JUDGMENT : SHAJI P. CHALY, J. This appeal is preferred by the State of Kerala and its officials challenging the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 30th March, 2015 in W.P.(C) No. 16646 of 2003, whereby the State of Kerala was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-to the respondent/writ petitioner within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the writ petition, which appears to be 9th July, 2003. However, the State was given the liberty to recover the said amount from the officers who are responsible for the illegal demolition. It is, thus, challenging the legality and correctness of the said judgment, this appeal is filed. 2. The grievance highlighted by the petitioner in the writ petition was that she is the owner in possession of 1.90 acres of property situated in Survey No. 397 of Parathodu Village, Udumbanchola Taluk, Idukki District by virtue of settled deed No 334/1969 of Devikulam Sub Registry, which in turn was an assignment granted by the Government in favour of the predecessor in interest of the property. According to the writ petitioner, the said property is situated in a colony by name Kallar Pattom Colony and the block number assigned to the property so allotted is 396. 3. The case projected by the respondent/writ petitioner was that she has constructed 3 buildings on the southern side of the property, out of which 2 of them are old tiled buildings and one is a concrete building. The writ petitioner along with her family members are residing in the upper portion of the concrete buildings. Other buildings in the ground floor of the RCC building are in the possession of the tenants. While so, appellants 2 to 4 namely the Executive Engineer, PWD (Roads), Nedumkandam, the Assistant Engineer, PWD (Roads), Nedumkandam, the Assistant Engineer, PWD (Roads), Nedumkandam respectively, commenced widening of works of a road namely Kallar-Ramakkalmedu Road at Thookkupalam junction, where the writ petitioner's property abuts the road. For widening activities, a contract was awarded, by appellants 2 to 4, and with the assistance of the Contractor buildings of several persons were demolished using JCB, on the ground that such buildings are situated in the poramboke. 4. For widening activities, a contract was awarded, by appellants 2 to 4, and with the assistance of the Contractor buildings of several persons were demolished using JCB, on the ground that such buildings are situated in the poramboke. 4. When the writ petitioner received information from reliable sources that appellants are proposing to demolish her building, she approached this Court basically contending that no portion of her buildings are encroaching into the PWD road or there is any poramboke in the landed property belonging to her. It was also the contention of the writ petitioner that no notice has been issued for fixation of any portion of her property for the purpose of widening of the road and no survey has been done at the instance of the PWD or any other authority in order to identify as to whether any portion of the Government property is in the possession of the writ petitioner. 5. The paramount contention advanced was that the appellants, who are discharging public duties, are not empowered to take a decision for demolition of the property belonging to the writ petitioner otherwise than in accordance with law. Anyhow, the appellants have started demolition of the buildings of the writ petitioner and it was thereupon, that the writ petitioner had approached this Court seeking a direction to the appellants not to interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of the residential building by the writ petitioner. At the time of filing of the writ petition, it was clearly averred by the writ petitioner that the two pillars of one of the buildings had already been pulled down and thereupon, she sought for stay of demolition of the rest of the buildings. 6. The learned single Judge had issued an interim direction on 29.05.2003 against the appellants not to demolish the building any further for a period of one week. According to the writ petitioner, the order was communicated to the Nedumkandam police, who, in turn, has intimated the 4th appellant. However, the 4th respondent directed the JCB operator engaged by the Contractor to demolish the buildings and thereupon, the front portion of the buildings situated in the property were demolished for a considerable extent, which made the building unusable. According to the writ petitioner, the order was communicated to the Nedumkandam police, who, in turn, has intimated the 4th appellant. However, the 4th respondent directed the JCB operator engaged by the Contractor to demolish the buildings and thereupon, the front portion of the buildings situated in the property were demolished for a considerable extent, which made the building unusable. Even though the writ petitioner informed the parties about the order granted by the learned single Judge and obstructed the illegal demolishing, the 4th appellant pushed the writ petitioner to the road and she had no other alternative than to retreat. 7. In fact, a counter affidavit was filed by the third appellant, namely the Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD Roads, Nedumkandam, refuting the allegations raised by the writ petitioner. In fact, it is admitted in the counter affidavit that the work was being carried out by the appellants to widen the area of the road basically for the purpose of providing drainage facility. However, it was submitted that during the discussion with the residents of the locality, they agreed that the required land for the improvement work will be made available after removing the existing construction and it was accordingly that the department had started the earth work. Anyhow, the allegation made by the writ petitioner that the buildings were demolished, was disputed by the appellants. But it was reiterated in the counter affidavit that the improvement works for the Thookkupalam Town was arranged on the basis of the mutual understanding between the local traders, political parties and the Department and further that the understanding was that the land required for the work will be made available by them. 8. Anyhow, taking into account the seriousness of the issue, the learned single Judge has appointed an Advocate Commissioner to inspect the property in question and report the matter before the Court. The Advocate Commissioner, after having visited the site, submitted a very detailed report stating that the inspection was initially conducted in the presence of appellants 2 to 4. However, after some time, they disappeared from the site and thereafter, they have not cooperated with the proceedings of the Advocate Commissioner. Anyhow, it is clear that it was in the presence of the officers and appellants that the Taluk Surveyor was instructed by the Advocate Commissioner to survey and identify the property belonging to the writ petitioner. 9. However, after some time, they disappeared from the site and thereafter, they have not cooperated with the proceedings of the Advocate Commissioner. Anyhow, it is clear that it was in the presence of the officers and appellants that the Taluk Surveyor was instructed by the Advocate Commissioner to survey and identify the property belonging to the writ petitioner. 9. After verification, survey, and demarcation, it was reported by the Taluk Surveyor that the property in which the writ petitioner had constructed the buildings was a private property owned by her and that the above aspect was not disputed by any of the officers or persons assembled therein. Therefore, according to the Advocate Commissioner, it was at that juncture, appellants vanished from the site as if to appear that they are disputing the correctness of the survey conducted by the Taluk Surveyor. The details of the buildings and the damages occured along with a sketch are provided in the report, and it is specifically stated that the writ petitioner has suffered a loss of approximately Rs.2,00,000/-. The Advocate Commissioner has also made enquiries with respect to the persons responsible for causing damage to the buildings of the writ petitioner with the people gathered there and who have witnessed the demolition of the building, and ascertained that the building had been demolished at the instance of the 4th appellant and one Cyril, a site supervisor. 10. It was also reported that the building had been demolished by making use of a JCB bearing registration No. KL-6A-676 on the basis of the instruction given by the 4th appellant to the site supervisor of the contractor. It was further reported that the demolition had taken place on 29.05.2003 between 11 a.m and 12 a.m and the rubbles, mud, wooden articles, bricks etc. were removed by the officers of the PWD and Contractor on 30.05.2003. It was taking into account the entire pros and cons and facts and figures as pleaded by the writ petitioner, the report of the Advocate Commissioner and the objections raised by the appellants that the learned single Judge had issued directions to pay damages to the writ petitioner. 11. The paramount contention advanced in the appeal is that the subject matter of the allegations was disputed by the appellants before the writ court and therefore, the writ court ought to have relegated the writ petitioner to the civil court. 11. The paramount contention advanced in the appeal is that the subject matter of the allegations was disputed by the appellants before the writ court and therefore, the writ court ought to have relegated the writ petitioner to the civil court. It is further contended that the number of JCB given by the writ petitioner is that of a jeep and therefore, the contention advanced by the writ petitioner that the building was demolished by using a JCB was never sustainable under law enabling the writ court to order damages against the appellants. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the respondent has neither demolished nor given any direction to dismantle the existing construction, since there is no provision for dismantling as per the agreement schedule. According to the appellants, the 3rd appellant had already produced the schedule of work as per Ext.R3(a) along with a counter affidavit filed in the writ petition and the description of work/schedule would tilt the entire verdict in favour of the appellants. It is further contended that the learned single Judge has not given any weight for the agreement schedule and has not stated anything about the same in the judgment. Hence the judgment is per se illegal. 13. It was further submitted that the learned single Judge omitted to note the averment in the affidavit of the respondent that, "It is also true that Smt. Safia has Submitted a representation in this regard on 28.05.2003. In the presence of the petitioner itself, I have given direction to the staff nor the contractor has entered the petitioner's property." Therefore, it was contended that when it was categorically stated in the counter affidavit that neither the staff nor the contractor has entered the writ petitioner's property, then the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge only on the basis of the Commission Report that the JCB was used for demolition of the building, especially when the vehicle is only a Jeep and not a JCB as per the records of RTO, cannot be sustained under law. 14. It was further submitted that the parties who are to be arrayed as respondents were not arrayed and obtained an order so as to use it a "right in personam" and also a right in rem". 14. It was further submitted that the parties who are to be arrayed as respondents were not arrayed and obtained an order so as to use it a "right in personam" and also a right in rem". The appellants are a mis-joinder in the writ petition and the actual person who has to be arrayed as respondents are not made a party in the proceedings. 15. It was also contended that the writ petitioner had not relied on any Panchayat building registration to prove either the occupancy or even the existence of such a building. The Taluk Surveyor or the Commissioner has not mentioned that the demolished portion of the building belonged to the writ petitioner. The sketch plan of the Taluk Surveyor with F.M.B (Field Measurement Book) records demarcating the portion of the demolished construction is not seen on record and therefore, the conclusion of the learned Judge fixing the liability on the shoulders of the respondent without the plan of the Surveyor on the basis of F.M.B is absolutely illegal. 16. It was also the case of the appellants that the writ petitioner neither lodged any complaint before the police nor registered any F.I.R. against the owner of the J.C.B., Contractor, Official respondents or any other person to book the culprits, who made a criminal trespass and demolished a portion of the building, and that the inaction of the writ petitioner to initiate criminal prosecution would lead to a genuine doubt to the story built up by the writ petitioner. 17. We have heard, Sri. K. V. Manoj Kumar, learned Senior Government Pleader appeared for the appellants and Sri. Abraham Mathew Vettom for the respondent, and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 18. Considering the contention advanced by the learned Senior Government Pleader Sri. K. V. Manoj Kumar, the primary aspect to be taken into account by this Court is as to whether in the facts and circumstances, the learned single Judge was right in ordering compensation on account of the damages suffered to the writ petitioner under the public law remedy. That being the question, the primary aspect to be sorted out by this Court is whether a public law remedy was available to the writ petitioner on account of the violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under part III of the Constitution of India. 19. That being the question, the primary aspect to be sorted out by this Court is whether a public law remedy was available to the writ petitioner on account of the violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under part III of the Constitution of India. 19. In our pursuit to find out as to whether there is any violation of the fundamental rights, we rely upon the factual circumstances pointed out by the writ petitioner discussed above. It is clear that the appellants had in the process of widening the road awarded a contract and executed an agreement with a third person. It is an admitted fact, as is evident from the counter affidavit filed by the 4th appellant, there was an understanding by and between the owners of the property in the Thookkupalam area to surrender the property free of cost for the purpose of widening the road. It is also an undisputed fact that the contractor was carrying on the work on the date and place in question. The Advocate Commissioner has also reported that the front portion of the buildings belonging to the writ petitioner were partly demolished. Reading together the pleadings put forth by the writ petitioner, the counter affidavit filed by the 4th appellant and the report of the Advocate Commissioner, it is clear that the buildings belonging to the writ petitioner were demolished partially. There is no objection filed by the appellants to the report of the Advocate Commissioner, which makes the situation more vulnerable and precarious to the appellant, since the Advocate Commissioner has submitted a report on the basis of the appointment made by the learned single Judge in order to identify the truth in the contentions raised by the writ petitioner, and it would have to be treated as a report drawn by the court itself, which is the underlying principle in respect of an advocate commission report. 20. Eventually, the report of the Advocate Commissioner was part of the record in the proceedings before the writ court and therefore, it will have to be treated as a substantial piece of evidence enabling the writ court to arrive at a just conclusion to redress the grievances of the writ petitioner. 21. Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution of India grants a fundamental right to every citizen to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India. 21. Article 19(1)(e) of the Constitution of India grants a fundamental right to every citizen to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India. The fundamental rights granted under the Constitution of India is a meaningful one, which guarantees every citizen to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India peacefully and by constructing a shelter for his own needs. It is an admitted fact that the writ petitioner, was residing in the building in question along with her family members and therefore, she is entitled, as of right, to live in the building peacefully and without any manner of interference from any third persons in his private life, much less the State. 22. Article 21 of the Constitution of India makes it clear that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law and by now it is well settled that the life guaranteed therein is a meaningful one to have a shelter and co-exist peacefully with others without any State intervention, which according to us, is a natural right streamlined under part III of the Constitution of India. The said guarantee extended under part III of the Constitution of India cannot be tinkered in any manner otherwise than in accordance with law, which is the fundamental and foundational principle to be followed in a democratic polity wherein rule of law is the basic requirement prevailing. Therefore, in our considered opinion, if it was found that the demolition was carried out by, or at the behest of the officials of the State, the public law remedy would come into play. In fact, as we have discussed above, the writ petitioner had a contention that the demolition was carried out by the State officials through a Contractor employed by them in the guise that the writ petitioner was occupying Government land, but no evidence was produced either before the learned single Judge or before this Court to establish the same by the appellants. On the other hand, the Taluk surveyor, who conducted the measurement, in unequivocal terms, reported that the property in question is a property belonging to the writ petitioner. 23. On the other hand, the Taluk surveyor, who conducted the measurement, in unequivocal terms, reported that the property in question is a property belonging to the writ petitioner. 23. Taking into account the circumstances available on record, we are also of the clear opinion that the State officials have encroached into the privacy of the writ petitioner, since, as of right, she is entitled to reside in a building of her choice peacefully and without intervention of any others. 24. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that there is a clear violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(e) and 21 of the Constitution of India. The issue is no more res integra, since the Apex Court had occasion to consider the issue in a large number of cases, whether the citizens suffered damages at the hands, behest, and negligence of the State can be awarded compensation invoking the public law remedy available under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and whether they need to be compulsorily relegated to the civil court to secure damages. We propose to analyse the situation on the basis of the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court, which are relevant to the context in question. 25. In Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another (1975) 2 SCC 148 , the Apex Court had considered the question of right to privacy in the anvil of Part III of the Constitution of India and specifically Articles 19(1)(a) and (d) and 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of several false cases registered against the writ petitioner and held as follows: “22. There can be no doubt that privacy-dignity claims deserve to be examined with care and to be denied only when an important countervailing interest is shown to be superior. If the Court does find that a claimed right is entitled to protection as a fundamental privacy right, a law infringing it must satisfy the compelling State interest test. Then the question would be whether a State interest is of such paramount importance as would justify an infringement of the right. Obviously, if the enforcement of morality were held to be a compelling as well as a permissible State interest, the characterization of a claimed right as a fundamental privacy right would be of far less significance. Then the question would be whether a State interest is of such paramount importance as would justify an infringement of the right. Obviously, if the enforcement of morality were held to be a compelling as well as a permissible State interest, the characterization of a claimed right as a fundamental privacy right would be of far less significance. The question whether enforcement of morality is a State interest sufficient to justify the infringement of a fundamental privacy right need not be considered for the purpose of this case and therefore we refuse to enter the controversial thicket whether enforcement of morality is a function of State. 23. Individual autonomy, perhaps the central concern of any system of limited Government, is protected in part under our Constitution by explicit constitutional guarantees. In the application of the Constitution our contemplation cannot only be of what has been but what may be. Time works changes and brings into existence new conditions. Subtler and far reaching means of invading privacy will make it possible to be heard in the street what is whispered in the closet. Yet, too broad a definition of privacy raises serious questions about the propriety of judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. Of course, privacy primarily concerns the individual. It therefore relates to and overlaps with the concept of liberty. The most serious advocate of privacy must confess that there are serious problems of defining the essence and scope of the right. Privacy interest in autonomy must also be placed in the context of other rights and values. 24. Any right to privacy must encompass and protect the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child rearing. This catalogue approach to the question is obviously not as instructive as it does not give an analytical picture of the distinctive characteristics of the right of privacy. Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has been the assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 26. Perhaps, the only suggestion that can be offered as unifying principle underlying the concept has been the assertion that a claimed right must be a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 26. In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal & others [ (1997) 1 SCC 416 ], it is observed that when a man is wronged and endangered, he must have a remedy under public law and held as follows: 43.“...The Court, where the infringement of the fundamental right is established, therefore, cannot stop by giving a mere declaration. It must proceed further and give compensatory relief, not by way of damages as in a civil action but by way of compensation under the public law jurisdiction for the wrong done, due to breach of public duty by the State of not protecting the fundamental right to life of the citizen. To repair the wrong done and give judicial redress for legal injury is a compulsion of judicial conscience. 44. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 45. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. 45. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim — civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family.” 27. In Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and others [ (1981) 1 SCC 608 ], the Apex court had considered the question of a detenu’s right to confer with a legal adviser and meet family members and friends under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and held that any unreasonable restrictions in that regard would violate the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and, it is held as follows: 7. Now obviously, the right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be restricted to mere animal existence. It means something much more than just physical survival. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. [(1964) 1 SCR 232] Subba Rao, J. quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois [(1877) 94 US 113 : 24 L Ed 77] to emphasize the quality of life covered by Article 21 : [Sunil Batra (I) v. Delhi Admn, SCR p 503 : SCC p 574 : SCC (Cri) p 235] “By the term “life” as here used something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation of the body or amputation of an arm or leg or the putting out of an eye or the destruction of any other organ of the body through which the soul communicates with the outer world” and this passage was again accepted as laying down the correct law by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the first Sunil Batra case [M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 1 SCR 192 : (1978) 3 SCC 544 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 468]. Every limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed is thus protected by Article 21 and a fortiori, this would include the faculties of thinking and feeling. Now deprivation which is inhibited by Article 21 may be total or partial, neither any limb or faculty can be totally destroyed nor can it be partially damaged. Moreover it is every kind of deprivation that is hit by Article 21, whether such deprivation be permanent or temporary and, furthermore, deprivation is not an act which is complete once and for all: it is a continuing act and so long as it lasts, it must be in accordance with procedure established by law. It is therefore clear that any act which damages or injures or interferes with the use of, any limb or faculty of a person, either permanently or even temporarily, would be within the inhibition of Article 21. 8. But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something more. We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights. Now obviously, any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into this right to live and it would, on this view, be prohibited by Article 21 unless it is in accordance with procedure prescribed by law, but no law which authorises and no procedure which leads to such torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment can ever stand the test of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness: it would plainly be unconstitutional and void as being violative of Articles 14 and 21. It would thus be seen that there is implicit in Article 21 the right to protection against torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment which is enunciated in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and guaranteed by Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights….. 28. In Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and another [ (1983) 4 SCC 141 ], the Apex Court observed that the compensation for illegal detention can be granted under Article 32 of the Constitution without affecting the right to sue for damages after holding as follows: 9. It is true that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously through the ordinary processes of courts, civil and criminal. A money claim has therefore to be agitated in and adjudicated upon in a suit instituted in a Court of lowest grade competent to try it. But the important question for our consideration is whether in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32, this Court can pass an order for the payment of money if such an order is in the nature of compensation consequential upon the deprivation of a fundamental right. The instant case is illustrative of such cases. The petitioner was detained illegally in the prison for over 14 years after his acquittal in a full-dressed trial. He filed a habeas corpus petition in this Court for his release from illegal detention. The instant case is illustrative of such cases. The petitioner was detained illegally in the prison for over 14 years after his acquittal in a full-dressed trial. He filed a habeas corpus petition in this Court for his release from illegal detention. He obtained that relief, our finding being that his detention in the prison after his acquittal was wholly unjustified. He contends that he is entitled to be compensated for his illegal detention and that we ought to pass an appropriate order for the payment of compensation in this habeas corpus petition itself. 10. We cannot resist this argument. We see no effective answer to it save the stale and sterile objection that the petitioner may, if so advised, file a suit to recover damages from the State Government. Happily, the State's counsel has not raised that objection. The petitioner could have been relegated to the ordinary remedy of a suit if his claim to compensation was factually controversial, in the sense that a civil court may or may not have upheld his claim. But we have no doubt that if the petitioner files a suit to recover damages for his illegal detention, a decree for damages would have to be passed in that suit, though it is not possible to predicate, in the absence of evidence, the precise amount which would be decreed in his favour. In these circumstances, the refusal of this Court to pass an order of compensation in favour of the petitioner will be doing mere lip-service to his fundamental right to liberty which the State Government has so grossly violated. Article 21 which guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders of release from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of the State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this country as it has perished in some others too well known to suffer mention, it is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It may have recourse against those officers.” 29. In Chairman, Railway Board and others v. Chandrima Das (MRS) and others [ (2000) 2 SCC 465 ], the Apex Court considered the question of violation of fundamental rights by public functionaries in the realm of employees of Railways causing injuries amounting to tortious act or violating the fundamental rights of any person and the compensation to be awarded exercising the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and held as follows: 7. The distinction between “public law” and “private law” was considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Common Cause, A Regd. Society v. Union of India [ (1999) 6 SCC 667 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1196 : AIR 1999 SC 2979 : JT (1999) 5 SC 237] in which it was, inter alia, observed as under: (SCC p. 701, paras 39-40) “39. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court has been given the power and jurisdiction to issue appropriate writs in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose. Thus, the High Court has jurisdiction not only to grant relief for the enforcement of fundamental rights but also for ‘any other purpose’ which would include the enforcement of public duties by public bodies. So also, the Supreme Court under Article 32 has the jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen under the Constitution. 40. So also, the Supreme Court under Article 32 has the jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen under the Constitution. 40. Essentially, under public law, it is the dispute between the citizen or a group of citizens on the one hand and the State or other public bodies on the other, which is resolved. This is done to maintain the rule of law and to prevent the State or the public bodies from acting in an arbitrary manner or in violation of that rule. The exercise of constitutional powers by the High Court and the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 has been categorised as power of ‘judicial review’. Every executive or administrative action of the State or other statutory or public bodies is open to judicial scrutiny and the High Court or the Supreme Court can, in exercise of the power of judicial review under the Constitution, quash the executive action or decision which is contrary to law or is violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. With the expanding horizon of Article 14 read with other articles dealing with fundamental rights, every executive action of the Government or other public bodies, including instrumentalities of the Government, or those which can be legally treated as ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 12, if arbitrary, unreasonable or contrary to law, is now amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or the High Courts under Article 226 and can be validly scrutinised on the touchstone of the constitutional mandates.” 8. The earlier decision, namely, LIC of India v. Escorts Ltd. [ (1986) 1 SCC 264 : AIR 1986 SC 1370 : 1985 Supp (3) SCR 909] in which it was observed as under: (SCC p. 344, para 102) “Broadly speaking, the Court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances.” 9. Various aspects of the public law field were considered. It was found that though initially a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution relating to contractual matters was held not to lie, the law underwent a change by subsequent decisions and it was noticed that even though the petition may relate essentially to a contractual matter, it would still be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The public law remedies have also been extended to the realm of tort. This Court, in its various decisions, has entertained petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution on a number of occasions and has awarded compensation to the petitioners who had suffered personal injuries at the hands of the officers of the Government. The causing of injuries, which amounted to tortious act, was compensated by this Court in many of its decisions beginning from Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar [ (1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : AIR 1983 SC 1086 : (1983) 3 SCR 508 ]. (See also Bhim Singh v. State of J&K [ (1985) 4 SCC 677 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 47 : AIR 1986 SC 494 ], Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. State of Bihar [ (1987) 1 SCC 265 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 58 : (1987) 1 SCR 631 : AIR 1987 SC 355 ], Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights v. Police Commr., Delhi Police Headquarters [ (1989) 4 SCC 730 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 75 : (1989) 1 Scale 599 ], Saheli, A Women's Resources Centre v. Commr. of Police [ (1990) 1 SCC 422 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 145 : 1989 Supp (2) SCR 488 : AIR 1990 SC 513 ], Arvinder Singh Bagga v. State of U.P. [ (1994) 6 SCC 565 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 29 : AIR 1995 SC 117 ], P. Rathinam v. Union of India [1989 Supp (2) SCC 716 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 228], Death of Sawinder Singh Grower In re [1995 Supp (4) SCC 450 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1464 : JT (1992) 6 SC 271 : (1992) 3 Scale 34 ], Inder Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1995) 3 SCC 702 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 857 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 586 : (1995) 30 ATC 122 : AIR 1995 SC 1949 ] and D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [ (1997) 1 SCC 416 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 92 : AIR 1997 SC 610 ] )” 30. In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana and others [ (2006) 3 SCC 178 ], the Apex Court considered a question in respect of custodial death/torture and awarding of compensation under Articles 32/226 of the Constitution of India and held as follows: 35. The law was crystallised in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [ (1993) 2 SCC 746 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 527]. In that case, the deceased was arrested by the police, handcuffed and kept in police custody. The next day, his dead body was found on a railway track. This Court awarded compensation to the mother of the deceased. J.S. Verma, J. (as he then was) spelt out the following principles: “[A]ward of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. (SCC p. 758, para 10) *** … enforcement of the constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of compensation as part of the legal consequences of its contravention. (SCC p. 758, para 10) *** … enforcement of the constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of compensation as part of the legal consequences of its contravention. … ‘a claim in public law for compensation’ for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is ‘distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort’ resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. (SCC pp. 762-63, paras 16-17)” 36. …The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by [the Supreme] Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. The purpose of public law is not only to civilise public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting ‘compensation’ in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of ‘exemplary damages’ awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law. 38. It is thus now well settled that the award of compensation against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy for redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under Article 21, by a public servant. The quantum of compensation will, however, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Award of such compensation (by way of public law remedy) will not come in the way of the aggrieved person claiming additional compensation in a civil court, in the enforcement of the private law remedy in tort, nor come in the way of the criminal court ordering compensation under Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 31. A learned single Judge of this Court in Shyam Balakrishnan v. State of Kerala and others [ (2015) 3 KHC 84 = 2015(2) KLT 927 =ILR 2015(2) Ker. A learned single Judge of this Court in Shyam Balakrishnan v. State of Kerala and others [ (2015) 3 KHC 84 = 2015(2) KLT 927 =ILR 2015(2) Ker. 801] had occasion to consider the matter of arrest on mere suspicion and deprivation of personal liberty concerning the detention of a person in the guise that he is a Maoist and the issue of public law remedy in the matter of awarding compensation and it was held as follows: “21. Thus, there cannot be any difficulty in holding that Article 226 can be moulded for compensation for a victim of an unlawful arrest. The petitioner claimed a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-as compensation. No doubt, he would have been entitled for a higher amount of compensation considering the trauma and mental agonies suffered by him. In that view of the matter, with liberty to claim any compensation if otherwise can be claimed by him before the Civil Court, the State shall pay to the petitioner a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees one lakh only) as compensation.” 32. As we have pointed out earlier, the subject issue in this case has also the characteristics of interference with the privacy of the writ petitioner, since the building in which the writ petitioner and his family members were residing was demolished partially. The question with respect to privacy was considered by a 9 Member Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others [ (2017) 10 SCC 1 , wherein it is held that if privacy is to be construed as a protected constitutional value, it would redefine in significant ways our concepts of liberty and the entitlements that flow out of its protection. It was further held in the judgment by Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, who rendered the judgment on behalf of the Hon’ble then Chief Justice J.S Khehar and Justice R.K. Agrawal, that privacy, in its simple tense, allows each human being to be left alone in a core, which is inviolable and the preservation of constitutional liberty is, so to speak, work in progress. D.Y. Chandrachud, who rendered the judgment on behalf of the Hon’ble then Chief Justice J.S Khehar and Justice R.K. Agrawal, that privacy, in its simple tense, allows each human being to be left alone in a core, which is inviolable and the preservation of constitutional liberty is, so to speak, work in progress. After an elaborate consideration of the issues, including the question of natural and inalienable rights, it was held that privacy is a concomitant of the right of the individual to exercise control over his or her personality and that it finds an origin in the notion that there are certain rights which are natural to or inherent in a human being. It was also held that natural rights are inalienable because they are inseparable from the human personality. 33. The issue was also considered by the Apex Court in the angle of dignity and liberty and His Lordship Justice S.A. Bobde in his concurrent separate judgment held thus: “Privacy's connection to dignity and liberty 407. Undoubtedly, privacy exists, as the foregoing demonstrates, as a verifiable fact in all civilised societies. But privacy does not stop at being merely a descriptive claim. It also embodies a normative one. The normative case for privacy is intuitively simple. Nature has clothed man, amongst other things, with dignity and liberty so that he may be free to do what he will consistent with the freedom of another and to develop his faculties to the fullest measure necessary to live in happiness and peace. The Constitution, through its Part III, enumerates many of these freedoms and their corresponding rights as fundamental rights. Privacy is an essential condition for the exercise of most of these freedoms. Ex facie, every right which is integral to the constitutional rights to dignity, life, personal liberty and freedom, as indeed the right to privacy is, must itself be regarded as a fundamental right”. 34. Also in a separate concurrent judgment, His Lordship Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul has held as follows: “646. If the individual permits someone to enter the house it does not mean that others can enter the house. The only check and balance is that it should not harm the other individual or affect his or her rights. This applies both to the physical form and to technology. If the individual permits someone to enter the house it does not mean that others can enter the house. The only check and balance is that it should not harm the other individual or affect his or her rights. This applies both to the physical form and to technology. In an era where there are wide, varied, social and cultural norms and more so in a country like ours which prides itself on its diversity, privacy is one of the most important rights to be protected both against State and non-State actors and be recognised as a fundamental right. How it thereafter works out in its inter-play with other fundamental rights and when such restrictions would become necessary would depend on the factual matrix of each case. That it may give rise to more litigation can hardly be the reason not to recognise this important, natural, primordial right as a fundamental right.” 35. Again, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the question in S. Nambi Narayan v. Siby Mathews [ AIR 2018 SC 5112 ] in the realm of deprivation of the right to enjoyment of a private reputation vis-a-vis the public law remedy and held as follows : 37. If the obtaining factual matrix is adjudged on the aforesaid principles and parameters, there can be no scintilla of doubt that the Appellant, a successful scientist having national reputation, has been compelled to undergo immense humiliation. The lackadaisical attitude of the State police to arrest anyone and put him in police custody has made the Appellant to suffer the ignominy. The dignity of a person gets shocked when psycho-pathological treatment is meted out to him. A human being cries for justice when he feels that the insensible act has crucified his self-respect. That warrants grant of compensation under the public law remedy. We are absolutely conscious that a civil suit has been filed for grant of compensation. That will not debar the constitutional court to grant compensation taking recourse to public law. The Court cannot lose sight of the wrongful imprisonment, malicious prosecution, the humiliation and the defamation faced by the Appellant. … 36. We are absolutely conscious that a civil suit has been filed for grant of compensation. That will not debar the constitutional court to grant compensation taking recourse to public law. The Court cannot lose sight of the wrongful imprisonment, malicious prosecution, the humiliation and the defamation faced by the Appellant. … 36. On a deep seated analysis of the principles of law laid down by the Apex Court, it is clear that whenever a fundamental right is violated, and damages suffered, a writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not hesitate to order payment of adequate compensation. 37. In the instant case, it is emphatic that the learned single Judge had found that the buildings were partly demolished by the appellants even overlooking the status quo directed to be maintained by the writ court. Therefore, taking into account the facts and circumstances and the principles of law laid down by the Apex Court, we are of the clear opinion that the learned single Judge was right in awarding compensation, exercising the power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since the fundamental rights guaranteed to the writ petitioner was violated by the appellants. 38. In that view of the matter, we do not think, the State and its officials have made out a case of jurisdictional error or other legal infirmities on the part of the learned Single Judge in exercising the power of discretion conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India so as to interfere with the judgment. Needless to say, writ appeal fails and accordingly, it is dismissed.