ORDER : Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment dated 12.07.2017, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, H.P., in Cr. Appeal No.28 of 2017, titled Kehar Singh vs. Manju Banga, affirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.01.2017 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, District Kullu, in Cr. Complaint No. 877-1/2013/525-1/2015 (old), 471-1/2016/13/471-III/2016/13(new), titled Manju Banga vs. Kehar Singh, whereby court below while holding petitioner-accused (hereinafter referred to as ‘accused’) guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act’) convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay compensation of Rs. 2,50,000/- to the complainant and in default of payment of compensation, to further undergo simple imprisonment of one month. 2. Precisely, the facts as emerge from the record are that respondent-complainant (hereinafter referred to as ‘complainant’) instituted complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, District Kullu, stating therein that she is proprietor of M/s Pawan Putra Steels, Banga Trading Company, Dhalpur, Kullu and accused was known to her and they were having cordial relations with each other. Complainant alleged that accused purchased steel/saria from her shop worth Rs.2,00,000/- and with a view to discharge aforesaid liability, issued cheque Ext.CB. However, fact remains that aforesaid cheque on its presentation to the bank concerned was dishonoured on account of ‘insufficient funds’, vide Ext. C-C. After having received memo from the bank concerned, complainant issued a legal notice Ext.CD to the accused calling upon him to make the payment good within stipulated time, but since he failed to do the same, complainant was compelled to institute complaint under Section 138 of the Act. Trial Court on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties, held accused guilty of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him as per description given hereinabove. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.01.2017, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, District Kullu H.P., which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 12.07.2017. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.01.2017, accused preferred an appeal in the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kullu, District Kullu H.P., which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 12.07.2017. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C, 1973, praying therein for his acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction and order of sentence passed by courts below. 3. Vide order dated 18.09.2017, this Court while suspending substantive sentence imposed by court below, directed accused to deposit 50% of compensation amount within a period of six weeks, however, fact remains that aforesaid order passed by this Court, never came to be complied with despite repeated opportunities and as such, this Court has no option, but to decide the instant petition on its own merits. 4. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused the material available on record, this Court finds that though accused has denied issuance of cheque, but he has nowhere disputed his signatures on the same. Complainant with a view to prove her case, tendered her affidavit Ext. CW-1/A in evidence, wherein, she deposed that accused purchased steel/saria from her shop, i.e. M/s Pawan Putra Steels, Banga Trading Company, Dhalpur, Kullu, worth Rs. 2,00,000/- and in order to discharge said liability, issued cheque Ext.CB. However, such cheque on its presentation was dishonored with an endorsement on memo, i.e. ‘insufficient funds’. She also stated that after having received memo from the bank concerned, her counsel issued legal notice to accused, which was duly served upon him, but despite that he failed to make payment. In her cross-examination, this witnesses stated that she knew the accused since 2011 and she had not shown sum of Rs.2,00,000/- in her income tax return. She admitted that she had sold steel to accused in the month of December 2012 and cheque had been filled up with the different ink, however she specifically denied the suggestion put to her that accused never purchased steel from her shop. She also deposed that she had also issued bills to the accused. She admitted that she had sold steel to accused in the month of December 2012 and cheque had been filled up with the different ink, however she specifically denied the suggestion put to her that accused never purchased steel from her shop. She also deposed that she had also issued bills to the accused. Accused though was afforded opportunity to lead evidence but he failed to do, however in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C, he specifically denied factum with regard to purchase of steel/saria from the shop of complainant and handing over the cheque in lieu thereof. 5. It is quite apparent from the bare perusal of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record by respective parties that parties were known to each other and cheque Ext.CB having been issued by accused bears his signatures. Since, signatures on the cheque have not been disputed by accused, only question which remains to be determined is that, "whether cheque Ext.CB was issued by accused towards discharge of his lawful liability, if any." Though, in the case at hand, accused has claimed that he had never purchased steel/saria from the shop of the complainant, but he failed to place on record explanation, if any, with regard to his signatures on the cheque. He nowhere stated that cheque Ext.CB was not issued/handed over by him to the complainant and he misused the same. Ext.CB, i.e. cheque dated 17.03.2013, bears the signatures of accused and the same was issued in favour of the complainant for a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-. Ext.CC clearly reveals that cheque was dishonoured on account of ‘insufficient funds’ in the account of the accused. Mere admission with regard to signatures of accused on cheque Ext.CB creates presumption in favour of complainant that accused had issued cheque to the complainant towards discharge of his lawful liability. Presumption as available to the holder of cheque under Section 118 and 139 of N.I. Act, is though rebuttable, but for that purpose, accused is to raise probable defence either by leading some positive evidence or to refer to the evidence led on record by the complainant. However, in the case at hand, no probable defence has been raised by the accused to rebut the presumption of issuance of cheque for discharge of lawful liability by him in favour of complainant. 6. However, in the case at hand, no probable defence has been raised by the accused to rebut the presumption of issuance of cheque for discharge of lawful liability by him in favour of complainant. 6. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal) 260, has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 7. Having carefully examined the evidence available on record, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below, which otherwise appear to be based upon the correct appreciation of evidence and as such, same need to be upheld. Having carefully examined the evidence available on record, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below, which otherwise appear to be based upon the correct appreciation of evidence and as such, same need to be upheld. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 8. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, and as such, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 9. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, and as such, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 9. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but Mr. Singh, learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 10. Mr. Ajay Chandel, learned counsel, representing the petitioner, while referring to the statement made by CW-1, wherein she stated that she has shown Rs.2,00,000/- in income tax return, contended that once such amount was never received by the complainant, it is not understood that how such amount could be shown in the income tax return and as such, version put forth by complainant deserves outright rejection, being totally false. However, this Court is not impressed with the aforesaid submission made by Mr. Chandel, for the reason that signature on the cheque has nowhere been disputed. If accused had not issued cheque towards the discharge of lawful liability, then onus was upon him to explain that how this cheque reached to complainant and how he misused that. 11. In the case at hand, evidence led on record by the complainant, if read in its entirety, clearly reveals that complainant discharged her initial liability by successfully proving that steel worth Rs.2,00,000/- was supplied to accused and he with a view to discharge his liability issued cheque in question Ext.CB, but the same was dishonoured on account of ‘insufficient funds’. Moreover, issuance of legal notice Ext.CD and receipt thereof Ext. CE and CF, has not been disputed by the accused. 12. Moreover, issuance of legal notice Ext.CD and receipt thereof Ext. CE and CF, has not been disputed by the accused. 12. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by learned trial Court and further upheld by learned Appellate Court and as such, same are upheld. 13. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed alongwith pending applications, if any. Interim directions, if any, stand vacated. Petitioner is directed to surrender forthwith to serve the sentence imposed by the trial court vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence, dated 18.1.2017.