ATC Telecom Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Meghalaya
2021-10-21
H.S.THANGKHIEW, RANJIT MORE
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Ranjit More, CJ. - Heard Mr. S.Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A.Kumar, learned AG along with Mr. K.Khan, learned Sr. GA for the respondents. 2. By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the constitutional validity of Section 3(1)(c) of the Meghalaya Electricity Duty (Assam Act XXX of 1964 as adapted by Meghalaya) as amended vide amendment Act dated 15th October, 2019 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as “the Act”). 3. Before the 2019 amendment, Section 3(1)(c) of the Assam Electricity Duty Act, 1964 (Assam Act XXX of 1964) reads as follows: “3. (1) There shall be levied and paid to the State Government a duty, to be called the “electricity duty”, at the rate of five paise per unit of energy. (c) generated by a person or a company or a firm or any organisation for own use or consumption”. 4. The provision of Sub-section (c) of Section 3(1) was challenged before the Gauhati High Court by filing WP(C) No. 710/2010. Admittedly, the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court held and declared that the State is not legally competent to levy duty from the cellular phone companies on self-produced and self-consumed electricity. The Division Bench further held that taxable event is generate and that cannot be read as consumption and hence Entry 53 of the State List of the Seventh Schedule does not support the State action. Consequently, Section 3(1)(c) of the Assam Electricity Duty Act, 1964 is declared ultra vires. Sub Section 3 (1)(c), thereafter was subsequently substituted by the State of Assam. Similar action was taken by the State of Meghalaya and Sub Section 3(1) (c) of the Meghalaya Electricity Duty (Assam Act XXX of 1964 as adapted by Meghalaya) was amended. Thereby, Sub-Section (c) was substituted as follows: “(c) Consumed by any person or any organization generating energy”. 5. Mr. S.Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to the definition of “consumer” in Section 2 (b) of the said Act and submitted that the petitioner does not fall within this definition and therefore, is not a consumer. He submitted that if the petitioner is not a consumer of electricity, in that event, the electricity duty cannot be levied against it under Section 3 (1) of the said Act.
He submitted that if the petitioner is not a consumer of electricity, in that event, the electricity duty cannot be levied against it under Section 3 (1) of the said Act. He also submitted that the petitioner is generating the electricity as well as consuming the electricity generated by it. In short, his argument is that self-consumption cannot be taxed or levied under Section 3 (1) of the said Act. 6. Per contra, Mr. A.Kumar, learned AG and Mr. K.Khan, learned Sr. GA appearing for the respondents submitted that the 2019 amendment of the said Act is in consonance with Entry 53 of the State List. Learned AG further submitted that the 2019 amendment to the said Act has made it abundantly clear that taxable event in respect of captive consumption of electricity is when the electricity is “consumed” by the person generating it. Consequently, the duty is not imposed under Section 3 (1) (c) of the said Act on the mere act of “generation” of electricity. He further submitted that levy of electricity duty under the amended Sub Section 3(1) on consumption of electricity is perfectly admissible. In this regard, they relied upon decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jiyageerao Cotton Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1963 SC 414 and State of Andhra Pradesh v. National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (NTPC) AIR 2002 SC 1895 . 7. Having considered the rival submission of the respective counsels, we are of the opinion that the issue raised in this petition is squarely covered by the two Apex Court judgments in Jiyageerao Cotton Mills Ltd. (Supra) and National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (Supra). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jiyageerao Cotton Mills Ltd. (Supra) in para 5 and 6 held as follows: “5…’Producer’ as defined in Section 2 (d-1) of the Act means “a person who generates electrical energy at a voltage exceeding hundred volts for his own consumption or for supplying to others”. If we read the two definitions together, omitting the non-essentials, ‘consumer’ would include “any person who consumes electrical energy supplied by a person who generates electrical energy for his own consumption”. Under Section 3 a person who generates electrical energy over hundred volts for his own consumption is liable to pay duty on the units of electrical energy consumed by himself.
Under Section 3 a person who generates electrical energy over hundred volts for his own consumption is liable to pay duty on the units of electrical energy consumed by himself. A producer consuming the electrical energy generated by him is also a consumer, that is to say, he is a person who consumes electrical energy supplied by himself. The Table prescribes rates of duty payable with respect to electrical energy supplied for consumption and, therefore, the levy on the appellant falls squarely within the table under Section 3 of the Act and Mr. Viswanatha Sastri’s argument is devoid of substance. 6. It is difficult to see how the levy of duty upon consumption of electrical energy can be regarded as duty of excise falling within Entry 84 of List I. Under that Entry what is permitted to Parliament is levy of duty of excise on manufacture or production of goods (other than those excepted expressly by that entry). The taxable event with respect to a duty of excise is “manufacture” or “production”. Here the taxable event is not production or generation of electrical energy but its consumption. If a producer generates electrical energy and stores it up, he would not be required to pay any duty under the Act. It is only when he sells it or consumes it that he would be rendered liable to pay the duty prescribed by the Act. The Central Provinces and Berar Electricity Act was enacted under Entry 48-B of List II of the Government of India Act, 1935. The relevant portion of that Entry read thus: “Taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity…..”. Entry 53 of List II of the Constitution is to the same effect. The argument of Mr. Sastri is that the word “consumption” should be accorded the meaning which it had under the various electricity Acts, including the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. Under that Act and under the various Provincial and State Acts, Consumption of Electricity means, according to him, consumption by persons other than producers and that both in the Government of India Act and under the Constitution the word ‘consumption’ must be deemed to have been used in the same sense. The Acts in question deal only with a certain aspect of the topic “electricity”, and not with all of them.
The Acts in question deal only with a certain aspect of the topic “electricity”, and not with all of them. Therefore, in those Acts the word “consumption” may have a limited meaning, as pointed out by learned Counsel. But the word “consumption” has a wider meaning. It means also “use-up”, “spend” etc. The mere fact that a series of laws were concerned only with a certain kind of use of electricity, that is consumption of electricity by persons other than the producer cannot justify the conclusion that the British Parliament in using the word “consumption’ in Entry 48-B and the Constituent Assembly in Entry 53 of List II wanted to limit the meaning of “consumption” in the same way. The language used in the legislative entries in the Constitution must be interpreted in a broad way so as to give the widest amplitude of power to the Legislature to legislate and not in a narrow and pedantic sense. We cannot, therefore, accept either of the two grounds urged by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri challenging the vires of the Act”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Thermal Power Corporation Limited (Supra), in para 22 and 23 held as follows: “22. We now come to the question on the interpretation of Entry 53 in List II of Seventh Schedule. It provides for taxes on the consumption or sale of electricity. The word 'sale' as occurring in Entry 52 came up for the consideration of this Court in Burmah- Shell Oil Storage & Distributing Co. India Ltd. v. The Belgaum Borough Municipality 1963 Supp. (2) SCR 216. It was held that the act of sale is merely the means for putting the goods in the way of use or consumption. It is an earlier stage, the ultimate destination of the goods being “use or consumption”. We feel that the same meaning should be assigned to the word 'sale' in Entry 53. This is for a fortiorari reason in the context of electricity as there can be no sale of electricity excepting by its consumption, for it can neither be preserved nor stored. It is this property of electricity which persuaded this Court in Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerela (1996) 7 SCC 637 : AIR 1996 SC 1431 , to hold that in the context of electricity, the word 'supply' should be interpreted to include sale or consumption of electricity.
It is this property of electricity which persuaded this Court in Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerela (1996) 7 SCC 637 : AIR 1996 SC 1431 , to hold that in the context of electricity, the word 'supply' should be interpreted to include sale or consumption of electricity. Entry 53 should therefore be read as 'taxes on the consumption or sale for consumption of electricity'. 23. With these two things in mind, namely, that electricity is goods, and that sale of electricity has to be construed and read as sale for consumption within the meaning of Entry 53, the conflict, if any, between Entry 53 and Entry 54 ceases to exist and the two can be harmonized and read together. Because electricity is goods it is covered in Entry 54 also. It is not disputed that duty on electricity is tax. Tax on the sale or purchase of goods including electricity but excluding newspapers shall fall within Entry 54 and shall be subject to provisions of Entry 92A of List I. Taxes on the consumption or sale for consumption of electricity within the meaning of Entry 53 must be consumption within the State and not beyond the territory of the State. Any other sale or electricity shall continue to be subject to the limits provided by Entry 54. Even purchase of electricity would be available for taxation which it would not be if electricity was not includible in the meaning of term “goods”. A piece of legislation need not necessarily fall within the scope of one entry alone; more than one entry may overlap to cover the subject-matter of a single piece of legislation. A bare consumption of electric energy even by one who generates the same may be liable to be taxed by reference to Entry 53 and if the State Legislature may choose to impose tax on consumption of electricity by the one who generates it such, tax would not be deemed to be a tax necessarily on manufacture or production or a duty of excise, as held by Constitution Bench in Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd., Birlanagar, Gwalior v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1962 Supp. (1) SCR 282.
(1) SCR 282. A mere consumption of goods (other than electricity), not accompanied by purchase or sale would not be taxable under Entry 54 because it does not provide for taxes on the consumption and Entry 53 does not speak of goods other than electricity. Thus in substance Entries 53 and 54 can be and must be read together and to the extent of sale of electricity for consumption outside the State, the electricity being goods, shall also be subject to provisions of Entry 92A of List I…..”. 8. Reading of the above observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court makes it clear that even bare consumption of electricity energy by a person who generates the same is permissible to be taxed by reference to Entry 53 of the State List. In the light of the above, we find no merit in the petition. Same is accordingly disposed of.