be construed in such a manner as to ensure that the object of the Act is fulfilled. Obviously, if the language of the Act is clear then the language has to be followed, it would be impermissible for the Court to give its own interpretation. It is therefore, submitted that purposive interpretation can be resorted to only when the statute provides more than one meaning, so is not the case with the provisions of Section 36, language whereof is clear and simple. 7.8. While adverting to the judgment in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra), it is submitted that the Apex Court in para 51, has laid down the proposition that the democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or Rules or Bye-laws, both on the principle and procedure and, if not, it is for the Court to read the democratic principles into the Act or Rules or the Bye-laws. It is therefore, submitted that the right to recall therefore, must weigh on the higher pedestal as being democratic right based on the scheme of the Constitution of India. 7.9. It is submitted that the provisions as regards composition, constitution and administration of the municipalities are provided in Part IXA of the Constitution of India by way of 74th Constitutional Amendment with effect from 01.06.1993. It is submitted that the provisions of Article 243-U provide for the term of the municipality to be 5 years; however, no such provision is available with regard to the term of the President of the municipality. Further, the provisions of Article 243-R(2)(b) provide that the legislature of the State may by law, provide for the manner of elections of the chairperson of the municipality. The right to elect itself includes right to recall or remove and therefore, there is no provision in the entire Part providing for continuity, stability or protective period for the post of the President of the municipality. Thus, the State legislature within its competence, has thought it fit not to provide for the protective period unlike the municipal statutes in other States across the nation. Thus, the State legislature within its competence, has thought it fit not to provide for the protective period unlike the municipal statutes in other States across the nation. It is submitted that the validity of the provisions contained in Section 36 of the Act of 1963 is not the subject matter of challenge and it is legal and valid provision holding the legal sphere. 7.10. It is further submitted that the panchayats and municipalities are entrusted with different nature of works under the Constitution of India and are governed by the different Parts. None of the provisions of each such institution apply to one another. They being the separate institutions, independent and distinct of each other, the provisions related to the Act of 1993 cannot be equated with the provisions of the Act of 1963 nor it can be treated as pari-materia. 7.11. While adverting to the merits of the case, it is submitted that Section 36 of the Act of 1963 provides for motion of no confidence. It permits any councilor of the Municipality, who intends to move a motion of no confidence against its President or Vice-President, to give notice to the Municipality and such notice should be supported by not less than one third of the total number of the then councilors of the Municipality and with such support, the motion can be moved. It is submitted that the total number of councilors are 28, out of which, 25 have moved the motion in a prescribed form, which is in conformity with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Act of 1963 inasmuch as, the motion is carried out by a majority of not less than two third of the total number of the then councilors of the Municipality. 7.12. While concluding, therefore, it is submitted that the reliance placed on the judgment in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) so also, in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra) can be of no help to the petitioner and the present writ petition, being bereft of any merits, deserves to be dismissed. 8. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. 8. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties. The core issue which arises for the consideration of this Court, is, whether the principles laid down in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), which dealt with the provisions of no confidence motion under the Act of 1993 as well as the principles laid down in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra) which dealt with the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 as regards the reasonable time, within which time, no confidence motion cannot be permitted, apply to the facts of the present case? For deciding the said issue, certain provisions of the Constitution of India, Act of 1993, the Act of 1963 so also, the judgments on the point, are required to be taken note of. 9. Before proceeding further, the relevant extract of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Constitution (Seventy- Third Amendment) Act, 1992 are worth referring to, which reads thus:- "Though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have been in existence for a long time, it has been observed that these institutions have not been able to acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive people's bodies due to a number of reasons including absence of regular elections, prolonged supersessions, insufficient representation of weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women, inadequate devolution of powers and lack of financial resources. Article 40 of the Constitution which enshrines one of the Directive Principles of State Policy lays down that the State shall take steps to organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. In the light of the experience in the last forty years and in view of the short-comings which have been observed, it is considered that there is an imperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain basic and essential features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty, continuity and strength to them." 10. In the light of the experience in the last forty years and in view of the short-comings which have been observed, it is considered that there is an imperative need to enshrine in the Constitution certain basic and essential features of Panchayati Raj Institutions to impart certainty, continuity and strength to them." 10. As is discernible from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, though the Panchayati Raj Institutions have been in existence for a long time and it was observed that the institutions have not been able to acquire the status and dignity of viable and responsive peoples' bodies due to a number of reasons including absence of regular elections prolonged supersessions, insufficient representation of weaker sections like Schedule Caste, Scheduled Tribes and women, inadequate devolution of powers and lack of Financial resources, it was proposed to add a new part relating to panchayats in the Constitution to provide for among other things, gram Sabha in a village or group of villages; Constitution of panchayats at the village and other level or levels; direct elections to all seats in panchayats at the village and intermediate level, if any and to the offices of chairpersons of Panchayats at such levels; etc. With this objective in mind, the Constitution 73rd Amendment Act 1992 was brought into force in the Constitution of India. 11. Similarly, since it was observed that local bodies in many States have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold a regular elections, prolonged supersession and inadequate devolution of powers and functions as a result whereof, urban local bodies were not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic unit of self-government, that the 74th Amendment was brought into force providing for various matters. The relevant extract of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Constitution (Seventy-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 reads thus:- “In many States local bodies have become weak and ineffective on account of a variety of reasons, including the failure to hold regular elections, prolonged supersessions and inadequate devolution of powers and functions. As a result, Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. 2. As a result, Urban Local Bodies are not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-government. 2. Having regard to these inadequacies, it is considered necessary that provisions relating to Urban Local Bodies are incorporated in the Constitution particularly for- (i) putting on a firmer footing the relationship between the State Government and the Urban Local Bodies with respect to- (a) the functions and taxation powers; and (b) arrangements for revenue sharing; (ii) Ensuring regular conduct of elections; (iii) ensuring timely elections in the case of supersession; and (iv) providing adequate representation for the weaker sections like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women. 3. Accordingly, it is proposed to add a new part relating to the Urban Local Bodies in the Constitution to provide for- (a) constitution of three types of Municipalities: (i) Nagar Panchayats for areas in transition from a rural area to urban area; (ii) Municipal Councils for smaller urban areas; (iii) Municipal Corporations for larger urban areas. The broad criteria for specifying the said areas is being provided in the proposed article 243-0; (b) composition of Municipalities, which will be decided by the Legislature of a State, having the following features: (i) persons to be chosen by direct election; (ii) representation of Chairpersons of Committees, if any, at ward or other levels in the Municipalities; (iii) representation of persons having special knowledge or experience of Municipal Administration in Municipalities (without voting rights); (c) election of Chairpersons of a Municipality in the manner specified in the State law; (d) constitution of Committees at ward level or other level or levels within the territorial area of a Municipality as may be provided in the State law; (e) reservation of seats in every Municipality- (i) for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to their population of which not less than one-third shall be for women; (ii) for women which shall not less than one-third of the total number of seats; (iii) in favour of backward class of citizens if so provided by the Legislature of the State; (iv) for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women in the office of Chairpersons as may be specified in the State law; (f) fixed tenure of 5 years for the Municipality and re-election within six months of end of tenure. If a Municipality is dissolved before expiration of its duration, elections to be held within a period of six months of its dissolution; xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 12. By virtue of the Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992, Part IX came to be incorporated titled “The Panchayats”. Article 243(d) defines the term “Panchayat” to mean an institution (by whatever name called) of self-government constituted under Article 243B for the rural areas. Similarly, Part IXA came to be incorporated by virtue of the Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992 titled “The Municipalities”. Article 243P(d) defines the term “Municipal area” to mean the territorial area of a Municipality; Article 243P(e) defines the term “Municipality” to mean the institution of the self-government constituted under Article 243Q. Therefore, by virtue of Parts IX and IXA, the Panchayats and the Municipalities have been conferred with the status of local self-government at rural and urban areas. Both Parts IX and IXA provide for composition of the Panchayats and Municipalities respectively. It also provides for elections at the interval of five years, reservation of seats, powers to impose taxes by and funds of the local self-government, powers, authorities and responsibilities of Panchayats and Municipalities etc. Perusal of the provisions contained in Parts IX and IXA, it suggests that almost all provisions are similar. In conformity with the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, the Act of 1993 came to be enacted and certain provisions were incorporated in the Act of 1963. 13. Adverting to the aspect of motion of no confidence, it is required to be noted that the language contained in the provisions is identically worded under the Act of 1993 vis-a-vis the Act of 1963. Section 56 of the Act of 1993 provides that any member, who intends to move a motion of no-confidence against the Sarpanch or the Upa - Sarpanch may give notice in the prescribed form to the panchayats concerned, condition precedent being that the notice should be supported by one half of the total number of members of the Panchayat concerned. So is the position with respect to Section 70 dealing with the no confidence motion at the Taluka level and Section 84 at the District level. Sections 56, 70 and 84 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 read as under:- 56. So is the position with respect to Section 70 dealing with the no confidence motion at the Taluka level and Section 84 at the District level. Sections 56, 70 and 84 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 read as under:- 56. (1) Any member who intends to move a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch or the Upa-Sarpanch may give notice thereof in the prescribed form to the panchayat concerned. If the notice is supported by one half of the total number of members of the panchayat concerned, the motion may be moved. (2) Where in the case of the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch, the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the members of the panchayat, the Sarpanch or, as the case may be, the Upa-Sarpanch shall cease to hold office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried unless he has resigned and the resignation has become effective earlier ; and thereupon the office held by him shall be deemed to have become vacant. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a Sarpanch or, as the case may be, an Upa-Sarpanch, shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him, but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote). (4) When the offices of both the Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch become vacant simultaneously, such Officer as the Taluka Development Officer may authorize in this behalf shall, pending the election of the Sarpanch, exercise all the powers and preform all the functions and duties of Sarpanch but he shall not have the right to vote in any meetings of the panchayat. (4) When the offices of both the Sarpanch and Upa-Sarpanch become vacant simultaneously, such Officer as the Taluka Development Officer may authorize in this behalf shall, pending the election of the Sarpanch, exercise all the powers and preform all the functions and duties of Sarpanch but he shall not have the right to vote in any meetings of the panchayat. (5)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 91 or 95 a meeting of the panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date on which the notice of such motion is received by the panchayat; (b) If the Sarpanch fails to call such meeting, the Secretary of the panchayat shall forthwith make a report thereof the competent authority and thereupon the competent authority shall call a meeting of the panchayat within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the report. 70. (1) Any member who intends to move a motion of no confidence against the President or Vice-President may give a notice thereof in the prescribed form to the panchayat. If the notice is supported by such number of members as may be prescribed, the motion may be moved. (2) If the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the then members of the panchayat, the President or the Vice President, as the case may be, shall cease to hold office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried, unless he has resigned earlier; and thereupon the office held by such President or Vice-President shall be deemed to be vacant. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder a President or Vice-President shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him; but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote). (4)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in section l22, a meting of the panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date on which a notice of such motion is received by the panchayat. (4)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in section l22, a meting of the panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date on which a notice of such motion is received by the panchayat. (b) If the President of the panchayat fails to call such meeting, the Secretary of the panchayat shall make a report thereof to the competent authority and thereupon the competent authority shall call a meeting of the panchayat within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the report. 84. (1) Any member who intends to move a motion of no confidence against the President or Vice-President may give notice thereof in the prescribed form to the panchayat. If the notice is supported by such number of members as may be prescribed, the motion may be moved. (2) If the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of the then members of the panchayat, the President or Vice-President, as the case may be, shall cease to hold office, after a period of three days from the date on which the motion was carried unless he has resigned earlier; and thereupon the office held by such President or Vice-President shall be deemed to be vacant. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder, a President or Vice-President shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence is discussed against him; but he shall have a right to speak or otherwise to take part in the proceedings of such a meeting (including the right to vote). (4) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 144, a meeting of the panchayat for dealing with a motion of no confidence under this section shall be called within a period of fifteen days from the date which a notice of such motion is received by the panchayat. (b) If the President of the panchayat fails to call such meeting, the Secretary of the panchayat shall make a report thereof to the competent authority and thereupon the competent authority shall call a meeting of the panchayat within a period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the report." 14. Similarly, Section 36 of the Act of 1963 provides for motion of no confidence. Similarly, Section 36 of the Act of 1963 provides for motion of no confidence. It contemplates that any Councilor of a municipality who intends to move a motion of no confidence against its President or Vice-President may give notice, in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government, to the municipality condition precedent, being that it should be supported by not less than one third of the total number of the then councilors of the municipality. For ready reference, Section 36 of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 is reproduced hereinbelow:- "36. Motion of no confidence.-(1) Any councilor of a municipality who intends to move a motion of no confidence against its president or vice-president may give a notice thereof, in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government, to the municipality. If the notice is supported by not less than one third of the total number of the then councilors of the municipality, the motion may be moved. (2) If the motion is carried by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total number of then councilors of the municipality, the president or, as the case may be, the vice-president shall cease to hold office after a period of three days from the date on which the motion is carried unless he has earlier resigned; and thereupon the office held by him shall be declared to be vacant. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder, the president, or as the case may be, the vice-president shall not preside over a meeting in which a motion of no confidence against him is discussed; but he shall have the right to speak in or otherwise take part in the proceedings of such meeting (including the right to vote). 15. Therefore, if one considers the provisions of the motion of no confidence contained in the Act of 1993 on one hand and motion of no confidence as contained in Section 36 of the Act of 1963 on the other, they are almost identical. Therefore, the distinction drawn by the learned advocate appearing for the respondent in support of his contention that the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), cannot be made applicable, is misconceived and is rejected in view of the discussion to follow. 16. Therefore, the distinction drawn by the learned advocate appearing for the respondent in support of his contention that the principle laid down by this Court in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), cannot be made applicable, is misconceived and is rejected in view of the discussion to follow. 16. Keeping the aforesaid applicable provisions of the Constitution of India, relevant provisions of both the Acts, namely, Act of 1993 and Act of 1963 in the forefront, the judgment in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra) is worth referring to. This Court was dealing with the provisions of Section 56 amongst others of the Act of 1993. Central to the issue was whether it was permissible to move a motion of no confidence against the Sarpanch within a period of one month from the date of the election in absence of no time limit prescribed for moving no confidence motion. It has been held and observed that the provisions of the statute are to be interpreted keeping in mind the object and spirit of the Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. By applying the said principle, it is always open for the Courts to interpret the provisions keeping in mind Objects and Reasons of the statute so also, the constitutional background. For the present purpose, the relevant paragraphs 36 to 45 are set out hereinbelow:- 36. Referring to aforesaid case law on the subject and in view of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v/s. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 , it is the case of the appellant that looking to the objective of 73rd Constitutional Amendment that the stability and continuity of the Panchayat is intended and further Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 is enacted only to bring law of Panchayat in tune with the constitutional amendment. Unless reasonable time for prohibiting moving of no confidence motion is read into Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, it will run contrary to the object and spirit of the constitutional amendment. It is also the case of the appellant that if composite scheme of the Panchayat Act is looked into, it is clear that unless elected Sarpanch is allowed to work for reasonable time after election, it is not open to the members of the Panchayat to move no confidence motion immediately after election. It is also the case of the appellant that if composite scheme of the Panchayat Act is looked into, it is clear that unless elected Sarpanch is allowed to work for reasonable time after election, it is not open to the members of the Panchayat to move no confidence motion immediately after election. It is submitted that if same is allowed, it will destroy the object and spirit of 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. 37. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State and learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.C. Dave appearing for the respondents by placing reliance on the judgments in the case of Union of India v/s. Namit Sharma reported in (2013) 10 SCC 359 and Bharat Aluminium Company v/s. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Service Inc. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 552 have submitted that in view of clear language under section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, which is unambiguous, it is not open to interpret the provisions of Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, but at the same time, in view of the judgment in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v/s. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 , provisions of the statute are to be interpreted keeping in mind object and spirit of Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. By applying aforesaid principle, it is always open for the Courts to interpret provisions keeping in mind object and reasons of the statute and also constitutional background. We are unable to accede to submission made by learned Senior Counsel Mr. D.C. Dave that principle of reading into or reading down is to be applied only in cases where vires is challenged. Even in case, where vires is not challenged, if any provision of statute falls for interpretation, it is always open for the Court to interpret such provision having regard to object and reasons of the statute and constitutional background for such statute. 38. In the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v/s. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Limited and Ors. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 , the Honble Supreme Court while holding that in absence of any provision, no confidence motion can be moved against elected President of the Cooperative Societies, has also issued guidelines noticing restriction for moving no confidence motion immediately after election in various States under Cooperative Societies Act, Municipal Act and Panchayat Act in the country. As a measure of guidelines, in the aforesaid judgment, the Honble Supreme Court has held that no confidence motion cannot be moved for a period of two years from the date of election and also further held that similar attempt to move no confidence motion cannot be made for a period of one year, once it is failed. Looking at Chapters IX, IXA and IXB of the Constitution of India, having similar object and reasons, said amendments were made in the Constitution. 39. In view of the fact that continuity and stability of Panchayati Raj Institutions is one of the objectives of Constitutional 73rd Amendment Act, 1992, if no confidence motion is moved against elected Sarpanch immediately after election, without even permitting said elected Sarpanch to work for reasonable time to discharge his / her functions, and obligation as contemplated under section 55 of the Panchayats Act, any move for removal by way of no confidence motion immediately after election will run contrary to the spirit and object behind 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992. 40. Though the appellant is elected in the election held on 27.12.2016 by the qualified voters of Panchayat, she is sought to be removed by way of no confidence motion by the members of Panchayat barely within a period of one month from the date of declaration of election. Though no reasons are required to be mentioned for moving no confidence motion, but unless elected Sarpanch is allowed to work for reasonable time, moving no confidence motion on the allegation that members of the Panchayat have lost confidence is illegal and arbitrary. If the same is permitted, it will result in vicious circle, as much as, there is no disqualification attached once Sarpanch is removed by way of no confidence motion, unlike disqualification attached to removal as contemplated under Section 57 of the Panchayats Act. It is fairly well settled that if a person is removed by way of no confidence motion, it is neither censure motion nor punitive one and it will not attach any disqualification for future contest. 41. Once elected candidate is removed by way of no confidence motion, resulting in vacancy, again the very same person may contest and also win the immediate election. 41. Once elected candidate is removed by way of no confidence motion, resulting in vacancy, again the very same person may contest and also win the immediate election. Same cannot be the scheme under the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, which is enacted to bring law relating to panchayat in tune with provisions under Chapter IX of the Constitution of India. 42. Then the next question which arises is, in absence of any restriction for a particular time under section 56 of the Act, what should be the reasonable time, within which time no confidence motion cannot be permitted, so as to read into section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act. Reasonable time is nothing but a time that is fairly required to do whatever is required to be done, conveniently under the permitted circumstances. Reasonable time varies from the contextual meaning, under which it is used. In short, the reasonable time is any time which is not manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances. 43. Under section 13 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993, every panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under this Act shall continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. Keeping such provisions in mind, and executive functions entrusted to the elected Sarpanch under Section 55 of the Panchayat Act, and object of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 i.e. continuity and stability of Panchayati Raj institutions, we deem it appropriate that reasonable time of one year should be considered as reasonable time, within which time, no motion could be permitted for removal of elected Sarpanch by way of no confidence motion as contemplated under section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act from the date of declaration of result. Similarly, once, no confidence motion is moved and defeated, same cannot be permitted for a period of one year from the date of such defeat. 44. So far as President of Taluka Panchayat is concerned, initially period can be of one year from the date of declaration of result, within which time, no motion can be permitted for removal of elected President of Taluka Panchayat. However, keeping in mind tenure of elected President of Taluka Panchayat being only two and half years, once motion is defeated, same can be permitted to be moved only after six months from the date of defeat. 45. However, keeping in mind tenure of elected President of Taluka Panchayat being only two and half years, once motion is defeated, same can be permitted to be moved only after six months from the date of defeat. 45. We have issued aforesaid directions, in absence of any specific provision for prohibiting no confidence motion after declaration of election against Sarpanch and UpSarpanch under Section 56 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993 and so far as President of Taluka Panchayat under Section 70 of the Gujarat Panchayat Act, 1993. We make it clear that it is open for the competent authority to make suitable amendment in aforesaid provisions.” 17. This Court has referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra). It has been observed that the Apex Court, while noticing restrictions for moving no confidence motion, immediately after elections, in various States under Cooperative Societies Act, Municipalities Act and Panchayats Act in country has issued guidelines. The said guidelines were necessitated in absence of any provision, of moving no confidence motion against elected representative. This Court also observed that as a measure of guidelines in the judgment of the Apex Court, it has been held that no confidence motion cannot be moved for a period of two years from the date of election and once, no confidence motion is moved and defeated, the same cannot be permitted for a period of one year from the date of such defeat. This Court held and observed that looking at Parts IX, IXA and IXB of the Constitution, having similar objects and reasons, said amendments were made in the Constitution. Therefore, this Court has unequivocally held that Parts IX, IXA and IXB have similar Objects and Reasons. In view of the said observation, the contention raised by the learned advocate for the respondent that the provisions related to Panchayats Act cannot be equated with the provisions of the Municipalities nor it can be treated as pari-materia is misplaced and against the observations made in paragraph 38 of the judgment in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel. In view of the said observation, the contention raised by the learned advocate for the respondent that the provisions related to Panchayats Act cannot be equated with the provisions of the Municipalities nor it can be treated as pari-materia is misplaced and against the observations made in paragraph 38 of the judgment in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel. Feeble attempt has been made by learned advocate Mr.Champaneri in drawing the distinction between the provisions of the Act of 1993 on one hand and the Act of 1963 on the other hand; however, the said distinction, if accepted, would run against the spirit of the Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution of India. The contention of learned advocate Mr.Champaneri that the Sarpanch at the village level is elected by ballot by the qualified voters of the village from amongst themselves whereas, the President is elected by the councilors from amongst themselves in the manner prescribed by the State Government cannot be accepted inasmuch as, the fact remains that the provisions of Section 36 of the Act of 1963 providing for moving of the motion of no confidence on one hand and Sections 56, 70 and 84 of the Act of 1993 dealing with the provisions of the motion of no confidence at village, taluka and district level respectively, on the other, are almost identical. 18. The aforesaid view is also fortified by the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra). The Apex Court, while dealing with the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act, has made a reference to the judgment in the case of Bhanumati vs. State of U.P. (supra) and observed that the cooperative principles governing democratic institutions have been discussed in detail; no doubt while dealing with the Panchayati Raj institutions. However, the basic democratic principles governing both the institutions, enjoying the constitutional status, are the same. The Apex Court therefore, referred to the discussion made in paragraphs 58 and 66 of the judgment in the case of Bhanumati vs. State of U.P. (supra). The Apex Court has further held that the cooperative principles so also, the Panchayati Raj Institutions are governed by the democratic principles enjoying the constitutional status. The Apex Court therefore, referred to the discussion made in paragraphs 58 and 66 of the judgment in the case of Bhanumati vs. State of U.P. (supra). The Apex Court has further held that the cooperative principles so also, the Panchayati Raj Institutions are governed by the democratic principles enjoying the constitutional status. The Apex Court, in para 20, has further held that if a person has been selected to an office through democratic process, and when that person loses the confidence of the representatives, who selected him, those representatives should necessarily have a democratic right to remove such an office-bearer in whom, they do not have confidence, in case those institutions are viewed under the Constitution/statues as democratic institutions. Moreover, in paragraphs 52, 52.1 and 52.2, the Apex Court, while dealing with the provisions of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, has referred to the provisions of Panchayats Act and Municipalities Act and has held and observed that having regard to the set up in the local self-governments, a motion of no confidence against an office bearer shall be moved only after two years of his assumption of office. Therefore, the municipalities having been conferred a constitutional status, by virtue of 74th Amendment Act to the Constitution, cannot be put on the different pedestal. Paragraphs 52, 52.1 and 52.2 are reproduced hereinbelow:- “52. Now that this Court has declared the law regarding the democratic set up of a cooperative society and that it is permissible to remove an elected office bearer through motion of no confidence, and since in many States, the relevant statutes have not carried out the required statutory changes in terms of the constitutional mandate, we feel it just and necessary to lay down certain guidelines. However, we make it clear that these guidelines are open to be appropriately modified and given statutory shape by the competent legislature/authority. 52.1. Having gone through the provisions regarding motion of no confidence in local self-governments, we find that there is no uniformity with regard to the procedure and process regarding motion of no confidence. Some States provide for a protection of two years, some for one year and a few for six months, to the office bearers in office before moving a motion of no confidence. Some States provide for a protection of two years, some for one year and a few for six months, to the office bearers in office before moving a motion of no confidence. However, majority of the States provide for two years and a gap of another one year in case one motion of no confidence is defeated. Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and two years, Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 provides for a protection of two and a half years, Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 provides for a protection of two years, Orissa Grama Panchayats Act, 1964 provides for a protection of two years, Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years, Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and one year, Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 provides for a protection of two years and Uttar Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1947, as followed by Uttarakhand, provides for a protection of two years and one year. 52.2. Having regard to the set up in local self-governments prevailing in many of the States as above, we direct that in the case of cooperative societies registered under any Central or State law, a motion of no confidence against an office bearer shall be moved only after two years of his assumption of office. In case the motion of no confidence is once defeated, a fresh motion shall not be introduced within another one year. A motion of no confidence shall be moved only in case there is a request from one-third of the elected members of the Board of Governors/Managing Committee of the cooperative society concerned. The motion of no confidence shall be carried in case the motion is supported by more than fifty per cent of the elected members present in the meeting.” 19. The motion of no confidence shall be carried in case the motion is supported by more than fifty per cent of the elected members present in the meeting.” 19. The Apex Court, while referring to the provisions of no confidence motion in local self-government, had observed that there is no uniformity with regard to the procedure and process regarding the motion of no confidence. The Apex Court had also referred to the Panchayats Act as well as Municipalities Act. Having considered the provisions to be not in conformity, directed that in the case of Co-operative societies registered under any Central or State law, a motion of no confidence against an office-bearer shall be moved only after two years of his assumption of office and in case, the motion of no confidence is once defeated, a fresh motion shall not be introduced within another one year. Considering the similar principle governing the amendment pertaining to local self Government, namely, Panchayats and Municipalities, the Apex Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra), has read the power to bring motion of no confidence as well as restriction to bring it within a reasonable period. After enunciation of law by the Apex Court in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra), this Court, while deciding the issue relating to Section 56 of the Act of 1993 in the case of Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), extensively referred to the judgment in the case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra). 20. While adverting to the observations made by the Division Bench in the context of Section 56 of the Act of 1993, it is required to be noted that the Division Bench has held and observed that reasonable time is nothing but a time that is fairly required to do whatever is required to be done, conveniently under the permitted circumstances. Reasonable time varies in the contextual meaning, under which, it is used. It has been held that reasonable time is any time which is not manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, the Division Bench considering the object of the 73rd Constitution Amendment Act, 1992 that is continuity and stability of Panchayati Raj Institutions considered one year as a reasonable time, within which time, no motion could be permitted for removal of the elected Sarpanch by way of no confidence motion as contemplated. Therefore, the Division Bench considering the object of the 73rd Constitution Amendment Act, 1992 that is continuity and stability of Panchayati Raj Institutions considered one year as a reasonable time, within which time, no motion could be permitted for removal of the elected Sarpanch by way of no confidence motion as contemplated. Therefore, so far as the nature and character of the local self-governments being the same, the principles laid down in the two judgments, namely, Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary (supra) and Shivangiben Chetankumar Patel (supra), as regards the reasonable time within which the motion of no confidence could be permitted for removal of the elected representative from the date of declaration of result, apply on all fours to the provisions of Section 36 of the Act of 1963. 21. Considering the similar basic democratic principles, governing both the institutions enjoying same Constitutional status, this Court is of the opinion that it would be appropriate to consider one year as a reasonable time, within which time, no motion can be permitted for removal of the elected president by way of no confidence motion as contemplated under Section 36 of the Act of 1963 from the date of declaration of result. In the present case, the petitioner was appointed as a President of the Municipality on 24.08.2020 for a period of two and half years and within a span of six months, the other members of the Nagarpalika forwarded a requisition for moving the motion of no confidence against the petitioner. Hence, in view of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs; the provisions of the Act of 1963 as well as the law on issue and applicable principle, the requisition dated 18.01.2021 challenged in the captioned writ petition deserves to be quashed and set aside and is hereby quashed and set aside. 22. The present petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute. No order as to cost.