ORDER : The petitioner in this revision petition calls in question the order dated 30.08.2018 passed by the LXVII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City in O.S.No.4224 of 2017 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 (a) & (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’ for short) seeking rejection of the plaint. 2. Brief facts leading to the filing of the present petition, as borne out from the pleadings, are as follows: On 10.06.1967 the family members of the vendors of the petitioner partitioned their properties. Long after the said partition, on 19.09.1994, the petitioner purchased the land to an extent of 1 acre 10 guntas in Sy.No.209/1 of Kodigehalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk under three registered sale deeds and took possession of the aforesaid property in terms of rights under the sale deeds. Pursuant to the petitioner coming into possession of the property, on the strength of the sale deeds, applied for change of revenue entries to the appropriate authority and the mutation entries were changed in the name of the petitioner in terms of mutation Nos.3/94-95, 4/94-95 and 5/94-95. 3. In terms of another sale deed dated 10-12-2003 the petitioner again purchased remaining extent of 1 acre 11 guntas of land in Sy.No.209/1 which totally comprised of 2 acres and 21 guntas. Therefore, the petitioner initially having purchased 1 acre 10 guntas and subsequently the remaining 1 acre and 11 guntas became absolute owner of the entire extent of Sy.No. 209/1. 4. On 18.07.2012, the petitioner applied and was granted conversion of land from agriculture to nonagricultural purposes by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, after which, it is claimed that the petitioner developed the land and was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property right from 1994. 5. 4. On 18.07.2012, the petitioner applied and was granted conversion of land from agriculture to nonagricultural purposes by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, after which, it is claimed that the petitioner developed the land and was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property right from 1994. 5. The 1st plaintiff claiming to the daughter of one late Ramaiah and plaintiffs 2 to 9 claiming to the wife and children of one late Narayanaswamy who did not have any right or title and even interest over the land filed a suit against the petitioner and 10 others seeking the relief of declaration to declare them as absolute owners and put them in possession of the land to an extent of 1 acre out of 2 acres and 21 guntas and also seek that the three registered sale deeds of the year 1994 are not to be binding on them. The petitioner was arrayed as defendant No.11 in the said suit. In the said suit, the petitioner filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 (a) & (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking rejection of the plaint. The trial Court rejects the application on the ground that limitation, which plea was set up by the petitioner herein, to be a mixed question of law and fact and declined to accept the application under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) CPC. It is the rejection by this order that has brought the petitioner to this Court. 6. Heard Shri Shivaprasad Shantanagoudar, learned counsel for the petitioner. Shri P.M. Narayanaswamy and Shri Ramesh Kumar, learned counsel for respondents 1 to 8 are absent. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the trial Court has grossly erred in not accepting the application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) as repeatedly suits are filed by strangers claiming to be family members of the vendors of the petitioner and every time the plaint has been rejected by an order of the trial Court. Such orders having become final, suits are filed again and again which is an abuse of the process of the Court and seeks that the application filed for rejection of the plaint should be allowed and the suit be dismissed with exemplary costs. 8. Such orders having become final, suits are filed again and again which is an abuse of the process of the Court and seeks that the application filed for rejection of the plaint should be allowed and the suit be dismissed with exemplary costs. 8. This Court issued emergent notice on 29.03.2019 and also permitted service of notice on the counsel who represented the plaintiffs before the trial Court, before granting any interim order. After service of notice upon the counsel and an acknowledgment being filed, this Court granted an interim order of stay of all further proceedings before the trial Court on 08.04.2019. The matter has appeared on five occasions after the said date, respondent Nos.1 to 8 remained absent on most of the occasions. The matter was listed on 03.06.2021 and service on respondent No.9 was also treated as complete. 8.1 The matter was heard on 10.06.2021 and owing to continuous absence of the learned counsel for respondents 1 to 8 since 2019, the matter was directed to be listed on 24.06.2021. Again on 24.06.2021 there was no representation on behalf of the respondents and as a last opportunity, the matter was directed to be listed on 5.07.2021 for further hearing. It was also indicated that in the event respondents 1 to 8 do not appear, the matter would be taken up for consideration in their absence. Again on 5.07.2021 there was no representation. The matter was directed to be listed on 13.07.2021. On 13.07.2021 again when the learned counsel for the respondents remained absent, the matter was heard. 9. The facts that are narrated hereinabove need not be reiterated. Sy.No.209 comprised of 2 acres and 21 guntas which the vendors of the petitioner had purchased by way of sale deed dated 2.04.1956 and became property of a particular joint family and thereafter on 10.06.1967 a partition was entered into in the joint family of the vendors of the petitioner. The petitioner on 19.09.1994 by three separate sale deeds purchased 1 acre and 10 guntas out of the total extent of 2 acres and 21 guntas in Sy.No.209 and again by sale deed dated 10.12.2003 he purchased the remaining extent of 1 acre 11 guntas and thereby became absolute owner of the property. The land was converted by the competent authority from agriculture to nonagricultural purposes on 18.07.2012. The land was converted by the competent authority from agriculture to nonagricultural purposes on 18.07.2012. It transpires that the family members of the vendors of the petitioner had instituted two proceedings against the petitioner – one challenging the order of conversion of the earlier purchase of 1 acre and 10 guntas in Writ Petition No.17371 of 2004 and a civil suit in O.S.No.17562 of 2004 which was in fact filed by the very plaintiffs who were the respondents in the present civil revision petition. 10. This suit came to be dismissed on 8.01.2014. After institution of the suit in O.S.No.17562 of 2004, the other family members of the vendors of the petitioner instituted another suit in O.S.No.2923 of 2008 seeking partition and possession and further sought declaration that the sale deed dated 19.09.1994 entered into by their ancestors was not binding on them. This suit also came to be dismissed on 21.03.2011 which was further affirmed by this Court in R.F.A.No.1414 of 2014. 11. In the interregnum, the rest claiming to be that they are left over family members had instituted suit in O.S.No.6026 of 2011 claiming partition and separate possession. In the said suit, the present petitioner and defendants 3 and 4 in the subject suit were also parties. It is in this suit, the petitioner herein filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC. This application filed by the petitioner was allowed and the suit was rejected. This rejection of the plaint became final. 12. It is after all the aforesaid proceedings, the present suit is instituted by the plaintiffs who are respondents 1 to 8 herein claiming that the sale deed entered into between the family members who are either father or grand-father of the plaintiffs not to be binding on them. After issuance of notice in the subject suit, the petitioner files this application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. The trial Court claiming to be considering the application rejects the same by this perfunctory order in the following words: “6. POINT NO.1:- On perusal of the plaint averments it is clear that the suit is filed for declaratory relief and consequential relief of permanent injunction. In para No.17 of the plaint, it is stated that the cause of action to the suit arose on 1-06-2017 when the defendants interfered with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession. POINT NO.1:- On perusal of the plaint averments it is clear that the suit is filed for declaratory relief and consequential relief of permanent injunction. In para No.17 of the plaint, it is stated that the cause of action to the suit arose on 1-06-2017 when the defendants interfered with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession. Therefore, at this stage, the cause of action set out as to the relief of injunction is deserved to be considered along with the question of limitation as preliminary issue. Even though, the defense contention is having some weight as to the declaratory relief is to be considered under Limitation Act as the sale deeds intended to be declared as null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs date back to 1994. The fact as to limitation and interference with the possession to be dealt on facts and law. Therefore, at this stage, the plaint need not be rejected. 7. The plaintiffs relief is upon the dictum of our own Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka reported in ILR 2016 Karnataka 31, wherein it is observed that the issue of law may not be tried as preliminary issue as per Order XIV Rule 2 of CPC. The question of limitation is mixed the question of law and fact. On the other hand, the defendants placed reliance on the dictum in 2017(4) AKR 13, wherein it is observed that under Order VII Rule 11 CPC,the suit for rejection of plaint – Suit for partition and separate possession Undisputedly ancestor of plaintiff and the defendants not having any properties – defendant becoming absolute owner of property by virtue of sale deed – Plaintiff not challenging said sale deed – However, challenging subsequent gift deed executed by defendant – Apparently suit filed by plaintiff not bona fide to assert rights in law – No valid cause of action for suit – Plaint liable to be rejected. But, here is the case wherein the plaintiff asserts his right on the basis of possession. Therefore, at the inception, the plaint cannot be rejected. Hence, the application is dismissed. The other defendants have not resorted to invoke the provisions under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint. Therefore, rights of the parties are to be determined on framing the issues. The equitable relief of injunction is having continuous and recurring cause of action. Hence, the application is dismissed. The other defendants have not resorted to invoke the provisions under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC for rejection of the plaint. Therefore, rights of the parties are to be determined on framing the issues. The equitable relief of injunction is having continuous and recurring cause of action. Accordingly, I answer the point No.1 in the negative. 8. Point No.2:-My finding on this pointis as per following: ORDER : I.A.No.5 file by the defendant No.11 under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) is hereby dismissed.” The petitioner, in his application, had clearly brought out all the afore-narrated facts and contended that the plaint had to be rejected for two reasons – one being limitation and the other being no cause of action. The trial Court rejects the application on the ground that limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. 13. While considering the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC what is to be looked into is the plaint averments. The plaint averments even if looked into cannot give rise to cause of action on sheer ground of it being barred by limitation. The prayer that is sought in the suit is germane to be noticed and it reads: “WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to pass judgment and decree for the following: i. Declare the plaintiffs are the absolute owners and in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property ii. Declare the alleged sale deed dated 19-09-1994, vide register No.3249/1994-95 volume No.507, pages No.240 to 244, registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Yelahanka, Bangalore in favour of Sri P.R.Chenna Reddy S/o Veera Reddy, executed by defendants in respect of land bearing Sy. No.209/1 measuring 15 guntas situated at Kodigehalli Village, Yelahanka Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk is not binding the plaintiffs. iii. Declare the alleged sale deed dated 19-09-1994, vide register No.3250/1994-95 volume No.546, pages No.86 to 90, registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Yelahanka, Bangalore in favour of Sri P.R.Chenna Reddy S/o Veera Reddy, executed by defendants to an extent of 20 guntas in land bearing Sy.No.209/1 situated at Kodigehalli Village is not binding the plaintiffs. iv. iii. Declare the alleged sale deed dated 19-09-1994, vide register No.3250/1994-95 volume No.546, pages No.86 to 90, registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Yelahanka, Bangalore in favour of Sri P.R.Chenna Reddy S/o Veera Reddy, executed by defendants to an extent of 20 guntas in land bearing Sy.No.209/1 situated at Kodigehalli Village is not binding the plaintiffs. iv. Declare the alleged sale deed dated 19-09-1994, vide register No.3251/1994-95 volume No.546, pages No. 90 to 94, registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Yelahanka, Bangalore in favour of Sri P.R.Chenna Reddy S/o Veera Reddy, executed by defendants in respect of land bearing Sy.No.209/1 measuring 15 guntas situated at Kodigehalli Village is not binding the plaintiffs. v. Permanent injunction restraining the defendant No.11 his agents, servants, or anybody claiming under him or through him from alienating, mortgaging, leasing and dealing in any manner of the suit schedule property. vi. Permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants, or anybody claiming under them or through them from interfering with the plaintiffs peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. vii. For any other consequential reliefs including court costs of the suit as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstance of the case, in the interest of justice and equity.” (emphasis added) The entire prayer is to declare three sale deeds dated 19-09-1994 not to be binding on the plaintiffs and seek a permanent injunction against the petitioner on the averments made out at paragraph 15 of the plaint which reads as follows: “15. The plaintiffs submit that they came to know the alleged sale transactions in respect of suit schedule property, after they obtained certified copies of the suit document i.e., on 8-06-2017. It is pertinent to submit that, in spite of the alleged sale transactions and the alleged revenue records, in the name of the respondents, the plaintiffs have been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property, as its absolute owners. It is submitted that, the conduct of the defendants created an eclipse over the plaintiffs title, to the suit schedule property.” The plaintiffs admit that the revenue records were changed in the name of the petitioner but contend that they are in possession of the property. Revenue records having been changed pursuant to certain sale deeds which the plaintiffs themselves admit cannot be seen to be in possession of the property. Revenue records having been changed pursuant to certain sale deeds which the plaintiffs themselves admit cannot be seen to be in possession of the property. It is for this reason, being fully aware of the earlier transaction, they cleverly seek the prayer that the three sale deeds to be not binding on them. It is this ingenious drafting that has led to the filing of the present suit after suit on the very same cause of action claiming to be different family members. It is in this light, the trial Court ought to have considered the application in its proper perspective and rejected the plaint as was done on earlier occasions concerning the very same survey number and very same sale deeds. 14. It is apposite to consider the judgment of the Apex Court under the parameters of consideration of an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC for rejection of the plaint. The Apex Court in the case of DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI, (2020) 7 SCC 366 has held as follows:- “23.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under: “11. Rejection of plaint, -The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases – (a) Where it does not disclose a cause of action. (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so. (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9: Provided that the time fixed by the court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp papers shall not be extended unless the court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.” 23.2. The remedy under Order 7 Rule 11 is an independent and special remedy, wherein the court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated. On any of the grounds contained in this provision. 23.3. The underlying object of Order 7 Rule 11(a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under rule 11(d), the court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted. 23.4 In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 Supp SCC 315 this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the Court, in the following words: (SCC p. 324 para 12) “12. ….. The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.” 23.5. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even in an ordinary civil litigation, the court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.” 23.5. The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order 7 Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to. 23.6. Under Order 7 Rule 11, a duty is cast on the court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law. 23.7 Order 7 Rule 14 (1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under: “14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies – (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in court when the plaintiff is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint. (2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses or, handed over to the witness merely to refresh his memory.” 23.8.Having regard to Order 7 Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed along with the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11(a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. 23.9. When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint. 23.9. In exercise of power under this provision, the court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out. 23.10. At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration. 23.11. The test for exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & Landon S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I – (2004) 9 SCC 512 which reads as: (SCC p.562, para 139) “139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed. 23.12. In Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd., v. Hede & Co – (2007) 5 SCC 614 the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman – (1999) 3 SCC 267 . 23.13. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact. D.Ramachandran v. R.V.Janakiraman – (1999) 3 SCC 267 . 23.13. If on a meaningful reading of the plaint it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. 23.14. The power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra – (2003) 1 SCC 557 . The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain case. 23.15. The provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (e) are made out. If the court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the court has no option, but to reject the plaint. 24. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit. 24.1. In Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam [Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, (2005) 10 SCC 51 ] this Court held: (SCC p. 60, para 24) “24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded.” (emphasis supplied) 24.2. In T.Arivandandam v. T.V.Satyapal [T. Arivand-andam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467 ] this Court held that while considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words: (SCC p. 470, para 5) “5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful—not formal—reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing.…” (emphasis supplied) 24.3. Subsequently, in ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70 ] this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint. 24.4. If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal [Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602] held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court. 25. The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court. 25. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article. 26. Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the period of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which reads as under: “Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 58. To obtain any other declaration. Three years When the right to sue first accrues. 59. To cancel or set aside an instrument or decree or for the rescission of a contract. Three years When the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract rescinded first become known to him.” The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first accrues. 27. In Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 484] this Court held that the use of the word “first” between the words “sue” and “accrued”, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued. 28. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued. 28. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh [State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, (1991) 4 SCC 1 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1082] held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Order 7 Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected. This is rendered following the judgment in the case of RAGHWENDRA SHARAN SINGH v. RAM PRASANNA SINGH, (2020) 16 SCC 601 wherein the Apex Court delineated the principles of limitation to be considered while considering the application seeking rejection of plaint. The Apex Court holds at para-7 therein as under: “7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions on exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the facts of the case in hand and the averments in the plaint, we are of the opinion that both the courts below have materially erred in not rejecting the plaint in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. It is required to be noted that it is not in dispute that the gift deed was executed by the original plaintiff himself along with his brother. The deed of gift was a registered gift deed. The execution of the gift deed is not disputed by the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift and therefore the same is not binding on him. The deed of gift was a registered gift deed. The execution of the gift deed is not disputed by the plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift and therefore the same is not binding on him. However, it is required to be noted that for approximately 22 years, neither the plaintiff nor his brother (who died on 15-12-2002) claimed at any point of time that the gift deed was showy deed of gift. One of the executants of the gift deed, brother of the plaintiff during his lifetime never claimed that the gift deed was a showy deed of gift. It was the appellant herein-original defendant who filed the suit in the year 2001 for partition and the said suit was filed against his brothers to which the plaintiff was joined as Defendant 10. It appears that the summon of the suit filed by the defendant being TS (Partition) Suit No. 203 of 2001 was served upon Defendant 10-plaintiff herein in the year 2001 itself. Despite the same, he instituted the present suit in the year 2003. Even from the averments in the plaint, it appears that during these 22 years i.e. the period from 1981 till 2001/2003, the suit property was mortgaged by the appellant herein-original defendant and the mortgage deed was executed by the defendant. Therefore, considering the averments in the plaint and the bundle of facts stated in the plaint, we are of the opinion that by clever drafting the plaintiff has tried to bring the suit within the period of limitation which, otherwise, is barred by law of limitation. Therefore, considering the decisions of this Court in T.Arivandandam [T.Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467 ] and others, as stated above, and as the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation, the plaint is required to be rejected in exercise of powers under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.” (emphasis supplied) The Apex Court, in the aforesaid judgments, has clearly held that clever or ingenious drafting cannot mask the Court for consideration of an application seeking rejection of the plaint when the suit is barred by limitation on the face of it. 15. 15. Therefore, in the light of the peculiar facts obtaining in the case at hand as narrated hereinabove and the judgments of the Apex Court in the afore-extracted cases, it cannot but be held that when a suit instituted by the plaintiffs was clearly abuse of process of the Court and bereft of any merit, the trial Court ought to have exercised its power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC by allowing the application filed by the petitioner and rejecting the plaint. 16. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following: ORDER (i) The Civil Revision Petition is allowed. (ii) The impugned order dated 30.08.2018 passed by the LXVII Additional City Civil Judge and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru City on I.A.No.V in O.S.No.4224 of 2017 is quashed. (iii) Application filed under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of CPC stands allowed. (iv) The plaint in O.S.No.4224 of 2017 stands rejected. (v) No costs.