JUDGMENT : This second appeal is filed against the divergent findings in a suit for declaration that Ext.A1 Sale Deed is void ab initio and for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property having an extent of 30.35 ares in Thalavoor Village, Kollam district. The appellant is the defendant. The suit was dismissed by the Munsiff's court, Punalur (hereinafter referred to as 'the trial court') finding that the suit for declaration was not filed within the period of three years during which the right to sue first accrues as provided under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the Limitation Act'). The plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Sub Court, Punalur (hereinafter referred to as 'the first appellate court'). In reversal of the finding, the first appellate court held that the suit for declaration and recovery on the strength of title was filed within 12 years as provided under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. Challenging the judgment and decree of the first appellate court, the defendant filed this second appeal. For the sake of convenience and clarity, the parties are hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff' and 'the defendant' according to their status in the trial court. 2. On 8.3.2019, this Court admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law : (a) Whether the finding of the first appellate court that the right to sue first accrued only on 12-05-2013 and that the suit is not barred by limitation is correct? (b) Whether Exhibit B1 sale deed is valid? (c) What is the effect of not filing a suit for Specific Performance based on Exhibit A2? (d) Whether respondent could claim any right over the Plaint Schedule property ignoring Exhibit A2? 3. The plaintiff filed O.S. No. 232/2013 before the trial court claiming that Ext.A1 Sale Deed was executed as a security for a loan when she borrowed an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- from the defendant on 20.8.2001. According to her, Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance dated 20.8.2001 was also executed simultaneously whereby the defendant had agreed to sell the property purchased as per Ext.A1, to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had agreed to return the property when the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- borrowed by her is repaid with interest. According to her, Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance dated 20.8.2001 was also executed simultaneously whereby the defendant had agreed to sell the property purchased as per Ext.A1, to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had agreed to return the property when the sum of Rs.1,50,000/- borrowed by her is repaid with interest. She maintained that she never intended to convey any title over the property to the defendant and the sale deed was executed only as a security for a debt. She would claim that she approached the defendant with a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- on 5.1.2012, but the amount was not accepted by the defendant, saying that he would only accept the whole amount with interest. She would further contend that she approached the defendant with a sum of Rs.3,62,000/- on 12.5.2013 in full and final settlement of the amount due to the defendant. However, the defendant refused to accept the amount. Thereafter, the plaintiff came to know that the defendant had no intention to return the property. Hence the suit was filed. 4. The defendant filed written statement contending that the defendant purchased the property on payment of consideration to the plaintiff. According to him, he had taken possession of the property on the date of sale itself and has been in possession and enjoyment of the property since 20.8.2001. The property lies within specified boundaries. After the execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff requested the defendant that the property may be sold to her if the defendant intends to sell it later. Accordingly, the defendant informed the plaintiff that the property was not purchased for sale. However, he agreed that if it is being sold within a year, he is ready to sell the property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not approach him with money on 5.1.2012 and 12.5.2013 as alleged. It is specifically contended that the attempt of the plaintiff is to grab the property, which is owned and possessed by the plaintiff for more than 13 years. He contended that the suit is barred by limitation. 5. Based on the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial:- 1. Whether sale deed No.1455/2001 of Pattazhy, SRO has come into effect? 2. Whether sale deed No.1455/2001 of Pattazhy, SRO is a sham document? 3. He contended that the suit is barred by limitation. 5. Based on the above pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues for trial:- 1. Whether sale deed No.1455/2001 of Pattazhy, SRO has come into effect? 2. Whether sale deed No.1455/2001 of Pattazhy, SRO is a sham document? 3. Whether plaintiff is entitled to get decree of declaration that sale deed No.1455/2001 of Pattazhy SRO is null and void? 4. Whether plaintiff is entitled to get decree of possession of plaint schedule property from defendant as prayed for? 5. What is the order as to cost? 6. In this connection, it is pertinent to note that although limitation was set up as a defence, no specific issue was framed in this regard. During the trial, PWs.1 to 4 were examined and marked Exts.A1 to A3. Dws.1 and 2 were examined and marked Exts.B1 to B4 on defendant's side. The defendant produced Ext.B1 original sale deed and the plaintiff produced copy of Ext.B1 as Ext.A1. The defendant produced property tax receipts as Exts.B3(a) and B4 to show that mutation was effected in his name and he paid tax to the property. 7. The trial court held that Ext.B1 original sale deed lacked consideration and it was executed as security for payment of a debt. However, the suit was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation relying on Article 58 of the Limitation Act. 8. The defendant did not challenge the trial court judgment and decree presumably for the reason that the suit was ultimately dismissed as barred by limitation. The plaintiff challenged the trial court judgment before the first appellate court. The appellant did not raise any cross-objection in the appeal instead the appellant raised arguments before the first appellate court contending that the findings of the trial court touching Ext.B1 is incorrect. It was further contended that the suit is barred by limitation. The first appellate court agreed with the finding of the trial court that the document was executed as a security for payment of debt. In reversal of the finding of the trial court, the first appellate court held that period of limitation for a suit for declaration and recovery is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The first appellate court agreed with the finding of the trial court that the document was executed as a security for payment of debt. In reversal of the finding of the trial court, the first appellate court held that period of limitation for a suit for declaration and recovery is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. According to the first appellate court, the period of limitation starts only from 12.5.2013, the date on which the defendant has denied the title of the plaintiff. The first appellate court further held that the failure of the plaintiff to sue for specific performance based on Ext.A2 is of no consequences. Accordingly, the first appellate court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court. The first appellate court declared title of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property and has allowed her to recover the plaint schedule property from the defendant through the process of court. 9. Heard Adv. Sri. V. Philip Mathews, the learned counsel for the appellant and Adv. Sri. Rinny Stephen Chamaparambil, the learned counsel for the respondent. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that Ext.A1 sale deed has not been set aside by the first appellate court. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the respondent has received an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- from the appellant as per Ext.A2 and the said amount has not been returned to the plaintiff. Elaborating on the submission, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that there is no order regarding the manner in which the money has been dealt with. The learned counsel further submitted that even if the case advanced by the plaintiff is true to facts, she has been unlawfully enriched at the expense of the defendant. The learned counsel further submitted that the courts below have erroneously relied on Articles 58 and 65 of the Limitation Act without framing requisite issue for the said purpose. It was further contended that the failure of the defendant to file appeal or cross-objection is of no consequence as the trial court judgment was in his favour. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the cause of action under Article 58 of the Act accrues only when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or there is at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the cause of action under Article 58 of the Act accrues only when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or there is at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. Therefore, it is contended that the mere existence of an adverse entry in the revenue record as per Exts.B3(a) and B4 cannot give rise to a cause of action to institute a suit. The learned counsel for the respondent maintained that the cause of action to institute the suit has arisen within three years from the date of infringement as noted in the plaint. The learned counsel further maintained that the first appellate court correctly found that the suit is not barred by limitation as it is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. It held that the suit was not a suit for mere declaration, but a suit for declaration of title coupled with delivery of possession. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the respondent was made to believe that Ext.A1 was a security for payment of debt, but in fact that was a registered sale deed, which was obtained by the defendant clandestinely. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the respondent willingly offered the loan amount to retain the land and then she came to know later that the defendant played fraud on the plaintiff and obtained Ext.A1 for a nominal consideration though by then the value of the suit property was more than ten times. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the omission to frame an issue as required under Order XIV Rule 1 and 2 of CPC would not vitiate the trial in a suit where the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led evidence in support of their contentions. It has been pointed out that in the case on hand, both the trial court and the appellate court specifically considered the question of limitation and answered in favour of the respondent. More so, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant as alleged. Last but not the least, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Ext.A1 sale deed was executed without any consideration. The said finding of the trial court was not challenged in the first appeal. More so, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant as alleged. Last but not the least, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that Ext.A1 sale deed was executed without any consideration. The said finding of the trial court was not challenged in the first appeal. Since the said finding has become final, the appellant is legally precluded from contending otherwise before this Court. 13. It is not in dispute that Ext.B1 sale deed, which is sought to be set aside has been titled as a sale deed. The plaintiff is described as a vendor and the defendant, a vendee. Going by the contents of Ext.B1, the recitals therein satisfy the requirements and stipulations of a sale deed for a total consideration of Rs.1,50,000/-. On the same date, Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance was executed. It is a fact that as per Ext.A2, the defendant agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff for a total consideration of Rupees Ten lakh only within a year. In Ext.A2, the parties referred to the deed of sale executed on the same day. In Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance, the parties were described as vendor and vendee. It was also stated therein that the defendant had agreed that if the plaintiff or his successor pay the consideration amount of Rupees Ten Lakh only within a year, then, the defendant would execute the deed of sale to the said property, to the plaintiff. 14. The question involved in this case is as to whether Ext.B1 sale deed was executed by the plaintiff as a sale deed or Ext.B1 was executed as a security for payment of a debt. Ext.B1 sale deed is dated 20.8.2001. Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance is also on the same date. The suit was filed on 03.07.2013 before the Munsiff's Court, Punalur for a declaration that Ext.B1 sale deed is null and void and for recovery of the plaint schedule property. The trial court entered a finding that the suit was not filed within three years as provided under Article 58 of the Limitation Act. According to the first appellate court, both Articles 58 and 65 of the Limitation Act are applicable in this case and thus, reversed the decree of the trial court. The trial court entered a finding that the suit was not filed within three years as provided under Article 58 of the Limitation Act. According to the first appellate court, both Articles 58 and 65 of the Limitation Act are applicable in this case and thus, reversed the decree of the trial court. The first appellate court was of the view that the period of limitation under Article 58 starts to run from the date on which right to sue first accrued. Taking into consideration the pleading that the defendant denied the plaintiff's title only on 12.5.2013 thus declining to execute a re-conveyance deed, the first appellate court held that the limitation would run within three years therefrom. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that as the suit for declaration of title and consequential relief of possession was filed within three years from the date of execution of the deed, it cannot be held to be barred by limitation. It was further contended that different articles of the Limitation Act will have to be interpreted harmoniously. If the contention of the defendant that Article 58 applies to a suit for possession based on title where declaration is also sought for, is accepted, it was contended that it would amount to ignoring the relief for recovery of possession and application of Article 65 to a suit for possession and taking away the right of the plaintiff to prove that suit is within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Thus, it was argued that Article 58 applies to a case where declaration simpliciter is sought for without possession whereas Article 65 of the Limitation Act would only apply where the suit is based on title and consequential relief of recovery of possession. 16. Section 3 of the Limitation Act mandates that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period is liable to be dismissed even though the limitation is not set up as a defence. If, from the facts pleaded by the plaintiff himself, it becomes evident that the suit is barred by limitation, the court is obliged to dismiss it. If, from the facts pleaded by the plaintiff himself, it becomes evident that the suit is barred by limitation, the court is obliged to dismiss it. However, if the court finds that the plea as to limitation is to be examined further, it has to postpone the consideration thereof to subsequent stages. While dismissing the suit in exercise of power under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, the court must be satisfied that the plea of limitation does not require any further consideration. In the present context, the trial court held that Article 58 is applicable whereas according to the first appellate court both Articles 65 and 58 of the Limitation Act are applicable. In the case at hand, as noticed, the trial court omitted to frame an issue regarding limitation. If it is a pure question of law, it is within the realm of the defendant to canvass the issue regarding limitation though not specifically raised before the trial court. However, the application of Article 65 of the Limitation Act cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time at hearing of the first appeal by the plaintiff. 17. It is a well settled principle of law that the issue regarding limitation is a mixed question of fact. It is to be considered whether any question of fact is involved in determination of the issue regarding limitation for which evidence may have to be adduced. If the finding on the issue of limitation depends upon oral evidence, it may not be desirable to take up the issue as a preliminary issue and decide the matter at its threshold without permitting the parties to adduce evidence. In the present case, the trial court has not considered the plea of limitation raised in the written statement. No specific issue was formulated. However, the trial court had mentioned in the judgment that the suit is barred by limitation. When the plea of limitation was set up as a defence, it was the duty of the trial court to frame an issue for the same. 18. In the plaint, Ext.B1 sale deed is sought to be declared as null and void. The trial court dismissed the suit as a whole on the ground of limitation. Before the first appellate court, the decree was reversed declaring the title of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property. 18. In the plaint, Ext.B1 sale deed is sought to be declared as null and void. The trial court dismissed the suit as a whole on the ground of limitation. Before the first appellate court, the decree was reversed declaring the title of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property. Ext.B1 sale deed was not declared as null and void. However, the title was declared and recovery of possession was granted on the strength of the title. The first appellate court went wrong in declaring the title of the plaintiff over the plaint schedule property without setting aside Ext.B1 sale deed. Further, the suit was not filed for specific performance of contract on the strength of Ext.A2 contract for re-conveyance between the parties. The validity of Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance was not decided by the first appellate court. What was involved in this case was sale followed by a contemporaneous agreement for re-conveyance of the property. Such an agreement to re-convey is an option contract and the right has to be exercised within the period of the limitation provided. In such an agreement for re-conveyance, it is the duty of the court to examine as to whether the time is the essence of the contract. It is also necessary to examine that when the plaintiff has not filed the suit within the time for re-conveyance, it would be possible for him to seek a declaration that the transaction of sale entered into between the parties should be construed in the light of Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance executed by the defendant. 19. The first appellate court got over the plea of limitation by pointing out that the plaintiff has set up Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance, which was refused to be performed by the defendant. However, the suit was not filed for specific performance. Ext.A2 sale deed would show that the plaintiff received an amount of Rupees ten lakh from the defendant as consideration. The said amount was admittedly not repaid. No amount was repaid as stated in Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance. The suit was filed long after the expiry of time prescribed under Ext.A1. 20. Ext.A2 sale deed would show that the plaintiff received an amount of Rupees ten lakh from the defendant as consideration. The said amount was admittedly not repaid. No amount was repaid as stated in Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance. The suit was filed long after the expiry of time prescribed under Ext.A1. 20. Coming to the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration prayed for, as held by the first appellate court, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the first appellate court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff without considering all the relevant issues involved in the case. Even assuming that a suit for declaration and recovery of possession on the strength of title is maintainable, still it is the duty of the court to peruse the evidence regarding all issues and pass a decree touching all the issues involved. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the trial court specifically held that Ext.B1 document is an invalid document executed only as a security for payment of debt. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the said finding has not been appealed by the defendant and hence, the said finding has become final. 22. In Shri Sourav Jain and another v. M/s. A.B.P. Design and another [Civil Appeal No.4448 of 2021, dtd. 5th August, 2021, reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 552], the Supreme Court held that a party in whose favour a court had decreed the suit, can challenge an adverse finding before the appellate court without a cross-objection. It is not necessary that a challenge to the adverse finding of the trial court needs to be made in the form of a memorandum of cross objection. 23. In the case at hand, the trial court dismissed the suit, though it accepted the plaintiff's contention that Ext.B1 sale deed was executed as a security for payment of debt. The question of validity of Ext.B1 was not considered by the first appellate court on the ground that the appellant did not file a cross-objection against the finding of the trial court. Referring to Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC, it was contended that a party in whose favour the civil court has decreed a suit, can raise arguments against the findings without having to file a cross-objection in the appeal. 24. Referring to Order XLI Rule 22 of the CPC, it was contended that a party in whose favour the civil court has decreed a suit, can raise arguments against the findings without having to file a cross-objection in the appeal. 24. Addressing the above contentions, in Shri Saurav Jain's case (supra), the Supreme Court discussed the history and scope of Order XLI Rule 22(1) of the CPC in paragraph 25 of the judgment as follows:- “25. It is apparent from the amended provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 CPC and the above authorities that there are two changes that were brought by the 1976 amendment. First, the scope of filing of a cross-objection was enhanced substantively to include objections against ‘findings’ of the lower court; second, different forms of raising cross-objections were recognised. The amendment sought to introduce different forms of cross-objection for assailing the findings and decrees since the amendment separates the phrase “but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour” from “may also take any cross-objection to the decree” with a semi colon. Therefore, the two parts of the sentence must be read disjunctively. Only when a part of the decree has been assailed by the respondent, should a memorandum of cross-objection be filed. Otherwise, it is sufficient to raise a challenge to an adverse finding of the court of first instance before the appellate court without a cross objection.” 25. In view of the above, though the appellant did not assail the findings of the trial court on the issue of Ext.B1 sale deed before the first appellate court, under order XLI Rule 22 either by filing a memorandum of cross-objection or otherwise, he is not precluded from raising an argument before this Court, particularly when mixed questions of facts and law arise pursuant to the execution of Ext.B1 sale deed and Ext.A2 contract for sale. Hence, this contention is unsustainable. 26. The substantial questions of law formulated for decision in this appeal are thus answered as above. For the foregoing reasons, this second appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate court are set aside and the suit is remitted to the trial court for fresh disposal. Hence, this contention is unsustainable. 26. The substantial questions of law formulated for decision in this appeal are thus answered as above. For the foregoing reasons, this second appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate court are set aside and the suit is remitted to the trial court for fresh disposal. The trial court is directed to frame additional issues regarding limitation and validity of Ext.A2 agreement for re-conveyance and decide the suit after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence. The trial court is directed to dispose of the suit finally within six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment uninfluenced by the observations and findings contained in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.