L. DAYANANADA REDDY, S/O LATE LAKSHMAIAH REDDY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE
2021-06-30
M.NAGAPRASANNA
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The petitioners in this petition call in question an order passed by the Trial Court in OS No.960/2019 rejecting the application filed by the petitioners seeking refund of Court fee of Rs.2,63,000/-which was paid while instituting the suit in OS No.960/2019. 2. Sans details, brief facts leading to the filing of present petition as borne out from the pleadings are as follows: The 2nd respondent-defendant instituted a suit for specific performance before the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rural District, Bengaluru at Bengaluru in OS No.1680/2018. This suit ended in a compromise being recorded by the Court which ended in closure of the suit. The petitioners claiming that fraud was played by the plaintiff therein on the Court while recording the compromise decree which was without their consent, filed another suit in OS No.960/2019 seeking annulment of a compromise decree that was arrived at in OS No.1680/2018. 3. The trial Court, in OS No.960/2019, entertained the suit and also granted a temporary injunction against the second respondent herein who was the plaintiff in OS.No.1680/2018. An application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC was filed by the plaintiff in OS NO.1680/2018 contending that under Order XXIII Rule 3(a) of CPC, an application ought to have been filed before the Court which had recorded the compromise and not a separate suit. It is then the petitioners withdrew the suit and filed an application before the very same Court which had recorded the compromise, seeking recalling of the said compromise decree. 4. After such withdrawal, the petitioners filed an application before the trial Court where they had instituted a suit in OS No.960/2019 seeking refund of Court fee, rejection of that application is what has driven the petitioners to this Court in this Civil Revision Petition. 5. Heard Sri.Kumbar Vasant Fakeerappa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Smt. H.R.Anitha, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1-State and perused the material on record. 6.
5. Heard Sri.Kumbar Vasant Fakeerappa, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and Smt. H.R.Anitha, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1-State and perused the material on record. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that petitioners are entitled to a refund of Court fee, as they had by mistake and inadvertence paid the Court fee in OS No.960/2019 and would rely on Section 67 of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for short) and would submit that the trial Court committed an error in declining to accept the application and refund the Court fee. He would place reliance on the following judgments: (i) ILR 2015 KAR 4024 in the case of Smt.Lakshmamma and others Vs. Sri.T.H.Ramegowda and others (ii) (2020)3 ALD(SC) 104 in the case of Trilokinath Singh Vs. Anirudh Singh and others 7. On the other hand, learned counsel representing the State would vehemently refute the contentions of the petitioners and submit that the petitioners are not entitled to any refund, as refund of Court fee is available only in terms of Section 66 of the Act and not Section 67 of the Act, as contended. In this regard, the learned counsel would place reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in the case of K.S.Periyaswamy Vs. State of Karnataka rendered in W.P.No.29493/2019. 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the aforesaid learned counsels and perused the material on record. In furtherance whereof, the issue that falls for my consideration is: ‘Whether the petitioners who withdrew the suit are entitled to a refund of court fee in terms of the Act?’ 9. The facts with regard to the suit being instituted by the petitioners who were defendants in earlier suit and the plaintiffs in the next suit need not be reiterated. Chapter 7 of the Act deals with the refund of Court fees. In terms of Section 66 of the Act, refund of Court fee is available to a litigant only in the circumstances narrated in Section 66 of the Act. Section 66 of the Act reads as follows: “66. Refund on settlement before hearing.
Chapter 7 of the Act deals with the refund of Court fees. In terms of Section 66 of the Act, refund of Court fee is available to a litigant only in the circumstances narrated in Section 66 of the Act. Section 66 of the Act reads as follows: “66. Refund on settlement before hearing. – (1) Where the Court refers the parties to the suit to any one of the modes of settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the dispute is settled, seventy-five pr cent of the amount of Court fee paid in respect of the claim or claims in the suits shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties by whom the same have been respectively paid. (2) In cases not covered by sub-section (1); whenever by agreement of parties.- (a) any suit is dismissed as settled out of Court before any evidence has been recorded on the merits of the claim; or (b) any suit is compromised ending in a compromise decree before any evidence has been recorded on the merits of the claim; or (c) any appeal is disposed of before the commencement of hearing of such appeal; Seventy-five percent of the amount of Court fee paid in respect of the claim or claims in the suit or appeal shall be ordered by the Court to be refunded to the parties who have paid such fee.” In terms of Section 66 of the Act, the plaintiff is entitled to refund of Court fee where suit ends in settlement or dismissed out of Court before any evidence has been recorded on merits of the claim or any appeal being disposed of before the commencement of the hearing of such appeal. 10. The only change in the law is the amendment to Section 66 of the Act insofar it pertains to the quantum of refund of Court fees, which was earlier 75% and is amended to 100% by the amendment dated 16.10.2020, which reads as follows: “2. Amendment of section 66.
10. The only change in the law is the amendment to Section 66 of the Act insofar it pertains to the quantum of refund of Court fees, which was earlier 75% and is amended to 100% by the amendment dated 16.10.2020, which reads as follows: “2. Amendment of section 66. -In the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 (Karnataka Act 16 of 1958), (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act) in section 66, for the words “seventy five percent” occurring in two places, the words “hundred percent” shall be substituted.” In terms of the amendment, afore-extracted, the Court fee payable is now refundable to the tune of 100% for circumstances of closure of the suit in terms of Section 66 of the Act. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contends that petitioners are entitled to a refund under Section 67 of the Act. Section 67 of the Act reads as follows: “67. Refund of fee paid by mistake or inadvertence.-The fee paid by mistake or inadvertence shall be ordered to be refunded.” Therefore, the case at hand will have to be considered in terms of Sections 66 and 67 of the Act. 12. In terms of Section 67 of the Act, refund of the fee paid by mistake or inadvertence can be only of fees being paid in excess in any proceeding or an appeal and cannot cover the institution of suits. The petitioners with eyes wide open consciously file a suit for injunction in O.S.No.960/2019 seeking to annul the compromise decree in O.S.No.1680/2018 in which they were the defendants. The trial Court considering O.S.No.960/2019, entertains the same and grants an injunction against the defendant therein completely contrary to the decree of compromise entered into in O.S.No.1680/2018. 13. It is in O.S.No.960/2019, the 2nd respondent herein files an application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that an application ought to have been filed before the very same Court in which decree of compromise was recorded and not a separate suit. It is at this juncture, the petitioners withdrew O.S.No.960/2019 and later file an application seeking refund of a Court fees that was paid in O.S.No.960/2019. This, in my considered view, can by no stretch of imagination, bring the case under Section 67 of the Act. It is neither paid out of mistake nor inadvertence. 14.
It is at this juncture, the petitioners withdrew O.S.No.960/2019 and later file an application seeking refund of a Court fees that was paid in O.S.No.960/2019. This, in my considered view, can by no stretch of imagination, bring the case under Section 67 of the Act. It is neither paid out of mistake nor inadvertence. 14. It is not a case where the petitioners are seeking refund of excess Court fee paid. The suit having not been decreed in terms of Section 66 of the Act, no refund of Court fee can be granted in a suit which has been withdrawn, which is not a circumstance that Section 66 mandates. 15. The submission of the learned counsel that an application ought to have been filed before the very Court that had recorded the compromise decree in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3(a) of CPC and the reliance placed on the aforesaid judgments are concerned, there can be no qualm about the enunciation of law either by the Hon’ble Apex Court or by the Division Bench of this Court as laid down, that an application for recalling of a compromise decree has to be filed only before the Court that had recorded the compromise in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3(a) of CPC. This is the law laid down in the judgments of Smt.Lakshmamma and Trilokinath Singh (supra). The said judgments are therefore inapplicable to the facts of the case. 16. The case at hand is not a case where a decision has to be rendered with regard to, before which Court the compromise decree ought to be challenged or seek a recalling of the said decree. The case at hand is a case where refund of Court fee is sought after institution of the suit and the suit is subsequently withdrawn. Therefore, none of the grounds urged by the petitioners would sound acceptance. For the aforesaid reasons, I find no warrant to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court, rejecting the application for refund of Court fee. The Civil Revision Petition lacks merit and is dismissed.