JUDGMENT : By way of filing the present petition, the petitioner has urged to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to resolve her grievance in consonance with the provisions of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. 2. The petitioner joining at the Agricultural Research Service under Indian Council of Agricultural Research Centre [ICAR] was posted at ICAR Complex for North Eastern Hills Region, Tripura Centre. During her service she submitted a complaint on 05.12.2018 alleging sexual harassment as contemplated under Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 [for brevity, here-in-after referred to as Act of 2013]. Internal Complaints Committee submitted report wherein the Committee recommended the exoneration of respondent No.6. Against such recommendation, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 18(1) of the Act of 2013. Since the said statutory appeal is not disposed off, the petitioner has approached this court by way of invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying following reliefs: “In the premises aforesaid, it is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that Your Lordship may be graciously pleased to: (i) Issue Rule NISI calling upon the respondents and each of them, to show cause as to why a Writ of Mandamus and/or in the nature thereof, directing the respondent no. 3 to dispose of the appeal preferred by the petitioner under Section 18(1) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 within time frame, as may be directed by this Hon’ble Court; (ii) Issue NISI Rule calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why a writ/writs and/or order/orders, direction/ directions in the nature of certiorari calling for the entire records from the custody of respondents no. 3 and 4 and after hearing may please pass necessary order in this regard and may please direct the appellate authority to accept the additional ground on the report of the external committee (Annexure 13)” 3. There is no dispute that ICAR is a Central Government Organization in view of the notification of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions [Department of Personnel and Training], notification dated 20th April, 1987 published in the Gazette of India extraordinary, Part II, Section 3, sub-section (I). There is no dispute that ICAR is a Central Government Organization in view of the notification of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions [Department of Personnel and Training], notification dated 20th April, 1987 published in the Gazette of India extraordinary, Part II, Section 3, sub-section (I). By this notification, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 [for short, A.T.Act of 1985], the Government has notified that respondent No.2 herein will fall within the jurisdiction of Central Administrative Tribunal [for short, CAT]. 4. At the very threshold, Mr. B. Majumder, learned Asstt. Solicitor General had raised a preliminary objection in regard to the jurisdiction of this court to grant the reliefs as sought for by the petitioner. Learned Asstt. S.G. firmly contended that the grievances of the petitioner tantamount to “service matters” and in view of notification under Section 14(2) of the A.T. Act, the appropriate forum was the CAT being the court of first instance for the purpose of adjudication of disputes relating to “service matters”. 5. Since a question of maintainability has been raised, this court asked Mr. Somik Deb, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Mr. S.Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner to argue the case on the question of maintainability and with the consent of the learned counsels appearing for the parties to the lis, the matter was heard on the question of maintainability of this petition. 5.1 In order to delve into the said question posed before this court for decision, the law relating to sexual harassment of women at workplace as emerged from the case of ‘Vishaka & Ors. Vrs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 241 , needs little discussion. The apex court in Vishaka (supra) issued directions with a view to ensure that cases of sexual harassment of women at workplace are properly dealt with and guilty are punished. Noticeably, after the said judgment, the Central Govt. Vrs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 241 , needs little discussion. The apex court in Vishaka (supra) issued directions with a view to ensure that cases of sexual harassment of women at workplace are properly dealt with and guilty are punished. Noticeably, after the said judgment, the Central Govt. introduced proviso to Rule 14(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, which reads as under: “(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a Government servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof. Provided that where there is a complaint of sexual harassment within the meaning of rule 3-C of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, the complaints Committee established in each ministry or Department or Office for inquiring into such complaints, shall be deemed to be the inquiring authority appointed by the disciplinary authority for the purpose of these rules and the Complaints Committee shall hold, if separate procedure has not been prescribed for the complaints committee for holding the inquiry into the complaints of sexual harassments, the inquiry as far as practicable in accordance with the procedure laid down in these rules.” 6. The amendment was also carried out by the Central Govt. in CCS (Conduct) Rules,1964. This amendment speaks thus:- “Rule 3-C. Prohibition of sexual harassment of working women: (1) No Government servant shall indulge in any act of sexual harassment of any women at her workplace. (2) Every government servant, who is in-charge of a workplace shall take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment to any women at such workplace. Explanation: 1. For the purpose of this rule,--- (a) “sexual harassment” includes such unwelcome sexually determined behavior, whether directly or otherwise, as— (i) physical contact and advances; or (ii) demand or request for sexual favour; or (iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or (iv) showing pornography; or (v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal, non verbal conduct of a sexual nature.” 7. Explanation: 1. For the purpose of this rule,--- (a) “sexual harassment” includes such unwelcome sexually determined behavior, whether directly or otherwise, as— (i) physical contact and advances; or (ii) demand or request for sexual favour; or (iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or (iv) showing pornography; or (v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal, non verbal conduct of a sexual nature.” 7. After Vishaka (supra), the apex court in its subsequent judgments reiterated its view and urged for immediate need to create adequate mechanism to deal with the cases of sexual harassment to ensure that Articles 14, 16, 19, 21, 15(1), 15(3), 42, 51-A(a) and 51-A(c), become reality. 7.1 More importantly, in Medha Kotwal Lele & Ors. Vrs. Union of India & Ors., (2013) 1 SCC 297 , the apex court had considered the amendments made by the Central Government in CCS (CCA) Rules and in CCS (Conduct) Rules and it was directed that similar amendments were required to be made in other statutes including industrial employment (standing orders), etc. The apex court opined that existing law, if necessary, should be revised and appropriate new laws be enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislatures to protect women from any form of indecency, indignity and disrespect. The judgment in Medha Kotwal (supra), motivated the Central Govt. to give rise to new Act, viz. the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (No.14 of 2013). 8. Section 2(a) of the Act of 2013 defines “aggrieved women”. The women, who is allegedly subjected to any act of sexual harassment is defined as “aggrieved woman”. The person against whom “aggrieved women” makes the complaint is defined as “respondent” in Section 2(m). The definition of “workplace” mentioned in Section 2(o), is very wide. Section 4 deals with the “Constitution of Internal Complaints Committee”. Section 6 deals with “Constitution and Jurisdiction of Local Committee”. The methodology of lodging complaint is mentioned in Section 9 of the Act of 2013. Section 11 of the Act of 2013 deals with the mechanism by which complaint needs to be enquired. Section 11(1) reads as under: “11. Section 4 deals with the “Constitution of Internal Complaints Committee”. Section 6 deals with “Constitution and Jurisdiction of Local Committee”. The methodology of lodging complaint is mentioned in Section 9 of the Act of 2013. Section 11 of the Act of 2013 deals with the mechanism by which complaint needs to be enquired. Section 11(1) reads as under: “11. Inquiry into complaint.--(1) Subject to the provisions of section 10, the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall, where the respondent is an employee, proceed to make inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent and where no such rules exist, in such manner as may be prescribed or in case of a domestic worker, the Local Committee shall, if prima facie case exist, forward the complaint to the police, within a period of seven days for registering the case under section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), and any other relevant provisions of the said Code where applicable:” 9. Section 13 of the Act of 2013 speaks of method to deal with the inquiry report. Section 13(1) and Section (3)(i) may be reproduced here-under: “13. Inquiry report.-- (1) On the completion of an inquiry under this Act, the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, shall provide a report of its findings to the employer, or as the case may be, the District Officer within a period of ten days from the date of completion of the inquiry and such report be made available to the concerned parties. xxx xxx xxx (3) Where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be, arrives at the conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has been proved, it shall recommend to the employer or the District Officer, as the case may be— (i) to take action for sexual harassment as a misconduct in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the respondent or where no such service rules have been made, in such manner as may be prescribed;” 10. Section 18 of the Act of 2013 makes the provisions for appeal which is quoted here-in-below:- “18. Section 18 of the Act of 2013 makes the provisions for appeal which is quoted here-in-below:- “18. Appeal.--(1) Any person aggrieved from the recommendations made under sub-section (2) of section 13 or under clause (i) or clause (ii) of sub-section (3) of section 13 or sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 14 or section 17 or non-implementation of such recommendations may prefer an appeal to the court or tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the service rules applicable to the said person or where no such service rules exist then, without prejudice to provisions contained in any other law for the time being in force, the person aggrieved may prefer an appeal in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) The appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred within a period of ninety days of the recommendations” 11. Section 19 of Chapter VI of the Act of 2013 speaks about the duties of employer. In my opinion, clause (i) of Section 19 is very much relevant to decide the question of maintainability of this petition. Section 19(i) reads as under: “(i) treat sexual harassment as a misconduct under the service rules and initiate action for such misconduct.” 12. To reiterate, the main argument of Mr. Somik Deb, learned Sr. counsel on the question of maintainability revolves around that the petitioner being aggrieved of the recommendation made by the Local Complaints Committee had preferred an appeal and since the appeal was not disposed off for a considerable period of time, the petitioner approached this court for a direction upon the concerned respondents to dispose off the appeal within a certain period of time. I have noticed that at prayer No. 2 of the writ petition, the petitioner has sought for a direction upon the appellate authority to accept the additional ground on the report of the External Committee [Annexure-13 to the writ petition]. 13. According to Mr. Deb, learned Sr. counsel, the petitioner has the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to provide the reliefs claimed for by the petitioner in this petition. 13.1 Mr. Deb, learned Sr. counsel, further contended that subject of sexual harassment has not been included in the definition of “service matters” as contemplated under Section 3(q) of the A.T.Act, 1985. 13.2 Learned Sr. 13.1 Mr. Deb, learned Sr. counsel, further contended that subject of sexual harassment has not been included in the definition of “service matters” as contemplated under Section 3(q) of the A.T.Act, 1985. 13.2 Learned Sr. counsel drawing my attention to the enumerations as envisaged in Clause (v) of Section 3(q) of the A.T.Act, 1985 submitted that the said clause, though seemed to be very wide, but, it had to take colour from the other four enumerations, and since the complaint of sexual harassment could not in any way be said to be related to the conditions of her service, this court had the ample power to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to allow the reliefs as sought for by the petitioner. 14. To fortify his submission, learned Sr. counsel pressed into service the decision of the apex court rendered in Lt. Col.Vijaynath Jha Vrs. Union of India & Ors., (2018) 7 SCC 303 [SCC.P.307, Para 17] which reads thus-- “17. The provision excludes certain matters. The present case is not covered by excluded categories, hence that part of the provision is not relevant for the present case. The definition of “service matters” is an inclusive definition. A look into the enumerations as contained in Section 3(o) indicates that they all relate to matters relating to the conditions of the service of persons subject to the Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950. Last enumeration, i.e., (iv) is “any other matter whatsoever”, at first blush; it appears that the said enumeration is very wide which may cover all other residual categories. But, the phrase “any other matter whatsoever” is to take colour from the other three enumerations and the main provision of Section 3(o). The pre-condition of a matter to be a service matter has to be relating to the conditions of their service. Thus, for a matter to be treated as a service matter, it must relate to the conditions of their service. 15. Mr. Deb, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further places reliance upon the case of Md. Ansari Vrs. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 3 SCC 740 ; Union of India Vrs. Rasila Ram & Ors. (2001) 10 SCC 623 ; Dr. H. Mukherjee Vrs. S.K. Bhargava, (1996) 4 SCC 542 ; 16. Mr. 15. Mr. Deb, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further places reliance upon the case of Md. Ansari Vrs. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 3 SCC 740 ; Union of India Vrs. Rasila Ram & Ors. (2001) 10 SCC 623 ; Dr. H. Mukherjee Vrs. S.K. Bhargava, (1996) 4 SCC 542 ; 16. Mr. B. Majumder, learned Assistant SG refuting the submissions of Mr. Somik Deb, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the reliefs claimed for by the petitioner i.e. the incident of sexual harassment is enquired under the service rules and the person aggrieved of any order of the Internal Complaints Committee or by the appellate authority had to be dealt with by the CAT but not by this court as contemplated under Sections 14 and 19 of the CAT Act, 1985 as a court of first instance applying the law settled in L. Chandra Kumar Vrs. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 3 SCC 261 . 17. In my considered view, the provisions of Act of 2013 as extracted here-in-above are to be read with the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules and CCS (Conduct) Rules. With the advent of law, after the judgment of Vishaka (supra), the Central Govt. in their own wisdom and with a view to achieve certain objects amended the Conduct Rules as well as CCS (CCA) Rules. The subject of sexual harassment was brought within the purview of ‘misconduct’ and the mechanism to punish the employee was also introduced by way of amendment of Rule 14 (2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Added to it, Act of 2013 was brought into force. Now, dealing with the case of Rashila Ram (Supra), the apex court decided against full bench judgment of the CAT where the employee concerned was said to be an unauthorized occupant of an accommodation. The proceedings against him were initiated and the order was passed by the competent authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 for the purpose of his eviction. The Tribunal held the view that the proceedings being related to ‘service matter’, it had jurisdiction to entertain the application filed before it. The proceedings against him were initiated and the order was passed by the competent authority under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 for the purpose of his eviction. The Tribunal held the view that the proceedings being related to ‘service matter’, it had jurisdiction to entertain the application filed before it. In that situation, the apex court opined that once a government servant was held to be in occupation of a public premises as un unauthorized occupant within the meaning of the eviction Act, an appropriate order was passed thereof, the remedy to such occupant was lying with, as provided under the said Act. Thus, the ratio of the said judgment is that if a particular Act provides a particular remedy, it must be availed and Tribunal will have no jurisdiction in that regard. 18. The judgment of Rashila Ram (supra), in my opinion, would be of no assistance to the petitioner for the reason that the provisions of P.P. Act were taken into consideration in the said judgment where specific mechanism were made to deal with the subject in issue of that case. 19. In the case of Md. Ansari (supra), the apex court held that on a plain reading of Section 2(a) and 3(q) of the A.T. Act, 1985, it is found that the Act does not apply to any member of the Armed Forces and hence High Court was justified in holding that CAT has no jurisdiction to deal with the controversy. 20. In the said referred decision, it is clear that the definition of “service matters” under Section 3(o) specifically and in clear terms excludes the jurisdiction of the fact in some matters relating to any members of the Armed Forces under Clause (iv) of Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007.As such, this decision also would be of no assistance to decide the case of the petitioner. With this observation and inference of mine, the submission of learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner that Section 2(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 is pari materia to Section 3(q) of the A.T.Act, 1985, is accordingly repelled. 21. With this observation and inference of mine, the submission of learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner that Section 2(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 is pari materia to Section 3(q) of the A.T.Act, 1985, is accordingly repelled. 21. In the case of Vijaynath Jha (supra) also relates to a question of jurisdiction of CAT relating to “service matters” as defined in Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 where the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Tribunal has specifically been mentioned to deal with the conditions of service as contemplated in Clauses (i),(ii),(iii) and (iv) of Section 3(o) of the Act of 2007 and conspicuously, excludes the matters relating to orders issued under Section 18 of the Army Act, 1950, etc. and relating to transfers and postings including the change of place or unit on posting whether individually or as a part of unit, formation or ship in relation to the persons subject to the Army Act and the Air Force Act, etc. Keeping in view the exclusion of jurisdiction of CAT relating to certain “service matters” the apex court held that in view of the Clause (iv) under Section 3(o), the jurisdiction of CAT is ousted to deal with the subject in dispute as raised by the petitioner and opined that enumeration of Clause (iv) relating to “any other matter whatsoever”, though seems to be very wide, but, it must regulate the condition of service which take colour from the other three enumerations and the main provision of Section 3(o). 22. In H. Mukherjee (supra), I find that it was a case of civil nature filed by the petitioner against some officers of the department claiming damages. The nature of the suit being absolutely depicted as a matter of civil dispute, the Supreme Court held that the CAT has no jurisdiction to resolve the said dispute as it was not related to “service matters” in any manner whatsoever. 23. Reverting to the case in hand, in my opinion, Section 11 of the Act of 2013 makes it clear that where the ‘respondent’ is an employee and the Internal Committee or the Local Committee proceeds to make inquiry into the complaint, it will be an inquiry in accordance with the provisions of service rules. Thus, the intention of the legislature was to make an inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the service rules. Thus, the intention of the legislature was to make an inquiry into the complaint in accordance with the provisions of the service rules. The proceedings undertaken by the Internal Complaints Committee of the respondent No.2 and the reports of the Committee thereof [Annexure 5 to the writ petition], on the face of it reveals that the Committee has taken into account the service rules i.e. CCS (CCA) Rules and CCS (Conduct) Rules. Section 19(i) of the Act of 2013 makes it clear that the employer is duty bound to treat sexual harassment as a ‘misconduct’ under the service rule and initiate action for such ‘misconduct’. Section 13(2) further makes it clear that where the Internal Committee or the Local Committee, as the case may be arrives at a conclusion that the allegation against the respondent has not been proved, it shall recommend to the employer that no action is required to be taken in the matter. 24. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act of 2013, apparently makes it clear that the proceedings and the report of the Internal Complaints Committee has to be treated or equated as a “service matter”, more so, when the respondent is an employee of the respondent No.2. 25. Section 18 of the Act of 2013 provides for appeal. The provision starts with “any person aggrieved from the recommendations made under sub-section 2 of section 13 or ……….may prefer an appeal” before the appropriate forum. 26. In my opinion, the language used in this provision of appeal clearly manifests the intention of law makers to bring it within the ambit of service rule for a person who is aggrieved out of the recommendations that includes the complainant herself as enumerated in sub-section (2) of Section 13. To put it differently, the petitioner if aggrieved by the recommendation, can very well assail it on merits before the appellate forum. 27. Next, the ancillary question remains to be answered whether the grievance as agitated in this petition can be redressed by this court or before the CAT. The jurisdiction of the CAT can be traced from Section 14 of the CAT Act. Relevant portion of Section 14 of the CAT Act may be reproduced here-under, for convenience: “14. 27. Next, the ancillary question remains to be answered whether the grievance as agitated in this petition can be redressed by this court or before the CAT. The jurisdiction of the CAT can be traced from Section 14 of the CAT Act. Relevant portion of Section 14 of the CAT Act may be reproduced here-under, for convenience: “14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to— xxx xxx xxx (c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii) or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation [or society] or other body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment. [Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to “Union” in this sub-section shall be construed as including references also to a Union territory.]” 28. A bare perusal of this provision makes it abundantly clear that all “service matters” pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the Union can be decided by the Tribunal. The ‘service matter’ is defined in Section 3(q) of the A.T.Act which is reproduced here-under, for convenience:- 3. Definitions.-- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-- xxx xxx xxx xxx (q) “service matters”, in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government, as respect – (i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits; (ii)tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, revision, premature retirement and superannuation; (iii) leave of any kind; (iv) disciplinary matters; or (v) any other matter whatsoever;” 29. Keeping in view the submission of Mr. Deb, learned Sr. Keeping in view the submission of Mr. Deb, learned Sr. counsel that the enumeration as mentioned in “any other matter whatsoever”, though seems to be very wide, but, the said enumeration must get its colour from the preceding four enumerations. I have no problem to accept the said analogy. Now, taking the queue from this explanation as put forward by learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner, and further, if the proposition laid down in Vijanath Jha(supra), is applied in the case in hand, then, the phrase “any other matter whatsoever” as inserted in clause (v) of Section 3(q) is to take colour from the other four preceding enumerations that include “disciplinary matters” being inserted in clause (iv) i.e. preceded by clause (v) as stated above. In furtherance thereof, in my considered view, the inclusion of “disciplinary matters” in clause (iv) in the main provision of Section 3(q), has a rational nexus with the object the legislature sought to be achieved by the Act. 30. As quoted and extracted here-in-above, a conjoint reading of Section 11, 13(2), 18 and 19(i) of the Act of 2013 makes it clear that the incident of sexual harassment tantamounts to misconduct and the inquiry on the complaint has to be made as per service rules. To reiterate, the definition of “service matters” of the A.T. Act, 1985 includes “disciplinary matters”. 31. In the backdrop of above analysis of law, it is clear that the internal inquiry as initiated on the basis of the complaint of the petitioner falls within the ambit of the definitions of “service matters”. Thus, in the conscious consideration of this court, the Tribunal will have jurisdiction to decide the said aspect. 32. At the cost of repetition, in my view, the petitioner being an aggrieved person has challenged the recommendation of the Internal Complaints Committee before the appellate authority in accordance with the provisions of the service rules which comes within the ambit of the category of disciplinary matters as enumerated in Section 3(q) of the A.T.Act, 1985. 33. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra (supra), held that – Tribunal is the court of first instance and it will not be open for the litigant to approach the High Court as a court of first instance (Para 93). 34. 33. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra (supra), held that – Tribunal is the court of first instance and it will not be open for the litigant to approach the High Court as a court of first instance (Para 93). 34. As I have said earlier, since it is not in dispute that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with “service matters” of respondent- ICAR, the proper remedy for the petitioner is to file an application under Section 19 of the AT Act, 1985 before the Tribunal. 35. In view of the law laid down in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the instant petition presented before this court cannot be entertained. The grievance of the petitioner falls within the ambit of “disciplinary matters” which is inclusive of the definition of “service matters” as contemplated under Section 3(q) of the A.T.Act, 1985. For these cumulative reasons, this petition is not maintainable before this court. 36. The petition, accordingly, stands dismissed by preserving right of the petitioner to avail the remedy as contemplated under Section 19 of the A.T.Act, 1985. There shall be no order as to cost.