ORDER : 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated 22.04.2010 passed by learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition filed by petitioner-respondent was allowed with the following directions:- “In the result, writ petition is allowed. Impugned orders dated 31.08.1994 and 25.02.1995 are set-aside. Petitioner is held entitled to be reinstated in service with continuity. However, keeping in view the length of time which has elapsed between the order of penalty and now when this judgment is being passed and in totality of circumstances, petitioner is held entitled to only 50% of the consequential monetary benefits although he would be otherwise entitled to other benefits arising out of such continuity including retiral benefits and other consequential benefits. Compliance of the judgment shall be made within a period of three months from the date copy of this order is produced before the respondents.” 2. The petitioner-respondent had filed a writ petition. Case of the petitioner-respondent was that he was initially appointed as Constable and continued on the post of Driver- Constable. During the said period, the petitioner-respondent had applied for the acquired leave for thirty days and the Superintendent of Police, Dholpur vide Order No. 45/1992 dated 27.01.1992 accepted the application for leave and granted the said leave to the petitioner. The petitioner before proceeding on leave, sought the permission from Reserve Inspector, Dholpur (being immediate Officer). Then the Reserve Inspector refused the same but the petitioner kept mum, but being in the need of leave, he again made a request on 01.02.1992 to the Reserve Inspector. Then he orally permitted the petitioner to proceed on sanctioned leave. When the petitioner-respondent was proceeding on leave, he got injured and as a matter of result, he sustained grievous injuries on his nose and remained sick for weeks together. He was having severe pain in his stomach for long period. The Doctors of the General Hospital, Dholpur had advised him bed-rest for a period till complete recovery of health and because of this, the petitioner-respondent could not report for the duty upto 02.03.1992 (the date on which the 30 days leave comes to end). He sent an application through UPC to the Reserve Inspector, Dholpur and the Superintendent of Police, Dholpur for extension of his leave in such circumstances. He sent an application through UPC to the Reserve Inspector, Dholpur and the Superintendent of Police, Dholpur for extension of his leave in such circumstances. When the petitioner-respondent recovered and went to report for duty and submitted his joining report, the Superintendent of Police sent a notice to the petitioner-respondent on 23.02.1993 and asked him to join his duties within seven days from the receipt of notice. The said notice was received by the petitioner-respondent on 11.03.1993. The petitioner-respondent was served with a charge-sheet dated 18.05.1993 along with the memorandum on 02.06.1993 with particulars of the charges levelled against him and detailed list of the witnesses giving him 15 days time for submitting his reply or explanation regarding the same. The petitioner-respondent submitted an application dated 22.03.1994 to the Reserve Inspector, Police Line Dholpur and explained therein his inability to appear and attend the inquiry scheduled for 22.03.1994 on account of his illness and requesting him for fixing a new date enabling him to appear before the Inquiry Officer for justifying his case. During the period of treatment of the petitioner-respondent, he got a letter dated 02.03.1994 of the Reserve Inspector regarding the Departmental Inquiry and the petitioner-respondent was informed to attend proceedings before the Reserve Inspector on 07.03.1994 for producing the evidence/reply against the charges levelled against him. The petitioner-respondent attended the office on 07.03.1994 while his health did not permit him to leave the bed. The petitioner-respondent requested the Reserve Inspector to supply him copies of the report but the same were not supplied to him. Thereafter, he again submitted another application on 15.03.1994 before the Reserve Inspector demanding duplicate copies of the documents relating to the Departmental Inquiry and copies of the charges levelled against him, but no such copies were supplied to him. No preliminary inquiry was conducted prior to initiation of Departmental Inquiry against him. The Inquiry Officer recorded the statements of seven witnesses in his absence. The Departmental Inquiry was not conducted properly. The petitioner-respondent was not informed about it nor the Inquiry Officer had given any notice to the petitioner-respondent for opportunity of hearing. The inquiry was ex-parte, which is not permissible in the eye of law. The Inquiry Officer recorded the statements of seven witnesses in his absence. The Departmental Inquiry was not conducted properly. The petitioner-respondent was not informed about it nor the Inquiry Officer had given any notice to the petitioner-respondent for opportunity of hearing. The inquiry was ex-parte, which is not permissible in the eye of law. Inquiry Report was sent by the Reserve Inspector to the Superintendent of Police and the Superintendent of Police issued a show-cause notice under Rule 16(10)(1) Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control And Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereafter referred as ‘the Rules of 1958’) to the petitioner-respondent and the petitioner-respondent submitted reply to the show-cause notice and explained his innocence in this regard. The Disciplinary Authority passed an order dated 31.08.1994 by which the punishment of termination of services was awarded and arrears of salary and allowances were also forfeited. Aggrieved by this order of the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner-respondent challenged the same by way of filing an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Bharatpur Range under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958, but appeal was also rejected by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 25.02.1995. The petitioner-respondent being aggrieved, preferred a Review Petition before His Excellency the Governor of Rajasthan as contemplated under Rule 34 of the Rules of 1958, but that Review Petition was not decided in spite of lapse of considerable period of time. The Departmental Inquiry was conducted in violation of Rules of natural justice. No opportunity was afforded to the petitioner-respondent to participate in the inquiry. Proper hearing was not allowed. Inquiry Officer was prejudiced against the petitioner-respondent and his appointment as Inquiry Officer was vitiated on this ground alone. Copy of the Inquiry Report was not supplied to the petitioner-respondent before the passing of impugned orders dated 31.08.1994 and 25.02.1995. On these grounds, the petitioner-respondent filed the writ petition with following prayers:- “(i) issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature thereof thereby the impugned orders dated 31-8-1994 (Annexure-13) and 25-2-1995 (Annexure-15) passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority respectively, may kindly be quashed and set-aside and further the petitioner be reinstated with all consequential benefits. (ii) issue any other relief as it deem just and proper by this Hon’ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be passed in favour of the poor petitioner. (ii) issue any other relief as it deem just and proper by this Hon’ble Court in the facts and circumstances of the case, may also be passed in favour of the poor petitioner. (iii) cost of the writ petition be also allowed in favour of the petitioner.” 3. After hearing both the parties, learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and impugned orders dated 31.08.1994 and 25.02.1995 were set aside. The petitioner-respondent was held entitled to be reinstated in service with continuity. The petitioner-respondent was also held entitled to 50% of the consequential monetary benefits. 4. Aggrieved from the order of learned Single Judge, this appeal has been filed. 5. It has been argued on behalf of appellant that learned Single Judge did not consider the fact that even though the respondent had proceeded on leave after sanction by SP Dholpur for a period of thirty days, however, even after lapse of thirty days he did not join his duties and had thus remained willfully absent for a period of almost two years, for which no plausible reason or explanation was given by the respondent. Thus, the willful absence of respondent beyond a period of thirty days, was wholly unjustified. The respondent belonged to Disciplined Force, wherein the discipline is of utmost significance, however, the respondent had remained absent, which was unbecoming of a member of Disciplined Force. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority was fully justified in imposing the penalty of removal from service against respondent due to gravity of the misconduct. The Appellate Authority had also re-examined the matter in the appeal filed by the respondent and confirmed the penalty order vide its order dated 25.02.1995. The penalty order dated 31.08.1994, as also the appellate order dated 25.02.1995, were just and proper and the quantum of punishment was proportionate to the misconduct committed by the respondent, hence the impugned judgment and order dated 22.04.2010 passed by learned Single Judge, is liable to be set aside. The disciplinary proceedings had been conducted against the respondent as per the Rules of 1958. The respondent had himself preferred not to participate on his own choice in the inquiry, for which respondent himself is responsible. In spite of giving time and opportunity to the respondent, he had failed to produce any evidence and, therefore, there was no other option for the Disciplinary Authority but to conduct proceedings ex-parte. The respondent had himself preferred not to participate on his own choice in the inquiry, for which respondent himself is responsible. In spite of giving time and opportunity to the respondent, he had failed to produce any evidence and, therefore, there was no other option for the Disciplinary Authority but to conduct proceedings ex-parte. The respondent had pleaded before learned Single Judge that he had requested for sanction/extension of leave, however, the said averment of the respondent was not substantiated and only after issuance of the charge-sheet, the respondent came with a plea of sickness, which clearly was an afterthought and reveals the un-callous attitude on the part of respondent. The Inquiry Officer was not prejudiced against the petitioner-respondent. 6. It has been submitted on behalf of respondent that the departmental inquiry was conducted against the procedure established under the Rules of 1958. Principles of natural justice were not followed. The respondent was not afforded any opportunity of hearing. The Departmental Inquiry was conducted ex-parte, hence, respondent had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Respondent was not supplied the copy of the Inquiry Report. No opportunity was granted to the respondent to appoint Defence Nominee. In such circumstances, the order passed by learned Single Judge dated 22.04.2010 is just and valid and appeal is liable to be dismissed. In support of arguments, learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon following judgments:- (i) Union of India and Others vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma, (2018) 2 SCC (LS) 356 (ii) Vijay Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (2007) 2 SCC (LS) 664 (iii) Ram Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (2004) 1 RLW (Raj) 546 (iv) Ashok Dhariwal vs. University of Jodhpur, (1992) 2 RLW (Raj) 130 (v) Sardar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Others [S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3109/1995 decided on 07.01.2009] 7. Heard both the parties and perused the record available on the file carefully. 8. As per the record available on file, Annexure-1 is the application of petitioner- respondent, which was submitted to the Reserve Inspector, Police Line, Dholpur for permission to proceed on leave for thirty days. The petitioner-respondent had sought permission of the Reserve Inspector, Dholpur to allow him to proceed on leave for thirty days, which was sanctioned by the Superintendent of Police, Dholpur. The petitioner-respondent had sought permission of the Reserve Inspector, Dholpur to allow him to proceed on leave for thirty days, which was sanctioned by the Superintendent of Police, Dholpur. On that application, following officer report was recorded:- ^^Jheku~ th] bl le; ,eŒVhŒ esa nks pkyd lhŒ,yŒ ij gS o ,d pkyd ihŒ,lŒ fngksyh M~;wVhy esa x;k iqŒykŒ esa pkyd dh deh gS lsok esa fjiksVZ is'k gSA gLrk{kj 1-2-1992A** 9. Thereafter, following endorsement was made by the Reserve Inspector, Dholpur:- ^^vkjŒvkbZŒ Mh,yvkj lqfo/kkuqlkj gh jokuxh nh tkosA gLrk{kj 1-2-1992A** 10. Thus, perusal of Annexure-1 reveals that the petitioner-respondent had sought permission of the Reserve Inspector, Dholpur for proceeding on leave sanctioned by order of SP, Dholpur but the petitioner-respondent was not immediately relieved of his duties, and looking to the office report that there was a shortage of drivers, it was directed that he be relieved as per convenience. Charge-sheet dated 25.06.1993 was issued to the petitioner-respondent and the Reserve Inspector, Dholpur was appointed as the Inquiry Officer. Copy of the charge-sheet was sent to the petitioner-respondent. The Departmental Inquiry was initiated. The petitioner-respondent was informed to remain present and to appoint his Defence Nominee vide letters dated 04.07.1993, 16.07.1993, 04.08.1993, 10.08.1993, 03.09.1993, 13.09.1993, 17.09.1993, 27.09.1993 and 11.10.1993. The notice was also sent through Special Messenger and the information was also published in daily local newspaper, but despite several communications, the petitioner-respondent did not appear in the Departmental proceedings and no request was made for appointment of any Defence Nominee. In this situation, ex-parte proceedings were started and departmental evidence was recorded. In all, statements of seven witnesses were recorded for the Department and documents were exhibited. After completion of the departmental evidence, the delinquent employee was again afforded opportunity to lead his evidence in defence. A notice dated 02.03.1994 was issued for this purpose, which was served upon the petitioner-respondent. He was informed to present himself on 07.03.1994 in the Departmental Inquiry and opportunity was granted to him to produce any evidence or documents in his defence, if he so desired. On 07.03.1994, the petitioner-respondent appeared. He did not produce any evidence and time was sought by him. Next date was fixed as 15.03.1994 for defence evidence and further opportunity was granted to seek appointment of Defecne Nominee. On 07.03.1994, the petitioner-respondent appeared. He did not produce any evidence and time was sought by him. Next date was fixed as 15.03.1994 for defence evidence and further opportunity was granted to seek appointment of Defecne Nominee. On 15.03.1994, the petitioner-respondent again sought time, hence 22.03.1994 was fixed as next date and last opportunity was granted to the petitioner-respondent. On 22.03.1994, the petitioner-respondent again remained absent and no information was received on his behalf, hence the inquiry was concluded. Inquiry Report Exhibited-10 was sent to Disciplinary Authority (SP, Dholpur). Vide Annexure-11, copy of the Inquiry Report was sent to the petitioner-respondent and opportunity was given to submit his explanation within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice. The petitioner-respondent submitted his written representation, which was considered by the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 31.08.1994, passed the following direction:- ^^Jh [kyhy [kk¡ dkfuŒ uEcj 332 iqfyl ykbZu /kkSyiqj dks mlds fo:) vkjksfir vkjksiksa ds foHkkxh; tk¡p ls iw.kZr;k Áekf.kr ik;s tkus ij jkT; lsok ls i`Fkd fd;s tkus ds n.M ls nf.Mr fd;k tkrk gSA [kyhy [kk¡ dkfuŒ uEcj 332 dks LosPNk ls xSjgkftj vof/k fnukad 2-2-1992 ls 5-8-1994 rd dh M~;wVh esa ugha ekuk tkosxk vkSj uk gh bl vof/k dk dksbZ osru@HkRrk dkfuŒ dks ns; gksxkA** 11. Appeal against the order dated 31.08.1994 was preferred before the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority after considering entire facts and evidence on record, dismissed the appeal vide order dated 25.02.1995 (Annexure-15), and upheld the order of Disciplinary Authority dated 31.08.1994. 12. A perusal of the inquiry proceedings reveals that the petitioner-respondent had willfully remained absent for a very long period (02.02.1992 to 05.08.1994). Due procedure was followed in the conduct of the Departmental Inquiry. The petitioner-respondent was informed through several notices to participate in the inquiry proceedings. Service through Special Messenger was also effected upon him and information was also published in the daily local newspaper. Despite ample opportunities having been granted to him, the respondent failed to participate in the Departmental Inquiry. Thus, the Inquiry Officer was left with the only option of proceeding ex-parte against the petitioner-respondent. After recording evidence of the Department, opportunity was again given to the petitioner-respondent to produce evidence in his defence. 13. The petitioner-respondent appeared in the departmental proceedings but on several occasions he sought time for the purpose of appointment of Defence Nominee and to lead his defence evidence. After recording evidence of the Department, opportunity was again given to the petitioner-respondent to produce evidence in his defence. 13. The petitioner-respondent appeared in the departmental proceedings but on several occasions he sought time for the purpose of appointment of Defence Nominee and to lead his defence evidence. Thereafter, he again voluntarily remained absent from the proceedings. Thus, no option was left with the Inquiry Officer but to conclude the Departmental Inquiry. Speaking order was passed against the petitioner-respondent and Inquiry Report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority gave notice of the Inquiry Report to the petitioner-respondent and after considering his written representation, passed the impugned order of punishment dated 31.08.1994. Thereafter, appeal was preferred by the petitioner-respondent. The Appellate Authority also considered all the facts of the case and by speaking order, dismissed the appeal. 14. It has been submitted on behalf of respondent that the first charge that petitioner-respondent was willfully absent from duty from 02.02.1992, does not appear to hold good at-least for initial period of one month because petitioner-respondent was already granted leave for one month vide order dated 27.01.1992. Thus, period for which the petitioner-respondent was granted leave, could not be made part of the charge and the petitioner-respondent proceeded on leave on 01.02.1992. A perusal of the Inquiry Report discloses that though the petitioner-respondent was granted leave for one month w.e.f. 01.02.1992, but Annexure-1 also reveals the fact that the petitioner-respondent had not been relieved before proceeding on leave. The Reserve Inspector had recorded on his application that he be relieved as per convenience because other drivers of the Police Line were on leave. Thus, it appears that the petitioner-respondent was not relieved in pursuance to his sanctioned leave and he was directed to remain on duty till he was relieved, but despite that he proceeded on leave without there being any entry in the roznamcha. Thus, the subsequent inspection of the Police Line and marking of his absence in the roznamcha, cannot be held to be a fabricated entry and there is no ground to substantiate the allegation that the Inquiry Officer was prejudiced against the petitioner-respondent. 15. Thus, the subsequent inspection of the Police Line and marking of his absence in the roznamcha, cannot be held to be a fabricated entry and there is no ground to substantiate the allegation that the Inquiry Officer was prejudiced against the petitioner-respondent. 15. It has also been argued on behalf of the respondent that the third charge against the petitioner-respondent that he remained absent on thirteen occasions earlier, was vague as it was not pointed out either in the charge or statement of allegations specifically as to the period of absence. Hence, the charge was wholly vague. 16. Charge No. 3 Annexure-4 (charge-sheet), reads as under:- ^^vkjksi la[;k%& 3 vkids lsok fjdkMZ ds vuqlkj vki iwoZ esa fnukad 19-12-1984 ls fnukad 22-12-1984 rd 4 ;kse] fnukad 18-12-1984 dks ,d ;kse fnukad 16-7-1985 ls 31-7-1985 rd 16 ;kse] fnukad 2-8-1985 ls fnukad 14-9-1985 rd 44 ;kse] fnukad 6-6-1989 ls 15-6-1989 rd 10 ;kse] fnukad 16-6- 1989 ls 23 -6-1989 rd 8 ;kse] fnukad 16-8-1989 ls 18-8-1989 rd 3 ;kse] fnukad 19-8- 1989 ls 27 -8-1989 rd 9 ;kse] fnukad 5-8-1990 ls fnukad 12-8-1990 rd 8 ;kse] fnukad 30-5-1991 ls 4-6-1991 rd 6 ;kse] fnukad 19-4-1990 ls 10-5-1990 rd 22 ;kse] vFkkZr~ vc rd ds lsokdky esa dqy 13 ckj vyx&vyx vof/k rd LosPNk ls xSj&gkftj jgs ftldk fHkUu fHkUu vodk'kksa ds :i esa fuLrkj.k fd;k x;kA** 17. Thus, charge no. 3 specifically mentions dates regarding which allegation of absence on earlier occasions was levelled against the petitioner-respondent. 18. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the inquiry was held in utter violation of the principles of natural justice, which is also infraction of procedure contained in the Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958. It has also been argued on behalf of the respondent that there was denial of opportunity to avail services of Defence Nominee and that has occasioned miscarriage of justice, but the record of the inquiry proceedings as discussed above, clearly brings out the fact that the petitioner-respondent was informed to appear before the Medical Board for his medical examination, but no compliance was made by the petitioner-respondent. He did not appear before the Medical Board. Notices of inquiry were sent to him several times, even through Special Messenger. He did not appear before the Medical Board. Notices of inquiry were sent to him several times, even through Special Messenger. Publication in daily local newspaper was also made informing the petitioner-respondent to remain present in the departmental inquiry proceedings, but despite several opportunities having been granted, the petitioner-respondent willfully remained absent from the Departmental Inquiry proceedings, hence in such circumstance ex-parte evidence was recorded against him. Thereafter, he was again informed to remain present for producing defence evidence and for availing the opportunity of services of Defence Nominee. The petitioner- respondent sought time on two occasions and thereafter, he again remained absent from the proceedings. Thus, the Inquiry Officer was left with no option but to close the Departmental Inquiry. The findings of the Inquiry Officer as per Inquiry Report, Annexure-10, reads as under:- ^^mDr vkjksi i= dkfuŒ Jh [kyhy [kkau 332 dks fnukad 02-06-1993 dks ÁkfIr gqvkA foHkkxh; tkWp esa vfHk;kstu i{k dh vksj ls Jh ykyeqfu lgk;d mi&fujh{kd dks mi&LFkkid vf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k x;kA mDr vkjksiks ds ckcr fu;ekuqlkj foHkkxh; tkWp ÁkjEHk dh xbZA vkjksih dkfuŒ Jh [kyhy [kkW 332 dks foHkkxh; tkWp dk;Zokgh esa mifLFkr gksus ckcr o viuk cpko Áfrfuf/k fu;qDr djus ckcr rgjhjs fnukad Øe ls 4-7-1993] 16-7-1993] 4-8-1993] 10-8-1993] 3-9-1993 o 13-9-1993] 17-9-1993] 27-9-1993] 11-10-1993 dks tkjh dh xbZA rFkk rkehy gsM Lis'ky eslsUtj Hkh Hksts x, ,oa LFkkuh; lekpkj i= ^^frjaxk** es foKfIr Hkh Ádkf'kr djkbZ xbZA ftlesa dkfuŒ dks foHkkxh; tkWp esa mifLFkr vkus ckcr vafdr djk;k x;kA fdUrq mDr vkjksih dkfuŒ tkucw>dj foHkkxh; tkWp esa mifLFkr ugha gqvk vkSj uk gh dksbZ cpko Áfrfuf/k gh fu;qDr djk;kA ,slh fLFkfr esa fu;ekuqlkj foHkkxh; tkWp esa ,d rjQk dk;Zokgh ÁkjEHk dj vfHk;kstu i{k dh lk{; fjdkMZ ij yh xbZA nkSjkus tkWp fuEufyf[kr xokgku ,oa nLrkosth; lk{; fjdkMZ ij yh xbZA** 19. Thereafter, copy of the Inquiry Report was also sent to the petitioner-respondent. He was afforded opportunity to file written representation. Written representation was submitted by the petitioner-respondent to the Disciplinary Authority. Medical certificates on which the respondent relied, were submitted by him for the first time before the Disciplinary Authority at the time of submission of written representation. The Disciplinary Authority, by a speaking order, passed the punishment order. He was afforded opportunity to file written representation. Written representation was submitted by the petitioner-respondent to the Disciplinary Authority. Medical certificates on which the respondent relied, were submitted by him for the first time before the Disciplinary Authority at the time of submission of written representation. The Disciplinary Authority, by a speaking order, passed the punishment order. Observation of Disciplinary Authority in the order dated 31.08.1994, Annexure- 13, is important which reads thus:- ^^vkjksfir dkfuŒ dks lk{kkRdkj dk ekSdk fn;k tkdj ryc fd;k x;k pwafd dkfuŒ fnukad 2-02-1992 ls gh yxkrkj xSj&gkftj py jgk gSA vr% fnukad 5-8-1994 dks esjs le{k mifLFkr gqvk ftlus lquokbZ ds nkSjku vius vH;kosnu esa gh vafdr rF;ks dks nqgjk;kA vH;kosnu dk gh tkWp Áfrosnu] vkjksi i= dh rqyuk esa xgu v/;;u voyksdu fd;k x;kA dkfuŒ dk ekuuk gS fd og chekjh ds dkj.k xSj&gkftj Fkk o le; le; ij ;wŒihŒlhŒ i= ds tfj;s vkjŒvkbZŒ dks lwpuk nhA ;g fcYdqy >wB gS D;kasfd ,d Hkh i= vkjŒvkbZŒ dks o bl dk;kZy; ls ÁkIr ugha gqvkA ;fn dkfuŒ us dksbZ i= Hkstk gksrk ;k og Loa;a gh mifLFkr gksdj viuh chekjh ckcr v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ vkok vkjŒvkbZŒ iqfyl ykbZu] /kkSyiqj ls djrk rks bl rF; dh vo'; gh iqf"B foHkkxh; tkWp ds nkSjku ;k tkWp ls iwoZ gksrh fdUrq ;g rF; okLro esa fujk/kkj ,oa vlR; gS tks Li"V gSA vkjksih dkfuŒ dk ;g Hkh dguk o ekuuk gS fd og foHkkxh tkWp dk;Zokgh esa Hkkx ysus gsrq chp&chp esa vkjŒvkbZŒ iqfyl ykbZu /kkSyiqj ¼tkWp vf/kdkjh½ ls feyrk jgk gS D;ksafd foHkkxh; tkWp i=koyh ls ;g rF; Li"V gS fd vkjksih dkfuŒ ek= blfy;s vkjŒvkbZŒ iqfyl ykbZu] /kkSyiqj ls feyk fd mlds ikl viuh xSj&gkftj ckcr dksbZ i;kZIr lcwr ugha gSA mldk ;g dguk Hkh vlR; gS fd og iqfyl ykbZu /kkSyiqj esa vk;k D;ksafd vxj og iqfyl ykbZu] /kkSyiqj esa vkrk rks viuh vken D;ksa ugha djkbZ tcfd dkfuŒ us viuh vken fnukad 5-8-1994 dks le; 8-30 ihŒ,eŒ ij iqfyl ykbZu] /kkSyiqj esa djkbZ gSA vkjksih dkfuŒ us lkjs rF; >wBs o cukoVh ÁLrqr fd;s gS ftUgsa mlds cpko gsrq drbZ i;kZIr lk{; ugha ekuk tk ldrk gSA mlds }kjk ÁLrqr chekjh dk fpfdRlk Áek.k&i= Hkh dksbZ egRo ugha jgrk D;ksafd mlds }kjk ÁLrqr ÁFke fpfdRlk Áek.k i= 5 fnu dk gS o nwljk Áek.k i= lok lky dk ,d lkFk tkjh fd;s x;s gS tcfd fu;ekuqlkj o mPpkf/kdkfj;ksa ds funsZ'kkuqlkj lkr fnu ls vf/kd vof/k dk fpfdRlk Áek.k&i= dsoy esMhdy cksMZ }kjk gh tkjh fd;k tk ldrk gSA vr% ;g lok lky dk fpfdRlk Áek.k i= dks dkfuŒ vkjksih us vius cpko gsrq >wBk is'k fd;k gSA blds vykok fpfdRlk Áek.k i= 9 ekg dk ÁLrqr fd;k gS tks ÁkbosV MkDVj dk gS fu;ekuqlkj ;g Hkh ekU; ugha gSA ;g ckr drbZ ekU; ugh gks ldrh fd vkjksih dkfuŒ iqfyl ykbZu /kkSyiqj ls fnukad 2-2-1992 ls xSj&gkftj gksdj yxkrkj chekj jgk o vf/kdrj viuk bykt Hkh /kkSyiqj esa gh dj;k fdUrq lwfpr gksus ds i'pkr Hkh viuh M;wVh ij mifLFkr ugha gqvk vkSj uk gh viuh chekjh ckcr le;≤ ij fdlh vf/kdkjh dks voxr djk;k ;gh ugha 'kkjhfjd fpfdRlk gsrq lwfpr gksus ds ckn Hkh vkjksih dkfuŒ cksMZ }kjk fu;r rkjh[k ij cksMZ ds le{k u rks mifLFkr gqvk vkSj uk gh fdlh dkj.k ls fdlh dks voxr djk;k vkSj uk gh viuh M;wVh ij gkftj gqvkA** 20. Appellate Authority also dismissed the appeal by a detailed speaking order, and observed in the appellate order dated 25.02.1995 as under:- ^^¼d½ vihykFkhZ us Loh—r'kqnk mikftZr vodk'k ij jokuxh gsrq vkjŒvkbZŒ lkcg iqfyl ykbZu] /kkSyiqj dks tks ÁkFkZuk i= ÁLrqr fd;k gS] ml ij Li"V vafdr gS fd iqfyl ykbu esa nks pkyd vodk'k ij gS vkSj ,d pkyd M~;wVh esa Fkkuk fngkSyh ij gSA pkydksa dh deh py jgh gS ijUrq vihykFkhZ us mPpkf/kdkfj;ksa ds vkns'k dh vogsyuk dj] LosPNk ls M~;wVh ls vuqifLFkr gks x;kA mldks fu;ekuqlkj vius vf/kdkfj;ksa ls btktr ysdj iqfyl ykbu] /kkSyiqj ds jkstukepk vke esa jokuxh crkdj mikftZr vodk'k ij tkuk pkfg, FkkA vxj og fxj tkus ds dkj.k pksV ls ihfM+r Fkk rks mls vodk'k ds fy, is'k gksuk pkfg, Fkk ijarq mlus ,slk ugha fd;k vkSj MkWDVjh Áek.k i= tks Ásf"kr fd;s x;s gS] og rc vius esa dksbZ egRo ugha j[krs gSa vkSj fu;ekuqlkj lgh ugha gSA mls 'kkjhfjd fpfdRlk gsrq lwfpr gksus ds mijkUr Hkh cksMZ }kjk fu;r fnukad ij u rks og mifLFkr gqvk vkSj uk gh vuqifLFkr gksus dh ckcr fdlh dkj.k ls voxr djk;k x;kA chekjh ds dkj.k vuqifLFkr jgus o le;≤ ij jkŒihŒlhŒ i= ls lwpuk nsus ds laca/k esa mldh vksj ls ,d Hkh ÁkFkZuk i= ÁkIr ugha gqvk gSA ;g rF; fujk/kkj gSA vihykFkhZ dk ;g dguk fd og foHkkxh; tkap dh dk;Zokgh esa Hkkx ysus gsrq chp&chp esa vkjŒvkbZŒ iqfyl ykbu /kkSyiqj ls feyrk jgk rks og viuh vuqifLFkfr dh vken djk ldrk Fkk vkSj vf/kdkfj;ksa ls fuosnu Hkh dj ldrk Fkk ijUrq mlds }kjk tkucw> dj fu;eksa dh vogsyuk ,oa mYya?ku fd;k x;k gSA og ckj&ckj vuqifLFkr jgus dk vknh gS D;ksafd og ckj&ckj lwfpr fd, tkus ds i'pkr Hkh mifLFkr ugha gqvkA vihykFkhZ }kjk U;k;ky; dh tks nyhy ÁLrqr dh xbZ gS] mudk bl Ádj.k ls dksbZ lEcU/k ugha gSA** 21. In view of this, it is proved that the departmental proceedings were held as per the provisions of the Rules of 1958. Ample opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner-respondent. The principles of natural justice were followed. No infraction of principles of natural justice can be inferred. The petitioner-respondent himself voluntarily remained absent from the Departmental Inquiry proceedings. Hence, the petitioner- respondent cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 22. Ample opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner-respondent. The principles of natural justice were followed. No infraction of principles of natural justice can be inferred. The petitioner-respondent himself voluntarily remained absent from the Departmental Inquiry proceedings. Hence, the petitioner- respondent cannot take advantage of his own wrong. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon the judgment of rendered in Union of India and Others vs. Ram Lakhan Sharma (supra). In this judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case. It has been held by Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:- “Rules of natural justice have been recognised and developed as principles of administrative law. Natural justice has many facets. Its all facets are steps to ensure justice and fair play. This Court in Suresh Koshy George vs. University of Kerala and Others, AIR 1969 SC 198 had occasion to consider the principles of natural justice in the context of a case where disciplinary action was taken against a student who was alleged to have adopted malpractice in the examination. In paragraph 7 this Court held that the question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of Tribunal and the rules under which it functions. Following was held in paragraphs 7 and 8: 7......The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under which it functions. 8. In Russel vs. Duke of Norfolk, Tucker, L.J. observed: “There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so forth. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so forth. Accordingly, I do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have been from time to time used, but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case.” 23. As discussed above, in the facts of the case in hand, the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted by the appellant in the departmental inquiry proceedings. This judgment also deals with the question of effect of non appointment of Presenting Officer in a departmental inquiry, but no such controversy has been raised in this matter. Hence, this judgment does not advance the case of the respondent. 24. Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases, has propounded the scope of judicial review in disciplinary proceedings. 25. In S. Sreesanth vs. The Board of Control for Cricket in India and Others, (2019) 4 SCC 660 , it has been held as under:- “....This Court further held that jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction and the High Court does not exercise a jurisdiction of an appellate court. The findings of the fact reached by a tribunal as result of the appreciation of the evidence cannot be questioned in the writ proceedings. In paragraph 23 of the judgment, following has been laid down: 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. [See Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan] This Court again in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran, reiterated the same principles regarding judicial review of disciplinary proceedings. In Paras 12 and 13, the following has been laid down: 12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority. (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf. (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings. (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations. (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion. (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence. (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding. (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence. (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law. (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence. (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence. (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be. (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 26. Considered on touchstone of the guiding principles reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in S. Sreesanth’s case (supra), the facts of the present case do not call for the exercise of power of judicial review of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, so as to interfere with the punishment order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 31.08.1994 and 25.02.2995 respectively. 27. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has erred in allowing the writ petition. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The order of learned Single Judge dated 22.04.2010 is set aside. Consequently, writ petition filed by the petitioner-respondent is dismissed. 28. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.