JUDGMENT : This intra-court appeal is directed against the order dated 12.02.2021 passed in W.P.No.15032/2020 whereunder the look-out circular/communication dated 08.05.2020 and 18.07.2020 issued by respondent Nos.3 and 4 respectively preventing petitioner from traveling out of India and consequential endorsement dated 08.12.2020 (Annexure-A) issued by the first respondent came to be upheld and writ petition came to be dismissed. The parties are referred to as per their rank in the writ petitions. 2. Petitioner, who had booked a flight ticket to travel from Bengaluru to Abu Dhabi on 14.11.2020, was denied immigration clearance and was not permitted to travel by respondent Nos.1 and 2. Being aggrieved by the said action of respondents, petitioner filed W.P.No.13862/2020 during December 2020. On 10.12.2020 respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed a memo enclosing the impugned endorsement dated 08.12.2020, informing the writ court that petitioner had been stopped from traveling by the respondents due to the Look Out Circulars dated 08.05.2020 and 18.07.2020 issued by respondent Nos.3 and 4. Hence, challenging the said impugned endorsement namely, dated 08.12.2020 (Annexure-A) and issuance of Look Out Circular/Communication dated 08.05.2020 and 18.07.2020 issued by respondent Nos.3 and 4 respectively, W.P.No.15032/2020 came to be filed by the petitioner and said writ petition was heard and dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 12.02.2021. Hence, this intra-court appeal. FACTS OF THE CASE AS PLEADED BY THE WRIT PETITIONER IN THE WRIT PETITIONS 3. It was contended by the petitioner that he is a promoter of various companies in the field of pharmaceutical, hospitality, healthcare and foreign exchange businesses. It is further contended that said companies were under his control from its inception in early 2000s till 2015-17. Petitioner also claimed that he had stepped down from the management of the companies to the Senior Officers during 2015-17. It was further averred that due to various illegal activities and mismanagement of said companies by the then officers and persons in control and management, said companies ran into financial irregularities leading to default in servicing of loans taken by such companies from various financial institutions/Banks. 4. Petitioner had also contended that various Banks have initiated several proceedings against the companies and also against the petitioner in the capacity of being a guarantor of such loans. 4. Petitioner had also contended that various Banks have initiated several proceedings against the companies and also against the petitioner in the capacity of being a guarantor of such loans. The list of cases pending against the petitioner has been produced at Annexure-E, which would indicate that there are about 33 cases pending against the petitioner and same are pending in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. It is also stated that third respondent has filed a suit for specific performance in Commercial O.S.No.1/2020 against petitioner, wherein an application for grant of ad-interim order of temporary injunction to restrain the petitioner from alienating and/or encumbering the immovable properties described at Item Nos.1 to 13 and 16 of plaint schedule came to be granted by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in COMAP Nos.26/2020 c/w 27/2020 & 28/2020 vide order dated 17.04.2020. 5. It is also contended by the petitioner that ICICI Bank has filed a suit for permanent injunction in O.S.No.614/2020, which is pending before the Commercial Court, Mangalore in which, there is an order of ad-interim temporary injunction dated 10.07.2020 passed against the petitioner. Petitioner has also contended that Commercial Bank of Dubai has filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the petitioner in O.S.No.198/2020 before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru in which case, there is an order of ad-interim temporary injunction passed on 14.08.2020. 6. Petitioner has contended that he is ordinarily residing and carrying on business at UAE and had visited India during February, 2020 and on account of travel restriction due to pandemic prevalent, he was unable to return back to UAE and when he intended to travel back to UAE during November 2020, he had booked air ticket for traveling from Bengaluru to Dubai on 14.11.2020 and on proceeding to immigration clearance, he was denied permission and thereby his immigration clearance in the passport was cancelled. 7. Petitioner contends that act of the Foreign Regional Registration Officer (FRRO) was challenged by filing W.P.No.13862/2020 with a prayer interalia to declare the endorsement dated 14.11.2020 issued by the Bureau of Immigration not permitting him to travel to UAE as illegal. 7. Petitioner contends that act of the Foreign Regional Registration Officer (FRRO) was challenged by filing W.P.No.13862/2020 with a prayer interalia to declare the endorsement dated 14.11.2020 issued by the Bureau of Immigration not permitting him to travel to UAE as illegal. The learned Central Government Counsel vide memo dated 10.12.2020 produced the endorsement/communication dated 08.12.2020 wherein it was stated that respondent Nos.3 and 4 had issued Look Out Notices (hereinafter referred to as 'LOC' for short) dated 08.05.2020 and 18.07.2020 and as such, petitioner sought for the endorsement dated 08.12.2020 being quashed including the LOCs by filing W.P.No.15032/2020. 8. On respondents being notified, statement of objections came to be filed by respondent Nos.3 and 4 denying the averments made in the writ petition, except to the extent expressly admitted thereunder. In nut-shell respondent Nos.3 and 4 contended that writ petitioner has been in egregious breach of his obligation under the various personal guarantees issued by him, interalia by failing to disclose his assets and/or securing the entire sum that is due to them. It was also contended that petitioner had failed to establish his bonafides. It was also contended that LOCs issued against the petitioner falls within the parameters of the extant OMs and in the absence of there being any challenge to the OMs, petitioner cannot question the authority of these respondents, who have acted on the basis of the said LOCs. It is contended that petitioner and the entities controlled, directly and indirectly, by him were due to respondents to the tune of Rs.2800 Crores and the said companies controlled by the petitioner has been subject to various regulatory and criminal actions across the globe due to which the petitioner's financial status as well as solvency are under dire distress and his ability to honour his repayment obligations to the respondent Nos.3 and 4 are severely constrained and in jeopardy. 9. Third respondent has also contended that legal notice dated 03.05.2020 (Annexure-R16) was issued to the petitioner to comply with the obligations under the personal guarantees and the negative lein letter, but to no avail. It is stated that said respondent has filed a commercial suit OS. 9. Third respondent has also contended that legal notice dated 03.05.2020 (Annexure-R16) was issued to the petitioner to comply with the obligations under the personal guarantees and the negative lein letter, but to no avail. It is stated that said respondent has filed a commercial suit OS. No.1/2020 before the Commercial Court, Bengaluru for specific performance of negative lein letter and permanent injunction and in the said suit, temporary injunction was also sought for to restrain the petitioner from alienating or encumbering the immovable properties owned by him. It is contended that the internal audit and assessment of the accounts of the petitioner and the companies which he owned/controlled, disclosed that there were massive irregularities while operating the accounts and there was large scale cash withdrawals, misappropriation and diversion of funds, etc. On these amongst other grounds as pleaded in the statement of objections, respondent Nos.3 and 4 sought for dismissal of the writ petitions. FINDINGS OF THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE: 10. The learned Single Judge after considering the pleadings and rival contentions, took note of the fact that respondent Nos.3 and 4 have lent about Rs.2800 Crores to the petitioner and the companies run by him and petitioner is the promoter of the said company. It is also held that petitioner himself has admitted the default in repayment of the loans had occurred due to mismanagement of his companies and the financial institutions are bound to recover the public money and as such, LOCs have been issued against the petitioner. It is also held that petitioner has conceded to the Bank's power to issue LOCs. 11. The learned Single Judge taking note of the Official Memorandum dated 27.10.2010 (Annexure-AA) in general and paragraph 7 in particular noticed that, a person against whom LOC is issued can approach the officer who ordered for issuance of such LOC and explain the same was erroneously or wrongly issued against him and without approaching respondent Nos.3 and 4, prematurely, petitioner had knocked the doors of the writ court and as such, there is no cause of action to consider the prayer sought for in the writ petition. 12. 12. The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration that petitioner would be liable to repay about Rs.2800 Crores lent by public sector Banks and the money belonging to this country had been utilised by the petitioner in a foreign country to run his businesses and there was no material on record which establishes that money lent by respondent Nos.3 and 4 had resulted in any development within the country. The learned Judge also noticed that the debt has been declared as a bad debt by respondent Nos.3 and 4 and the public sector Banks are fighting litigations in India as well as in UAE to recover the said amount and it is a matter of great concern as it would have impact on the economy of this country. Hence, on this ground, the writ petition came to be dismissed, reserving liberty to the petitioner to approach the Bank authorities and assign reasons as to why LOCs were wrongly issued and as to why it should be revoked. On these grounds, the writ petitions came to be dismissed. Hence, the petitioner has preferred this intra-court appeal. 13. We have heard the arguments of Sri.Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner, Sri.Aditya Singh, learned Central Government Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Sri.Aditya Sondhi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent No.3 and Sri.D.R.Ravishankar, learned Advocate appearing for respondent No.4. Perused the case papers. CONTENTIONS RAISED BY SRI MUKUL ROHATGI, LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR THE PETITIONER: 14. It is the contention of Sri.Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner that learned Single Judge erred in arriving at a conclusion that petitioner has an alternate remedy namely, he can approach the Banks for the Look Out Notices being withdrawn by making out grounds on which same had been issued erroneously, on the ground that post decisional hearing is an empty formality and no purpose would be served by taking such recourse by the petitioner. He would submit that Banks have already filed cases against petitioner at UAE-Dubai and have obtained an order banning the travel of petitioner abroad, subsequent to the issue of LOC and as such preventing the petitioner from leaving the soil of India is nothing but strangulating the petitioner and it virtually amounts to civil death. He would submit that Banks have already filed cases against petitioner at UAE-Dubai and have obtained an order banning the travel of petitioner abroad, subsequent to the issue of LOC and as such preventing the petitioner from leaving the soil of India is nothing but strangulating the petitioner and it virtually amounts to civil death. 14.1 He would contend that preventing petitioner from traveling abroad is violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He would also contend that none of the conditions stipulated under the Circular for issue of LOC are fulfilled by the Banks and as such the LOCs issued against the petitioner is liable to be quashed. 14.2 He would contend that by preventing the petitioner from traveling to UAE, would amount to curtailment of petitioner's right to trade as enshrined in Article 19 of the Constitution of India and it is very much necessary for the petitioner to be physically present at UAE to save the business empire built by him over a period of 4 decades. The very fact that Banks at UAE require physical presence of the petitioner and are pressing for the same in the Courts of Dubai and simultaneously preventing the petitioner from leaving the territory of India, amounts to adopting double standard methods. These acts of the respondents are in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 14.3 He would further contend that none of the respondents have issued notice to the petitioner, prior to issuance of LOCs and failure to give notice is in violation of principles of natural justice and also depriving the petitioner from exercising his fundamental right to a fair hearing following due process of law as enshrined in Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 14.4 He would submit though violation of fundamental rights enshrined under Article 14, 19 and 21 including but not limited to the right to travel had been violated by the respondents, had been urged in the writ petition by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, yet learned Single Judge having accepted that "a citizen of this Country has a right to travel" ought to have exercised the extraordinary jurisdiction to quash the impugned LOCs. 14.5 He would further contend that petitioner is not required to explain to the Banks the reasons for his returning back to UAE and the very fact that petitioner has to appear in person at UAE as ordered by the Courts thereat not being in dispute, was itself sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that petitioner should be permitted to travel abroad. 14.6 He would also draw the attention of this Court to various orders of temporary injunction or restrainment orders passed against petitioner from encumbering or selling the immovable properties belonging to the petitioner, which was sufficient enough to ward off the apprehension of Banks and when there are no criminal cases or civil cases pending against the petitioner in India, prohibiting the petitioner from traveling abroad is in clear violation of rights guaranteed to a citizen of this Country under the Constitution of India. 14.7 He would submit that learned Single Judge erred in opining that petitioner ought to have been issued "prior notice" as it would defeat the purpose of LOC, inasmuch as, it is the specific case of the petitioner that after issuance of LOC petitioner ought to have been notified so as to enable the petitioner to exercise his available legal remedies and it is this violation of right which had been canvassed before the learned Single Judge, but was not considered. Hence, he prays for allowing the writ appeal by setting aside the order of learned Single Judge and consequently prays for allowing the writ petition. In support of his submissions he has relied upon the following judgments: (i) (2017) 6 SCC 801 : T.P.SENKUMAR v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (ii) (2007) 6 SCC 81 : BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v. MADDULA RATNAVALLI AND OTHERS (iii) (2012) 5 SCC 1 : RAMLILA MAIDAN INCIDENT, IN. RE, (iv) (2008) 3 SCC 613 : STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS v. BHAURAO PUNJABRAO GAWANDE (v) ILR (2010) VI DELHI 706: SUMER SINGH SALKAN v. ASSTT. DIRECTOR & ORS. (vi) 2015 SCC ONLINE DEL 7987 : (2015) 218 DLT 621 : PRIYA PARAMESWARAN PILLAI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. (vii) 2018 SCC ONLINE MAD 2229 : (2018) 2 SWC 609: KARTI P. CHIDAMBARAM v. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REP. DIRECTOR & ORS. (vi) 2015 SCC ONLINE DEL 7987 : (2015) 218 DLT 621 : PRIYA PARAMESWARAN PILLAI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. (vii) 2018 SCC ONLINE MAD 2229 : (2018) 2 SWC 609: KARTI P. CHIDAMBARAM v. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, REP. BY ITS COMMISIONER (IMMIGRATION), EAST BLOCK-VIII, LEVAL-V, SECTOR -1, R.K. PURAM, NEW DELHI - 100 066 (viii) WRIT PETITION No.55157/2018: ASIFKHADER v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS BANK SECURITIES AND FRAUD CELL (ix) WRIT PETITION NOS.10678-79 OF 2019 (GM-RES): SRI. PRASHANTH B HEGDE AND ANOTHER v. BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND ANOTHER (x) WRIT PETITION No.38488 OF 2016 (GM-RES): SRI. SAI RAMAKRISHNA KARUTURI v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (xi) (2967) 3 SCR 5265 : AIR 1967 SC 1836 : SATWANT SINGH SAWHNEY v. D.RAMARATHNAM, ASSISTANT PASSPORT OFFICER, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS (xii) (1978) 1 SCC 248 : MRS. MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (xiii) (2008) 3 SCC 674 : SURESH NANDA v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (xiv) CIVIL APPEAL NO.3802 OF 2019: SATISH CHANDRA VERMA v. UNION OF INDIA (UOI) AND ORS. (xv) 1965 SCC ONLINE KER 37 : AIR 1966 KER 20 : FRANCIS MANJOORAN AND OTHERS v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, NEW DELHI AND OTHERS (xvi) (1978) 3 SCC 544 : MADHAV HAYAWADANRAO HOSKOT v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (xvii) (2013) 6 SCC 740 : CHANDRAN RATNASWAMI v. K.C.PALANISAMY AND OTHERS (xviii) CRL.WRIT PETITION No.263/2019: AFZAL JAFFER KHAN v. THE OFFICER, CBI ACB OFFICE AND ORS. (xix) 2017 SCC ONLINE MAD 5960: CHERUVATHUR CHAKKUTTY THAMPI @ C.C.THAMPI v. UNION OF INDIA, REP. BY ITS SECRETARY, HOME DEPARTMENT (xx) 2020 SCC ONLINE CAL 431: MRITUNJAY SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (xxi) 2010 SCC ONLINE DEL 2475: VIKRAM SHARMA & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. (xxii) (1985) 4 SCC 677 : BHIM SINGH, MLA v. STATE OF J & K AND OTHERS CONTENTIONS RAISED BY SRI. ADITYA SONDHI, LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR RESPONDENT NO.3: 15. It is contended that petitioner owes third respondent a sum of Rs.2000 Crores and he has also furnished his personal guarantee for the monies borrowed by the companies which petitioner has owned, controlled and managed. ADITYA SONDHI, LEARNED SENIOR COUNSEL APPEARING FOR RESPONDENT NO.3: 15. It is contended that petitioner owes third respondent a sum of Rs.2000 Crores and he has also furnished his personal guarantee for the monies borrowed by the companies which petitioner has owned, controlled and managed. He contends that proceedings for recovery of said amount has already been initiated and petitioner having come to India during February 2020 sought for a settlement of the amounts due and payable by him to the Banks and in this regard a meeting was held on 18.03.2020, in which Minutes was drawn as per Annexure-R14 (not disputed by the petitioner till date) agreeing to repay the amounts and yet, has cleverly maneuvered to avoid and evade to abide by the terms as promised. 15.1 He would also draw the attention of the Court to the agreement of Negative Lein entered by petitioner with the Bank agreeing to create mortgage deed in respect of properties mentioned in Schedule-I-A and thereafter having not kept up his promise, for which an independent suit has been filed wherein interim temporary injunction has been issued restraining the petitioner from alienating or encumbering the immovable properties owned by him. He would contend that third respondent-Bank left with no other option has issued notice calling upon the petitioner to keep up his commitment, which has been replied with an evasive reply. Hence, third respondent was perforced to issue LOC, which is legal and does not suffer from any vices whatsoever and prays for rejection of contentions raised in that regard. 15.2 He would also submit that petitioner having not challenged the validity of OMs issued by the Ministry of Finance and the power to issue such LOC nor the contents of LOC can be questioned and as such he submits that neither the Writ Court was required to go into the said aspect nor this Court in the present intra-court appeal is required to address the said issues. 15.3 He would also draw the attention of the Court to the commercial suit - O.S.No.1/2020 filed by the third respondent and this Court in COMAP Nos.26/2020 c/w 27/2020 and 28/2020 wherein this Court has held there is a prima facie case in favour of Bank and has granted an order of temporary injunction against the petitioner in terms of prayer made in the interlocutory applications- I.A.Nos.1 and 2 in Commercial O.S.1/2020. 15.4 He would submit in the event of said order being violated, the right of Bank available to proceed against the petitioner is either under Order 39 Rule 2-A CPC or under Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, would be curtailed or in other words, third respondent- Bank would not be in a position to seek enforcement of said order, once petitioner leaves this country. 15.5 He would submit that track record of the petitioner is very doubtful and by referring to the past incidents of debtors having fled from the Indian soil, was itself sufficient for the third respondent-Bank invoking the extant OMs for issuing LOCs against the petitioner to prevent recurrence of such incidents. 15.6 He would also refer to Order 38 Rule 1(a) to defend the issuance of LOC against petitioner and thereby preventing the petitioner from leaving the territory of India. 15.7 He would draw the attention of the Court to the list of cases (Annexure-E) pending against the petitioner and the companies promoted by the petitioner as Chief Promoter, which is an indicator to the fact that once the petitioner leaves the soil of this Country, he is unlikely to return back to India. He would also place reliance on Document No.1 produced along with the memo dated 15.01.2021 before the learned Single Judge enclosing the report dated 28.12.2020, which discloses the fraud perpetrated by the petitioner in cheating the financial institution on the basis of complaint lodged by the third respondent. 15.8 He would further submit that post decisional hearing is a remedy available to an aggrieved party and on assumptions and presumptions petitioner cannot be heard to contend the same would be an empty formality. He would also submit that in MANEKA GANDHI's case referred to by the petitioner, a finding has been recorded that restriction can be placed on the foreign travel by an Indian citizen and conduct of the petitioner disentitles him to go abroad. 15.9 Relying upon the following judgments, he prays for confirming the order of the learned Single Judge by dismissing the intra-court appeal. (i) (2010) 6 SCC 614 : CHAIRMAN, ALL INDIA RAILWAY RECRUITMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER v. K.SHYAM KUMAR AND OTHERS (ii) (1978) 1 SCC 248 : MRS. MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (iii) 2016 SCC ONLINE SC 1886: STATE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. KINGFISHER AIRLINES LTD. (i) (2010) 6 SCC 614 : CHAIRMAN, ALL INDIA RAILWAY RECRUITMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER v. K.SHYAM KUMAR AND OTHERS (ii) (1978) 1 SCC 248 : MRS. MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER (iii) 2016 SCC ONLINE SC 1886: STATE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. KINGFISHER AIRLINES LTD. AND OTHERS (iv) 2016 SCC ONLINE SC 1673: STATE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. KINGFISHER AIRLINES LTD. AND OTHERS (v) (2017) 6 SCC 654 : STATE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. KINGFISHER AIRLINES LTD. AND OTHERS (vi) 2020 SCC ONLINE SC 701: DR.VIJAY MALLYA v. STATE BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS (vii) (2004) 4 SCC 311 : MARDIA CHEMICALS LTD. AND OTHES v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS (viii) (2009) 4 SCC 94 : CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA v. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS (ix) (2010) 8 SCC 110 : UNITED BANK OF INDIA v. SATYAWATI TONDON AND OTHERS (xii) (2010) 8 SCC 129 : INDIAN BANK v. BLUE JAGGERS ESTATES LIMITED AND OTHERS (xiii) 2021 SCC ONLINE CAL 440: HEMANTA KUMAR BANKA v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS CONTENTIONS RAISED BY SRI.D.R.RAVISHANKAR, LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING FOR RESPONDENT NO.4: 16. Endorsing the contentions raised by Sri.Aditya Sondhi, Sri.D.R.Ravishankar, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 has contended that when OMs are not under challenge this Court is not required to examine the validity of the same. He would rely upon the OM dated 05.12.2017 to contend that expression "if it appears" found in the said OM would indicate that subjective satisfaction of the officer issuing, is the requirement for issuing LOC and in the instant case such subjective satisfaction has been arrived at as could be seen from the LOC itself. 16.1 He would also rely upon the OM dated 27.10.2010 to contend that it provides for two (2) stages of consideration for issuance and continuance of the LOC issued against a person namely, (i) at the stage of issuing; and (ii) on LOC being issued the aggrieved person approaching the officer who issued LOC to seek for its revocation or withdrawal. 16.2 He would submit that between individual right and economic interest of the State, the larger public interest of the State has to yield to the private interest. 16.2 He would submit that between individual right and economic interest of the State, the larger public interest of the State has to yield to the private interest. 16.3 By relying upon the statement of objections filed by the respondent No.4 before the learned Single Judge and drawing sustenance therefrom, he would contend that from December 2019 onwards petitioner and the companies owned and managed by the petitioner started defaulting and the in-house investigation by NMC HealthCare LLC disclosed that debts of USD 2.7 billion had been kept hidden and had not been disclosed in the balance sheet. 16.4 He would submit that petitioner is a citizen of India and monies had been advanced by the Indian Banks and same having been utilised by petitioner in other countries, fourth respondent-Bank is made to suffer financial loss, which would have a bearing on the economic interest of the Country and as such it cannot be gainsaid by the petitioner that LOC could not have been issued on account of proceedings having been initiated by respondent No.4 in UAE. Referring to paragraph 15 of the statement of objections filed before the learned Single Judge he would contend that several persons-fugitives like the petitioner have fled from the territory of India by defrauding the Indian Financial Institutions, which has had an adverse impact on the economic interest of the Country. He would submit that order preventing petitioner from traveling out of the Country is to be preserved and as such prayer of the petitioner for revocation, if made would be considered by the fourth respondent-Bank in a holistic manner. By relying upon the following judgments he prays for dismissal of this writ appeal: (i) (1987) 2 SCC 364 : STATE OF GUJARAT v. MOHANLAL JITAMALJI PORWAL AND ANOTHER (ii) (2013) 7 SCC 466 : NIMMAGADDA PRASAD vs. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (iii) (2000) 9 SCC 366 : SUSHEELA NAIK AND ANOTEHR vs. G.K.NAIK REPLY ARGUMENTS BY SRI. MUKUL ROHATGI: 17. It is contended that the respondent Nos.3 and 4 have misconstrued the extant circulars and are virtually forcing recovery of monies from the petitioner. He would submit that Banks intend to keep the petitioner as a hostage in this Country and there being no criminal case pending against petitioner in India, necessity of detaining the petitioner in India is not warranted. He would submit that Banks intend to keep the petitioner as a hostage in this Country and there being no criminal case pending against petitioner in India, necessity of detaining the petitioner in India is not warranted. He would submit that petitioner is having more than 50 to 60 immovable properties in India and to safeguard the interest of the Banks, the petitioner has been injuncted from alienating and/or encumbering said properties and as such there would be no need or necessity for the petitioner being detained in India. 17.1 He would submit that respondents have referred to the contents of the sealed cover furnished to the Court and claims that inputs have been received by the Banks, which is not in the know-how of the petitioner and as such much reliance cannot be placed on the said material. He would submit that any reasons beyond what is contained in the LOC cannot be the ground on which LOC can be sustained as the impugned order should speak for itself and it cannot be supplemented. In support of this proposition he relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of MOHINDER SINGH GILL & ANR. vs. THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI & ORS. reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 . 17.2 He would contend that if on the basis of LOC petitioner is prevented from traveling abroad, it would amount to restricting his right to travel and he cannot be a hostage at the instance of a financial institution, which has initiated proceedings against the petitioner for recovery of monies and said proceedings has to proceed in accordance with law, as otherwise it amounts to policing act by the Bank or in other words, there would be no need or necessity for any Courts where the rule of law would prevail. 17.3 He would submit that petitioner had come from UAE and returning back to UAE is not fleeing from India. He would also contend that Clause-J of the Circular dated 23.04.2021 is an exception, which is to be strictly viewed and it cannot infringe the fundamental rights. He would also elaborate his submission by contending that Bank or its Officers cannot decide the rights of the petitioner and post decisional hearing is only an empty formality, since Banks have already taken a decision that petitioner should not leave the territory of India. He would also elaborate his submission by contending that Bank or its Officers cannot decide the rights of the petitioner and post decisional hearing is only an empty formality, since Banks have already taken a decision that petitioner should not leave the territory of India. To contend that post decisional hearing is an empty formality and the right to fair hearing is a fundamental right and in support of his submission, he has relied upon the following judgments: (i) (2006) 12 SCC 33 : SIEMENS LTD. vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS (ii) (1987) 4 SCC 431 : K.I.SHEPHARD & OTHERS. vs UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS 17.4 He would contend when the respondent-Bank itself has filed the suit in Dubai and have obtained restraint order against the petitioner from leaving UAE, simultaneously they cannot prevent the petitioner from defending the said case at UAE. By referring to judgment of the Kolkata High Court in the case of MRITYUNJAY SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. decided on 20.04.2021 in W.P.No.105/2020 he would contend that right to travel has been considered as a fundamental right and when there are no inputs that petitioner would run-away or flee away from the law courts of India, he cannot be prevented from traveling abroad. Hence, he prays for writ appeal being allowed. 17.5 Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge as well as giving our anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised at the bar, we are of the considered view that following point would arise for our consideration: (i) Whether the order dated 12.02.2021 passed in WP No.15032/2020 is liable to be interfered? If so, on what ground/s? OR Whether the grounds urged in the writ petition and reiterated in this intracourt appeal by the petitioner, merits acceptance or rejection? DISCUSSION AND FINDING ON THE POINTS FORMULATED HEREINABOVE: 18. The petitioner having promoted and run various companies like pharmaceutical, hospitality, healthcare and foreign exchange businesses at UAE and other countries are not in dispute. OR Whether the grounds urged in the writ petition and reiterated in this intracourt appeal by the petitioner, merits acceptance or rejection? DISCUSSION AND FINDING ON THE POINTS FORMULATED HEREINABOVE: 18. The petitioner having promoted and run various companies like pharmaceutical, hospitality, healthcare and foreign exchange businesses at UAE and other countries are not in dispute. Petitioner also candidly admits in the writ petition itself that during late 2019 and early 2020 the companies promoted by him were mismanaged by the persons in-charge and the companies owned, controlled, managed by the petitioner and his family members were unable to repay the debts borrowed from several financial institutions including respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein. 19. The list of cases at Annexure-E would disclose the proceedings pending against the petitioner. In fact, according to the respondent Nos.3 and 4 petitioner owes a sum of Rs.2800 Crores. In fact, listing and trading in shares of some of the companies owned and controlled by the petitioner has been suspended by the London Stock Exchange. Likewise, the Central Bank of UAE (equivalent to Reserve Bank of India) has initiated regulated proceedings against the petitioner's company and has frozen some of the accounts of the petitioner and his family members. The list of such proceedings initiated have been morefully enumerated by respondent No.3 in the statement of objections filed to the writ petition vide paragraph 3(c)(ix)(1) to (5). 20. It is based on the said amounts due to the third and fourth respondents-Banks the petitioner has been prevented from traveling out of India as communicated to the petitioner by first respondent under the endorsement dated 08.12.2020 based upon the LOCs dated 08.05.2020 and 18.07.2020 issued by respondent Nos.3 and 4 respectively. 21. Though Sri.Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel has vehemently contended that right to travel is a fundamental right and the restriction imposed on the petitioner from leaving the territory of India, amounts to infringement of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India, looks attractive at first blush, is not so on deeper examination for reasons more than one. Firstly, the petitioner has not challenged the constitutional validity of the Official Memorandum (OMs) dated 27.10.2010, 05.12.2017, 19.07.2018, 19.09.2018, 04.10.2018, 12.10.2018 (Annexures-AA to AE and Annexures-R1 and R2) whereunder it enables the authorities to impose restriction on a Indian citizen from leaving the territory of India. Firstly, the petitioner has not challenged the constitutional validity of the Official Memorandum (OMs) dated 27.10.2010, 05.12.2017, 19.07.2018, 19.09.2018, 04.10.2018, 12.10.2018 (Annexures-AA to AE and Annexures-R1 and R2) whereunder it enables the authorities to impose restriction on a Indian citizen from leaving the territory of India. As such neither the Single Judge was required to examine the said issue nor we are inclined to delve upon this aspect. 22. It is the specific act emerging from the said OMs, which the petitioner seeks to assail in the writ petition and when examined in this background, it would emerge from the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in the case of MANEKA GANDHI's wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court (per Hon'ble Mr. Justices Bhagawati, Untwalia and Fazal Ali) have observed that procedure established by law under Article 21 must meet the requirement of Article 14 and it has been further held the right to travel abroad cannot be regarded as forming part of Articles 19(1)(a) or 19(1)(g), since such right is not guaranteed and such right cannot be inferred as a peripheral or concomitant right under Article 19(1). It is further held by the Apex Court to the following effect: "34. The right to go abroad cannot, therefore, be regarded as included in freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) on the theory of peripheral or concomitant right. This theory has been firmly rejected in the All India Bank Employees Association's case and we cannot countenance any attempt to revive it, as that would completely upset the scheme of Article 19(1) and to quote the words of Rajagopala Ayyanger, J., speaking on behalf of the Court in All India Bank Employees Association's case "by a series of ever expending concentric. circles in the shape of rights concomitant to concomitant rights and so on, lead to an almost grostesque result". So also, for the same reasons, the right to go abroad cannot be treated as part of the, right to carry on trade, business, profession or calling guaranteed under Article 19(1) (g). The right to go abroad is clearly not a guaranteed right under any clause of Article 19(1) and section 10(3) (c) which authorises imposition of restrictions on the right to go abroad by impounding of passport cannot be held to be void as offending Article 19(1) (a) or (g), as its direct and inevitable impact is on the right. The right to go abroad is clearly not a guaranteed right under any clause of Article 19(1) and section 10(3) (c) which authorises imposition of restrictions on the right to go abroad by impounding of passport cannot be held to be void as offending Article 19(1) (a) or (g), as its direct and inevitable impact is on the right. to go abroad and not on the right of free speech and expression or the. right to carry on trade, business profession or calling." "54. The next question is whether the right to go out of India is an integral part of the right of free speech and expression and is comprehended within it. It seems to me impossible to answer this question in the affirmative as is contended by the petitioner's counsel, Shri Madan Bhatia. It is possible to predicate of many a right that its exercise would be more meaningful if the right is extended to comprehended an extraneous facility. But such extensions do not form part of the right conferred by the Constitution. The analogy of the freedom of press being included in the right of free speech and expression 4-119SCI/78 is wholly misplaced because the right of free expression incontrovertibly includes the right of freedom of the press. The right to, go abroad on one hand and the right of free speech and expression on the other are made up of basically different constituents, so different indeed that one cannot be comprehended in the other. 55. Brother Bhagwati has, on this aspect considered at length certain American decisions like Kent(1),_Apthekar(2) and Zemel(3) and illuminating though his analysis is, I am inclined to think that the presence of the due process clause in the 5th and 14th Amendments of the American Constitution makes significant difference to the approach of American Judges to the definition and evaluation of constitutional guarantees. The content which has been meaningfully and imaginatively poured into "due process of law" may, in my view, constitute an important point of distinction between the American Constitution and ours which studiously avoided the use of that expression. In the Centennial Volume. The content which has been meaningfully and imaginatively poured into "due process of law" may, in my view, constitute an important point of distinction between the American Constitution and ours which studiously avoided the use of that expression. In the Centennial Volume. "The Fourteenth Amendment" edited by Bernard Schwartz, is contained in an article on 'Landmarks of Legal Liberty' by Justice William J. Brennan in which the learned Judge quoting from Yeat's play has this to say : In the service of the age old dream for recognition of the equal and inaleinable rights of man, the 14th Amendment though 100 years old, can never be old. "Like the poor old women in Yeat's play, "Did you see an old woman going down the path?" asked Bridget. "I did not," replied Patrick, who had come into the house after the old woman left it, "But I saw a young girl and she had the walk of a queen." Our Constitution too strides in its majesty but, may it be remembered, without the due process clause, I prefer to be content with a decision directly in point, All India Bank Employees' Association(4) In which this Court rejected the contention that the freedom to form associations or unions contained in article 19 (1 ) (c) carried with it the right that a workers' union could do all that was necessary to make that right effective, in order to achieve the purpose for which the union was formed. One right leading to another and that another to still other, and so on, was described in the abovementioned decision as productive of a "grotesque result". 56. I have nothing more to add to what Brother Bhagwati has said on the other points in the case. I share his opinion that though the right to go abroad is not included in the right contained in article 19(1)(a), if an order made under section 10(3)(c) of the Act does in fact violate, the right of free speech and expression, such an order could be struck down as unconstitutional. It is well37 settled that a statute may pass the test of constitutionality and yet an order passed under it may be unconstitutional. But of that I will say no more because in this branch, one says no more than the facts warrant and decides nothing that does not call for a decision. It is well37 settled that a statute may pass the test of constitutionality and yet an order passed under it may be unconstitutional. But of that I will say no more because in this branch, one says no more than the facts warrant and decides nothing that does not call for a decision. The fact that the petitioner was not heard before or soon after the impounding of her passport would have introduced a serious infirmity in the order but for the statement of the Attorney General that the. Government was, willing to hear the petitioner and further to limit the operation of the order to a period of six months from the date of the fresh decision, if the decision was adverse to the petitioner. The order, I agree, does not in fact offend against article 19 (1) (a) or 19 (1) (g). 23. It has also been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court (per Hon'ble the Chief Justice-Mr.Beg and per Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kailasam) that a passport may be impounded without giving prior opportunity and subsequently hearing must be provided. Hence, petitioner cannot be heard to contend that his right of hearing has been taken away and thereby act of the respondents are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 24. In the instant case, we notice that the extant OMs provide for an opportunity to the petitioner namely, the petitioner being entitled to appear before the third and fourth respondent-Banks and explain the circumstances which perforced the Banks for issuing LOC was not prevailing and both the Banks are required to examine, consider and then pass an order on the said plea. Though Sri. Mukul Rohatgi has made an attempt to contend that post decisional hearing is an empty formality we are not inclined to accept the same, inasmuch as, Hon'ble Apex Court in MANEKA GANDHI's case has held that though prior opportunity at the time of impounding the passport is not required, the subsequent opportunity as to why such impounding is not required to be continued, should be considered as inherent in fair hearing. It has been further held to the following effect: "14. It has been further held to the following effect: "14. Now, as already pointed out, the doctrine of natural justice consists principally of two rules, namely, nemo debt esse judex propria cause : no one shall be a judge in his own cause, and audi alteram partem : no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing. We are concerned here with the second rule and hence we shall confine ourselves only to a discussion of that rule. The learned Attorney General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, fairly conceded that the audi alteram partem rule is a highly effective tool devised by the courts to enable a statutory authority to arrive at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on abuse or misuse of power and hence its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circum- scribed. He rightly did not plead for reconsideration of the historic advances made in the law as a result of the decisions of this Court and did not suggest that the Court should re-trace its steps. That would indeed have been a most startling argument coming from the Government of India and for the Court to accede to such an argument would have been so act of utter retrogression. But fortunately no such argument was advanced by the learned Attorney General. What he urged was a very limited contention, namely that having regard to the nature of the action involved in the impounding of a passport, the audi alteram partem rule must be held to, be excluded, because if notice were to be given to the holder of the passport and reasonable opportunity afforded to him to show cause why his passport should not be impounded, he might immediately, on the strength of the passport, make good his exit from the country and the object of impounding the passport would be frustrated. The argument was that if the audi alteram partem rule were applied, its effect would be to stultify the power of impounding the passport and it would defeat and paralyse the administration of the law and hence the audi alteram partem rule cannot in fairness be applied while exercising the power to impound a passport. The argument was that if the audi alteram partem rule were applied, its effect would be to stultify the power of impounding the passport and it would defeat and paralyse the administration of the law and hence the audi alteram partem rule cannot in fairness be applied while exercising the power to impound a passport. This, argument was sought to be supported by reference to the statement of the law in A.S. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed., where the learned author says at page 174 that "in administrative, law a prima facie right to prior notice and opportunity to be heard may be held to be excluded by implication-where an obligation to give notice and opportunity to be heard would obstruct the taking of prompt action, especially action of a preventive or remedial nature". Now, it is true that since the right to prior notice and opportunity of hearing arises only by implication from the duty to act fairly, or to use the words of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, from 'fair play in action, it may equally be excluded where, having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its implication and even warrants its exclusion. There are certain well recognised exceptions to the audi alteram partem rule established by judicial decisions and they are summarised by S.A. de Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd ed., at page 168 to 179. If we analyse these exceptions a little closely, _it will be apparent that they do not in any way militate against the principle which requires fair play in administrative action. The word 'exception' is really a misnomer because in these exclusionary cases the audi alteram partem rule is held inapplicable not by way of an exception to "fair play in action", but because nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. The audi alteram partem rule is intended to inject justice into the law and it cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice, or to make the law 'lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation'. The audi alteram partem rule is intended to inject justice into the law and it cannot be applied to defeat the ends of justice, or to make the law 'lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation'. Since the life of the law is not logic but experience and every legal proposition must, in the ultimate analysis, be tested on the touchstone of pragmatic realism, the audi alteram partem rule would, by the experiential test, be excluded, if importing the right to be heard has the effect of paralysing the administrative process or the need for promptitude or the urgency of the situation so demands. But at the same time it must be remembered that this is a rule of vital importance in the field of administrative law and it must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. It is a wholesome rule designed to- secure the rule of law and the court should not be too ready to eschew it in its application to a given case. True rue it is that in questions of this kind a fanatical or doctrinaire approach should be avoided, but that does not mean that merely because the traditional methodology of a formalised hearing may have the effect of stultifying the exercise of the statutory power, the audi alteram partem should be wholly excluded. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent permissible in a given case. It must not be forgotten that "natural justice is pragmatically flexible and is amenable to capsulation under the compulsive pressure of circumstances". The audi alteram partem rule is not cast in a rigid mould and judicial decisions establish that it may suffer situational modifications. The core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have a reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise. That is why Tucker, L.J., emphasised in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk(1) that "whatever standard of natural justice is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case". What opportunity may be regarded as reasonable would necessarily depend on the practical necessities of the situation. That is why Tucker, L.J., emphasised in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk(1) that "whatever standard of natural justice is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case". What opportunity may be regarded as reasonable would necessarily depend on the practical necessities of the situation. It may be a sophisticated fullfledged hearing or it may be a hearing which is very brief and minimal : it may be a hearing prior to the decision or it may even be a post-decisional remedial hearing. The audi alteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit modifications and variations to suit the exigencies of myriad kinds of situations which max, arise. This circumstantial flexibility of the audi alteram partem rule was empbasised by Lord Reid in Wiseman v. Sorneman (supra) when he said that he would be "sorry to see this fundamental general principle degenerate into a series of hard and fast rules" and Lord Hailsham, L.C., also observed in Pearl-Berg V. Party(2) that the courts "have taken in increasingly sophisticated view of what is required in individual cases". It would not, therefore, be right to conclude that the audi alteram partem rule is excluded merely because the power to impound a passport might be frustrated, if prior notice and hearing were to be given to the person concerned before impounding his passport. the Passport Authority may proceed to impound the passport without giving any prior opportunity to the person concerned to be heard, but as soon as the order impounding the passport is made, and opportunity of hearing, remedial in aim, should be given to him so that he may present his case and controvert that of the Passport Authority and point out why his passport should not be impounded and the order impounding it recalled. This should not only be possible but also quite appropriate, because the reasons for impounding the passport are required to be supplied by the Passport Authority after the making of the order and the person affected would, therefore, be in a position to make a representation setting forth his case and plead for setting aside the action impounding his passport. This should not only be possible but also quite appropriate, because the reasons for impounding the passport are required to be supplied by the Passport Authority after the making of the order and the person affected would, therefore, be in a position to make a representation setting forth his case and plead for setting aside the action impounding his passport. A fair opportunity of being heard following immediately upon the order impounding the passport would satisfy the mandate of natural justice and a provision requiring giving of such opportunity to the person concerned can and should be read by implication in the Passports Act, 1967. If such a provision were held to be incorporated in the Passports, Act, 1967 by necessary implication, as we hold it must be, the procedure prescribed by the Act for impounding a passport would be fight, fair and just and it would not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or unreasonableness. We must, therefore, hold that the procedure 'established' by the Passports Act, 1967 for impounding a passport is in conformity with the requirement of Article 21 and does not fall foul of that article. 25. This view also gets fortified from the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of MANEKA GANDHI vs UNION OF INDIA reported in (1978) 1 SCC 248 referred to herein supra whereunder Justice Krishna Iyer concurring with the opinion rendered by Bhagawati, Untwalia and Fazal Ali, JJ, held that any order passed under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act, 1967, is subject to a limited judicial scrutiny. It is further held: "189. In the result, I hold that the petitioner is not entitled to any of the fundamental rights enumerated-in Article 19 of the Constitution and that the Passport Act complies with the requirements of Art. 21 of the Constitution and is in accordance with the procedure established by law. I construe section 10(3)(c) as providing a right to the holder of the passport to be heard before the passport authority and that any order passed under section 10(3) is subject to a limited judicial scrutiny by the, High Court and the Supreme Court." Hence, the contention raised by Sri.Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner that subsequent hearing of the petitioner would be an empty formality or in other words, such post decisional hearing is impermissible cannot be accepted. However, it is needless to state that notwithstanding the conclusion arrived at by respondent Nos.3 and 4 for issuance of LOC against the petitioner, prayer of the petitioner for revoking the same shall be considered independently and without being influenced by any conclusion already arrived by them and without being influenced by any observations made either by the learned Single Judge or by this Court. 26. In the instant case the cause for issuance of LOC against the petitioner has been indicated by the third respondent in its statement of objections vide paragraph 5 and extraction of the same would only burden this judgment and as such we desist from doing so. In fact, respondent Nos.1 and 2 in their affidavit dated 11/16.12.2020 filed in W.P.No.13862/2020 have contended that documents pertaining to issuance of LOC are classified as secret and confidential. However, a sealed cover has been furnished for this Court in two (2) sets for perusal of LOCs issued against the petitioner. Same has also been perused by us. 27. The reasons which are assigned by the third respondent in the statement of objections filed in W.P.Nos.15032/2020 c/w 13862/2020 is to the following effect: "4. REASON FOR OPENING OF LOC: NMC Group companies had availed various fund based and non-fund based facilities aggregating 807.58 AED Mn (total in Rs.1655-54 crs) under multiple banking arrangement. Mr. Bavaguthu Raghuram Shetty @ B.R.Shetty is the Promoter/Director of the Borrower Companies and also the guarantor to the credit facilities sanctioned to the Companies. The accounts are at present in the category of SMA (Special Mentioned Account) and the aggregate balance outstanding in the accounts is 757.137 AED Mn (Rs.1552.13 crores). 1 Neo Pharma LLC 137.42 20.00 157.42 142.75 2 NMC Speciality Hospital LLC 10.00 0.00 10.00 9.88 3 UAE Exchange Centre LLC 223.45 175.00 398.45 361.41 4 Delta for Heavy Equipment 1.00 4.60 5.60 0.99 5 BRS Ventures & Holdings Ltd. 125.54 0.00 125.54 129.53 6 NMC Healthcare LLC (*) 74.41 0.00 74.41 74.41 7 B.R.Shetty 38.16 0.00 38.16 38.17 Total (AED Mn) 609.98 199.6 807.58 757.137 Total (Rs. Crs) (IAED=INR 20.50) 1250.46 409.18 1655.54 1552.13 (*) in Oman Territory M/s. NMC Healthcare LLC, Oman is having exposure of AED Mn 74.412. Dr. B.R.Shetty is the founder promoter of NMC Group and our Bank has taken sizeable exposure in NMC Group, looking to the brand value of Dr. B.R.Shetty. Crs) (IAED=INR 20.50) 1250.46 409.18 1655.54 1552.13 (*) in Oman Territory M/s. NMC Healthcare LLC, Oman is having exposure of AED Mn 74.412. Dr. B.R.Shetty is the founder promoter of NMC Group and our Bank has taken sizeable exposure in NMC Group, looking to the brand value of Dr. B.R.Shetty. As per terms of sanction, it was undertaken by the company that without bank's consent, company will not effect any change in its shareholding. However, without taking consent of the Bank, Dr. Shetty withdrew himself from the board of the Holding Company as well as diluted his stake holding, in an attempt to absolve himself from the liabilities of the Company. Mr. Shetty had also executed undertaking to create mortgage over his personal immovable properties to secure the loan exposure with Bank, but alter he refused to cooperate. Mr. Shetty had also submitted board resolution on 25.05.2020 to execute guarantees and securities by Neopharma Tennessee LLC and Neopharma INC; however on the very next day he informed that Neopharma Inc will not be able to give guarantee for the credit facilities provided to Neopharma LLC. The above actions of Mr. Shetty shows that his intention is to jeopardise bank's interests. The banking regulator of UAE, Central Bank of UAE has issued instructions to all banks in UAE to freeze the personal accounts of Mr. Shetty and other individuals. Further the Central Bank of UAE has also frozen the operations in advance account of M/s. UAE Exchange Centre LLC Mr. Shetty has already fled from UAE and is reportedly staying in India. He is not cooperating with the Bank to clear the dues of the Bank and to perfect/create security in favour of the Bank. Mr. Shetty for his business interest frequently travels abroad. As Mr. Shetty has business interests in other countries also, it is apprehended that if he is allowed to travel out of India, he may not return bank to India, which will jeopardize banks' interest. Hence looking to the substantial loan dues of Bank and the possibility of Mr. B.R.Shetty leaving India, opening of LOC against, Mr. Bavaguthu Raghuram Shetty S/o Late Shambhu Shetty, is recommended which will also strengthen Bank's efforts for recovery of dues." 28. By not intimating the petitioner about issuance of LOC would not infringe upon any of the rights of petitioner guaranteed under the Constitution of India. B.R.Shetty leaving India, opening of LOC against, Mr. Bavaguthu Raghuram Shetty S/o Late Shambhu Shetty, is recommended which will also strengthen Bank's efforts for recovery of dues." 28. By not intimating the petitioner about issuance of LOC would not infringe upon any of the rights of petitioner guaranteed under the Constitution of India. The OM dated 27.10.2010 (Annexure-AA) would clearly indicate that LOC can be issued subject to the guidelines prescribed therein. OMs dated 27.10.2010 has been revised/amended from time to time by issuance of OMs dated 05.12.2017, 19.07.2018 and 19.09.2018 by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. The amended OMs are dated 04.10.2018, 12.10.2018 and 22.11.2018 (Annexures-R1 to R3), which discloses the respondent Nos.3 and 4 are entitled to issue LOC against a person, in the facts and circumstances of the case that may be obtained. The extant OM dated 12.10.2018 (Annexure-R2) would clearly indicate that Chairman/Managing Director/Chief Executive of all public sector Banks are empowered to request Bureau of Immigration (first respondent) to issue LOCs vide Clause- 8B and 8J. Same has been referred to by the learned Single Judge under the order under challenge and as such we refrain from extracting the same. It would suffice to state that the said amended OM provides for: (i) The Managing Director of the public sector bank being empowered to make a request for opening an LOC; (ii) Such LOC can be issued by respondent Nos.1 and 2 by preventing or declining the departure of a person from India, if such departure is detrimental 'to the economic interest of India' and 'that such departure ought not to be permitted in the larger public interest at any given point of time'. 29. Thus, respondent No.3 and 4 being empowered to issue the LOCs by virtue of OM dated 22.11.2018 and "larger public interest", which also governs the "economic interests of India" same have been issued, which cannot be the subject matter of judicial scrutiny inasmuch as, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by respondent Nos.3 and 4 based on objective assessment, being inconsonance with the extant OMs. The Courts not having technical competence, cannot sit in the arm chair of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 to evaluate or ascertain whether such finding could have been arrived at. The Courts not having technical competence, cannot sit in the arm chair of the respondent Nos.3 and 4 to evaluate or ascertain whether such finding could have been arrived at. Even otherwise, the reasons which have been assigned to by the respondents in their statement of objections, defending the issuance of LOCs against the petitioner, cannot be said as either irrational or no person of ordinary prudence would have arrived at a conclusion for issuance of LOCs against the petitioner. We say so, for the reason that, petitioner had met the officials of the third respondent on 18.03.2020 in a meeting convened for the purposes of ascertaining as to how petitioner would be able to discharge his debts, Minutes of the meeting was drawn vide Annexure-R14 and it is duly signed by the petitioner and the officials of the third respondent-Bank, whereunder petitioner has agreed to secure the exposure of the bank by providing an all out comfort by providing additional security/collateral to the bank. It was also agreed by the petitioner that; (i) Various properties in Assam Tea Company, Mangaluru, Udupi, Bengaluru, etc. were proposed to be given as security; (ii) he would give all the property documents to enable the bank to pay a charge on the properties; 30. However, this solemn undertaking given to the bank has been flouted by the petitioner with impunity. In fact, it is contended in this intra-court appeal that said minutes was drawn under duress. Said submission deserves to be considered for the purposes of outright rejection for reasons more than one. Firstly, petitioner did not raise his little finger immediately after the drawing up of the said minutes. Secondly, till date he has not intimated or informed the third respondent-Bank about the said minutes having come into existence under duress. Thus, plea now sought to be put forward is a clear after thought and to stave-off the liability resting on petitioners shoulders. 31. In fact, petitioner and his wife have thereafter executed a letter of undertaking with Negative Lein Clause and Creation of Mortgage dated 21.04.2020 (Annexure-R15) whereunder both have agreed to do or perform the acts as morefully indicated in the said letter of undertaking. 31. In fact, petitioner and his wife have thereafter executed a letter of undertaking with Negative Lein Clause and Creation of Mortgage dated 21.04.2020 (Annexure-R15) whereunder both have agreed to do or perform the acts as morefully indicated in the said letter of undertaking. In this background, the third respondent had called upon the petitioner to comply with the personal guarantees and discharging his obligation as agreed to under the Negative Lein Letter by issuance of a legal notice dated 03.05.2020, which came to be evasively replied by petitioner on 06.05.2020 (Annexure-R17), in which there is not even a whisper of petitioner having not affixed his signature to the minutes of the meeting held on 18.03.2020 or letter of undertaking with Negative Lein Clause and Creation of Mortgage dated 21.04.2020 having been executed or they having coming into existence under duress. This would only indicate that petitioner is avoiding and evading performance of his obligations. 32. Sri.Mukul Rohatgi, has contended fair hearing would mean and include reasonable opportunity being extended before order being passed and post decisional hearing has been frowned upon by the Apex Court and in support of his submission he has relied upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of reported in the case of SIEMENS LTD. vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA reported in (2006) 12 SCC 33 and in the case of K.I.SHEPHARD AND OTHERS vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS reported (1987) 4 SCC 431 . He would contend that respondent Nos3 and 4 have already decided that petitioner is a defaulter and petitioner should not be allowed to leave the Country and heavy reliance has been placed on the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta rendered in WP No.105/2020 in the matter of MRITYUNJAY SINGH v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. The said judgment would not come to the rescue of the petitioner herein inasmuch as in the facts obtained in the said case it was noticed that petitioner therein was a sailor, being the Captain of Merchant Navy, had to necessarily travel on high seas for the major part of the year. The said judgment would not come to the rescue of the petitioner herein inasmuch as in the facts obtained in the said case it was noticed that petitioner therein was a sailor, being the Captain of Merchant Navy, had to necessarily travel on high seas for the major part of the year. In the facts obtained in the said case the Hon'ble learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court had noticed that the petitioner against whom LOC came to be issued was on the ground that he was a Director of the company and said company had defaulted in repayment of term loan availed from the State Bank of India. It was also noticed by the learned Single Judge that petitioner therein had resigned from the Directorship of the company long back and even before the discovery of alleged fraud in 2014 by the Bank. The learned Single Judge had further noticed that Union Bank of India had failed to demonstrate that petitioner therein was a guarantor of the loan borrowed by the company at the relevant point of time, so as to hold his liability being coextensive with the borrower company. In fact, very Bench that adjudicated MRITYUNJAY SINGH's case has distinguished it in a subsequent case in W.P.No.53/2021 in the matter of HEMANTH KUMAR BANK v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. vide 2021 SCC ONLINE CAL 440 wherein it came to be held that petitioner therein i.e., Mrityunjay Singh had been discharged in the criminal prosecution launched by CBI and petitioners contract of employment itself stipulated the outer limit within which the petitioner had to return to India namely, five (5) months. Hence, said judgment would not come to the rescue of the petitioner. 33. It would be apt and appropriate to note that Courts exercising extraordinary jurisdiction, while examining the claim of a person who is alleged to have committed an economic offence, would not treat him with kid gloves. Non pendency of any criminal case, by itself would not be a ground on which the Look Out Notice/Circular not being issued. 33. It would be apt and appropriate to note that Courts exercising extraordinary jurisdiction, while examining the claim of a person who is alleged to have committed an economic offence, would not treat him with kid gloves. Non pendency of any criminal case, by itself would not be a ground on which the Look Out Notice/Circular not being issued. The extant circular in the instant case would clearly indicate that if it appears to the authorities based on inputs received that departure of a person is detrimental to the bilateral relations with any country or to the strategic and/or economic interests of India or if such person if allowed to leave the country, he may potentially indulge in an act of terrorism or offences against the State and/or that such departure ought not be permitted in the larger public interest at any given point of time, then in such circumstances his right to go abroad can be curtailed or restricted. Thus, emphasis is on the expression "economic interests of India" or "larger public interest". The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of NIMMAGADDA PRASAD v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION reported in (2013) 7 SCC 466 after referring to STATE OF GUJARAT v. MOHANLAL JITAMALJI PORWAL reported in (1987) 2 SCC 364 has observed: "26) Unfortunately, in the last few years, the country has been seeing an alarming rise in white-collar crimes, which has affected the fiber of the country’s economic structure. Incontrovertibly, economic offences have serious repercussions on the development of the country as a whole. In State of Gujarat vs. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and Anr. (1987) 2 SCC 364 this Court, while considering a request of the prosecution for adducing additional evidence, inter alia, observed as under:- “5.....The entire Community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the State are not brought to book. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the Community. A murder may be committed in the heat of moment upon passions being aroused. An economic offence is committed with cool calculation and deliberate design with an eye on personal profit regardless of the consequence to the Community. A disregard for the interest of the Community can be manifested only at the cost of forfeiting the trust and faith of the Community in the system to administer justice in an even handed manner without fear of criticism from the quarters which view white collar crimes with a permissive eye unmindful of the damage done to the national economy and national interest….” 34. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of MARDIA CHEMICALS LTD. V. UNION OF INDIA reported in (2004) 4 SCC 311 while examining the validity of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), has observed that liquidity of finances and flow of money is essential for any healthy and growth oriented economy. It has been further held: "34. Some facts which need be taken note of are that the banks and the financial institutions have heavily financed the petitioners and other industries. It is also a fact that a large sum of amount remains unrecovered. Normal process of recovery of debts through courts is lengthy and time taken is not suited for recovery of such dues. For financial assistance rendered to the industries by the financial institutions, financial liquidity is essential failing which there is a blockade of large sums of amounts creating circumstances which retard the economic progress followed by a large number of other consequential ill effects. Considering all these circumstances, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act was enacted in 1993 but as the figures show it also did not bring the desired results. Though it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners that it so happened due to inaction on the part of the governments in creating Debt Recovery Tribunals and appointing Presiding Officers, for a long time. Even after leaving that margin, it is to be noted that things in the concerned spheres are desired to move faster. In the present day global economy it may be difficult to stick to old and conventional methods of financing and recovery of dues. Even after leaving that margin, it is to be noted that things in the concerned spheres are desired to move faster. In the present day global economy it may be difficult to stick to old and conventional methods of financing and recovery of dues. Hence, in our view, it cannot be said that a step taken towards securitisation of the debts and to evolve means for faster recovery of the NPAs was not called for or that it was superimposition of undesired law since one legislation was already operating in the field namely the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act. It is also to be noted that the idea has not erupted abruptly to resort to such a legislation. It appears that a thought was given to the problems and Narasimham Committee was constituted which recommended for such a legislation keeping in view the changing times and economic situation whereafter yet another expert committee was constituted then alone the impugned law was enacted. Liquidity of finances and flow of money is essential for any healthy and growth oriented economy. But certainly, what must be kept in mind is that the law should not be in derogation of the rights which are guaranteed to the people under the Constitution. The procedure should also be fair, reasonable and valid, though it may vary looking to the different situations needed to be tackled and object sought to be achieved." 35. In the matter of INDIAN BANK vs. BLUE JAGGERS ESTATES LTD. AND ORS. reported in (2010) 8 SCC 129 has held that public sector banks are trustees of public funds and it cannot compromise public interest for benefiting private individuals. It has been also held: "25. The Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the bank is a trustee of public funds. It cannot compromise the public interest for benefitting private individuals. Those who take loan and avail financial facilities from the bank are duty bound to repay the amount strictly in accordance with the terms of the contract. Any lapse in such matters has to be viewed seriously and the bank is not only entitled but duty bound to recover the amount by adopting all legally permissible methods. The Parliament enacted the Act because it was found that legal mechanism available till then was wholly insufficient for recovery of the outstanding dues of banks and financial institutions. Any lapse in such matters has to be viewed seriously and the bank is not only entitled but duty bound to recover the amount by adopting all legally permissible methods. The Parliament enacted the Act because it was found that legal mechanism available till then was wholly insufficient for recovery of the outstanding dues of banks and financial institutions. Reference in this connection deserves to be made to the judgments of this Court in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others (supra), Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala and others (2009) 4 SCC 94 and United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others." Thus, while considering the prayer for the Look Out Circular being quashed, which prohibits a person like the petitioner from going abroad or in other words, leaving the territory of India, the Courts will have to weigh the individual right vis-a-vis the interest of the Country. We are reminded of the celebrated quote of Vidhuraneethi- Chapter 5, Shloka No.17: xxxxxx "tyajedekam kulasyarthe gramasyarthe kulam tyajet-gramam janapdasyarthe hyatmarthe prthivim tyajet " "Renounce one person for the sake of family, a family for the sake of village; Village for the sake of country and even the (Kingdom of) earth for one's own sake." In other words, "renounce smaller selfish interest for the sake of bigger good". 36. Thus, the national interest is paramount and all other interests including the individual interest will have to yield or kneel before the national interest. In fact, the economic offences constitute a class by itself and the approach to said issue has to be from a wider angle, as economic offence if it goes unchecked, it would lead to serious consequences affecting the economy of the country as whole and it would pose a serious threat to the financial stability of the country. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that cause of the community deserves equal treatment at the hands of the Courts. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MOHANLAL JITMALJI's case referred to supra has observed: "the community or the state is not a personnon grata whose cause may be treated with disdain. The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the state are not brought to books." 37. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of MOHANLAL JITMALJI's case referred to supra has observed: "the community or the state is not a personnon grata whose cause may be treated with disdain. The entire community is aggrieved if the economic offenders who ruin the economy of the state are not brought to books." 37. Thus, when the claim of petitioner in the aforesaid background is examined, it would clearly indicate that petitioner is a borrower and a personal guarantor to various loans borrowed from respondent Nos.3 and 4. The total indebtedness of the petitioner to respondent Nos.3 and 4 is approximately to the tune of Rs.2800 Crores. In fact, petitioner has also executed personal guarantees for various loan accounts obtained from respondent Nos.3 and 4. In the month of December 2019 Muddy Waters Research LLC, an investment research firm has published a report making stark allegations of related party transactions, manipulation of balance sheet, implanted asset purchases, etc. in NMC Healthcare LLC, Oman of which company, petitioner is the promoter and it is this report which opened the financial irregularity of the companies owned and controlled by the petitioner and this resulted in sale of shares of companies promoted by the petitioner in discount and it also resulted in a in-house investigation by NMC Healthcare LLC disclosing the debt at USD 2.7 billion said to have been kept and hidden and not disclosed in the balance sheet. In fact, this has resulted in several criminal cases being filed against the group companies of the petitioner and various reports indicate that the indebtedness of the group of companies of the petitioner may be more than Rs.50000 Crores. There are several cases initiated against petitioner and the companies at UAE and India and as such the apprehension expressed by the respondent-Banks of petitioner fleeing away from the clutches of law, cannot be held as only an apprehension or said apprehension or said claim being without any foundation, it would be necessary to extract the report of third respondent "fraud monitoring returns" whereunder it has been noticed under the heading "the modus operandi" to the following effect: "major observations of the forensic audit report are as xxxx diversion accounts by the company. Thus, the borrower company was indulged in diversion of funds and misrepresented the facts and figures and defrauded the bank to the tune of Rs.751.38 Cr. Thus, the borrower company was indulged in diversion of funds and misrepresented the facts and figures and defrauded the bank to the tune of Rs.751.38 Cr. Findings of the forensic audit discussed in 5 GMs committee meeting held on 18.12.2020 and it was decided to declare the account as fraud. Date of occurrence is taken as 31.12.2017 as the financial statement of the company for the years 31.12.2017 and 31.12.2018 are not depicting the true and fair on the affairs of the company." Hence, we are of the considered view that the LOCs issued against the petitioner by respondent Nos.3 and 4 and the consequential endorsement dated 08.12.2020 issued by respondent No.1, as affirmed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any infirmities either in law or on facts calling for our interference. We are also of the considered view that finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is based on sound appreciation of facts and law. Hence, we answer the point formulated hereinabove against the writ petitioner-appellant and in favour of the respondents. For the reasons aforestated, we proceed to pass the following: JUDGMENT (i) Writ appeal is dismissed. (ii) The order dated 12.02.2021 passed in W.P.No.15032/2020 is affirmed. (iii) No order as to costs.