JUDGMENT : Deepak Roshan, J. Heard learned counsel for the parties through V.C. 2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the petitioner praying for quashing of the order dated 29.10.2010 passed by the Joint Secretary, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi; whereby the representfation of the petitioner for promotion has been rejected. 3. Brief fact of the case is that the petitioner was appointed in service of Respondent B.S.E.B. w.e.f. 19.01.1995 as an Operator. On 19.07.1999 he was appointed to the post of Junior Electrical Engineer (General cadre). 4. The grievance of the petitioner is that two persons, namely Shri Gopal Prasad Burnwal, whose date of joining is 20.12.1999 and Sri. Sudhir Kumar whose date of joining is 21.02.2000, as Junior Electrical Engineer (General Cadre) were given promotion to the post of Assistant Junior Engineer vide Notification dated 01.08.2007 but vide the same notification, the petitioner was only given the charge of Assistant Junior Engineer. 5. Mr. Jitendra Tripathy, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the persons who were junior to the petitioner were given promotion to the post of Assistant Junior Engineer leaving behind this petitioner who admittedly joined the post of Junior Engineer prior to those two persons. 6. He further draws attention of this court towards the impugned order (Annexure-9) which says that the finding of the concerned respondent that the senior most Junior Engineers have been given promotion with effect from 27.6.2007, is erroneous and against the record of the respondent themselves wherein it is categorically mentioned that the date of joining of this petitioner as Junior Electrical Engineer is on 19.07.1999; whereas the date of joining of Gopal Prasad Barnwal is 20.12.1999. Similarly, date of joining of Sudhir Kumar is 21.02.2000. Thus, the finding that senior most Junior Electrical Engineer has been given promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer is incorrect on the face of it as such; the same is perverse. 7. Learned counsel further submits that since the juniors have already been granted promotion to the post of Assistant Electrical Engineer; as such the petitioner is also entitled for such promotion from that very date i.e. 27.6.2007; however, the petitioner was granted promotion to the rank of Assistant Electrical Engineer vide notification dated 28.07.2008, with effect from 05.07.2008, which is not in accordance with law. 8. Mr. 8. Mr. Om Prakash Tiwary, learned counsel for the respondent submits that there is no error in the impugned order and when the minimum quota of A.M.I.E. degree holders was increased from 3% to 10%; the case of this petitioner was considered and the respondents have rightly promoted him from 05.07.2008. 9. Mr. Tiwary further refers Para 5 and 6 of the counter affidavit which is quoted below: “5. That in reply to prayer made in para-1 and prayer portion, it is stated that the petitioner has filed this writ petition for quashing the reasoned order passed by the Joint Secretary, Jharkhand State Electricity Board on 29th October 2010 in compliance of order dated 12/8/2010 passed by this Hon'ble Court in W.P.(S) No. 3198 of 2010 (Annexure-8). The petitioner was initially appointed on a temporary post of Operator on 19/1/1995 and further he was appointed to the post of JEE (General Cadre) with effect from 19.7.1999. Sri. Gopal Prasad Burnwal and Sri. Sudhir Kumar, the names indicated in Annexure-7 have joined to the post of JEE (General Cadre) in the forenoon of 20/12/99 and 21/2/2000. The appointment of above two JEE was pursuant to order of CWJC No. 5096 of 1999 (Deo Nandan Meta v. Bihar State Electricity Board) as would be evident from Annexure-3. 6. That the service rendered on the post of Operator cannot be considered for seniority on the post of JEE as JEE is the entry point of appointment not a promotional post. The erstwhile BSEB, Patna has prepared the tentative gradation list of JEE (General Cadre) and circulated the same vide letter no. 436 dated 8/4/2004 inviting objection and with a stipulation that if no information is received, it would be presumed that neither any addition nor any alteration is required in the list and the same will be taken as final gradation list.” 10. Relying upon the averments made in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit, learned counsel submits that since a provisional Gradation list was published; the petitioner ought to have filed objection before the respondent authority to correct his position in the Gradation List. Admittedly; the publication of provisional Gradation List is only for the purpose of getting objection and clarification but this petitioner sat over the matter for years together and did not file any objection; rather he filed this writ application. Thus, there is no error in the impugned order. Admittedly; the publication of provisional Gradation List is only for the purpose of getting objection and clarification but this petitioner sat over the matter for years together and did not file any objection; rather he filed this writ application. Thus, there is no error in the impugned order. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the averments made in the respective affidavits and the documents annexed therein it appears that respondent authorities have clearly admitted that the petitioner was initially appointed on temporary post of Operator on 19.01.1995 and he was further appointed on the post of Junior Electrical Engineer (General Cadre) with effect from 19.07.1999. The respondents have further admitted that other employees, namely Gopal Prasad Burnwal and Sudhir Kumar were appointed to the post of J.E.E. on 20.12.1999 and 21.02.2000, respectively. Thus, there is no dispute with regard to the facts of the case. 12. The argument of learned counsel for the respondents that the post of Operator cannot be considered for seniority for the purpose of promotion has no bearing on the case of the petitioner as the petitioner has not claimed seniority on the basis of the service period on the temporary post of Operator; rather, the petitioner is claiming seniority only on the basis of notification issued in his favour with regard to his appointment to the post of J.E.E. (General cadre). 13. Admittedly; the petitioner never raised objection at the right moment when the provisional Gradation List was published, but in the said provisional gradation list also the other two persons, who were given promotion earlier to the petitioner, were junior to him, inasmuch as, in that list also the date of joining of all the employees was clearly mentioned. Now the law is no more res integra, inasmuch as, there cannot be any discrimination between the identical set of employees. The respondents have clearly admitted in the counter affidavit that the appointment of above two JEE was pursuant to order of CWJC No. 5096 of 1999; as such, when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending the same benefit. 14. The respondents have clearly admitted in the counter affidavit that the appointment of above two JEE was pursuant to order of CWJC No. 5096 of 1999; as such, when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending the same benefit. 14. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered in the case of State of Uttar pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held at Paragraph 22.1, 22.2 and 22.3 as under: “22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.” 15. In view of the aforesaid findings and the judicial pronouncement, the impugned order as contained in 29.10.2010 passed by the Joint Secretary, Jharkhand State Electricity Board, Ranchi, is hereby, quashed and set aside and it is held that the petitioner is entitled for promotion with effect from 27.06.2007 i.e. from the date the juniors to the petitioner, namely, Gopal Prasad Burnwal and Sudhir Kumar were given promotion. 16. The Respondent No. 2 is directed to pass a fresh order in this regard within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 17. With the aforesaid terms, the instant writ application stands allowed.