ORDER : Instant criminal revision petition filed under S.397 read with S.401 CrPC, lays challenge to judgment dated 20.7.2019 passed by learned Sessions Judge Kullu, HP in Cr.Appeal No.06 of 2019, titled Gian Chand vs. Dharam Chand, affirming judgment and order of conviction dated 8.3.2019 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Lahul & Spiti at Kullu in Cr. Complaint No. 03-1/2013, titled Dharam Chand vs. Gian Chand, whereby learned trial Court, while holding petitioner-accused (hereinafter, ‘accused’) guilty of having committed offence punishable under S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter, ‘Act’) convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and to pay compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) and, in default of payment of compensation, to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record, are that, respondent/complainant instituted a complaint under S.138 of the Act in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lahul and Spiti at Kullu alleging therein that since the accused was well known to him and they were having friendly relations, he advanced a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- to the accused for construction of house who further with a view discharge his legally enforceable liability, issued a cheque bearing No. 745482 dated 26.10.2012 amounting to Rs.1,50,000/- drawn at Andhra Bank Kullu branch. However, the fact remains that on presentation of cheque Exhibit CB, was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds vide memo Exhibit CC. Complainant issued a legal notice Exhibit CD calling upon the accused to make good the payment within stipulated time but since he failed to do the same, complainant had no option but to institute complaint under S.138 of the Act. Learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence collected on record, held the accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under S.138 of the Act and convicted and sentenced him as per description given above. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with judgment and order of conviction dated 8.3.2019 passed by learned trial Court, accused preferred an appeal before learned Sessions Judge Kullu, Himachal Pradesh, which also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 20.7.2019. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his acquittal after setting aside judgments and order of conviction recorded by learned courts below. 4. In the aforesaid background, accused has approached this court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for his acquittal after setting aside judgments and order of conviction recorded by learned courts below. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record this court finds that the accused has nowhere disputed his signatures on the cheque and similarly he has also not disputed issuance of cheque by him but in his statement recorded under S. 313 CrPC, he has claimed that a blank cheque was issued by him to one Smt. Amra Devi as security, but complainant, in connivance with aforesaid Amra Devi, misused the same. Having taken note of the fact that there is no dispute with regard to issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon of accused only, question which needs to be determinated is, “whether cheque in question was issued towards discharge of legally enforceable liability or same was issued as a security, as claimed by accused in his statement recorded under S.313 CrPC.” 5. Complainant in the case at hand, with a view to prove his case, examined himself as CW-1. Statement of complainant, if read in its entirety, clearly reveals that he in his evidence, which came to be led on record as Exhibit CA stated the facts almost same to those stated in his complaint under S.138 of the Act. He stated that on 16.8.2012, accused borrowed a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- for the construction of house and with a view to discharge his liability, handed over cheque Exhibit CB amounting to Rs.1,50,000/- to him, payable at Andhra Bank Branch Kullu. He stated that on presentation of cheque to his banker, Punjab National Bank Naggar branch, same was sent to the banker of the accused i.e. Andhra Bank Kullu, but same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds. He placed on record memo dated 31.10.2012, Exhibit CC. He also deposed that before instituting complaint under S.138 of the Act, he served the accused with legal notice Ext. CD dated 19.12.2012, post receipt whereof is Exhibit CE. He deposed that the accused avoided to receive the notice and the same was returned on 27.11.2012 by the Department of Posts. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that he is a horticulturist and a contractor and he is in this business for the last 30-45 years. CD dated 19.12.2012, post receipt whereof is Exhibit CE. He deposed that the accused avoided to receive the notice and the same was returned on 27.11.2012 by the Department of Posts. In his cross-examination, this witness stated that he is a horticulturist and a contractor and he is in this business for the last 30-45 years. He deposed that he is a matriculate and prepares documents of transaction. He admitted that he did not file income tax return. 6. Mr. Prem P. Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner while referring to aforesaid cross-examination of the complainant, vehemently argued that once complainant himself admitted that he used to prepare documents of transactions, it is not understood why he did not prepare any document with regard to transaction, if any, inter se him and the accused. 7. This court is not impressed with the aforesaid submission of Mr. Prem P. Chauhan, Advocate, for the reason that once the accused has not denied issuance of cheque as well as his signatures thereupon, presumption is available to complainant under Ss.118 and 139 of the Act that such cheque was issued in discharge of lawful liability. 8. No doubt, presumption under Ss.118 and 139 of the Act is rebuttable but for that purpose, accused was under obligation to raise probable defence, which he admittedly has failed to do in the instant case, rather, the accused made an attempt to set up a case, while deposing in the statement recorded under S.313 CrPC that a blank cheque was issued by him to Smt. Amra Devi, but the complainant, in connivance with Amra Devi misused the same. However, he has not been able to prove aforesaid defence either by leading positive evidence or referring to evidence led on record by complainant. It is not understood that what prevented accused to cite Smt. Amra Devi as a witness, if he had issued that cheque to her. 9. In the case at hand, attempt has been made by Mr. However, he has not been able to prove aforesaid defence either by leading positive evidence or referring to evidence led on record by complainant. It is not understood that what prevented accused to cite Smt. Amra Devi as a witness, if he had issued that cheque to her. 9. In the case at hand, attempt has been made by Mr. Prem P. Chauhan, Advocate to carve out a case that once the complainant, despite his being a literate person, failed to execute document of transaction, if any inter se accused and the complainant, presumption as available under Ss.118 and 139 of the Act may not be available to him for the reason that the cheque in question though was signed by the accused but same was never issued to the complainant. However, aforesaid submission made by Mr. Prem P. Chauhan, Advocate though appears to be very attractive but if examined in light of provisions of Ss. 118 and 139 of Act, it deserves outright rejection because, mere issuance of cheque raises a presumption in favour of holder of cheque. Once issuance of cheque and signatures thereupon are not denied, presumption starts in favour of holder of cheque and once such presumption starts, onus shifts upon the person issuing the cheque. Reliance in this regard is placed upon judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 18 SCC 106 , wherein, it has been held as under: “18. In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, the Trial Court proceeded to question the want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regards the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want of examination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him money for advancing it to the accused. This approach of the Trial Court had been at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless the accused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such facts and circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilities tilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant's case could not have been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of funds for advancing loan to the accused-appellant. The aspect relevant for consideration had been as to whether the accused-appellant has brought on record such facts/material/circumstances which could be of a reasonably probable defence. 19. In order to discharge his burden, the accused put forward the defence that in fact, he had had the monetary transaction with the said Shri Jagdishbhai and not with the complainant. In view of such a plea of the accused-appellant, the question for consideration is as to whether the accused-appellant has shown a reasonable probability of existence of any transaction with Shri Jagdishbhai? In this regard, significant it is to notice that apart from making certain suggestions in the cross-examination, the accused- appellant has not adduced any documentary evidence to satisfy even primarily that there had been some monetary transaction of himself with Shri Jagdishbhai. Of course, one of the allegations of the appellant is that the said stamp paper was given to Shri Jagdishbhai and another factor relied upon is that Shri Jagdishbhai had signed on the stamp paper in question and not the complainant. 19.1 We have examined the statement of Shri Jagdishbhai as also the said writing on stamp papers and are unable to find any substance in the suggestions made on behalf of the accused-appellant. 19.2 The said witness Shri Jagdishbhai, while pointing out his acquaintance and friendship with the appellant as also with the respondent, asserted in his examination-in-chief, inter alia, as under: "Accused when he comes to our shop where the complainant in the matter Shashimohan also be present that in both the complainant and accused being our friends, were made acquaintance with each other. The accused had necessity of money in his business, in my presence, had demanded Rs.22,50,000/- (Rupees twenty two lacs fifty thousandly) on temporary basis. And thereafter, the complainant from his family members by taking in piecemeal had given to the accused in my presence. Thereafter, on demanding the money by the complainant, the accused had given seven (7) cheques to the complainant in our presence but such cheques being washed out in rainy water and on informing me by the complainant I had informed to the accused. Thereafter, Rohitbhai had given other seven (7) cheques to the complainant in my presence and the deed was executed on Rs. Thereafter, Rohitbhai had given other seven (7) cheques to the complainant in my presence and the deed was executed on Rs. 100/- stamp paper in there is my signature." 19.3 This witness was cross-examined on various aspects as regards the particulars in the writing on the stamp paper and the date and time of the transactions. In regard to the defence as put in the cross-examination, the witness stated as under: "I have got shop in National Plaza but in rain no water logging has taken place. It is not true that there had been no financial dealings between me and the accused today. It is not true that I had given rupees ten lacs to the accused Rohitbhai on temporary basis. It is not true that for the amount given to the accused, I had taken seven blank duly cheques also blank stamp paper without signature. It is not true that there was quarrel between me and the accused in the matter of payment of interest. It is not true that even after the payment of Rs. ten lacs and the huge amount of the interest in the matter of interest quarrel was made. It is not true that due to the reason of quarrel with the accused, in the cheques of the accused lying with me by making obstinate writing has filed the false complaint through Shashimohan Goyanka. It is not true that no financial dealings have taken place between the complainant and the accused. therefore I also the complainant both at the time of evidence the accused at what place, on what date at what time, the amount taken has not been able to make clearly. (sic) It is not true that the blank stamp paper duly signed were lying in which obstinate writing has been made therefore the same has not been registered through sub registrar. It is not true that the dealings have been made between me and accused therefore there is my signature and the signature of the accused and the complainant has not signed. It is not true that any types of dealings between the accused and the complainant having not been done in my presence therefore in my statement no clarification has been given. It is not true that the accused in my presence as mentioned in the complaint any cheque has not been given. It is not true that any types of dealings between the accused and the complainant having not been done in my presence therefore in my statement no clarification has been given. It is not true that the accused in my presence as mentioned in the complaint any cheque has not been given. It is not true that I in collusion with the complainant to usurp the false amount the false complaint has been filed through Shashimohan Goyanka. It is not true that in support of the complaint of Shashimohan Goyanka is giving false statement." 19.4 The statement of Shri Jagdishbhai does not make out any case in favour of the accused-appellant. It is difficult to say that by merely putting the suggestion about the alleged dealing to Shri Jagdishbhai, the accused- appellant has been able to discharge his burden of bringing on record such material which could tilt the preponderance of probabilities in his favour. 19.5 The acknowledgement on the stamp paper as executed by the appellant on 21.03.2007 had been marked with different exhibit numbers in these 7 cases. In Complaint Case No. 46499 of 2008, the same is marked as Ex. 54 and reads as under : "Today the executor I Rohit Patel Ranchhodray Masala is a partner. Due to the financial difficulties having been arised, I have taken Rs.22,500,000/- (Rupees twenty two thousand fifty thousand only- sic) from my group which are to be paid to Shashimohan Goyanka. With reference to that today I have given seven (7) cheques of Corporation Bank, Alkapuri Branch bearing No. 763346 to 762252 amounting to Rs. 22,50,000/- (Rupees twenty two lacs fifty thousand only) Dates : (1) 01/4/08, (2) 01/05/08 (3) 01/07/08, (4) 01/08/08 (5) 01/10/08 (6) 01/11/08 (7) 01/12/08 the account of which is 40007. Earliest these cheques were given but due to rainy water logging the said cheques having been washed out (7) cheques have again been given which is acceptable to me." 19.6 The fact of the matter remains that the appellant could not deny his signatures on the said writing but attempted to suggest that his signatures were available on the blank stamp paper with Shri Jagdishbhai. This suggestion is too remote and too uncertain to be accepted. No cogent reason is available for the appellant signing a blank stamp paper. This suggestion is too remote and too uncertain to be accepted. No cogent reason is available for the appellant signing a blank stamp paper. It is also indisputable that the cheques as mentioned therein with all the relevant particulars like cheque numbers, name of Bank and account number are of the same cheques which form the subject matter of these complaint cases. The said document bears the date 21.03.2007 and the cheques were post- dated, starting from 01.04.2008 and ending at 01.12.2008. There appears absolutely no reason to discard this writing from consideration. 19.7 One of the factors highlighted on behalf of the appellant is that the said writing does not bear the signature of the complainant but and instead, it bears the signatures of said Shri Jagdishbhai. We find nothing unusual or objectionable if the said writing does not bear the signatures of the complainant. The said writing is not in the nature of any bi partite agreement to be signed by the parties thereto. It had been a writing in the nature of acknowledgement by the accused-appellant about existence of a debt; about his liability to repay the same to the complainant; about his having issued seven post-dated cheques; about the particulars of such cheques; and about the fact that the cheques given earlier had washed away in the rain water logging. Obviously, this writing, to be worth its evidentially value, had to bear the signatures of the accused, which it does. It is not unusual to have a witness to such a document so as to add to its authenticity; and, in the given status and relationship of the parties, Shri Jagdishbhai would have been the best witness for the purpose. His signatures on this document, therefore, occur as being the witness thereto. This document cannot be ruled out of consideration and existing this writing, the preponderance of probabilities lean heavily against the accused-appellant. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of Gujarat, 2013 (1) RCR(Criminal), 260 has categorically held that if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to 25 of the judgment herein:- “23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court however, further observed that it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose money is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court further observed that it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of probabilities. 24. Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however, the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding commission of the offence comes into play if the same is not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. 25. It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay the amount, that the said default would be considered a dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But even in such cases, the question whether or not there was lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial court will have to examine having regard to the evidence adduced before it keeping in view the statutory presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.” 11. Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability. Similarly, Section 118 of the Act provides that unless contrary is proved , that the holder of the cheque received the cheque in discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or liability. Similarly, Section 118 of the Act provides that unless contrary is proved , that the holder of the cheque received the cheque in discharge, in whole or in part, of a debt or liability. True, it is that to rebut aforesaid presumption accused can always raise probable defence either by leading some positive evidence or by referring to the material, if any adduced on record by the complainant. But in the case at hand, accused has miserably failed to raise probable defence much less sufficient to rebut the presumption applicable in favour of the complainant under Section 118 and 139 of the Act. 12. While placing reliance on following judgment i.e. K. Subramani v. K. Damodara Naidu (2015) 1 SCC 99 , Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 and Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 , Mr. Prem P. Chauhan, Advocate argued that since the complainant has failed to disclose source of income and not filed any income-tax return, learned court below ought not have believed the version put forth by complainant that he advanced sum of Rs.1,50,000 to the accused for construction of house. 13. Perusal of aforesaid judgments reveals that in all the cases before Hon'ble Apex Court, transactions were of huge amount and in all those cases, accused were able to raise probable defence that the cheques were not issued in discharge of legally enforceable liability. However, the complainant has advanced only Rs.1.50 Lakh in the case at hand, coupled with the fact there is no denial on the part of the accused that the cheque does not bear his signatures, as such, there is presumption in favour of complainant that the cheque was issued for law. For the reasons stated above, judgments pressed into service by Mr. Prem P. Chauhan, Advocate are not applicable to the facts of present case. 14. Having carefully examined the evidence available on record, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below, which otherwise appear to be based upon the correct appreciation of evidence and as such, same need to be upheld. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.PC, to re-appreciate the evidence, especially, in view of the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the courts below. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri” (1999) 2 SCC 452 , wherein it has been held as under:- “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 15. Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if any, committed by the courts below while passing impugned judgments, and as such, there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power. 16. True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 SCC 241 ; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but Mr. Singh, learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 17. Singh, learned counsel representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity committed by the courts below while appreciating the evidence and as such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments passed by the courts below. 17. Having scanned entire evidence available on record, this court is convinced and satisfied that complainant has successfully proved by leading cogent and convincing evidence that he advanced Rs.1.50 Lakh to the accused, who with a view to discharge his lawful liability, issued cheque in question, but the same came to be dishonored on account of insufficient funds in his account. Since despite issuance of legal notice, accused failed to make good the payment , learned court below totality of evidence led on record by the complainant, rightly held accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under S.138 of act and as such, no interference in the impugned judgment/order of conviction and sentence is called for. Moreover, this court, after issuance of notice dated. 14.10.2019, repeatedly granted opportunity to the petitioner/accused to deposit the amount but neither he furnished personal bonds nor deposited amount. 18. Accordingly, the present revision petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit. Impugned judgment/order of conviction and sentence passed by learned Courts below are upheld. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by the learned trial Court, if not already served. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are cancelled.