JUDGMENT: This second appeal is presented against the decree and judgment in A.S.No.89 of 2010 dated 07.11.2015 on the file of the Court of learned I Additional District Judge, Guntur, by the defendant in O.S.No.1365 of 2007 on the file of the Court of learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Guntur. 2. The sole defendant died during pendency of this second appeal. His legal representatives being the appellants 2 to 7 have been brought on record. 3. The respondents are the plaintiffs in the suit. The suit was decreed in their favour by the judgment dated 29.10.2009 directing ejectment of the deceased - first appellant from the plaint schedule property. 4. The property in dispute described in the plaint schedule is a tin roof shed of two rooms with vacant site bearing Assessment Number 2754, in an extent of 50 Square Yards on Main Road, Near Bus Stand at Chebrolu, Guntur District. It shall be called hereinafter as 'the suit property' for convenience. 5. The first respondent is claimed to be a private temple (Mandir) belonging to a particular community at Chebrolu. The respondents 2 and 3 claimed being its trustees. 6. Their case in the plaint was that this Mandir was constructed about a century ago by the ancestors of the respondents 2 and 3 and is being maintained by their private family trust with their own funds. The suit property is stated to be a part and parcel of this Mandir. It was further averred in the plaint that on account of increase of worshippers, it was felt by them to renovate and add new constructions to suit their convenience, where the idles of Sri Vinayaka and Sri Rama are consecrated. 7. It was further averred in the plaint that at the request of the deceased – first appellant, the respondents agreed to lease out the suit property initially for a period of two years from 16.06.1999 to 15.06.2001 subject to the condition that he should vacate the premises irrespective of period of lease, on their demand. It was further extended for two more years from 16.06.2001 to 15.06.2003 subject to payment of rent at Rs.7,000/- per annum and later-on extended from 16.06.2003 to 15.06.2005 on agreed rent at Rs.9,000/- per annum. 8. It was further extended for two more years from 16.06.2001 to 15.06.2003 subject to payment of rent at Rs.7,000/- per annum and later-on extended from 16.06.2003 to 15.06.2005 on agreed rent at Rs.9,000/- per annum. 8. It was also averred in the plaint that the deceased – first appellant undertook to sell only pooja material besides coconuts from this property offering to vacate when ever demanded as per the requirements of the respondents, upon 15 days advance notice. It was also averred that this lease was oral. It was further averred in the plaint that the deceased – first appellant without keeping up his promise did not vacate or surrender the premises upon expiry of lease period and illegally continued his occupation. 9. It was also averred that he defaulted in paying rents to the respondents leading to an altercation in between them, who also failed to pay the electricity charges. Thus, he failed to pay the rents from 16.06.2005 onwards and it was further averred that in those circumstances, the respondents got issued a legal notice on 04.12.2006 to the deceased - first appellant terminating his tenancy calling upon him to vacate and surrender the premises on or before 15.01.2007 while further claiming damages @ Rs.18,000/- per annum for unauthorised occupation of the premises besides arrears of electricity consumption charges. It was further averred that the deceased appellant got issued a reply dated 18.12.2006 to it with false and untenable allegations that made the respondents to issue a rejoinder on 04.01.2007 without there being any further response. It was further averred that since the deceased - first appellant was making attempts to sublease this premises and in view of his illegal acts and highhanded nature, they were constrained to institute the suit. 10. Thus stating in the plaint, the respondents sought ejectment of the deceased - first appellant from the suit property, damages @ 18,000/- per annum from June 2005 till the deceased - first appellant vacated the premises and handed over possession to them. 11. Resisting this claim, the deceased - first appellant in his written statement and additional written statement questioned the locus standi of the respondents to institute the suit contending that this Mandir is a public temple and therefore, it is only Endowments Department that could appoint a trustee for its management. 12. 11. Resisting this claim, the deceased - first appellant in his written statement and additional written statement questioned the locus standi of the respondents to institute the suit contending that this Mandir is a public temple and therefore, it is only Endowments Department that could appoint a trustee for its management. 12. Denying the allegations that the suit property belonged to the first respondent Mandir, the deceased - first appellant further contended that he constructed the tin roof shed in a part of road poramboke vested in the Gram Panchayat and obtained electricity connection. He further contended that Gram Panchayat also issued a licence to him for running business from this premises and since he was benefited on account of this Mandir, since the devotees were purchasing coconuts etc. from him, he was contributing Rs.7,000/- towards maintenance of the temple. 13. Thus, he contended that the respondents did not have any right to claim ownership to the suit property and even otherwise, if such lease is considered, since this site belonged to the Gram Panchayat, action can be taken only by the Gram Panchayat against him. The deceased - first appellant also claimed that he made a donation of Rs.50,000/- for construction of this temple, since he stood benefited on account of the business carried on in front of this temple. He further contended that the funds of this temple are being misused by the respondent s without subjecting the same to audit. 14. On the pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff has any locus standi to file this suit? 2. Whether the suit schedule property is vested to panchayat? 3. Whether the suit schedule property belongs to the temple? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of ejectment as prayed for? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for any damages as prayed for? 6. To what relief, if any? 15. At the trial, the third respondent examined himself as P.W.1 and four other witnesses to support the contention of the respondents, while relying on Ex.A1 to Ex.A19. The deceased first appellant examined himself as D.W.1 apart from two other witnesses to support his claim, while relying on Ex.B1. Through P.W.4, Ex.X1 to Ex.X4 were marked in support of the contention of the respondents. 16. The deceased first appellant examined himself as D.W.1 apart from two other witnesses to support his claim, while relying on Ex.B1. Through P.W.4, Ex.X1 to Ex.X4 were marked in support of the contention of the respondents. 16. On the material and evidence, learned trial Judge rejected the defence of the deceased - first appellant holding that this suit property belonged to the first respondent Mandir and since there is proof of landlord and tenant relationship in between them, accepting termination of his tenancy, as well as damages claimed by the respondents against him from 16-06-2005 till he vacated the premises, the relief was granted. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. 17. In the appeal, learned appellate Judge agreed with the findings of the learned trial Judge and dismissed the appeal. 18. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel for Sri Vijay Kiran, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri G.Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for Sri G.Peddababu, learned counsel for the respondents addressed arguments. 19. This second appeal was admitted on 23.12.2016 on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the subject temple is within the meaning of public temple and if so attract the provisions of the Act 30 of 1987 amended from time to time? 2. If so, whether eviction of the tenant/appellant is only by recourse to Section 83 of the Act? 3. Even otherwise whether the findings of the Courts below in ordering eviction from the so called admission of the defendant's son as D.W.2 in the evidence of paying the rents to the plaintiff operates as waiver of the contest of the temple in question as public temple right from the written statement of the defendant and in view of the same the concurrent findings of the Courts below are ill-appreciation of the facts and law and perverse and unsustainable? 4. To what result? 20. However, Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellants mainly argued in relation to jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit of this nature at the instance of the respondents against the appellants for ejectment. This contention on behalf of the appellants included application of provisions of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987 (Act 30 of 1987) claiming that the first plaintiff Mandir is a public temple. 21. The identity of the suit property is not broadly in dispute. This contention on behalf of the appellants included application of provisions of A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987 (Act 30 of 1987) claiming that the first plaintiff Mandir is a public temple. 21. The identity of the suit property is not broadly in dispute. Its location as is deposed by the deceased - first appellant as D.W.1 and his son 5th appellant as D.W.2 is clear. It is to the north of this Mandir adjoining the highway at Chebrolu village. This highway is to the west of this Mandir as well as the suit property. There is also a bus stop adjoining the suit property towards north. 22. The deceased - first appellant as D.W.1 admitted the location of this suit property - the first respondent Mandir and the bus stop when he was confronted a bunch of photographs in Ex.A19, on behalf of the respondents. They depict that this Mandir, the suit property and the bus stop are located contiguously. 23. The substantial contention of the appellants at the trial was that the suit property is located in the road margin vested in Gram Panchayat, Chebrolu and hence the respondents did not have any right to this property nor seek their ejectment there from. 24. While there is evidence of P.W.1, viz. the third respondent, that of P.W.2 and P.W.3, who were the earlier tenants of this property and prior to the deceased - first appellant, the testimony of P.W.4, who was then Panchayat Secretary of Chebrolu Gram Panchayat drives the last nail into such contention. 25. P.W.4 deposed with reference to Ex.X1 to Ex.X4. 26. Ex.X1 and Ex.X2 are the extracts of the minutes book of the year 1956-57. These extracts are to the effect that a site was sought for location of the bus stop from Sri Vinayaka temple and also for construction of public toilets therein for convenience of the commuters. These two entries in the minutes book were appreciated by both the Courts below in right perspective holding that the contention of the deceased - first appellant that the suit property is located in road margin belonging to the Gram Panchayat, is not correct. 27. When Gram Panchayat itself sought this site from Sri Vinayaka temple, for the purposes stated in Ex.X1 and Ex.X2, it puts an end to the contention of the appellants. 27. When Gram Panchayat itself sought this site from Sri Vinayaka temple, for the purposes stated in Ex.X1 and Ex.X2, it puts an end to the contention of the appellants. In the first respondent Mandir admittedly there is an idle of Sri Vinayaka (Sri Vigneswara) and it appears that it was consecrated long ago. Ex.X1 and Ex.X2 confirmed this fact that this Mandir was in existence well prior to the year 1956. 28. The testimony of P.W.4 in this respect with-stood the test of cross-examination on behalf of the deceased - first appellant at the trial. Added to it, Ex.X3 an extract of street plan covering street No.96 refers to location of Sri Rama Mandir. Location of idle of Sri Rama in the first respondent Mandir is thus confirmed, by the date when this plan was prepared. It was not stated that the site in this plan, where this Sri Rama Mandir is located was a part of road margin belonged to the Gram Panchayat. 29. There was a suit for permanent injunction filed against the third respondent herein and Sri Devabhaktuni Mrutyunjayudu as well as A.P.S.R.T.C., Vijayawada by one Sri Suryadevara Raghupathi Rao and Vasa Sambaiah in O.S.No.532 of 1978 on the file of the Court of learned I Additional Munsif Magistrate, Tenali. Initially, it was decreed by the judgment dated 15.03.1982 granting permanent injunction restraining Sri Devabhaktuni Mrutyunjayudu and the third respondent herein in giving away the site of the first respondent Mandir to A.P.S.R.T.C. 30. However, it was reversed in A.S.No.36 of 1982 by the decree and judgment of the Court of learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Tenali, dated 21.04.1986. Certified copy of the judgment in A.S.No.36 of 1982 is Ex.A1. Its contents indicate that the first respondent Mandir was enjoying the properties claimed therein including a site and it was being used for worship by a particular community in the village, who contributed for its construction. 31. Location of the idles of Sri Vigneswara and Sri Rama in this Mandir is also referred to in this judgment. Reference is also made to the resolutions of the Gram Panchayat referred to above in this judgment, observing that the Gram Panchayat took the site on lease, where a bus shelter was constructed, being used by public in general. It appears that a gazette notification was issued in this regard, which was considered in this judgment. Reference is also made to the resolutions of the Gram Panchayat referred to above in this judgment, observing that the Gram Panchayat took the site on lease, where a bus shelter was constructed, being used by public in general. It appears that a gazette notification was issued in this regard, which was considered in this judgment. It was also observed that the defendants therein permitted A.P.S.R.T.C. to construct bus shelter and thus questioned the nature of suit brought out by the plaintiffs therein for perpetual injunction. 32. This judgment in Ex.A11 is relevant in terms of Section 13 of Indian Evidence Act. Though the deceased appellant or other appellants are not parties to this litigation, this judgment is establishing the right asserted by the defendants 1 and 2 therein, in respect of the first respondent Mandir and the property in dispute not only concerned to the above litigation but also this matter vide (TIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS v. K.M.KRISHNAIAH, (1998) 3 SCC 331 ) 33. The evidence of the deceased - first appellant as D.W.1 and his son D.W.2 is also proving that the affairs of the first respondent Mandir are being managed by the respondents 2 and 3 and that the third respondent has been taking utmost interest in this respect. 34. The contention of the respondents that this Mandir is being managed as a private trust is established by Ex.A10 - the copy of Trust Deed, dated 29.10.1999. Properties are also conferred upon the first respondent Mandir by the family members of the respondents 2 and 3 as is established from Ex.A18 - a Gift Deed, dated 27.10.1994. 35. However, contentions are advanced by Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the first respondent Mandir has all the characteristics of a public temple, which is clear from the averments in the plaint and also the contents of Ex.A11 judgment. The manner in which public at large including the villagers of Chebrolu have access to this Mandir is a definite indication of nature of this temple as a public entity and thus a temple defined in Section 2(27) of Act 30 of 1987. It is also a religious institution in terms of Section 2(23) of this Act. The manner in which public at large including the villagers of Chebrolu have access to this Mandir is a definite indication of nature of this temple as a public entity and thus a temple defined in Section 2(27) of Act 30 of 1987. It is also a religious institution in terms of Section 2(23) of this Act. It is further contended by learned Senior Counsel that in view of Section 1(3)(b) of A.P. Act 30 of 1987, this Act applies to all Hindu public religious institutions and endowments, whether registered or not in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. 36. Thus, it is contended that despite the fact that there is no registration of the first respondent Mandir and its reference in the list of charitable and religious institutions and endowments in terms of Section 6 of Act 30 of 1987, when the first respondent Mandir is a public temple, the respondents 2 and 3 cannot claim themselves being the trustees of the first respondent Mandir, since they are not recognized nor appointed in terms of Section 17 of this Act. Thus, the competence of the respondents 2 and 3 to file the suit on behalf of the first respondent is questioned on behalf of the appellants. 37. On the same basis further contention advanced is that in this backdrop, in view of Section 151 of Act 30 of 1987, Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the appellants since it is barred and that, it is only the Endowments Tribunal constituted in terms of Section 162 of this Act, which is specifically empowered to decide the affairs as well as the management of all the institutions covered by this Act is competent to decide the dispute in this case in terms of Section 87 of Act 30 of 1987. Thus, the question of jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain this dispute is specifically raised, in this second appeal. 38. In this context, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants specifically brought to the notice of this Court the nature of defence set up in the written statement and at the trial, by the deceased first appellant questioning the capacity as well as competence of the respondents 2 and 3 to lay the suit against the deceased – first appellant, their locus standi and contending that the first respondent is a public temple. 39. 39. Sri G.Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel for the respondents contended that these questions now raised are totally irrelevant having regard to the nature of dispute as to tenancy of the deceased – first appellant in relation to the suit property and the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended the jurisdictional issue is raised for the first time in this second appeal, where the confines are controlled by Section 100 CPC and in as much as the question of jurisdiction is based on fact and law, it cannot be permitted for the first time to be raised in this second appeal. 40. Learned counsel for the respondents further contended that in view of the proof on record that the deceased – first appellant was the tenant of the first respondent Mandir, in terms of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act the appellants are estopped from questioning title and interest of the first respondent Mandir in respect of the suit property and therefore, the contentions so advanced on behalf of the appellants now cannot stand. 41. The defence of the deceased – first appellant at the trial, now pursued in this second appeal that the suit property is a part of Gram Panchayat and road margin for the reasons stated above, stood rejected. It is established as a fact from the material on record that the suit property is a part and parcel of the property belonged to the first respondent. 42. There is evidence from P.W.1 to P.W.3 as well as P.W.5 on record that the deceased – first appellant became the lessee or tenant of the suit property after P.W.2 and P.W.3 vacated. There is specific admission from the deceased appellant as P.W.1 that he started his business in the suit property on 16.06.1999. It is in consonance with the stand of the respondents that he obtained the suit property on lease from them with effect from 16.06.1999, during the first period of lease. The evidence from D.W.1 and D.W.2 is also indicating that periodical payments were being made to the first respondent Mandir. Initially it was Rs.5,000/- per annum. The testimony of D.W.1 and D.W.2 established that Rs.6,000/- was being paid to the first respondent Mandir later. 43. There is no dispute that there was exchange of notices in between these parties as seen from Ex.A1, Ex.A5 and Ex.A6. 44. Initially it was Rs.5,000/- per annum. The testimony of D.W.1 and D.W.2 established that Rs.6,000/- was being paid to the first respondent Mandir later. 43. There is no dispute that there was exchange of notices in between these parties as seen from Ex.A1, Ex.A5 and Ex.A6. 44. Learned trial Judge considered the contents of Ex.A5 reply in para 10 of his judgment, where it is stated that the amount was being paid by the deceased – first appellant regularly to the respondents and that on account of confidence and relationship, he did not obtain any receipts. This version in Ex.A5 was also admitted at trial by D.W.1 that the amount due till November 2006 was already paid and nothing was due to the first respondent temple. 45. The statement of D.W.2 elicited in cross-examination is clear that he has been paying Rs.7,000/- to the first respondent temple per year. This statement elicited in later part of cross-examination from D.W.2 if considered along with his earlier statements in cross-examination of payment of Rs.5,000/-, by his father and later Rs.6,000/- to the first respondent Mandir they are clear indications that these periodical payments were only towards the rent or lease amount since they have been in occupation of the suit property. No other inference can be drawn in this context. The findings recorded by both the Courts below in this context are just and appropriate. They are based on the material on record. 46. Thus, the finding of the Courts below that there existed the jural relationship between the first respondent temple and the deceased – first appellant as landlord and tenant, shall be the fulcrum for the consideration now, of various contentions raised on behalf of the appellants as well as the respondents. 47. When once such relationship is established, in terms of Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act, the deceased – first appellant as the tenant is estopped to deny the title of the landlords to the suit property either at the beginning of the tenancy or lease or later. It in-turn inhibits to question the status of this Mandir and that of the respondents 2 and 3 to represent this Mandir in the suit. 48. This tenancy stood terminated validly by issuance of Ex.A1 quit notice and no impropriety is pointed out therein, which is legally tenable. 49. It in-turn inhibits to question the status of this Mandir and that of the respondents 2 and 3 to represent this Mandir in the suit. 48. This tenancy stood terminated validly by issuance of Ex.A1 quit notice and no impropriety is pointed out therein, which is legally tenable. 49. As rightly contended for the respondents no specific defence was raised in the written statement contending that the civil Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit nor it was pursued during the trial. Raising such question for the first time in this second appeal particularly when it is based on the fact situation, as such, cannot be permitted. 50. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in support of the contentions relating to jurisdiction of the Civil Court relied on SRISAILA KSHETRA ALL INDIA ARYA VYSYA ANNA SATRA SANGAM AND OTHERS v. P.SATYANARAYANA AND OTHERS, 2006(5) ALD 89 . In this ruling with reference to adjudication of disputes in terms of Section 87 of Act 30 of 1987 prior to establishment of The Endowment Tribunal and when Deputy Commissioner of Endowments was the adjudicating authority, observations recorded in para – 7 are as under: “7. If there exists any dispute as to the character of such institutions, Section 87 provides for the adjudication of the disputes by the Deputy Commissioner of Endowments, having jurisdiction over the concerned area. Further, Section 151 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in relation to the disputes which can be determined under the act. In other words even where the religious institution or endowment is registered under Section 6 of the Act or not, and any dispute is raised touching upon the determination of the character of such institution, such dispute can be resolved only by instituting proceedings under Section 87 of the Act. However, the bar does not operate in relation to the other kinds of remedies in respect of the institutions which are not registered under Section 6 of the Act. If any person intends to bring any institution, which is not included in the list prepared under Section 6, within the purview of the Act, the only course is to institute proceedings under Section 87. If any person intends to bring any institution, which is not included in the list prepared under Section 6, within the purview of the Act, the only course is to institute proceedings under Section 87. Therefore, in the limited context of the bar of jurisdiction or operation of Section 156 of the Act, the predominant criterion would be whether the institution in question is the one registered under Section 6 of the Act or whether in any proceedings under Section 87 of the Act any declaration was made, bringing it within the fold of the Act.” 51. Sri V.S.R.Anjaneyulu, learned Senior Counsel contended that the effect of Section 13 of A.P.Act 30 of 1987 was not considered in this ruling and in view of Section 151 of this Act, any dispute in relation to any institution covered thereunder is not brought within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. 52. Further reliance is placed in the same context on judgments of learned single Judges of this Court in ESTATE SHRI LAXMANJI MAHARAJ TEMPLE v. A.NARSING RAO, 1989(1) APLJ (HC) 593 and TIRUMALA TIRUPATI DEVASTHANAMS v. A.M.ESWARA MUDALIAR, 2012(1) ALT 166 . 53. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants further contended that a jurisdictional issue since goes to the root of the matter has a pre-eminent status in deciding the lis. Reliance is placed in support of this contention in P.DASA MUNI REDDY v. P.APPA RAO, AIR 1974 SC 2089 . Basing on this ruling, it is contended that when the civil Court did not have jurisdiction to decide this issue, the whole proceeding becomes irregular. It was a ruling, where the dispute is with reference to the jurisdiction of a Rent Controller or the civil Court to decide the lis, where date of construction of the building held significance. In that context in para – 12 of this ruling, it is stated: “It is indisputable that the Rent Controller could have no jurisdiction in respect of the building in question because of the date of construction of the building. The decree in the suit before the Rent Controller cannot be pleaded as res judicata because the Rent Controller would have no jurisdiction to try and decide not only a particular matter in the suit but also the subsequent suit in which the issue is raised. See Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund (29 IA 196 = ILR 29 Calcutta 707(PC). The decree in the suit before the Rent Controller cannot be pleaded as res judicata because the Rent Controller would have no jurisdiction to try and decide not only a particular matter in the suit but also the subsequent suit in which the issue is raised. See Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund (29 IA 196 = ILR 29 Calcutta 707(PC). Section 44 of the Evidence Act also supports the appellant to show that the, judgment in the suit before the Rent Controller is delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it. Want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from irregular or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction. If there is want of jurisdiction the whole proceeding is coram non judice. The absence of a condition necessary to found the jurisdiction to make an order or give a decision deprives the order or decision of any conclusive effect. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Ed. Vol. 15 para 384). 54. Further contentions are advanced on behalf of the appellant that the present situation cannot be considered as a waiver of defence relating to jurisdictional issue nor it can be culled out from the material on record that there was complete abandonment of right. Doctrine of waiver and its application are also considered in the above ruling and in para – 13, observations recorded are thus: 13. Abandonment of right is much more than mere waiver, acquiescence or laches. The decision of the High Court in the present case is that the appellant has waived the right to evict the respondent. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, benefit, claim or privilege which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed. Waiver can also be a voluntary surrender of a right. The doctrine of waiver has been applied in cases where landlords claimed forfeiture of lease or tenancy because of breach of some condition in the contract of tenancy. The doctrine which the courts of law will recognise is a rule of judicial policy that a person will not be allowed to take inconsistent positions to gain advantage through the aid of courts. Waiver sometimes partakes of the nature of an election. Waiver is consensual in nature. It implies a meeting of the minds. It is a matter of mutual intention. The doctrine does not depend on misrepresentation. Waiver sometimes partakes of the nature of an election. Waiver is consensual in nature. It implies a meeting of the minds. It is a matter of mutual intention. The doctrine does not depend on misrepresentation. Waiver actually requires two parties, one party waiving and another receiving the benefit of waiver. There can be waiver so intended by one party and so understood by the other. The essential element of waiver is that there must be a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. The voluntary choice is the essence of waiver. There should exist an opportunity for choice between the relinquishment and an enforcement of the right in question. It cannot be held that there has been a waiver of valuable rights where the circumstances show that what was done was involuntary. There can be no waiver of a non-existent right. Similarly, one cannot waive that which is not one's as a right at the time of waiver. Some mistake or misapprehension as to some facts which constitute the underlying assumption without which parties would not have made the contract may be sufficient to justify the court in saying that there was no consent.” 55. A request is also made on behalf of the appellants to relegate the parties to approach the A.P. Endowment Tribunal for adjudication in terms of Section 87 of Act 30 of 1987. 56. The fact situation considered in all these rulings is not similar or nearer to the one being considered in the present case. Added to it, this objection sought to be raised is on behalf of the tenant in occupation of the property of the first respondent Mandir. It is specifically claimed by the respondents 2 and 3 that this Mandir is managed by a private trust for their denomination. Having regard to the scope of the dispute in this matter being between landlord and the tenant and being limited in scope as well as ambit, the larger question relating to entitlement of the respondents to sue the appellants, is not now open for consideration. 57. The nature of defence of a tenant in a matter of this nature is limited in scope. His status remained as of a tenant at sufferance. 57. The nature of defence of a tenant in a matter of this nature is limited in scope. His status remained as of a tenant at sufferance. In the light of the material pointing out the situation of the first respondent Mandir as an entity or denomination, affairs of which are managed and governed by the trust propounded by the respondents 2 and 3, at the instance of the deceased – first appellant and later the appellants, these questions relating to application of Act 30 of 1987 cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in this second appeal. 58. These are all predominantly questions of fact. Objection as to jurisdiction is a mixed question of fact and law. In the circumstances, it is not correct to say that civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this dispute. In a matter of this nature, objection under Section 151 of Act 30 of 1987 is not applicable. A suit for eviction of a tenant in such circumstances and on facts or for his ejectment is maintainable. 59. It is not a case where a declaration of the nature of first respondent Mandir is sought by an interested person in terms of Act 30 of 1987. 60. Undisputedly this Mandir is not brought within purview of Act 30 of 1987 as a religious institution. 61. For the same reasons, the question whether the first respondent Mandir is a public or private Mandir need not be considered. Effort of learned Senior Counsel to rely on SHRI RAM MANDIR, INDORE v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS, (2019) 18 SCC 94 , VIJENDRA KUMAR AND OTHERS v. COMMISSIONER, A.P.CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AND ENDOWMENT DEPARTMENT, HYDERABAD AND ANOTHER, 2007(5) ALD 683 (DB), CHINNAREDDIVI RAMACHANDRA REDDY AND OTHERS v. ARCHAKAM SREENIVASA BHATTAR, 2006(1)ALT 641 and GOSWAMI SHRI MAHALAXMI VAHUJI v. RANCHHODDAS KALIDAS AND OTHERS, 1969(2) SCC 853 cannot assist their contention. 62. Contentions are also advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that learned appellate Judge did not consider this jurisdictional issue in right perspective and the manner in which the points for determination raised in the appeal, did not meet the requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. 63. The requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC going by the contentions on behalf of the appellants, has an imperative effect. 63. The requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC going by the contentions on behalf of the appellants, has an imperative effect. Reliance is placed in this context in THAKUR SUKHPAL SINGH v. THAKUR KALYAN SINGH AND ANOTHER, AIR 1963 SC 146 . In this context, para 6 to 8 of this ruling are relevant, which are extracted hereunder: 6. The Privy Council observed in Mi. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus ( AIR 1921 PC 55 ) "In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show some reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances are considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has been discharged." With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is the duty of the appellant to show that the judgment under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown this that the appellate Court would call upon the respondent to reply to the contention. It is only then that the judgment of the appellate Court can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in Rule 31, Order XLI. 7. This Court observed in' Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya (1955) II SCR 1 at page 8: "Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such: It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: ... Too technical construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it." The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably construed and should held to require the various particulars to be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has actually raised certain points for determination by the appellate Court and not when no such points have been raised as had been the case in the present instance when the appellant did not address the Court at all. 8. The provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41 support our construction of Rule 31. 8. The provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41 support our construction of Rule 31. This Rule reads: "The Appellate Court, after hearing the parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be considered necessary, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders." It is to be noticed that this rule does not make it incumbent on the appellate Court to refer to any part of the proceedings in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. The appellate Court can refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of these proceedings to which reference be considered necessary. It is in the discretion of the appellate Court to refer to the proceedings. It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing what the parties or their pleaders submit to it for consideration. It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for its consideration, the appellate Court can decide the appeal without any reference to any proceedings of the Courts below and, in doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged anything which would tend to show that the judgment and decree under appeal were wrong.” 64. Basing on these observations, thus it is contended that the duty of the appellants is to show that the judgment under appeal is incorrect and erroneous pointing out the reasons and for such purposes, it is but necessary for the first appellate Court to frame appropriate points for determination in terms of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. 65. Pointing out the effect of failure to frame appropriate points for determination in the appeal in terms of Section 96 CPC, reliance is also placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in G.AMALORPAVAM AND OTHERS v. R.C.DIOCESE OF MADURAI AND OTHERS, (2006) 3 SCC 224 . 66. Further reliance is placed in this context in MALLURU MALLAPPA (D) THROUGH LRs. V. KURUVATHAPPA, 2020(4) SCC 313 . In para 19 of this ruling, the observations recorded are: “19. 66. Further reliance is placed in this context in MALLURU MALLAPPA (D) THROUGH LRs. V. KURUVATHAPPA, 2020(4) SCC 313 . In para 19 of this ruling, the observations recorded are: “19. It is clear from the above provisions and the decisions of this Court that the judgment of the first appellate court has to set out points for determination, record the decision thereon and give its own reasons. Even when the first appellate court affirms the judgment of the trial court, it is required to comply with the requirement of Order XLI Rule 31 and non-observance of this requirement leads to infirmity in the judgment of the first appellate court. No doubt, when the appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial court. Expression of a general agreement with the reasons given by the trial court would ordinarily suffice.” 67. The proposition of law canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants is neither disputed by the respondents nor can be disputed. There cannot be any other opinion than that it is the bounden duty of the first appellate Court to frame appropriate points for determination in accordance with Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in its effort to reappraise the material and evidence on record and to consider the nature of the reasons assigned by the trial Court in its judgment to draw such inferences and conclusions. 68. A careful consideration and examination of judgment of the first appellate Court indicated that there was reappraisal of the material on record including oral and documentary evidence considered by the trial Court. The points for determination framed in para – 11 of the judgment in appeal, are in effect as to relationship of landlord and tenant between the first respondent temple and the deceased – first appellant in relation to lease of the suit property propounded by the respondents as well as its valid termination. 69. In view of establishment of such relationship in between these parties, learned first appellate Judge is right in confining its consideration to this question, particularly in the light of failure of the deceased – first appellant to specifically raise a question as to bar of jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a dispute of this nature. 70. 69. In view of establishment of such relationship in between these parties, learned first appellate Judge is right in confining its consideration to this question, particularly in the light of failure of the deceased – first appellant to specifically raise a question as to bar of jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a dispute of this nature. 70. Therefore, when the first appellate Court applied all the required measures in this context in its anxious consideration of the contentious issues before it, as such, it cannot be found fault with. Therefore, the judgment of the appellate Court did not suffer from the vice of breaching the mandate under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. 71. The limitations that circumscribe application of Section 100 CPC thus impede this Court from considering these contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants, particularly when they are predominantly based on question of fact and not pure application of law. The concurrent findings consistently recorded by both the Courts below shall be the basis in this context. 72. Therefore, this Court is satisfied that there are no such substantial questions of law much less the one raised by the appellants for reconsideration and determination in this second appeal. Therefore, this attempt of the appellants should fail finding no merit. The tenants in occupation of the property belonging to the first respondent Mandir intend to continue to squat thereon and for such purposes, designedly, they have come up with these contentions. 73. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed with the costs of the respondents confirming the decrees and judgments of both the Courts below. The respondents are permitted to withdraw the amounts deposited by the appellants as per orders of this Court in S.A.M.P.No.959 of 2016 dated 23.12.2016 if they are available to the credit of the suit without furnishing any security. Interim orders if any, stand vacated. All pending petitions, stand closed.