JUDGMENT : 1. All these Intra–Court Appeals seek to lay a challenge to the orders of the learned Single Judge, whereby in substance the prayer for a direction to the State Government and the State Election Commission, to elongate the tenure of elected Members of the local bodies by setting aside the appointment of Administrators, has been negatived. 2. The learned Government Advocate appearing for the State vehemently resists these appeals making submission in justification of the impugned orders and the reasons on which they have been structured. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the papers, we decline to grant indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: (a) The tenure of elected local bodies like the panchayat & municipality, regardless of their varying nomenclatures is constitutionally fixed as being ‘five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer’ vide the Constitution (Seventy Third Amendment) Act, 1992 w.e.f. 24.04.1993 & the Constitution (Seventy Fourth Amendment) Act 1992 w.e.f. 01.06.1993; acceding to the prayer of the writ petitioners and thereby directing the respondent-State & the Election Commission to extend the tenure of these bodies militates against the constitutional mandate; it has been a well settled position of constitutional jurisprudence that no writ can issue to do what the law does not permit; this inarticulate premise has animated the impugned orders, absence of elaborate discussion therein, not withstanding. (b) The vehement submission of appellant-writ petitioners that in the absence of an enabling provision in the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, if Government can appoint the Administrators when statutorily prescribed prerequisites are lacking, it is open to the Government to issue appropriate orders for elongating the tenure of the elected body or its office bearers, cannot be countenanced; the observations of the Apex Court in Kishansing Tomar V. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahamadabad (2006) 8 SCC 352 do not lend support to such a wide proposition; our constitution envisages a limited government that can do what is permitted or sanctioned by law either expressly or by necessary implication; contention advanced on behalf of the applicants offends this well established norm. (c) In Kishansingh Tomar, supra the Apex Court having discussed the object of Seventy Fourth Amendment to the Constitution expressed its anguish against delaying and postponing of elections to the local bodies in many States; at paragraph 14, it observed that it is incumbent upon the Election Commission and other authorities to carry out the mandate of the Constitution that the duration of the municipality having been fixed as five year; the new municipality has to be constituted in time by holding periodical elections before the expiry of this duration; at paragraph 21, the Court only recognized certain exceptional circumstances that may justify delayed elections beyond the period of five years mandatorily fixed under Article 243U; the last four lines in the paragraph being pertinent are reproduced below: “… It is only when the municipality is dissolved for any other reason and the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any elections for constituting the municipality for such period.” (d) More than a century ago, Lord Halsbury in the celebrated case of Quinn V. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 had emphasized that a decision is an authority for the proposition that it actually lays down, and not for all that which logically follows from what has been so laid down; there is nothing in the decision cited at the Bar even remotely supportive of the contention of the writ petitioners that the Government and the State Election Commission have power to extend the tenure of elected local bodies of the kind in any circumstances whatsoever; the text & context of Seventy Third & Seventy Fourth amendments to the Constitution do not leave even a shadow of such power. (e) It hardly needs to be stated that the voters/electors elect their representatives to the local bodies for the tenure prescribed by the Constitution and the statute under which they are constituted; these representatives have the popular mandate for the specified tenure and not beyond that; this tenure sometimes may be cut short by operation of law or by an act authorized by law; that in such a gratuitous situation the popular mandate is shortened is true; however, the reverse logic that if the popular mandate can be cut short, it can be elongated too, in extraordinary situation like the COVID19 Pandemic is difficult to agree with; in the militant absence of statutory enablement, if the Government & the Election Commission accede to the request of the writ petitioners, that amounts to they donning the mantle of voters/electors; this offends the rudiments of democracy, which is a Basic Feature of the Constitution vide Kesavananda Bharti, (1973)4 SCC 225 . In the above circumstances, these appeals being devoid of merits are liable to be and accordingly rejected.