JUDGMENT : The matter has been heard with the consent of learned counsel for the parties through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual quality. I.A.No.11903 of 2019 The instant interlocutory application has been filed for condoning the delay of 102 days taking the ground of department to take a decision to prefer appeal, for which, an opinion has been taken in the matter, some conferences took place with the concerned law officer and instructions were given to procure all the related documents and pleadings so as to prepare a proper memo of appeal. Thereafter, the said procedure took time after settlement of decision by the discussion with the law officer, the file has been handed over to the filing counsel for the purpose of preparing the final draft memo. Thereafter, the appeal has been filed which caused the delay of 102 days. It has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-State that the instant interlocutory application may be allowed since the appellant has got good case on merit and on technicality, the instant appeal would be dismissed, the same will prejudice the appellant. On the other hand, Mr. Saurav Arun, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner has opposed the delay condonation application by putting reliance upon the certain judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Cicily Kallarackal Vrs. Vehicle Factory, (2012) 8 SCC 524 , Post Master General and Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Ltd. and Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 563 , Union of India and Ors. Vrs. Nripen Sarma, (2013) 4 SCC 57 , Vijay Shankar Pandey Vrs. Union of India and Anr., (2014) 10 SCC 589 . We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the rival submissions, first deem it fit and proper to deal with the judgments, upon which, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner. So far as the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Cicily Kallarackal Vrs. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the rival submissions, first deem it fit and proper to deal with the judgments, upon which, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner. So far as the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Cicily Kallarackal Vrs. Vehicle Factory(supra) which pertains to filing of appeal against the order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum under Section 27A(1)(c) and in that pretext, it has been laid down that in filing the appeal, the limitation period provided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, is required to be followed but the fact of this case pertains to intra-court appeal to be governed, wherein, the period of limitation is to be considered under the Limitation Act, 1963 and as such, on fact, the judgment rendered in the aforesaid case is distinct from the fact of the present case. So far as the judgment rendered in the case of Post Master General and Ors. Vrs. Living Media India Ltd. and Anr.(supra), we, on consideration of the factual aspect involved therein has found therefrom that therein the delay in filing the appeal was of 427 days. It is evident from the factual aspect that the Hon’ble Apex Court on the basis of contradiction in the fact has not found to condone the delay of 427 days but the said fact is not available in the facts of the present case as would appear from the ground taken for condonation of delay in the interlocutory application, hence, this judgment is not applicable in the facts of this case. So far as the case of Union of India and Ors. Vrs. Nripen Sarma(supra), there was delay of 239 days in filing the appeal. Herein, the delay of 102 days. It further requires to refer herein the other proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana Vrs. Chandra Mani and Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 132 , wherein, it has been laid down to the effect that while condoning the delay of 109 days in filing the LPA before the High Court, this Court has observed that certain amount of latitude within the reasonable limits is permissible having regard impersonal bureaucratic set up involving red tapism. In State of U.P. and Ors. Vrs. In State of U.P. and Ors. Vrs. Harish Chandra and Ors., (1996) 9 SCC 309 , by giving similar reasons, as mentioned in Chandra Mani’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court, condoned the delay of 480 days in filing the SLP. In National Insurance Company Ltd. Vrs. Giga Ram and Ors., (2002) 10 SCC 176 , the Hon’ble Apex Court after finding that the High Court was not justified in taking too technical view of the facts and refusing to condone the delay, accepted the case of the appellant-Insurance Company by protecting the interest of the claimant and condoned the delay. In State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok Ao and Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 752 , the Hon’ble Apex Court while reiterating the principle that latitude be given to the government litigation, allowed the appeal filed by the State of Nagaland. This Court after considering the aforesaid position of law, is of the view that it would not be proper to throw out the instant appeal on the ground of limitation rather it would be in the ends of justice to consider the case on merit, so that, there will be no prejudice to the party. Accordingly, we thought it proper to condone the delay of 102 days in filing the instant appeal. In the result, I.A.No.11903 of 2019 is allowed and delay of 102 days in preferring the appeal is condoned. L.P.A. No.869 of 2019 The instant intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 30.07.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.3503 of 2008, whereby and whereunder, the departmental proceeding dated 05.04.2003 and the consequential order dated 04.06.2008, the enquiry report dated 28.06.2012, punishment order dated 24.10.2012, appellate order dated 28.07.2013 have been quashed and set aside. 2. The brief facts of the case required to be referred herein read as hereunder:- The writ petitioner was proceeded departmentally by issuance of memo of charge vide memo no.139 dated 08.03.003. It is alleged in charge that the writ petitioner provoked various constables not to do their job and duty as the strike called by the Jharkhand Police Men’s Association. One of the officers informed the Superintendent of Police, Seraikella-Kharsawan that the writ petitioner and other fours persons have violated the order passed by the higher authority. The writ petitioner was put under suspension on 21.03.2003. One of the officers informed the Superintendent of Police, Seraikella-Kharsawan that the writ petitioner and other fours persons have violated the order passed by the higher authority. The writ petitioner was put under suspension on 21.03.2003. The Superintendent of Police, Seraikella-Kharsawan informed the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 28.03.2003 that the writ petitioner was still participating in the strike making allegation against the Superintendent of Police even after his suspension on 21.03.2003, as such, the another charge was framed on 05.04.2003 by the Deputy Inspector General of Police who is the appellate authority of the Constable. It has been agitated before the learned Single Judge by referring to the charge dated 05.04.2003 along with charge dated 08.03.2003 which according to the writ petitioner is more or less same and similar in nature and the period is also same. It has been contended that since on the basis of the charge dated 08.03.2003, the departmental proceeding was concluded and the Superintendent of Police, Seraikella-Kharsawan dismissed the writ petitioner from service on 07.10.2003 but finally the order of dismissal has been set aside in an order passed in the memorial by the Inspector General of Police dated 18.06.2005, in pursuant thereto, the writ petitioner was reinstated in service. But against the proceeding in pursuant to the memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003, has been revived, in which the disciplinary authority has passed the order dismissing the writ petitioner which has been affirmed by the appellate authority also vide order dated 28.07.2013. According to the writ petitioner, since on the same and similar charges, the writ petitioner has already been directed to be reinstated in service, the revival of the second departmental proceeding cannot be said to be proper and justified. 3. Taking into consideration the fact that on the same and similar charges the writ petitioner has already been reinstated in service, as such, there is no requirement to revive the memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 and further since the other Constables have already been reinstated in service, therefore, the learned Single judge has rightly passed the order for quashing and setting aside the impugned orders dated 24.10.2012 and 28.07.2013 as contained in Annexure-19 and 21 respectively to the writ petition. Assailing the same, the instant intra-court appeal has been filed. 4. Mrs. Vandana Singh, learned Sr. Assailing the same, the instant intra-court appeal has been filed. 4. Mrs. Vandana Singh, learned Sr. S.C.-III appearing for the appellant-State has submitted that both the charges dated 05.04.2003 and 08.03.2003 levelled against the writ petitioner are quite different and as such, finding recorded by the learned Single Judge considering both the charges for the same and similar allegation cannot be said to be correct. She further submits that the competent authority has taken decision for keeping the departmental proceeding pertaining to memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 in abeyance to be revived after reinstatement of the writ petitioner in service which order has never been challenged by the writ petitioner and therefore, once the writ petitioner has been reinstated in service, the authority in pursuant to the order passed in this regard with respect to the charge dated 05.04.2003 has rightly revived the departmental proceeding and concluded by dismissing the writ petitioner from service. It has further been submitted that when two departmental proceedings have been initiated by virtue of two memorandum of charges even in one charge, if in the departmental proceeding the delinquent employee is dismissed from service, but in case of order of reinstatement the other departmental proceeding which is pending, can well be revived for the purpose of reaching to the logical end and taking into consideration the aforesaid position of law, the departmental proceeding which has been kept in abeyance on the ground of dismissal of the writ petition by virtue of memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 has rightly been revived and the order of punishment has rightly been passed on the same but the said aspect has not been considered by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has also not considered the fact about the difference in both the charges and without making comparison in between the two charges, the conclusion has been arrived at that since in one charge, the writ petitioner has already been reinstated in service after the order of dismissal having been quashed by the authority having power of memorial on the same set of allegation, there cannot be an order of dismissal from service. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law. 5. In that view of the matter, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law. 5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 6. The admitted fact of this case is required to be referred herein before assessing the legality and propriety of the impugned order which reads as hereunder:- The writ petitioner was proceeded departmentally by issuance of memorandum of charge as contained in memo no.139 dated 08.03.2003, framed against him by the Superintendent of Police, Seraikella-Kharsawan. It has been alleged therein that the writ petitioner in the capacity of Secretary, Jharkhand Police Men’s Association at Seraikella-Kharsawan provoked various Constables not to do their job and duty as there was strike called by the Jharkhand Police Men’s Association. The writ petitioner and other four persons have violated the order passed by the higher Police Official by not discharging their duties and as such, the writ petitioner was put under suspension vide order dated 21.03.2003. A regular departmental proceeding was initiated by issuance of memorandum of charge dated 08.03.2003. Subsequent thereto, another charge issued against the writ petitioner dated 05.04.2003 by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, South Chhotanagpur Range Ranchi. The departmental proceeding pertaining to memorandum of charge dated 08.03.2003 has proceeded and concluded by finding the charge proved and after its acceptance, the writ petitioner was dismissed from service. He, however, has been reinstated in service by the order passed by the authority empower to deal with the memorial. The authorities have passed an order on 20.02.2003 as has been annexed as annexure-26 to the memo of appeal that after initiation of departmental proceeding pertaining to charge dated 08.03.2003, the departmental proceeding pertaining to charge dated 05.04.2003 is kept in abeyance, however with the stipulation made therein that if the delinquent employee will be reinstated in service, the said departmental proceeding will be revived, in pursuant thereto, the departmental proceeding has been revived finally the same culminated in the order of dismissal from service which has been affirmed by the appellate authority. Both the orders have been assailed before the writ Court by filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by taking the plea that allegation in both the charges dated 08.03.2003 and 05.04.2003 since almost similar and once the writ petitioner in pursuant to the departmental proceeding pertaining to charge dated 08.03.2003 has been reinstated in service on the same and similar allegation, the subsequent order of punishment of dismissal is not tenable in the eye of law. The learned Single Judge has accepted the aforesaid submission and allowed the writ petition by quashing and setting aside the impugned orders dated 24.10.2012 and 28.07.2013 which is for consideration under the instant intra-court appeal. 7. The learned Single Judge has accepted the aforesaid submission and allowed the writ petition by quashing and setting aside the impugned orders dated 24.10.2012 and 28.07.2013 which is for consideration under the instant intra-court appeal. 7. We, in order to reach to the rightful conclusion about the legality and propriety of the impugned order, first deem it fit and proper to consider the memorandum of charge pertaining to departmental proceeding on 08.03.2003, for ready reference, the said memorandum of charge is being reflected herein-below: ^^ljk;dsyk&[kjlkaok ftyk cy ds iqfyl&39 lat; dqekj ;kno ds fo:} vuq'kklughurk] drZO;ghurk ,oa iqfyl foHkkx ds vuq'kklu ,oa e;kZnk ds fo:} dk;Z dj ftys ds iqfyldfeZ;ksa ¼goynkj ,oa flikgh½ dks HkM+dk dj jkT; ljdkj ,oa iqfyl Áeq[k ds fo:} foæksgh dh fLFkfr mRiUu djrs gq,] ,d v;ksX; iqfyldehZ gksus dk vkjksi yxk;k tkrk gS D;ksafd %& ¼1½ bUgsa >kj[k.M iqfyl esUl ,'kksfl,'ku ljk;dsyk&[kjlkaok ftyk ds ea=h ds :i esa la?k dk dk;Z lnL;ksa ds dY;k.kkFkZ djrs gq, mudh ekax dks foHkkx ,oa ljdkj ds le{k vuq'kklu ds lkFk laoS/kkfud :i ls j[kus dk gSA ijUrq budk dk;Zdyki blds foijhr ik;k x;k] D;ksafd fnukad 22-02-2003 dh e/; jkf= ls ;s voS/k :i ls lkewfgd vodk'k esa pys x;s vkSj vius dqN lfØ; lgdfeZ;ksa ds lkFk txg&txg fofHkUu iqfyl Fkkuksa ,oa dSai ij tkdj iqfyldfeZ;ksa dks HkM+dk;k vkSj mUgsa iqfyl Áeq[k rFkk ljdkj ds fo:} foæksg djus ds fy, mdlkus dk dk;Z fd;kA ftu iqfyldfeZ;ksa us budk lkFk nsuk ugha pkgk mUgsa Hkh bUgksaus lfØ; lkfFk;ksa ds lkFk M~;wVh ugha djus ds fy, ck/; fd;k vkSj M~;wVh ij tkus ls jksdus dh dkjZokbZ Hkh dhA ¼2½ bUgksaus 50&60 lkFkh iqfyldehZ ds lkFk v/kh{kd dk;kZy; ds cjkens ij dCtk tek fy;k vkSj dk;kZy; vof/k ds nkSjku iqfyl egkfuns'kd ,oa ljdkj ds fo:} vkifRrtud ukjs ckth dh Hkk"k.k fn;k vkSj 'kL= dk Án'kZu fd;kA ¼3½ bUgksaus vius lfØ; lgdfeZ;ksa ds lkFk ekuuh; ftyk ,oa l= U;k;k/kh'k ,oa vU; U;k;k/kh'kksa ds vaxj{kd dks Hkh M~;Vh ij ugha tkus dks ck/; dj inkf/kdkfj;ksa dh lqj{kk O;oLFkk ij [krjk mRiUu fd;kA ¼4½ bUgksaus vius lfØ; lgdfeZ;ksa ds lkFk fnukad 23-02-2003 dks ftyk {ks= esa vk, ekuuh; dY;k.k ea=h Jh vtqZu eq.Mk dks lqj{kk esa vk, LdkWV nLrk dks tcju ljk;dsyk esa gh jksd fy;k vkSj ekuuh; ea=h dks lqj{kk O;oLFkk ij [krjk mRiUu fd;kA ¼5½ bUgksaus vius lfØ; lgdfeZ;ksa ds lkFk fnukad 22-02-2003 dks pkbZcklk ls fof/k O;oLFkk M~;Vh gsrq cqyk, x, 20 x`g j{kdksa dks /kedh nh vkSj mUgsa M~;Vh NksM+dj pkbZcklk ykSVus ds fy, etcwj dj fn;kA ¼6½ bUgksaus vius lfØ; lkfFk;ksa ds lkFk fnukad 25-02-2003 dks eSfVªd ijh{kk ÁkjaHk gksus ds nkSjku ijh{kk dsUæ ,oa xLrksa ny esa dk;Zjr gksexkMZ tokuksa dks M~;wVh NksM+us gsrq nckc Mkyk mUgsa /kedk;k vkSj M~;wVh NksM+us ds fy, etcwj dj fn;k] ftlls Á'kklu dks lgh ¼7½ bUgksaus fnukad 27-02-2003 dks mik;qDr ds nksuksa vaxj{kdksa dks M~;wVh djrs ns[k vius lfØ; lkfFk;ksa ds lkFk mudh onhZ mrkjus dh /kedh nh vkSj /kedh nsdj lkewfgd vodk'k ij tkus ds fy, vkosnu ij gLrk{kj djok;kA ¼8½ bUgksaus iqfyldfeZ;ksa dks lkewfgd vodk'k esa ÁLFkku djus ds nkSjku mUgsa 'kL= ugha tek djus fn;k vkSj 'kL= ds lkFk iqfyl v/kh{kd] dk;kZy; ds cjkens ij tek fd;k vkSj 'kL= dk Án'kZu dj ;g fn[kkus dh dksf'k'k fd;k fd ekaxs ugha tkus ij 'kL= dk mi;ksx Hkh dj ldrs gS vkSj bl rjg mUgksaus vius fØ;k&dykiksa ls ftyk iqfyl cy esa foæksg dh fLFkfr iSnk dhA** The charge dated 05.04.2003 which has been appended as annexure-5 is being referred herein-below for ready reference: ^^ljk;dsyk&[kjlkaok ftyk cy ds fuyafcr iqfyl&39 lat; dqekj ;kno ds fo:} vuq'kklughurk] drZO;ghurk] drZO;foew<+rk ,oa v;ksX; iqfyldehZ gksus dk vkjksi yxk;k tkrk gS D;ksafd %& ¼1½ fnukad 20-03-2003 dks midkjk v/kh{kd] ljk;dsyk Jhefr vksfyi xzsl dqYyw iqfyl v/kh{kd] ljk;dsyk dks muds dk;kZy; esa tkdj crk;k fd muds dkjk dk ,d ds dSnh foxr 10 fnuksa ls xEHkhj :i ls t[eh ,oa chekj gS vkSj mls fo'ks"k tkap ,oa bZykt gsrq VhŒ,eŒ,pŒ vLirky] te'ksniqj Hkstus ds fy, fnukad 12-03-2003 dks gh fyf[kr :i ls iqfyl cy dh ekax dh xbZ Fkh] tks vc rd ÁkIr ugha gqvk gS vkSj dSnh dh xEHkhj gkyr dks ns[krs gq, l'kL= cy miyC/k djk;k tk;A ,slh fLFkfr ,oa ftyk esa cy dh deh dks ns[krs gq, iqfyl ykbZu esa miyC/k iqfyl esUl ,'kksfl,'ku ds lnL;ksa dks tsy xkMZ] ljk;dsyk&[kjlkaok }kjk fnok inkf/kdkjh Jh xkso/kZu jke dks fn;k x;k rks bUgksaus la?k ds lfpo ds :i esa Lo;a ,oa vU; lnL;ksa dks Hkh vkns'k i= ysus ls badkj djok fn;k] ftldh fyf[kr lwpuk fnok inkf/kdkjh }kjk iqfyl v/kh{kd] ljk;dsyk&[kjlkaok dks nks xbZA ¼2½ iqfyl v/kh{kd] ljk;dsyk&[kjlkaok us mijksDr fLFkfr dh fyf[kr tkudkjh fnok inkf/kdkjh ls ÁkIr gksus ds mijkar bUgsa vius dk;kZy; d{k esa M~;wVh ls badkj djus ds laca/k esa iwNrkN djus ds laca/k esa cqyk;k x;k vkSj dkj.k tkuuk pkgk rks bUgksaus ml d{k esa cSBs vuqe.My iqfyl inkf/kdkjh] ljk;dsyk Jh ukxsUæ pkS/kjh ds mifLFkfr esa vuq'kklughu ¼3½ iqfyl v/kh{kd] ljk;dsyk&[kjlkaok us tc bUgsa iqfyl eq[;ky; ds bl vkns'k dk gokyk fn;k fd la/k ds lnL;ksa dks iqfyl ykbZu esa inLFkkfir jgrs gq, M~;wVh djuh gS rks bUgksaus vuq'kklughu ¼4½ iqfyl v/kh{kd us tc iqfyl gLrd fu;e 619 dh leh{kk fd rks ik;k fd vkifrd fLFkfr;ksa esa LFkkuh; inkf/kdkfj;ksa dh 'kfDr;ksa ls lacaf/kr bl rjg bUgksaus fu;e dh xyr O;k[;k rks dh lkFk gh lkFk vius vuq'kklughu vkpj.k ds vkjksi ls cpus ,oa M~;wVh ugha djus mn~ns'; ls bUgksaus ?kVuk ds fnu vFkkZr fnukad 20-03-2003 dh frfFk esa ljk;dsyk ds fpfdRld MkŒ ihŒdsŒ irh ls chekjh dk ,d dkxtkr cuok fy;k vkSj ,d lIrkg ds vkjke fy[kk yh bldh QksVks Áfr fnukad 20-03-2000 dh jkf= 8%20 cts iqfyl v/kh{kd ds dk;kZy; esa ÁkIr djk;k] tcfd ;s mDr frfFk ls gh yxkrkj ljk;dsyk 'kgj esa iqfyl ykbZu ds inkf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk ?kqers&fQjrs ns[ks tk jgs gSA ¼5½ mijksDr xEHkhj vkjksiksa ds vkyksd esa iqfyl v/kh{kd us bUgsa vius Kkikad 470@xksŒ fnukad 21-03-2003 }kjk fuyafcr dj fn;k ¼ftykns'k la[;k 161@03½ tc bl fuyacu vkns'k dh Áfr gLrxr djrs gsrq bUgsa jf{kr dk;kZy; esa cqykdj fn;k rks bUgksaus jf{kr dk;kZy; ds lkŒi`Œ 47 jkekuUn feJk ds le{k ftykns'k dks i<+dj mls ÁkIr ugha fd;k vkSj ;g dgdj okil dj fn;k fd ckn esa ysaxsA bUgksaus fuyacu vkns'k ds vuqikyu esa vc rd iqfyl ykbZu esa ;ksxnku ugha fn;k gS vkSj nwljh vkSj 'kgj esa ?kqedj LFkkuh; laoknnkrkvksa ds ek/;e ls iqfyl v/kh{kd ds fo:} lekpkj i=ksa esa eux ¼6½ budk iwoZ vkpj.k ,oa bfrgkl Hkh vR;Ur fuUnuh; jgk gS rFkk fuEukafdr ftykns'kksa }kjk drZO;ghurk] vuq'kklughurk] M~;wVh ls badkj djus ,oa M~;wVh ls Hkkx tkus ds vkjksi esa nafMr gks pqds gSaA bl rjg ls ;s ,d vknru] vuq'kklughu] drZO;ghu ,oa mnaM Áo`fr ds iqfyl gSa vkSj ,d vuq'kkflr lsok esa jgus ds loZFkk v;ksX; gSA** From bare comparison of allegations levelled in both the charges, it would be evident that the charges levelled as under annexure-1 as quoted hereinabove is totally different to that of charge pertaining to memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 as because in the memo of charge dated 08.03.2003, the writ petitioner has gone for mass strike from the night of 22.02.2003 and with the connivance of other co-employee has provoked the other Police Constables not to discharge their duties as also provoked them to revolved. Even such Constables who are not willing to cooperate have been compelled to follow the instruction. Further, about 50 to 60 co-police employees have taken possession on the baramda of the office of the Superintendent of Police and raised the slogan against the Inspector General of Police and the government as also not allowing the bodyguard of the District and Sessions Judge to discharge his duty. Further, even the movement of one Minister namely Shri Ajit Munda has been interrupted. Further, 20 home-guards have been threatened. It has further been alleged that two bodyguards on the duty of the Deputy Commissioner have been threatened from taking out their uniform and forcefully got their signatures to go for mass strike, while on the other hand, the memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 (annexure-5) speaks about an allegation occurred on 05.04.2003 that when the members of the Police Men’s Association assigned duty in the jail situated at Saraikella-Kharasawan have denied to discharge their duties and misbehaved with the higher officials. Therefore, both the charges cannot be said to be same and similar. It is also admitted fact that since departmental proceeding pertaining to memorandum of charge dated 08.03.2003 has culminated into order of punishment, therefore, departmental proceeding pertaining to memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 has been kept in abeyance with a stipulation made therein that if the writ petitioner would be reinstated in service, the said departmental proceeding will be revived, pursuant thereto, the departmental proceeding has been revived. It requires to refer that decision of revival of the departmental proceeding pertaining to memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 has never been questioned by the writ petitioner. The issue for revival of the departmental proceeding fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra Vrs. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal and Anr., (2014) 13 SCC 198 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph-11 that in case of dismissal of order having been set aside and the concerned employee will be reinstated in service as a result thereof, the relationship of the employer and employee between the parties will stand restored. In that eventuality, it would be permissible for the appellant to proceed with the inquiry relating to departmental proceeding which has been kept in abeyance, for ready reference, paragraph-11 is being referred herein which reads as hereunder:- “11. In that eventuality, it would be permissible for the appellant to proceed with the inquiry relating to departmental proceeding which has been kept in abeyance, for ready reference, paragraph-11 is being referred herein which reads as hereunder:- “11. It is clear from the above that only on the ground that Respondent 1 has already been dismissed from service in another separate inquiry, the High Court has held that insofar as charge-sheet dated 6-7-1988 is concerned, inquiry cannot continue. We are of the opinion that the High Court is only partially correct in its approach. No doubt, so long as Respondent 1 is facing penalty of dismissal, no question arises to continue the inquiry into the charges levelled vide charge-sheet dated 6-7-1988. It is because of the reason that with the dismissal of Respondent 1 from service, as of now Respondent 1 has ceased to be the employee of the appellant. Moreover, the employee who has already been dismissed from service cannot be imposed any other penalty on the conclusion of inquiry pertaining to the charge-sheet dated 6-7-1988. Therefore, at this stage no purpose is going to be served to continue with the inquiry into the said charge-sheet. At the same time, it is also to be borne in mind that Respondent 1 has challenged dismissal order and the matter is pending before the Tribunal. In case the said dismissal is set aside by the Tribunal and/or the High Court/this Court and Respondent 1 is reinstated in service as a result thereof, the relationship of employer-employee between the parties shall also stand restored. In that eventuality, it would be permissible for the appellant to proceed with the inquiry relating to charge-sheet dated 6-7-1988 as well. Therefore, normally such a direction of the High Court to the effect that “proceedings have to terminate” insofar as charge-sheet dated 6-7-1988 is concerned would not be correct. Instead of terminating these proceedings appropriate order as that should normally be passed is to keep in ‘abeyance’. That is the course of action which is permissible under the extant Rules as well as in such circumstances.” 8. Therefore, according to our considered view, there is no embargo in revival of the departmental proceeding as has been revived and furthermore, the decision of the revival of the departmental proceeding dated 05.04.2003 has never been questioned by the writ petitioner. 9. Therefore, according to our considered view, there is no embargo in revival of the departmental proceeding as has been revived and furthermore, the decision of the revival of the departmental proceeding dated 05.04.2003 has never been questioned by the writ petitioner. 9. Finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the allegation levelled in both the charges are almost same and similar in nature, therefore, the order of punishment passed on the basis of memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 has been held to be not sustainable in the eye of law. 10. According to our considered view, the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the fact that the departmental proceeding if initiated exactly on the same and similar charges, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge would be said to be a correct proposition of law but such finding could not have come in case of nature of charges if found to be almost same and similar rather it should be exactly same and similar and not almost same and similar. Here, it is evident from the perusal of both the charges which are different to each other and occurred on two different dates i.e. charge dated 08.03.2003 pertains to allegation initiated in the night of 22.02.2003 while the allegation of another charge dated 05.04.2003 speaks about the occurrence of 05.04.2003, hence, both the charges cannot be said to be same and similar. Further, it would be evident from the comparative assessment of the charge levelled against the writ petitioner in both the memorandum of charges, it would be found that the charges levelled against the writ petitioner is quite different to each other as would appear from the finding recorded in the impugned order, has not considered the allegation levelled against the writ petitioner since nothing has been referred in this regard. 11. It is the settled position of law that if two departmental proceedings have been initiated on different allegation and if in one allegation the order of punishment has been passed for dismissal from service and on revival of the delinquent employee in service by virtue of order of reinstatement by the competent authority by the Court of law, the pending departmental proceeding can be revived and thus by following the said position of law, the pending departmental proceeding has been revived which ultimately culminated into the order of punishment of dismissal from service. In the instant case, the sole plea agitated before the learned Single Judge about the similarity in both the allegations which has been accepted by the learned Single Judge and coming to the fact that other Constables have been reinstated in service leaving apart the writ petitioner, has passed the impugned order. The question before coming to such conclusion which was to be considered by the learned Single Judge by taking into consideration the charges if levelled against the other Constables but as would appear from the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge, no such factual aspect has been pleaded by the parties, as to whether any charges have been levelled against the other Constables or not and if yes, then what were its consequences? It is not in dispute that in the departmental proceeding the parity of punishment is also one of the point to be considered by the High Court under the power of judicial review, if such plea would be taken along with the charges, if levelled, against any delinquent employee and in absence thereof, if any finding has been recorded, the same cannot be said to be proper. It is the settled position of law that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enter into the fact finding is very least, however, it would be evident from the impugned order that no such plea has been taken by the parties for showing interference with the impugned orders on perversity of the finding recorded by the enquiry officer but we have also travelled to that aspect of the matter by taking into consideration the finding recorded by the enquiry officer vis-à-vis the order passed by the disciplinary authority. It requires to refer herein that the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enter into the fact finding by the enquiry officer is least to be interfered with as has been held in case of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran as reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 wherein at paragraph 13, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads hereunder as: “13. P. Gunasekaran as reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 wherein at paragraph 13, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads hereunder as: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr. reported in (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has laid down therein that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. vs. Abrar Ali reported in AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down the guidelines at paragraph 8 showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is being quoted herein below: “8.Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; 13.(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." 12. In view of the aforesaid settled position of law since herein the charge has been found to be proved which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority by passing the order of punishment having been affirmed by the appellate authority also. No such ground has been made out for making interference with the said impugned order, so far as the finding recorded by the enquiry officer is concerned. 13. It cannot be forgotten that the member of the discipline force is required to perform his duty with utmost sincerity but as would appear from the nature of allegation not only flouted the order passed by the higher authority rather denied to discharge his official duty which cannot be accepted from the member of the discipline force. 14. Learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has, however, agitated the ground about the similarity in the charge but as would appear from the finding recorded by the enquiry officer, no such ground has been agitated before it, even not agitated before the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority and for the first time, such ground has been agitated before the writ Court which should not have been accepted by the learned Single Judge as because the departmental proceeding if initiated in a proceeding, the charge is required to be examined by the enquiry officer, wherein the opportunity is to be availed to raise all the points. Herein the opportunities have been provided to the writ petitioner which he has availed by participating before the enquiry officer but such plea has been agitated about the similarity in the memo of charges dated 08.03.2003 and 05.04.2003. Herein the opportunities have been provided to the writ petitioner which he has availed by participating before the enquiry officer but such plea has been agitated about the similarity in the memo of charges dated 08.03.2003 and 05.04.2003. Further, point has been agitated that the memorandum of charge dated 05.04.2003 has been initiated by the Deputy Inspector General of Police who is the appellate authority and as such, the appellate authority is having no jurisdiction but this aspect of the matter is not fit to be considered at this stage since the writ petitioner has submitted to the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority by filing response to the memorandum of charge, participated before the enquiry officer and thereafter, has not filed appeal before the appellate authority rather he has chosen to file memorial without raising this aspect of the matter, under what capacity, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, even though, he being the appellate authority, has issued the memorandum of charge, therefore, at this stage, this point cannot be allowed to be agitated by the writ petitioner. 15. This Court in the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed hereinabove is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge requires interference by this Court and accordingly, the order dated 30.07.2019 is quashed and set aside. 16. In the result, the instant intra-court appeal stands allowed. 17. Accordingly, W.P.(S) No.3503 of 2008 stands dismissed. 18. In consequent to disposal of this appeal, I.A.No.11904 of 2019 also stands disposed of.