JUDGMENT : This appeal is at the instance of respondent No.1employer calling in question the legality of the award dated 19.02.2009 in WCA/SR No.122/2005 passed by the learned Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Sub Division II, Belgaum (for short “the Commissioner”). 2. The brief facts are that claimant Saleem Kutubuddin Mulla was working as emery worker in Bharat Emery Works (respondent No.1), which is a partnership firm with appellants 2 to 4 as partners. On 14.09.2004 while the claimant was working as per the instructions of his employer, his right hand got stuck in the machine and he suffered fractures of fingers and while he was being treated in KLE Hospital, Belgaum, his three fingers had to be amputated. 3. The only substantial question of law contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is that as per Part II of Schedule I of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, (for short “the Act”) for loss of three fingers of one hand, the loss of earning capacity should be taken at 30% and the learned Commissioner having determined the loss of earning capacity at 100%, has violated the norm fixed by the statute itself and, therefore, it is illegal. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the claimant Sri. Harish Maigur, per contra, submits that there is no dispute about the fact that claimant while working as per the instructions of respondent No.1 had suffered amputation of three fingers of his right hand and he is not in a position to gainfully employ himself on account of amputation and, therefore, learned Commissioner was right in fixing his loss of earning capacity at 100%. In this behalf, he placed reliance on a decision reported in 2010(2) Kar.L.J. 650 (Supreme Court) (S. Suresh v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another) and submitted that the functional disability caused on account of permanent disability caused to a workman in employment related accident is also a determining factor and Courts cannot entirely go by the schedules prescribed in the Act for determining loss of earning capacity. He submits that on account of amputation of three fingers in right hand of the claimant he is totally disabled from doing any manual labour and therefore, he has lost the prospects of getting any job as a manual labourer. He submits that on account of amputation of three fingers in right hand of the claimant he is totally disabled from doing any manual labour and therefore, he has lost the prospects of getting any job as a manual labourer. He, therefore, submits that finding of learned Commissioner being supported by evidence, the same is not liable to be interfered with in an appeal filed under Section 30(1) of the Act. 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made on either side and I have perused the records. 6. There is no dispute about the fact that while claimant was working as an employee under respondent No.1, on account of employment related accident taking place, his three fingers of right hand had to be completely amputated. The said case of the claimant is supported by medical evidence as also the photograph, Ex.P1. Learned Commissioner, after appreciating the evidence and examining the photograph, has come to the conclusion that the workman claimant will not be in a position to rehabilitate himself into any job involving manual labour and, therefore, he is completely deprived of sources of livelihood. Being of the said view, he has fixed the loss of earning capacity at 100%. This finding of the learned Commissioner is a finding of fact based on evidence. 7. In regard to the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Schedule II of the Act having fixed the loss of earning capacity at 30% for loss of three fingers in any one hand learned Commissioner had no jurisdiction to fix the loss of earning capacity at 100% is concerned, the said contention is liable to be noticed only to be rejected in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in 2010(2) Kar.L.J. 650 (Supreme Court) (S. Suresh v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited and another) and at Para Nos.7 and 8 it is observed as under: “7. The correctness of the impugned judgment is questioned mainly on the ground that the claimant being a lorry driver, the loss of his right leg ipso facto meant a "total disablement" as understood in terms of Section 2(1)(l) of the Act and as such the compensation payable to the claimant had to be computed on that basis. The correctness of the impugned judgment is questioned mainly on the ground that the claimant being a lorry driver, the loss of his right leg ipso facto meant a "total disablement" as understood in terms of Section 2(1)(l) of the Act and as such the compensation payable to the claimant had to be computed on that basis. In support of the plea, reliance is placed on a four Judges Bench decision of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs. Srinivas Sabata & Anr. In that case, a carpenter had suffered amputation of his left arm from the elbow. This Court held that this amounted to a total disability as the injury was of such a nature that the claimant had been disabled from all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. It was observed as under: "5. The expression "total disablement" has been defined in Section 2(1)(l) of the Act as follows: (1) "total disablement" means such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement. It has not been disputed before us that the injury was of such a nature as to cause permanent disablement to the respondent, and the question for consideration is whether the disablement incapacitated the respondent for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident. The Commissioner has examined the question and recorded his finding as follows: The injured workman in this case is carpenter by profession.... By loss of the left hand above the elbow, he has evidently been rendered unfit for the work of carpenter as the work of carpentry cannot be done by one hand only. This is obviously a reasonable and correct finding." 8. In our view, the ratio of the said judgment is squarely applicable to the facts at hand. We are of the opinion that on account of amputation of his right leg below knee, he is rendered unfit for the work of a driver, which he was performing at the time of the accident resulting in the said disablement. Therefore, he has lost 100% of his earning capacity as a lorry driver, more so, when he is disqualified from even getting a driving licence under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. Therefore, he has lost 100% of his earning capacity as a lorry driver, more so, when he is disqualified from even getting a driving licence under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. It is very relevant to make a reference to the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 14 in a decision reported in (2018) 4 SCC 571 (Jagadish v. Mohan and others), which reads as follows: “14. In making the computation in the present case, the court must be mindful of the fact that the appellant has suffered a serious disability in which he has suffered a loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged in manual activities, it requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a complete deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing – at least in the facts of this case – can restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law’s does. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic of human dignity.” 9. The above decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly suggest that the Courts while deciding cases in this jurisdiction have some latitude and they are not strictly bound by the percentage of loss of earning capacity fixed in the schedule itself. Ultimately what is required to be borne in mind is the effect of the disability on ability of the workman to rehabilitate him in any other gainful employment on account of the employment related injury suffered by him. In this case, the records produced before the learned Commissioner, including photograph Ex.P11, as also the evidence of the claimant and the qualified medical practitioner, clearly show that it is well nigh impossible for the claimant to secure gainful employment to earn his livelihood. In this case, the records produced before the learned Commissioner, including photograph Ex.P11, as also the evidence of the claimant and the qualified medical practitioner, clearly show that it is well nigh impossible for the claimant to secure gainful employment to earn his livelihood. Under such circumstances, I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant and I reject his submission. 10. There cannot be any dispute about the fact that claimant is entitled to award of interest w.e.f. 30 days from the date of the accident in view of the provision under the Act itself. The claimant in this case is entitled for grant of interest on the award amount w.e.f. 30 days from the date of the accident till the date of realization. Hence, the following: ORDER The above appeal is dismissed. While maintaining the quantum of compensation, the appellants are liable to pay the interest on award amount w.e.f. 30 days from the date of the accident till the date of realization. The amount in deposit, if any, before this Court, shall be transmitted to the jurisdictional Court of the learned Senior Civil Judge along with records forthwith. In view of disposal of the appeal, pending interlocutory applications, if any, do not survive for consideration.