JUDGMENT : SHAJI P. CHALY, J. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner, a Society, challenging Exhibit P7 order passed by the Kerala State Human Rights Commission dated 4th November, 2020 directing the Secretary of the petitioner Society to disburse the eligible benefits of one late Sudhakaran who died on 16.05.2013 while in service of the petitioner, within two months from the date of receipt a copy of the order. The Director of the Diary Development Department was further directed to ensure that the benefits are received by the 4th respondent in time. 2. According to the petitioner, petitioner was never made a party in the proceedings before the Human Rights Commission and in fact, the Human Rights Commission has relied upon the report of the Director of Diary Development Department that husband of the 4th respondent committed suicide on 16.5.2013 while working as Lab Assistant with the petitioner Society. It was also noted that a financial irregularity of Rs.7,23,191/-surfaced in the Society during the year 2012-2013 and late Sudhakaran, Lab Assistant, and K.P.Johny, the Procurement Assistant, were responsible for the irregularity as stated by the Secretary. 3. But on a perusal of the bank transaction records, it was found that Smt.Sheela.P.K. -Secretary, was on duty at that time and the irregularity was committed using the jointly signed cheques of the President and Secretary of the Society and it was because of the lapse of the Secretary in discharging the duty, the financial irregularity has taken place in the Society and hence, the entire loss is to be recovered from the Secretary of the Society as the Chief Executive Officer of the Society, on the basis of a letter issued by the Deputy Director of the Diary Development Department, Idukki to the President of the Society on 19.3.2014. It was also found from the report that, against the direction of the Deputy Director, Smt.Sheela.P.K. approached the High Court with W.P.(C) No.11600/2014 and a stay was obtained on 6.5.2014 from enforcing the order of the Deputy Director. However, the Commission found that there was no prima facie records to show that late Sudhakaran committed financial irregularity and there is no restriction imposed by the High Court in paying the benefits due to late Sudhakaran. That apart, it was also noted, a crime was registered at Rajakkad Police Station against the financial irregularities. However, the Commission found that there was no prima facie records to show that late Sudhakaran committed financial irregularity and there is no restriction imposed by the High Court in paying the benefits due to late Sudhakaran. That apart, it was also noted, a crime was registered at Rajakkad Police Station against the financial irregularities. It was also noted by the Commission that Smt.Sheela.P.K., Secretary of the Society, was held responsible. 4. It seems the Deputy Director had also reported that late Sudhakaran and another person had taken cheque leaves of the Society and misappropriated the funds. Anyhow, the Commission has found that nothing is mentioned in the report about the initiation of proceedings for recovering the misappropriated amount from the properties of late Sudhakaran, though the Secretary has raised allegations against late Sudhakaran. It was thereupon that the directions as pointed out above were issued by the Commission to the petitioner. 5. The paramount contention advanced by the petitioner in the writ petition is that the dispute raised by the 4th respondent in Exhibit P1 complaint is a service matter/labour dispute with respect to non-payment of gratuity of her late husband by the petitioner society and therefore, by virtue of section 17 of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations – 2001, the Commission had no jurisdiction to interfere in the dispute and direct the petitioner to pay the service benefits of late Sudhakaran to the 4th respondent. 6. Apart from the same, it is contended that in order to attract jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission, there should be a violation of human rights enabling the Commission to interfere in the matter and issue appropriate orders or recommendations. That apart it is submitted that as per regulation 17(f) of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations – 2001, there are restrictions to deal with any service matter or labour dispute and therefore, the Commission did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and issue the directions. 7. It is also contended that the petitioner had taken a decision on 17.11.2013 to forfeit the gratuity of deceased Sudhakaran invoking section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 on account of the loss sustained to the petitioner due to the criminal acts of misappropriation of money, forgery and fabrication of records of the petitioner. 7. It is also contended that the petitioner had taken a decision on 17.11.2013 to forfeit the gratuity of deceased Sudhakaran invoking section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 on account of the loss sustained to the petitioner due to the criminal acts of misappropriation of money, forgery and fabrication of records of the petitioner. But all these aspects could not be pointed out by the petitioner before the 1st respondent since it was not made a party, and for that matter there was no opposite party in the complaint filed by the 4th respondent before the Human Rights Commission, which is also clear and evident from Exhibit P7 order. 8. A detailed counter affidavit is filed by the 4th respondent supporting the order passed by the Human Rights Commission and also submitting that there is no prima facie evidence to prove that late Sudhakaran had any manner of involvement in the financial irregularity detected in the society, as stated by the Secretary of the petitioner itself. It is also pointed out that it is clearly specified in Exhibit P3 that the Society is liable to pay the terminal benefits of late Sudhakaran to the 4th respondent – his widow. Learned counsel for the 4th respondent has further submitted that none of the adverse provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act enabling the petitioner to detain the gratuity would come into play since Sudhakaran died while in service and the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act creating adverse consequences would apply only on the termination of service. 9. Therefore, according to the 4th respondent, the legal contentions advanced in the writ petition relying upon the provisions of Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations – 2001 and the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 may not have any legal bearing at all. That apart it was submitted that the non-payment of the gratuity amount due to late Sudhakaran is clearly a human rights violation, which was liable to be addressed by the State Human Rights Commission, and therefore the order passed by the Human Rights Commission is not having any arbitrariness or illegality liable to be interfered with by this Court exercising the power of discretionary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for 4th respondent also submitted that it is not mandatory that the Commission shall hear the opposite party. Learned counsel for 4th respondent also submitted that it is not mandatory that the Commission shall hear the opposite party. To top up the above submissions, it was argued that the Human Rights Commission is vested with sufficient powers to adjudicate any complaint before it without any notice to the rival party and it is also not mandatory that in a complaint before the commission affected persons are made parties. 10. Petitioner has filed a reply affidavit refuting the contentions raised in the counter affidavit and reiterating the stand adopted in the writ petition. 11. We have heard, learned counsel for the0 petitioner Sri.Latheesh Sebastian, learned counsel Smt.M.P.Mary for the 4th respondent, learned Senior Government Pleader Sri.K.P.Harish for the Government Officials and perused the pleadings and materials on record. 12. The basic contention advanced by the writ petitioner is relying upon regulation 17(1)(f) of the Kerala State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations – 2001. Regulation 17 deals with the complaints not ordinarily maintainable before the Commission, which specifies that the Commission may dismiss in limine complaints of the nature delineated thereunder. Clause (f) makes it clear that any issue relating to civil disputes, service matters, labour or industrial dispute are included in the provision, by which a complaint in regard to the service benefits of a deceased employee is not maintainable. The submission made by learned counsel for the 4th respondent in that regard was that the expression ‘may’ employed in regulation 17 of regulations 2001 makes it clear that the Commission has got discretion to decide as to whether the complaint of the nature specified thereunder was to be entertained or not, and having exercised the discretion taking into account a report submitted by a competent officer, no manner of interference is required to the impugned order. 13. On the other hand, according to the learned counsel for petitioner, the discretion of the Commission, is not in respect of the matters enumerated thereunder but to identify as to whether there are any laws, rules and guidelines issued by the State or Central Government to deal with the situation specified in regulation 17. Therefore, it was submitted that the issue of payment of gratuity is guided by section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Therefore, it was submitted that the issue of payment of gratuity is guided by section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Sub-section (1) thereto clearly states that gratuity shall be payable to an employee on termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years,-- (a) on his superannuation, or (b) on his retirement or resignation, or (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease. 14. Therefore, it is discernible from the said provision that the issue of payment of gratuity comes into play only on cessation of employment under the circumstances discussed above. The second proviso thereto makes it clear that in the case of death of employee, gratuity payable to him shall be paid to his nominee or if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor shall be deposited with the controlling authority, who shall invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority. More significant is subsection 6 of section 4 of Act 1972, which reads thus: (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section(1),— (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, willful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused; (b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited— (i) If the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, or (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment. 15. On a consideration of the said provision conjointly with section 4 (1) of Act 1972, termination for the purpose of entitlement for gratuity includes a death also. Thinking so, we do not find much force in the said contention of the learned counsel for the 4th respondent. 16. 15. On a consideration of the said provision conjointly with section 4 (1) of Act 1972, termination for the purpose of entitlement for gratuity includes a death also. Thinking so, we do not find much force in the said contention of the learned counsel for the 4th respondent. 16. Learned counsel has also invited our attention to section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 dealing with determination of the amount of gratuity. Certain of the provisions of section 7 is relevant for the purpose of adjudicating the issue raised by the rival parties and it reads thus: “Determination of the amount of gratuity.—(1) A person who is eligible for payment of gratuity under this Act or any person authorised, in writing to act on his behalf shall send a written application to the employer, within such time and in such form, as may be prescribed, for payment of such gratuity. (2) As soon as gratuity becomes payable, the employer shall, whether an application referred to in sub-section (1) has been made or not, determine the amount of gratuity and give notice in writing to the person to whom the gratuity is payable and also to the controlling authority specifying the amount of gratuity so determined. [(3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. [(3) The employer shall arrange to pay the amount of gratuity within thirty days from the date it becomes payable to the person to whom the gratuity is payable. (3A) If the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, as that Government may, by notification specify: Provided that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on this ground.] (4) (a) If there is any dispute to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under this Act or as to the admissibility of any claim of, or in relation to, an employee for payment of gratuity, or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall deposit with the controlling authority such amount as he admits to be payable by him as gratuity. [(b) Where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in clause (a), the employer or employee or any other person raising the dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute.] [(c)] The controlling authority shall, after due inquiry and after giving the parties to the dispute a reasonable opportunity of being heard, determine the matter or matters in dispute and if, as a result of such inquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount or, as the case may be, such amount as reduced by the amount already deposited by the employer.]" 17. On an analysis of sub-section 4 (a) it is true that, if there is any dispute with respect to the amount of gratuity payable to an employee under the Act, 1972 or as to the admissibility of any claim of or in relation to an employee for payment of gratuity or as to the person entitled to receive the gratuity, the employer shall be liable to deposit with the controlling authority such amount which he admits to be payable by him as gratuity alone. Which thus means the liability of the employer to deposit the amount is limited to the admitted amount and if there is no admitted amount to be deposited, the compulsion contained under the said provision would not come into play. Though it is significant to note that gratuity is not a bounty of the employer but a right of the employee and a benevolent legislation, if and when there are damages allegedly caused to the employer, the provisions of the act 1972 has to be construed strictly , and a serious adjudication of the issue is required to be undertaken by the statutory authority to protect the public interest and to sustain the rule of law. In that context it is relevant to note that, if found otherwise, the authority is vested with powers to compensate with interest as provided under subsection 3A of section 7 of Act 1972. 18. Even going by the contentions put forth by the parties and the order of the State Human Rights Commission, it is clear that there was a disputed issue pending in the petitioner society at the time of the death of Sudhakaran, which was a subject matter of enquiry, allegedly into the involvement of late Sudhakaran also. However, consequent to the death of Sudhakaran, he could not be proceeded with and it was thereupon that the society has taken a decision to recover the amount misappropriated from the persons, who are responsible for the same. Anyhow, it is clear that where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in sub-section 4(b) of section 7 of Act 1972, the employer or employee or any other person raising a dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute. 19. Anyhow, it is clear that where there is a dispute with regard to any matter or matters specified in sub-section 4(b) of section 7 of Act 1972, the employer or employee or any other person raising a dispute may make an application to the controlling authority for deciding the dispute. 19. On an in-depth analysis of subsections 4 (a) to (c) of section 7 of Act 1972, amble power is vested with the controlling authority to conduct due enquiry and after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity of being heard to determine the matter or matters in dispute and if as a result of such enquiry any amount is found to be payable to the employee, the controlling authority shall direct the employer to pay such amount. To put it materially and succinctly, even the claim raised by the legal heir or heirs of a deceased employee, is guided by the aforementioned peremptory provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. 20. In our considered opinion the relevance of regulation 17 of Regulations, 2001 is to be appreciated by reading the provisions of the Gratuity Act, 1972 discussed above, and the said regulation conjointly, which would only make the said provision expressive, sensible and meaningful. Thinking so, the word “may” employed in regulation 17 of Regulations, 2001 shall have to be provided with a strict meaning expressing a command since the power conferred to the State Human Rights Commission as per regulation 17 can only be seen as a restrictive methodology depriving adjudication of the matters governed by regulation 17 of regulations 2001 and accordingly “may” employed in regulation 17 has to be construed as “shall” to secure a purposive interpretation thought of by the law maker, and that too the State Humans Rights Commission itself, by exercising the powers conferred under Section 10 (2) read with Section 29 of the Kerala State Human Rights Act 1993. 21. 21. It is also clear from section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 that the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent that the provisions of section 7 of Act 1972 would not come into play since there is no termination of employment so as to detain the gratuity, may not be correct in view of the fact that in order to enable an employee or his heirs to have right for claiming gratuity, there should be cessation of employment consequent to superannuation or retirement or resignation or death or disablement due to accident or disease. 22. Here is a case where the employee died and therefore, the claim for gratuity has arisen in favour of the legal heirs of the deceased and in that context the provisions contained under section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 would be significant because the controlling authority under the Act, 1972 is also the authority vested with powers to entertain the claim of the legal heirs of the deceased person. It is also clear from the second proviso to section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 that if and when an employee dies, the gratuity payable shall be paid to his nominee, or if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor, shall be deposited with the controlling authority who shall invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority. Therefore it can be seen that the issue of Disbursal of the gratuity takes on various aspects of relevance and importance which has to be adjudicated by the controlling authority by virtue of the powers conferred under the Act, 1972 after providing opportunity to all concerned. Therefore it can be seen that the issue of Disbursal of the gratuity takes on various aspects of relevance and importance which has to be adjudicated by the controlling authority by virtue of the powers conferred under the Act, 1972 after providing opportunity to all concerned. However, we are of the view that the issue is guided by section 16 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 which deals with the manner in which persons likely to be prejudicially affected to be heard and it specifies that if at any stage of the enquiry the Commission considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person or is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry, it shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence. 23. Therefore, when the report was submitted by the Director of Dairy Development the Commission was aware of the misappropriation of the amount of the society, and in that circumstances it would have been only appropriate to decide to hear the petitioner society. If such a course was adopted, definitely the intrinsic aspects considered above would have been made a subject matter of adjudication in order to find out as to whether the complaint was maintainable before the State Human Rights Commission. 24. In that view of the matter, we are inclined to think that these significant aspects were not brought to the notice of the Commission enabling the Commission to arrive at a just and proper decision as to whether the Commission is still vested with powers to proceed with the complaint consequent to the limitations and inhibitions prescribed under regulation 17 of Regulations, 2001. Considering the factual and legal aspects, discussed above, we are of the clear opinion that the Human Rights Commission did not have the power to proceed with the complaint and it ought to have rejected the same at the threshold, leaving open the liberty of the 4th respondent to approach the statutory authority. 25. Accordingly, we hold that the order of the State Human Rights Commission dated 4th November, 2020 in HRMP No.3563/11/4/2019/IDK at Exhibit P7 cannot be sustained under law and we quash the same. 25. Accordingly, we hold that the order of the State Human Rights Commission dated 4th November, 2020 in HRMP No.3563/11/4/2019/IDK at Exhibit P7 cannot be sustained under law and we quash the same. However we leave open the liberty of the 4th respondent or the legal heirs of late Sudhakaran to approach the authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, and if any such application is filed, we have no reason to think that the said authority would not take into account the entire pros and cons so as to arrive at a just and proper conclusion in accordance with law at the earliest. Writ petition is allowed accordingly.