ORDER : 1. This Civil Revision Petition has been filed against the Judgment in C.M.A.No.18/2012 on the file of Additional District Court-I, Kalpetta by which order of confiscation No.W4-3726/2012 dated 01.10.2012 passed by the Authorised officer, Wild Life Warden, Wayanad was confirmed. 2. Revision petitioner is the owner of sawmill in the name and style 'Nirmala Wood Industries', Sulthan Bathery. He is the 11th accused in O.R.6/12(NFS) registered by Assistant Wild Life Warden Sulthan Bathery. According to the respondent on 03.05.2012, Flying-squad, Kalpetta, upon a secret information, seized unauthorizedly kept teakwood from Bishop's House, Meenangadi. About two months prior to the seizure, three teak trees were found to be stolen from Kulachira 1972, Teak Estate within Naikkatty Station of Sulthan Bathery Range. A mahazar was prepared and O.R.No.6/2012 (NFS) was registered in connection with the seizure of the teak-wood. Two vehicles used for transportation of the teak-wood and the machineries in the mill (10 HP Texmo Motor – one, sword of sawing, cutting machine, belt) used for sawing the wood were seized by the Assistant Wildlife Warden and produced the items before the Wildlife Warden, the Authorized officer for initiating proceedings under Section 61A of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 (in short, 'the Act'). As per Order No.W.4-3726/2012 dated 01.10.2012 the Authorized officer confiscated the vehicles involved and also the machineries in the saw mill. 3. As per a common judgment, the learned Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge confirmed the confiscation proceedings initiated against the revision petitioner as well as the owner of the vehicles which were used for transportation of the wood items. The facts in respect of seizure of vehicle are not in issue in this case and the challenge by the petitioner is against the confiscation proceedings initiated against the machineries of his Saw mill. 4. Notice was issued to the respondents and the learned Special Government Pleader appeared on behalf of the respondents and learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents were heard. Lower court records were also called for and perused. 5. Though a contention was advanced by the revision petitioner before the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the machineries in the sawmill will not come within the definition of 'tools' and that was rightly negatived by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in view of the dictum laid down in Moosa Ahamed v. Authorised Officer and Divisional Forest Officer, Trivandraum and Anr. Though a contention was advanced by the revision petitioner before the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the machineries in the sawmill will not come within the definition of 'tools' and that was rightly negatived by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in view of the dictum laid down in Moosa Ahamed v. Authorised Officer and Divisional Forest Officer, Trivandraum and Anr. [ 2014 3 KLJ 534 ], no such contention was raised at the time of argument before this Court though such a ground was raised in the memorandum of revision. 6. According to the learned counsel for the revision petitioner (in short petitioner), the wood was sawed in his mill after verification of the pass issued and on making entries in the register kept in his office and receiving charges for the work done. Though copy of the pass kept in the office and copy of the register in which the details of the wood sawed etc. were produced by him during hearing, none of the contentions raised by him were considered and that has caused miscarriage of justice. It is also his contention that he was informed that the timber is brought from Kallumukku Church and it has to be supplied to Meenangadi Bishop's House. Hence he had no suspicion regarding the authenticity of the wood brought for sawing. He has taken all reasonable care and caution in sawing the wood. So the confiscation of the machineries ordered is illegal and unsustainable. The learned counsel placed reliance on State of Kerala v. Mathew [ 1995(2) KLT 772 ] : [ILR 1996(1) Ker. 561] : [1995 KHC 386] and also State of Kerala v. James Thomas [ 2017 2 KLJ 863 : 2017 2 KHC 805 : 2017 2 KLT SN, 73]. 7. The learned Government Pleader on the other hand would contend that the revision petitioner was quite aware of the illicit transportation of the wood and he has not verified the pass and hence has not taken necessary precaution. The Manager of the sawmill has given statement that he has not verified the documents, since the same has been verified by the owner/revision petitioner. But quite contrary to that revision petitioner has given a statement that since he had some urgent works, he directed the writer to verify the documents. The Manager of the sawmill has given statement that he has not verified the documents, since the same has been verified by the owner/revision petitioner. But quite contrary to that revision petitioner has given a statement that since he had some urgent works, he directed the writer to verify the documents. So those statements given by the Writer and the revision petitioner are contradictory and, in short, according to him, the wood which was brought to the sawmill of the revision petitioner was without any pass and other necessary documents and the revision petitioner sawed the teak-wood in his sawmill knowing that wood was brought without necessary pass and hence he has not taken the reasonable and necessary precaution against illicit use of the tools. 8. Before going to the factual aspects, the law with regard to the confiscation proceedings settled by this Court and the Apex Court is relevant to be discussed. The ecological imbalance due to deforestation which the country is facing for the past few decades is a matter of great concern. Way back in the year 1986, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Baby v. Forest Range Officer (ILR 1986 (2) Ker. 57) has expressed his views with regard to the strict interpretation of the provisions of Forest Laws which is apposite in this context to be extracted and it reads thus : “The background in which legislation regarding forest had been made and had been improved from time to time, both by the Parliament and by the State Legislatures, has to be viewed in the larger background. When the legislature has taken note of the colossal depredation of the forest wealth and when it is scientifically established that such wanton waster of forest-cover would take the country perilously near desertification and a total disturbance” of the ecology and environment, the Court should be slow to give a narrow interpretation to such well meant statutory provisions”. In State v. Pushpan ( 1984 KLT 257 ) Bhaskaran Nambiar J. has also observed in the same tone though in different words like this : “The onus is on the owner to prove that the vehicle was used for transporting illicit timber without his knowledge and without his connivance and that he had taken all precautions against such use. The owner did not discharge this burden. Forest cannot be denuded and forest wealth cannot be dissipated. The owner did not discharge this burden. Forest cannot be denuded and forest wealth cannot be dissipated. Pretended ignorance cannot cover resourceful attempts and protect sharp practices. Lenient view in such case is bound to affect public interest and will indirectly set this as an accepted pattern for illicit transport of forest produce.” Constitutional validity of confiscatory provisions in the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in Divisional Forest Officer v. Sudhakr Rao ( AIR 1986 SC 328 ) and in the decision their Lordships justified the change in legislative approach as a necessity “to prevent the growing menace of ruthless exploitation of government forests”. 9. In State of Kerala v. Mathew relied on by the petitioner the above decision has been quoted and paragraph No.6 of the said judgment is also relevant in this context to be extracted which reads thus: “The contention that such a strict view would adversely affect an innocent vehicle owner cannot be countenanced since any narrow or liberal interpretation of confiscatory provisions in the Act can eventually lead to disastrous consequences for forest wealth which is a very endangered bounty of nature. The idea behind extension of confiscatory provisions to vehicles etc, is to convey a peremptory and explicit message to the vehicle owners not to allow their vehicles to be used to depletion of forest wealth. If any vehicle is caught in the nefarious act of carrying illicit forest produce, it is not enough that the owner establishes his innocence alone. If he wants to retrieve his vehicle he must show further that the person who was in charge of the vehicle has taken reasonable and necessary precautionary measures against such user of the vehicle. The owner cannot rest with establishing his innocence his failure to establish the next limb might lead to hard consequences to him. Legislature intended, by providing such stringent conditions, to prevent harder consequences for the society and for the posterity.” 10. In State of Kerala and Another v. James Thomas ( 2017 (2) KHC 805 ) a learned Single Judge of this Court have made a detailed discussion with regard to the law in the field and the nature of duties vested with the authorized officers and affirmed it as quasi judicial function and made a detailed discussion with regard to the strict interpretation of the provisions of Sec.61A and 61B of the Act. 11. Sec.52 of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 empowers a Forest Officer to seize timber or other forest produce with respect to which he has reason to believe that a forest offence has been committed with tools, rocks, chains etc. The tool alleged to be involved in this case is the machineries attached to the saw-mill of the petitioner (10 HP electric motor, 4 sawing sorts, 3 belts). Though there was a contention that the machineries in the saw-mill will not come under the tools mentioned in Sec.52 before the court below and in the memorandum of revision also, at the time of argument no contention was raised in that regard. 12. Sec.61B of the Act prescribe the procedure of confiscation. For convenience it is extracted and it reads thus : “Issue of show cause notice before confiscation under Sec.61A – (1) No order confiscating any timber, charcoal, firewood, ivory, tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles or cattle shall be made under Section 61A unless the person from whom the same is seized - (a) is given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate such timber, charcoal, firewood, ivory, tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles or cattle; (b) is given an opportunity of making a representation in writing within such reasonable time as may be specified in the notice against the grounds of confiscation; and (c) is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1) no order confiscating any tool, rope, chain, boat, vehicle or cattle shall be made under Section 61A if the owner of the tool, rope, chain, boat, vehicle or cattle proves to the satisfaction of the authorized officer that it was used in carrying the timber, charcoal, firewood or ivory without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any and the person in charge of the tool, rope, chain, boat, vehicle or cattle and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use.” 13. Sub-Section (1) of Sec.61B expressly provides that when a notice in writing is given informing the person from whom the articles are seized, all the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate is to be stated and it also provides that the person from whom the article is seized should be given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation in writing within a reasonable time as specified in the notice against the ground of confiscation and sub clause (c) further provides a right of hearing of the person from whom the articles are seized. 14. In the present case, the main defence of the petitioner is with regard to the non-compliance of the formalities under sub-section (2) of Sec.61B. His defence is that he was not aware that the wood sawed in the mill was a forest produce and further that he has taken reasonable and necessary precaution by verifying the pass and also entered the details of the wood sawed in the register kept in his office and hence he has taken all reasonable and necessary precaution against illicit use of machineries. 15. The learned counsel placed reliance on State of Kerala v. Mathew ( 1995 (2) KLT 772 = 1995 KHC 386). It is apposite in this context to quote paragraph Nos.4 and 5 of the above decision which read as follows : “4.S.61-B contains two sub-sections. The first sub-section says that no order of confiscation shall be made without giving notice to the person from whom it was seized informing him of the grounds for confiscation and affording him an opportunity of making representation. Sub-section (2) contains a further restriction against confiscation. It says that no order of confiscation shall be made if the owner of the vehicle proves that it was used in carrying the timber “without the knowledge or connivance of the owner himself, his agent, if any, and the person in charge of the vehicle and that each of them had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. 5. The restriction against confiscation contained in sub-s.(2) can operate only on the combination of three postulates. First is that the owner or his agent was totally unaware of the illicit use. Second is that he had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. 5. The restriction against confiscation contained in sub-s.(2) can operate only on the combination of three postulates. First is that the owner or his agent was totally unaware of the illicit use. Second is that he had taken all reasonable and necessary precautions against such use. Third is, the person in charge of the vehicle had also taken reasonable and necessary precaution against such use. If the owner succeeds in satisfying only the first two postulates, he would not get the benefit of the restriction against confiscation. The third condition is as important as the other two and unless that also is established no advantage would practically enure to the owner of the vehicle. Subsection (2) would remain at bay if the third condition remains unsatisfied.” 16. It goes without saying that the burden of proof is upon the person from whom the tool or vehicle etc, have been seized to prove the ingredients of sub-section (2) of Sec.61B in order to claim the benefit thereunder. The first ingredient is that he was totally unaware of the fact that the wood which have been sawed was a forest produce. The second is that, he had taken all reasonable and necessary precaution against the illicit use of the tools. The third limb formulated above is not applicable in the present case because the petitioner has no case that anybody in charge of the mill has been entrusted by him to do the work so as to prove that he has also taken reasonable and necessary precaution against the illicit use. 17. To establish the first ingredient, the learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the order of confiscation passed by the authorized officer in which there is reference with regard to the pass which has been verified by the revision petitioner. It is the specific contention of the revision petitioner that it was informed that the teak wood is from Kallumukku Church and it is to be supplied to Meenangadi Bishop's house. The fact that the wood in question have been seized from Meenangadi Bishop's house is admitted and the case of the respondent from the beginning is that it has been collected unauthorizedly at Meenangadi Bishop's house. 18. The fact that the wood in question have been seized from Meenangadi Bishop's house is admitted and the case of the respondent from the beginning is that it has been collected unauthorizedly at Meenangadi Bishop's house. 18. The learned Special Government Pleader would vehemently contend that there was no pass and the statement given by the revision petitioner to the authorized officer was that since he was busy with other works, he directed his writer to verify the documents and he did not get time to verify it. Hence the contention regarding the verification of pass is not sustainable. 19. The impugned order passed by the authorized officer would state that the owner of the mill, (the petitioner herein), has not even verified as to whether the pass shown is genuine or not. So the fact that a pass was shown while bringing the wood for sawing is borne out from the order of the Authorized Officer also. 20. The respondent has also got a contention that initially these teak woods have been taken for sawing to 'CG Timbers' and the owner of that saw-mill Sri.George refused to saw the wood and thereafter it was taken to the revision petitioner's mill. There is reference with regard to the statement of the said mill owner in the confiscation order. The copy of the statement by the saw-mill owner was brought to my attention and it would show that necessary documents with respect to the teak wood were not shown to him by the persons who brought the teak wood. It is alleged that there after the teak wood have been sawed in the saw-mill of the revision petitioner. He has given statement regarding the showing of pass and the verification of the same and the finding of the authorized officer is that petitioner has not verified the genuineness of the pass shown to him. So also, he has given statement to the Authorised Officer that the entry regarding the wood sawed is entered as 14th item in first page of the then register. 21. Copy of the statement given by the petitioner would corroborate with the contention of the learned Special Government Pleader that petitioner has not verified the documents since he has got some urgent matters and hence he directed the writer to verify the documents and saw the woods. 21. Copy of the statement given by the petitioner would corroborate with the contention of the learned Special Government Pleader that petitioner has not verified the documents since he has got some urgent matters and hence he directed the writer to verify the documents and saw the woods. In subsequent part of his statement, it has been stated that photocopy of the pass issued from the Forest Department was shown and believing it to be genuine the woods were sawed. It is not clear from the statement to whom the pass was shown and who verified it. However, the order of confiscation would show that the finding of the Authorised Officer is that the genuineness of the pass was not verified by the petitioner. At the same time statement of the petitioner was that he directed his writer to verify the documents and saw the wood items. Though the learned Special Government Pleader made reference about the statement of the writer, it has not been referred by the Authorized Officer in the order of confiscation. Without evaluation of the statement of the writer by the Authorized Officer and the Appellate Court, it will not be proper on the part of this Court to examine the statement of writer and point out the inconsistency in the statement given by the writer and the petitioner. Question regarding the verification of the documents is a prime factor to determine the reasonable and necessary precaution on the part of the revision petitioner to prevent illicit use of the tools. So I am of the view that a definite finding of the authorized officer in that regard is lacking in this case. 22. The impugned confiscation order would refer the statement given by the revision petitioner about the entry in the Sawing Register about the details of the wood sawed. So there is a duty cast upon the Authorised Officer to verify the veracity of that entry and make a finding with regard to the same as to whether it is acceptable or not. The specific contention advanced by the revision petitioner that with all bonafides, thinking that the teak wood brought is from Kallumukku Church for Meenangadi Bishop's house, he did not doubt about the authenticity of teak wood brought for sawing cannot be brushed aside lightly. The specific contention advanced by the revision petitioner that with all bonafides, thinking that the teak wood brought is from Kallumukku Church for Meenangadi Bishop's house, he did not doubt about the authenticity of teak wood brought for sawing cannot be brushed aside lightly. He has also given statement that the persons who brought the timber for sawing are Baby, the Mandalam President of a prominent Political Party and others were the Committee members of the Church and hence he had no reason to disbelieve them and the wood was also brought during day time etc. All those factors have not been properly considered by the Authorized Officer while passing the impugned order. He has given a statement that for the last more than 50 years he has been conducting the saw-mill and the saw-mill has been started in the year 1963 by his father and till date, they were not involved in any offence. It has also come out that during the pendency of the proceedings the confiscated items (10 HP electric motor, 4 sawing sorts, 3 belts) have been released to the petitioner on furnishing security. 23. The power exercised by the Authorized Officer while passing the impugned order is quasi judicial in nature and justice, equity and fair-play are the factors which have to be observed by a quasi judicial body while passing any order. The learned Single Judge while disposing State of Kerala and Another v. James Thomas, made a detailed discussion regarding the principles to be observed by a quasi judicial body while exercising the powers. The decision reported in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raja mahendra pal (1990 (4) SCC 93) has been quoted to determine whether the nature of the function is quasi-judicial and the primary test to determine is whether the authority has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at a decision in question. If the reply is in the affirmative, the authority is deemed to be quasi-judicial and if it is in the negative, it would not be a quasi judicial functionary. 24. Administrative Law by Wade and Forsyth, 9th Edition Page 482 deals with judicial and quasi judicial acts. Paragraph 2 and 3 are relevant in this context to be extracted which reads thus : “Every administrative act was thus treated as 'judicial' if it adversely affected any person's rights or entailed a penalty. 24. Administrative Law by Wade and Forsyth, 9th Edition Page 482 deals with judicial and quasi judicial acts. Paragraph 2 and 3 are relevant in this context to be extracted which reads thus : “Every administrative act was thus treated as 'judicial' if it adversely affected any person's rights or entailed a penalty. Exactly the same abuse of language was adopted in requiring a 'duty to act judicially' as a condition of the availability of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and to this an unprofitable discussion must be devoted elsewhere. When in time the courts came to forget the paradoxical sense which they had invented for 'judicial', they found themselves in difficulty. If every power affecting some person's rights is called 'judicial', there is virtually no meaning left for 'administrative'. The term quasi-judicial' accordingly came into vogue, as an epithet for powers which, though administrative, were required to be exercised as if they were judicial, i.e., in accordance with natural justice. This at least was less of a misnomer than 'judicial' and made it easier for the courts to continue the work of developing their system of fair administrative procedure. 'Quasi-judicial' was the subject of a classic discussion and definition by the Committee on Ministers' Powers, who emphasised that a judicial decision consists of finding facts and applying law whereas a quasi-judicial decision consists of finding facts and applying administrative policy. The latter term was much used in the housing cases, related below”. 25. In Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, and others ( 1978 (1) SCC 405 = AIR 1978 SC 851 = 1978 KHC 478) while dealing with the validity of an order of a statutory authority it has been held that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain ground, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplanted by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. 26. Otherwise an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. 26. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Malu M. and others v. State of Kerala and Others ( 2015 KHC 590 = 2015 (3) KLT S.N. 62 = ILR (2015 (3) (Ker.) 869) while dealing with the object underlying the rules of natural justice, held that the underlined rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. The recording of reasons by an administrative or Quasi-judicial authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision making and it would apply equally to all decisions made by such authorities and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. 27. In the case on hand the Authorized Officer, while passing the order confiscating the tools of the saw-mill whether acted by observing the principles of fair-play is a matter to be evaluated from the order passed. The learned Special Government Pleader argued by referring a statement of the Writer of the petitioner's sawmill to content about the contradiction in the statement of the petitioner and the Writer. But it has not been referred in the order of confiscation of the Authorised Officer. So this Court cannot supplement anything to the impugned order pointing out the inconsistency in the statement of the petitioner and that of writer. So also obviously the order of confiscation shows that the revision petitioner at the time of hearing mentioned about the entry of the teak wood sawed in the mill, in the register concerned. The order does not reveal whether the entries in the register referred by him are true or not. Normally no owner of a mill will make any entry in the register involving illicit use of machineries. Whether the Authorised Officer accepted the statement of the petitioner or rejected it, is not discernible from the order of confiscation. Only if the order passed by the Authorised Officer evaluated those facts it can be said that the order of confiscation was passed duly observing the principles of fair play. Whether the Authorised Officer accepted the statement of the petitioner or rejected it, is not discernible from the order of confiscation. Only if the order passed by the Authorised Officer evaluated those facts it can be said that the order of confiscation was passed duly observing the principles of fair play. So lack of fair play which is expected of from a quasi-Judicial Authority is explicit in passing the order of confiscation. So on totality of the facts and circumstances, the impugned confiscation order passed by the Authorised officer and consequent judgment in C.M.A.18/2012 are not sustainable against the petitioner. 28. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed and the impugned judgment and also the order of confiscation No.W4-3726/2012 dated 01.10.2012 passed by the Authorised Officer to the extent of confiscating the tools (10 HP electric motor, 4 sawing sorts, 3 belts) of the revision petitioner is set aside and the Authorised Officer is directed to pass fresh orders in the light of discussion made above. In the facts and circumstances there is no order as to costs.