JUDGMENT : Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed challenging the order dated 26/02/2007 passed by State of Madhya Pradesh, thereby dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 4th January, 2006 by which the petitioner has been saddled with punishment of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect. 2. Challenging the orders passed by the authorities below, it is submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner on three charges. Charge Nos. 1 and 2 were not found proved, whereas Charge No. 3 was found proved. In fact, the order of punishment is based on no evidence and Charge No. 3 is dependent upon Charge Nos. 1 and 2 and if Charge Nos. 1 and 2 were not found proved, then the authorities have committed a glaring mistake in holding that Charge No. 3 was proved. It is further submitted that it is a case of no evidence, therefore, the order of punishment is vitiated. 3. Per contra, the petition is opposed by the Counsel for the State. It is submitted by Shri Deepak Khot that Charge No. 3 is independent to Charge No. 1 and 2. T Charges No. 1 and 2 were in respect of non-examination of an injured (who subsequently died) whereas Charge no. 3 relates to manipulation of official record to show that the injured was hospitalized. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. Before considering the facts of the case, this Court thinks it apposite to consider the scope of interference by this Court in the departmental matters. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others vs. Rajendra Kumar Dubey, by order dated 25th November, 2020 passed in Civil Appeal No. 3820 of 2020 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 32580 of 2017) has held as under:- 12. Discussion and Analysis We have heard learned Counsel for the parties, and perused the record, and written submissions filed on their behalf. 12.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and re-appreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. 12.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and re-appreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao, a three judge bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If however the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition. These principles were further reiterated in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises the power not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal on the appreciation of evidence, are not re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ court, but not an error of fact, however grave it may be. A writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the finding of fact, the tribunal has erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence. A finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the material evidence adduced before the tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point, and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal. In subsequent decisions of this Court, including Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Director General RPF v. Ch. Sai Babu, Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali, Union of India v. Manab Kumar Guha, these principles have been consistently followed. In a recent judgment delivered by this Court in the State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Heem Singh this Court has summed up the law in following words: "33. In exercising judicial review in disciplinary matters, there are two ends of the spectrum. The first embodies a rule of restraint. The second defines when interference is permissible. The rule of restraint constricts the ambit of judicial review. This is for a valid reason. The determination of whether a misconduct has been committed lies primarily within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The judge does not assume the mantle of the disciplinary authority. Nor does the judge wear the hat of an employer. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. Deference to a finding of fact by the disciplinary authority is a recognition of the idea that it is the employer who is responsible for the efficient conduct of their service. Disciplinary enquiries have to abide by the rules of natural justice. But they are not governed by strict rules of evidence which apply to judicial proceedings. The standard of proof is hence not the strict standard which governs a criminal trial, of proof beyond reasonable doubt, but a civil standard governed by a preponderance of probabilities. Within the rule of preponderance, there are varying approaches based on context and subject. The first end of the spectrum is founded on deference and autonomy-deference to the position of the disciplinary authority as a fact finding authority and autonomy of the employer in maintaining discipline and efficiency of the service. At the other end of the spectrum is the principle that the court has the jurisdiction to interfere when the findings in the enquiry are based on no evidence or when they suffer from perversity. A failure to consider vital evidence is an incident of what the law regards as a perverse determination of fact. Proportionality is an entrenched feature of our jurisprudence. Service jurisprudence has recognized it for long years in allowing for the authority of the court to interfere when the finding or the penalty are disproportionate to the weight of the evidence or misconduct. Judicial craft lies in maintaining a steady sail between the banks of these two shores which have been termed as the two ends of the spectrum. Judges do not rest with a mere recitation of the hands-off mantra when they exercise judicial review. To determine whether the finding in a disciplinary enquiry is based on some evidence an initial or threshold level of scrutiny is undertaken. That is to satisfy the conscience of the court that there is some evidence to support the charge of misconduct and to guard against perversity. But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. But this does not allow the court to re-appreciate evidentiary findings in a disciplinary enquiry or to substitute a view which appears to the judge to be more appropriate. To do so would offend the first principle which has been outlined above. The ultimate guide is the exercise of robust common sense without which the judges' craft is in vain." In Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, this Court held that the High Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court would determine whether: (a) the enquiry is held by the competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations which are extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held that: "13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." 7. Thus, it is clear that the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority and cannot substitute its own findings. The departmental enquiries are decided on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and principle of strict proof is not applicable to the departmental proceedings. 8. Thus, it is clear that the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority and cannot substitute its own findings. The departmental enquiries are decided on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and principle of strict proof is not applicable to the departmental proceedings. 8. The charges which were levelled against the petitioner read as under:- e/; Áns'k 'kklu yksd LokLF; ,oa ifjokj dY;k.k foHkkx ea=ky; Hkksiky] fnukad 04 tuojh 2006 vkns'k %& Øekad ,Q&13&28@2004@17@esfM&1 ;r% Mk0 ,e-ds- vksLVoky] fpfdRlk vf/kdkjh] fofn'kk dks vkfnoklh ljiap Jh Vhdkjke ds mipkj ,oa LokLF; ijh{k.k esa ykijokgh cjrus ij e0Á0 flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k rFkk vihy½ fu;e&1966 ds fu;e 9¼1½ ds vUrxZr vk;qDr] Hkksiky laHkkx Hkksiky ds vkns'k Ø0 2339@fodkl@2000 fnukad 23-11-2000 }kjk fuyafcr fd;k tkdj fnukad 02-01-2001 ds }kjk fuEufyf[kr 3 vkjksiksa ds fy;s dks vkjksi i=kfn tkjh fd;s x;s Fks%& vkjksi %& ¼1½ ;g fd vkids }kjk e`rd Jh Vhdkjke vkfnoklh ljiap xzke y[kwyh dks iqfyl Fkkuk X;kjliqj ds t;sa ÁLrqr fd;s tkus ij Bhd rjhds ls e`rd ljiap dk ijh{k.k ugha fd;k x;k rFkk xEHkhj pksVksa dks tkucw>dj lk/kkj.k pksVsa gksuk ,e-,y-lh- esa vafdr fd;kA ¼2½ ;g fd e`rd Jh Vhdkjke dh pksVksa dk ijh{k.k Mk0 lh-lh- tSu ÁkbosV fpfdRld ¼HkwriwoZ fpfdRld ftyk fpfdRlky; fofn'kk½ ,oa Mk0 'ks[kj tkyokudj] fpfdRld ftyk fpfdRlky;] fofn'kk ds }kjk tkap djus ij xaHkhj pksVsa gksuk ik;k x;k tks vkidh dRrZO;ksa ds Áfr ?kksj mnklhurk ,oa lafnX/k fu"Bk dk gksuk fu#fir djrk gSA ¼3½ ;g fd vkius fnukad 12-11-2000 dks e`rd Jh Vhdkjke vkfnoklh dh tkap i'pkr mls ftyk fpfdRlky; esa HkrhZ ugha fd;k] cfYd fnukad 13-11-2000 dks e`R;q gks tkus ij vius d`R;ksa dks Nqikus ds fy;s iqjkuh rkjh[k esa vks-ih-Mh- iath ds ljy Øekad&19299 ij HkrhZ djus dh feF;k Áfof"V djkbZ xbZA 2@& ;r% Mk0 vksLVoky }kjk vkjksih ds }kjk ÁLrqr Áfrokn mRrj larks"ktud ugha ik;s tkus ds dkj.k vk;qDr Hkksiky laHkkx Hkksiky ds vkns'k fnukad 23-04-2001 }kjk vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh] X;kjliqj ftyk fofn'kk dks tkap vf/kdkjh fu;qDr fd;k x;k FkkA tkap vf/kdkjh us tkap Áfrosnu fnukad 25-01-2003 dks ÁLrqr fd;k] ftlesa vkjksi Ø0 1 ,oa 2 fl) ugha ik;k rFkk vkjksi Ø0 3 fl) ik;kA 3@& ;r% vk;qDr] Hkksiky laHkkx] }kjk tkap Áfrosnu dh Áfr foHkkx dks Ásf"kr dj Áekf.kr vkjksi dh xaHkhjrk ds dkj.k vkjksih dks nh?kZ 'kkfLr ls nf.Mr djus dk ÁLrko fn;k x;kA tkap Áfrosnu dh Áfr vkjksih vf/kdkjh dks Hkstdj vH;kosnu ÁLrqr djus dk volj Ánku fd;k x;kA bl lanHkZ esa Mk0 vksLVoky }kjk fnukad 21-03-2003 dks vH;kosnu ÁLrqr fd;k x;kA 4@& ;r% Mk0 vksLVoky ds fo#) vkjksfir vkjksi Áfrokn tkap Áfrfyfi vk;qDr] Hkksiky laHkkx Hkksiky dh vuq'kalk ds ifjis{; esa ijh{k.kksijkUr Mk0 vksLVoky dh ^^nks okf"kZd osru o`f);ka lap;h ÁHkko ls jksdh tkus** dh 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir fd;s tkus dk vuafre Á'kkldh; fu.kZ; fy;k tkdj Ádj.k yksd lsok vk;ksx ds vfHker gsrq Hkstk x;kA vk;ksx us vius i= Ø0 10165@167@2005@th-,l-] fnukad 30 uoEcj 2006 (Not visible) }kjk foHkkx ds ÁLrko ls lgefr O;Dr dhA 5@& vr% jkT; 'kklu Mk0 ,e-ds- vksLVoky] fpfdRlk vf/kdkjh ds fo#) ik;s x;s vkjksi ds fy;s mUgsa e/;Áns'k flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k ,oa vihy fu;e&1966 ds fu;e 10 ¼pkj½ ds varxZr ^^nks okf"kZd osru o`f);ka** lap;h ÁHkko ls jksdus dh 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir djrk gSA e/;Áns'k ds jkT;iky ds uke ls rFkk vkns'kkuqlkj ¼ih-vkj-ekyoh;½ voj lfpo e/;Áns'k 'kkluyksd LokLFk; ,oa ifjokj dY;k.k foHkkx 9. Charge No. 1 was that the petitioner, deliberately did not examine the injured (who subsequently died) properly and deliberately mentioned that he has suffered simple injuries. Charge No. 2 was that when the injured (who subsequently died) was examined by one private doctor, then he found that the injured (who subsequently died) had sustained grievous injuries and it was mentioned that this conduct of the petitioner amounts to misconduct and negligence in discharge of his duties, whereas in Charge No. 3, it is alleged that the injured (who subsequently died) was not hospitalized on 12/11/2000 and after death of the injured, with an intention to suppress this fact, a backdated manipulated entry was made in the register on 13/11/2000 to show that the injured was hospitalized. 10. It is true that the petitioner has been exonerated for Charge Nos. 1 and 2, whereas he has been found guilty for Charge No. 3. 11. From the plain reading of Charges levelled against the petitioner, it is clear that Charge Nos. 1 & 2 were related to negligence on his medical duties, whereas Charge No. 3 was in respect of manipulation of official record. Charge No. 3 has nothing to do with the medical duties of the petitioner. It is incorrect to say that Charge No. 3 was completely dependent upon Charge Nos. 1 & 2. In fact, Charge No. 3 is independent to other charges and if the respondents have found that Charge No. 3 was duly proved in Departmental Enquiry, then it cannot be said that such findings cannot be given unless and until Charge Nos. 1 and 2 are found to be proved. It is not the case of the petitioner that the findings given by the Enquiry Officer which was accepted by the disciplinary authority were based on no evidence. On the contrary, the enquiry report clearly indicates that Charge No. 3 was found to be proved on the basis of documentary evidence. 12. No other argument is advanced by the counsel for the petitioner. 13. On the contrary, the enquiry report clearly indicates that Charge No. 3 was found to be proved on the basis of documentary evidence. 12. No other argument is advanced by the counsel for the petitioner. 13. Considering the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioner as well as the enquiry report submitted by the enquiry officer which was duly accepted by the disciplinary authority as well as considering the limited scope of interference of this Court in the departmental enquiry, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out for interference in the matter. 14. Even otherwise, the punishment imposed upon the petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate or shocking to the conscience of this Court. The petitioner is alleged to have manipulated the official record in order to cover up his misdeeds. 15. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the punishment of stoppage of two increments without cumulative effect, does not require any interference. Accordingly, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.