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2021 DIGILAW 722 (ALL)

Dharmraj v. D. D. C. Faizabad

2021-07-26

JASPREET SINGH

body2021
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri I.D. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri P.V. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the private-respondents as well as learned standing counsel for the State-respondents. 2. The issue involved in the instant writ petition relates to the validity of a sale-deed executed on 17.05.1975 which is said to be hit by the provisions of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953. 3. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the original respondent no.2 Ram Dular, who is now represented by his legal heirs sought his mutation in respect of Chak-456 constituted by the Plot Nos.71, 72, 73, 119, 120, 122, 124 and 125. He applied for his mutation by moving an application under Section 12 of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 on the basis of the registered sale-deed dated 17.05.1975 executed by the original tenure-holder namely Sita Ram. 4. The petitioner and the respondents no.2 to 4 also made an application for mutation on the basis that the original tenure-holder Sita Ram died and the petitioner and the respondents no.2 to 4 being his real brothers and the legal heirs have succeeded to his estate and on the basis of the succession and claimed their names to be mutated. 5. It is in this backdrop that the issue arose before the Consolidation Officer whether the sale-deed dated 17.05.1975 relied upon by the respondent no.2 Ram Dular was hit by Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 since no permission from the Settlement Officer of Consolidation (for short, 'SOC') was taken. 6. The respondent no.2 while defending his claim before the Consolidation Officer had submitted that there was no need to take permission from the SOC since Sita Ram had executed a registered sale-deed dated 17.05.1975 in respect of his whole holding and, therefore, the bar contained in Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 did not affect the transfer and he was entitled to succeed. 7. 7. The Consolidation Officer, Akbarpur, District Faizabad by means of the order dated 20.08.1982 rejected the contention of the respondent no.2 and found that the sale-deed dated 17.05.1975 was bad in the eyes of law and accordingly it refused to recognize the same, hence, as a consequence, the names of the petitioner and the respondents no.2 to 4 were mutated as the successors of Sita Ram on the basis succession. 8. The respondent no.2 Ram Dular filed an appeal against the said order which also came to be dismissed by the SOC by means of the order dated 14.06.1983. 9. Being aggrieved against the order of dismissal of his appeal, Ram Dular preferred a revision under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad (for short, 'DDC, Faizabad'), who by means of the order dated 20.04.1987 allowed the revision and ordered for mutation of the name of respondent no.2 alone on the ground that since Sita Ram had transferred his entire holding in favour of the respondent no.2, hence, no permission as contemplated under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 was required. This order passed by the DDC, Faizabad dated 20.04.1987 is under challenge in this writ petition. 10. Insofar as the facts are concerned, there is not much dispute between the parties. It is not disputed that the respondent no.2 claimed his rights on the basis of the registered sale-deed dated 17.05.1975 claiming full rights over the Chak-456 situate in Village Akbarpur, Gram Saidpur, District Faizabad whereas the contention of the petitioner is that upon the death of Shri Sita Ram, the petitioner and the respondents no.2 to 4 being the brothers succeeded to the property and the sale-deed was hit by Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953. It is also not disputed by the parties that Sita Ram had not sought any permission from the SOC prior to executing the sale-deed dated 17.05.1975. 11. It will be relevant to mention here that petitioner no.1, respondents no.2 and 4 died during the pendency of the writ petition and were duly substituted by their legal heirs. However, for sake of easy reference, the Court is referring to the original parties as impleaded in this writ petition. 12. 11. It will be relevant to mention here that petitioner no.1, respondents no.2 and 4 died during the pendency of the writ petition and were duly substituted by their legal heirs. However, for sake of easy reference, the Court is referring to the original parties as impleaded in this writ petition. 12. In view of the aforesaid, the only issue that require consideration is whether the sale-deed dated 17.05.1975 is valid or not. 13. Addressing the Court on the aforesaid issue, Shri I.D. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that Section 5(1)(c)(ii) contained in U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 categorically provided that no tenure-holder except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer Consolidation previously obtained shall transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange his holding or any part of his holding in the consolidation area. 14. It is further submitted that the aforesaid provision was the subject matter of controversy before the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Rati vs. Gram Samaj, AIR 1974 (Alld.) 106. It is further urged that the Full Bench expressed its opinion that expression 'any part of his holding' used in Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 meant only part of the holding and not the whole holding. 15. He further urged that after the decision of the aforesaid Full Bench of Ram Rati (supra), the Legislature amended the aforesaid provision by means of the U.P. Amending Act No.34 of 1974, which came into force w.e.f. 07.12.1974 and Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 was amended and it was made applicable to all transfers whether in respect of the entire holdings or any part thereof. He submits that since the aforesaid sale-deed in question was executed on 17.05.1975 i.e. after Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 was amended which came into effect from 07.12.1974. Thus, the contention that the embargo of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 was only applicable in respect of part of the holding is incorrect. 16. Thus, the contention that the embargo of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 was only applicable in respect of part of the holding is incorrect. 16. The said embargo now applied both on the part of the holding as well as the entire holding and since the sale-deed was executed after the amendment came into force, hence, the view taken by the DDC, Faizabad in the impugned order is contrary to the law, hence, the impugned order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record and is liable to be set aside. 17. Shri I.D. Shukla in support of his submission has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of (i) Riasat Khan vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Lucknow & Ors., 1981 RD Page 22; (ii) Smt. Ram Kali vs. Hira Lal & Ors.,1986 RD Page 147 and (iii) Siya Sharan Yadav & Ors. vs. D.D.C. & Ors., 2014 (125) RD 463 . 18. Per contra, Shri P.V. Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 submits that the view taken by the DDC, Faizabad was apposite. He submits that the purpose of consolidation is only to provide compact agriculture land holding to the tenure-holder. He has further urged that even otherwise during pendency of the aforesaid proceedings the law has changed and Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 has been deleted from the statute books. He submits that in light of the U.P. Amending Act No.30 of 1991 which was published in the extraordinary gazette on 19.02.1991, Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 was omitted. 19. He further submitted that it will be relevant to notice the preamble of the amending Act No.30 of 1991. He submits that in order to remove the practical and legal difficulties experienced in implementation of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act and U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 and for extending the consolidation scheme in the hill areas, it was considered necessary to amend the aforesaid Acts as well as to do away with the provisions of taking permission of the SOC for transfer of holdings after the commencement of consolidation scheme in order to prevent corruption and ensure quick disposal of cases relating to consolidation. 20. 20. The emphasis made by Shri Chaudhary is that it being the intention of the legislature to remove and delete the aforesaid provision, this subsequent event must be taken note of by the Court while deciding the aforesaid writ petition. The law is it stands today, there is no requirement for any tenure-holder to seek permission from the SOC prior to executing any sale-deed. Since, the sale-deed which was executed in favour of the respondent no.2 has not been declared as void nor has been cancelled by any Court of law till date, hence, the rights of the respondent no.2 stands preserved. Accordingly, in the facts and circumstances, substantial justice has already been done by the DDC, Faizabad which has further been cemented with the deletion of the impugned provision by amending Act No.30 of 1991. Accordingly, in this backdrop, the writ petition deserves to be rejected. 21. Shri Chaudhary in support of his submission has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of (i) Ram Bhawan & Ors. vs. Joint Director of Consolidation, Faizabad & Anr., 2018 (138) RD 432 . He also relies upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of (ii) Smt. Asharfunisa Begum vs. Dy. Director of Consolidation & Ors. AIR 1971 (Alld.) 87 (FB); (iii) Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., AIR 1974 (Alld.) 106 (FB); (iv) Shabbir Ahmad vs. Abdul Sattar, (2000) 7 SCC 323 ; (v) Lalta Prasad vs. IX A.D.J. Agra, 1996 (87) RD 544; (vi) Prema Devi vs. Raja Ram, (2014) 32 LCD 2179 . 22. In order to appreciate the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, at the very outset, it will be relevant to notice the provisions of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 as it stood prior to the amendment and also after the amendment in 1974. "Section 5(1)(c)(ii) as it existed before its amendment by U.P. Act No.XXXIV of 1974 read thus:- (c) Notwithstanding anything contained in U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, no tenure-holder except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer Consolidation previously obtained shall- (ii) transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area. ** * * * * * * * * * After its amendment by U.P. Act No.XXXIV of 1974, which amendment Act came into force on December 7, 1974, it reads thus:- (c) Notwithstanding anything contained in Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 no tenure-holder except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer Consolidation previously obtained shall- (ii) transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange his holding or any part thereof in the consolidation area." 23. From the perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that prior to the amendment in the year 1974, the language used in Section 5(1)(c)(ii) indicates that the embargo pertained to transfer where it related to any part of the holding of the tenure-holder. This provision was considered by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra). The Full Bench noticed that the issue had already been decided by an earlier Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum (supra). The Full Bench noticed that a plain reading of the provisions indicated that the embargo was only in respect to the part of the holding and, therefore, in the opinion of the Full Bench only such transfer was hit by Section 5(1)(c)(ii) which related to the part of holding and in case if any tenure-holder transferred his entire holding, the same would not fall within the mischief of the aforesaid section. 24. It will also be relevant to notice that once the aforesaid interpretation was ascribed by the Full Bench in the case of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum (supra) this matter was again referred to a Full Bench in the case of Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra) for the reason that there was some discrepancy regarding the use of the language in Section 5(1)(c) (ii) in Hindi and its English version. Settling that controversy the subsequent Full Bench in the case of Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra) approved the interpretation ascribed by the earlier Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum (supra) and held that English version of the Act would prevail over the Hindi version and thus, it would be seen that the issue was authoritatively decided by the Full Bench. 25. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra) approved the interpretation ascribed by the earlier Full Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum (supra) and held that English version of the Act would prevail over the Hindi version and thus, it would be seen that the issue was authoritatively decided by the Full Bench. 25. Be that as it may, the issue in the present case relates to a sale-deed which was executed on 17.05.1975 i.e. after the amendment in Section 5(1) (c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953, which became effective from 07.12.1974. 26. As already noticed above, the language prior and after the amendment is very clear, the legislature thought best to include all transfer whether in respect of part of the holding or the entire holding and thus, in order to avoid any misgivings, the amendment was introduced. 27. Once, the amendment was brought on the statute book and was enforced, the sale-deed dated 17.05.1975 cannot be saved from the mischief since admittedly the sale-deed is subsequent to the amendment and once the amendment had taken place, it could not be said that by virtue of the decision of Full Bench in the cases of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum (supra) and Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra), the sale-deed in question is saved as both the Full Bench considered the provisions of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 as it stood prior to amendment in the year 1974. 28. In view of the aforesaid, the reliance placed by Shri Chaudhary on the two Full Bench decisions in the cases of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum (supra) and Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra) do not come to his rescue. 29. The other issue raised by Shri Chaudhary that the provisions of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 has been deleted from the statute by amending the Act No.30 of 1991 effective from 19.02.1991 and on the date when the writ petition is being decided, the aforesaid change in law must be noticed including the intention of the legislature as expressed in the prefactory notes and statement appended to the Amending Act of 1991 which expresses the intention of the legislature. 30. The aforesaid argument of Shri Chaudhary is also fallacious and does not impress the Court. 30. The aforesaid argument of Shri Chaudhary is also fallacious and does not impress the Court. It will be noticed that the writ petition is not a continuity of the proceedings. An appeal is considered in continuity of the original proceedings. The parties have contested their case before the Consolidation Officer as well as SOC and the DDC, Faizabad and thus, the remedies in terms of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 stands exhausted. 31. The writ petition has been preferred under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India where the issue before the Court is to see the validity of the order passed by the authority concerned. It is also to be noticed that the law as it exists which give rise to the cause of action crystallizes the rights of the parties. It is well-settled that the rights of the parties will be determined on the basis of the rights available to them on the date of the suit and this Court is fortified in its view in light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Nand Kishore Marwah & Ors. vs. Samundri Devi, (1987) 4 SCC 382 . 32. Considering the aforesaid aspect, the sale-deed in question was executed on 17.05.1975 after Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 was amended in 1974 and it encompassed within its ambit, all transfers whether in part or whole of the holding, hence, the sale-deed dated 17.05.1975 which is the basis of the claim of the respondent no.2 was squarely hit by the aforesaid provision. 33. Apparently, the order passed by the Consolidation Officer and the SOC takes note of the amended provision of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 and thus, it cannot be said that there is any fault in the order passed by the two authorities. However, the DDC, Faizabad while passing the impugned order has relied upon the earlier position prior to amendment and basing its decision on obsolete proposition of law set aside the order passed by the Consolidation Officer and the SOC and has validated the sale-deed. 34. However, the DDC, Faizabad while passing the impugned order has relied upon the earlier position prior to amendment and basing its decision on obsolete proposition of law set aside the order passed by the Consolidation Officer and the SOC and has validated the sale-deed. 34. The decision relied upon by Shri Chaudhary, if noticed, would reveal that the case of Prema Devi (supra) does not come to his rescue, as in the said case of Prema Devi, it was a case where the Court was exercising its jurisdiction in an appeal which is a continuation of the proceedings. Hence, the said decision is clearly distinguishable on the facts. 35. From the perusal of the impugned order passed by the DDC, Faizabad dated 20.08.1987 it would indicate that it has relied upon a decision in the case of Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra). From the perusal of the decision of Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra), the redeeming feature which can be noticed from the said decision is that the sale-deed in question was dated 29.05.1968 and that it related to the entire holding of the tenure-holder. The Court placed reliance upon the decision found that the sale-deed to be valid. Apparently, in light of the discussions made above, the reliance placed by the DDC, Faizabad on the decision of Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra) was misplaced for the reason that it related to the position prior to the amendment in the Act. 36. In the instant case, the sale-deed was executed in the year 1975 whereas the Act was amended in 1974 and the amendment brought within its boundaries all transfers whether it related to part or the whole of the holding, thus, this error is apparent on the face of the record and the order passed by the DDC, Faizabad cannot be sustained. 37. 37. It will also be relevant to notice that since the rights of the parties had crystallized on the date when the cause of action arose i.e. on the date of the execution of the sale-deed which is subsequent to the amendment of the year 1974 and all remedies under the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 stood exhausted in the year 1987 i.e. when the final authority under the Act i.e. DDC, Faizabad passed the impugned order dated 20.04.1987. The amendment brought in the Act in the year 1991 during pendency of the writ petition cannot be treated to be retrospective so as to grant any benefit to the respondent no.2. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court does not find that there is any merit in the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent no.2. 38. Much emphasis was laid by Shri Chaudhary on the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Bhawan & Ors. (supra) to buttress his submission that even in the case of Ram Bhawan (supra), the sale-deeds in question related to the period post the amendment in the year 1974 and also related to the entire holdings and the Court considering the intention of the legislature as well as relying upon the two Full Bench decision in the cases of Smt. Asharfunisa Begum (supra) and Smt. Ram Rati & Ors. vs. Gram Samaj & Ors., (supra) allowed the writ petition. 39. Upon careful reading of the aforesaid decisions, this Court with utmost respect is unable to follow the aforesaid decisions. The aforesaid decisions only takes note of the provision of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953. However, there is no consideration of Section 45(A) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953. 40. It will be relevant to notice Section 45(A) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 and is being reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:- "Section 45(A). Penalty for contravening provisions of Section 5.-(1) Any person contravening the provisions of Section 5(c)(i) shall, on conviction by a Court of contempt jurisdiction, be liable to a fine not exceeding rupees one thousand. (2) A transfer made in contravention of the provisions of Section 5(c)(ii) shall not be valid or recognized; anything contained in any other law for the time being in force to the contrary notwithstanding." 41. (2) A transfer made in contravention of the provisions of Section 5(c)(ii) shall not be valid or recognized; anything contained in any other law for the time being in force to the contrary notwithstanding." 41. The aforesaid provision clearly indicates the consequence of an act done in violation of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953. It specifically provides that a transfer made in contravention of the provisions of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 shall not be valid or be recognized notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. 42. The use of the language made in the aforesaid section clearly indicates that so far as the consolidation authorities are concerned, any deed which is in contravention of Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 shall not be treated to be valid nor can be recognized, despite anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. 43. The aforesaid sub-section (2) of Section 45(A) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 is a non-obstante clause. Once, the consequence of the aforesaid Act is provided and the same has not been considered by this Court in the case of Ram Bhawan (supra), apparently for the said reason the said decision is rendered per incuriam. 44. It will be relevant to note the meaning of the word 'per incuriam'. In Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, the word ''per incuriam" has been defined as under:- "per incuriam (per in-kyoor-ee-em), adj. (Of a judicial decision) wrongly decided, usu. because the judge or judges were ill-informed about the applicable law. There is at least one exception to the rule of stare-decisis. I refer to the judgments rendered per incuriam. A judgment per incuriam is one which has been rendered inadvertently. Two examples come to mind: first, where the judge has forgotten to take account of a previous decision to which the doctrine of stare decisis applies. For all the care with which attorneys and judges may comb the case law, errare humanum est, and sometimes a judgment which clarifies a point to be settled is somehow not indexed, and is forgotten. For all the care with which attorneys and judges may comb the case law, errare humanum est, and sometimes a judgment which clarifies a point to be settled is somehow not indexed, and is forgotten. It is diction to a previous judgment that should have been considered binding, and in ingnorance of that judgment, with no mention of it, must be deemed rendered per incuriam; thus, it has no authority... the same applies to judgments rendered in ignorance of legislation of which they should have taken into account. For a judgment to be deemed per incuriam, that judgment must show that the legislation was not invoked.' Louis-Philippe Pigeon, Drafting and interpretating Legislation 60 (1988). As a general rule the only cases in which decisions should be held to have been given per incuriam are those of decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in such cases some features of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found on that account to be demonstrably wrong. This definition is not necessarily exhaustive, but cases not strictly within it which can properly be held to have been decided per incuriam, must in our judgment, consistently with the stare decisis rule which is an essential part of law, be of the rarest occurrence." Rupert Cross & J.W. Harris, Precedent in English Law 149 (4th ed. 1991)." 45. In the Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyer's (5th edition), it has been defined as under:- "Per incuriam. (Lat.) (of a judicial decision) wrongly decided, usually because the Judge or Judges were ill-informed about the applicable law. Through inadvertence or through want of care. Through carelessness, through inadvertence. 'Per incuriam' means 'through want of care'. A decision of the Court which is mistaken. A decision of the Court is not a binding precedent if given per incuriam, i.e. without the Court's attention having been drawn to the relevant authorities, or statutes. Through inadvertence or through want of care. Through carelessness, through inadvertence. 'Per incuriam' means 'through want of care'. A decision of the Court which is mistaken. A decision of the Court is not a binding precedent if given per incuriam, i.e. without the Court's attention having been drawn to the relevant authorities, or statutes. "As a general rule the only cases in which decisions should be held to have been given per incuriam are those of decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the Court concerned, so that in such cases some features of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found on that account to be demonstrably wrong. This definition is not necessarily exhaustive, but cases not strictly within it which can properly be held to have been decided per incuriam, must in our judgment, consistently with the stare decisis rule which is an essential part of our law, be of the rarest occurrence." RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, President in English law 149 (4th ed. 1991). In HALSBURY'S Law of England (4th Edn.) Vol.26 at pp. 297-98, para 578, it is stated: "A decision is given per incuriam when the Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a Court of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, in which case it must decide which case to follow (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd.) (1944) 1 KB 718, at p.729 : (1944) 2 All ER at p.293, 300). In Huddersfield Police Authority v. Watson, 1947 KB 842 Lord GODDARD, CJ. said that a decision was given per incuriam when a case or statute had not been brought to the Court's attention and the Court gave the decision in ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of the case or statute): or when it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having statutory force. [Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 1 KB 718 at p.729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293, 300 CA[As cited in State of Punjab v. Devans, Modern Brewaries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26 157 para 340]" Per incuriam. [Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 1 KB 718 at p.729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293, 300 CA[As cited in State of Punjab v. Devans, Modern Brewaries Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 26 157 para 340]" Per incuriam. "per incuriam" are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory provision or authority binding on the Court concerned, or a statement of law caused by inadvertence or conclusion that has been arrived at without application of mind or proceed without application of mind or proceed without any reason so that in such a case some part of the decision or some steps in the reasoning on which it is based, is found that account to be demonstrably wrong. [State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 , para 67] 46. Actually, the concept of per-incuriam has been developed by the English Courts which is to relax or dilute the Rule of Stare-decisis. The general and sancrosanct proposition, what is quotable in law is binding, can be avoided and ignored if it is rendered 'Inignoratiun' of a Statue or other 'Binding Authority'. The aforesaid concept has also been adopted by our Constitutional Courts. 47. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak and Another, 1988 (2) SCC 602 while dealing with the issue of a decision being per-incuriam, in paragraphs 104 and 105 has held as under:- "..........104. To err is human, is the oft-quoted saying. Courts including the apex one are no exception. To own up the mistake when judicial satisfaction is reached does not militatte against its status or authority. Perhaps it would enhance both." 105. It is time to sound a note of caution. This Court under its Rules of Business ordinarily sits in divisions and not as a whole one. Each Bench, whether small or large, exercises the powers vested in the court and decisions rendered by the Benches irrespective of their size are considered as decisions of the court. The practice has developed that a larger Bench is entitled to overrule the decision of a smaller Bench notwithstanding the fact that each of the decisions is that of the court. That principle, however, would not apply in the present situation and since we are sitting as a Bench of Seven we are not entitled to reverse the decision of the Constitution Bench. That principle, however, would not apply in the present situation and since we are sitting as a Bench of Seven we are not entitled to reverse the decision of the Constitution Bench. Overruling when made by a larger Bench of an earlier decision of a smaller one is intended to take away the precedent value of the decision without affecting the binding effect of the decision in the particular case. Antulay, therefore, is not entitled to take advantage of the matter being before a larger Bench. In fact, if it is a case of exercise of inherent powers to rectify a mistake it was open even to a Five Judge Bench to do that and it did not require a Bench larger than the Constitution Bench for that purpose." 48. In the aforesaid case of A.R. Antulay (Supra), in a dissenting opinion by one of Hon'ble Judge of the Apex Court, though on the issue of per-incuriam, it is in consonance with the view expressed in the majority judgment, and worthy of mention and recorded in paragraphs 182 and 183 of the said report is being reproduced hereinafter:- ".......182. It is asserted that the impugned directions issued by the Five-Judge Bench was per incuriam as it ignored the statute and the earlier Chadha case [ AIR 1966 SC 1418 : (1966) 2 SCR 678 : 1966 Cri LJ 1071] . 183. But the point is that the circumstance that a decision is reached per incuriam, merely serves to denude the decision of its precedent value. Such a decision would not be binding as a judicial precedent. A co-ordinate Bench can disagree with it and decline to follow it. A larger Bench can overrule such decision. When a previous decision is so overruled it does not happen --nor has the overruling Bench any jurisdiction so to do --that the finality of the operative order, inter partes, in the previous decision is overturned. In this context the word ''decision' means only the reason for the previous order and not the operative order in the previous decision, binding inter partes. Even if a previous decision is overruled by a larger Bench, the efficacy and binding nature, of the adjudication expressed in the operative order remains undisturbed inter partes. In this context the word ''decision' means only the reason for the previous order and not the operative order in the previous decision, binding inter partes. Even if a previous decision is overruled by a larger Bench, the efficacy and binding nature, of the adjudication expressed in the operative order remains undisturbed inter partes. Even if the earlier decision of the Five-Judge Bench is per incuriam the operative part of the order cannot be interfered within the manner now sought to be done. That apart the Five-Judge Bench gave its reason. The reason, in our opinion, may or may not be sufficient. There is advertence to Section 7(1) of the 1952 Act and to the exclusive jurisdiction created thereunder. There is also reference to Section 407 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Can such a decision be characterised as one reached per incuriam? Indeed, Ranganath Misra, J. says this on the point : (para 105) "Overruling when made by a larger Bench of an earlier decision of a smaller one is intended to take away the precedent value of the decision without effecting the binding effect of the decision in the particular case. Antulay, therefore, is not entitled to take advantage of the matter being before a larger Bench." 49. Thus, it would be seen that where a decision has been rendered per incuriam, it is robbed of its precedent value and thus, this Court is unable to follow the aforesaid decision as it does not take note of the provisions of Section 45(A) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 and for the foregoing reasons, the said decision of Ram Bhawan (supra) does not come to the rescue of the respondent no.2. 50. Lastly, decision of Lalta Prasad (supra) is also distinguishable on facts inasmuch as in the said case though the provisions of Section 45(A) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 has been considered, but it has been held that invalidity of the transfer in absence of prior permission as envisaged under Section 5(1)(c)(ii) of the U.P. Consolidation and Holdings Act, 1953 does not per se makes the transfer transaction void or legally ineffective as the said invalidity is curable which can be cured before the finalization of the provisional consolidation scheme. 51. 51. In the case of Lalta Prasad (supra) the permission was granted on 05.10.1977 and the permission provided that the sale-deed should be executed within thirty days, however, the sale-deeds in question were executed on 23.02.1978 i.e. after the time period provided in the said permission. Thus, apparently, the facts of the aforesaid case are quite different inasmuch as in that case there was a permission which was taken prior to the transfer, but in the instant case at hand, there is no permission at all, hence, the said decision also does not help the respondent no.2. 52. It is settled law that with slight change in the facts there is huge difference in the precedent value of a decision. This Court is fortified in its view in light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Anr., (2003) 2 SCC 111 . The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid report is quoted hereinafter:- "59. A decision, as is well known, is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision. [See Ram Rakhi v. Union of India [ AIR 2002 Del 458 (FB)], Delhi Admn. (NCT of Delhi) v. Manohar Lal [ (2002) 7 SCC 222 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1670 : AIR 2002 SC 3088 ], Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Mills[ (2002) 3 SCC 496 : JT (2002) 1 SC 482] and Nalini Mahajan (Dr) v. Director of Income Tax (Investigation) [ (2002) 257 ITR 123 (Del)] .]" 53. Thus, for all the reasons above, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 20.04.1987 passed by the DDC, Faizabad is apparently erroneous and is in ignorance of the provisions of law and the said order cannot be sustained. 54. The writ petition succeeds. The impugned order dated 20.04.1987 passed by DDC, Faizabad in Revision No.2599/1118/449/574 is quashed and the order dated 20.08.1982 passed by the Consolidation Officer is maintained. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.