JUDGMENT : SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. The petitioners' land became utilized by the respondents concerned, for the purpose of construction of road nomenclatured as Udho-Niwas-Jakhar-Bartu Road. The utilization of the petitioners' land, as, comprised in Khasra No. 610 and 603, situated in Patwar Circle Jakhar, Mohal Jakhar, Tehsil Rohru, District Shimla, H.P., has occurred in the year 1996-97. 2. Though, the respondents in their reply meted to the writ petition, have not contested the factum of utilization by them, of writ khasra numbers, as owned by the petitioners. However, they contended, that the writ petition is hit by vices of delay, and, laches, as, it has been preferred in the year 2019, despite the utilization of their land for the purpose supra, by the respondents, occurring in the year 1996-97. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has contended with much vigour, before this Court, that the petitioners, did not mete their implied or scribed consent, to the respondents, for their land being utilized, for the afore road construction activity, rather without any compensation becoming determined, vis-a-vis, them, through proceedings drawn under the Land Acquisition Act. 4. Moreover, the respondents also in their reply, except raising the plea of the writ petition being hit by vices of delay and laches, were not able to place on record, any scribed or written consent, meted for the afore purpose, by the writ petitioners, and, with complete candid echoings becoming borne therein, qua the writ petitioners without any compensation being determined, vis-a-vis, them, through proceedings drawn under the Land Acquisition Act, theirs permitting the respondents to utilize their land supra, for the road construction activity as under taken by the respondents. 5. Since, only through proven implied consent or upon scribed consent, being meted by the petitioners, for the afore purpose, thereupon, alone the respondents became enabled to contend with force, before this Court, that the petitioners were not entitled for determination of compensation, vis-a-vis, them, through proceedings drawn under the Land Acquisition Act. 6. However, as aforestated, the afore implied or scribed consent is not available on record. 6. However, as aforestated, the afore implied or scribed consent is not available on record. Therefore, the factum of delay and laches, as arising from the road construction activity becoming completed, in the year 1996-97, and, the extant writ petition becoming filed belatedly in the year 2019, cannot stand in the way of the petitioners, for theirs making strivings for determination of compensation, vis-a-vis, them, for their lands, as became utilized for the relevant purpose by the respondents. 7. The afore made view, is supported by verdict rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court, in a case titled as Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, reported in (2013) 1 SCC 353 , the relevant paragraphs where stand extracted hereinafter, wherein it has been expostulated, that there is a necessity of purveyings of explicit consent, by the landowners concerned, prior to the undertaking of the construction activities, by the authorities concerned, as, without the afore consent being meted to the respondents concerned, would cause breach to the mandate of Article 300-A of the Constitution. Moreover, it has been expostulated therein, that the afore constitutional mandate is inviolable, besides, it has also been declared to be rather warranting completest adherence, being meted thereto, by the authorities concerned. In addition, it has been expostulated therein, that the authorities concerned, are enjoined to, in the absence of any express consent, being meted by the landowners concerned, to the authorities concerned, rather determine compensation in accordance with law, vis-a-vis, the land of the landowners concerned, which become utilized by the authorities concerned, hence for road construction activity. The relevant paragraphs of the afore verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Tukka Ram's case supra read as under:— “12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party's defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide : P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152 : AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC 768 ;) 14. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. (Vide : Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353 ; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 : AIR 1993 SC 802 ; Dayal Singh v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 593 : AIR 2003 SC 1140 ; and Shankara Coop Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar, (2011) 5 SCC 607 : AIR 2011 SC 2161 ) 15. In the case of H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 2 SCC 337 : AIR 1984 SC 866 , this Court condoned a 30 year delay in approaching the court where it found violation of substantive legal rights of the applicant. In that case, the requisition of premises made by the State was assailed.” 8. The afore view is also supported by another verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in a case titled, as Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569 . A reading thereof, does unveil, that the afore plea of any implied or verbal consent of the landowners concerned, besides the writ claims being hit by vices of delay, and, laches, becoming completely repudiated by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 9. For the foregoing reasons, the extant writ petition is allowed, and, the respondents are directed to, within four weeks from today, issue the requisite acquisition notice, under, the relevant statute, vis-a-vis, the lands of the writ petitioner, and, thereafter forthwith determine, just, and, fair compensation qua the lands of the landowners concerned. All pending applications also stand disposed of.