JUDGMENT : This appeal is filed by the 2nd defendant in O.S.No.79 of 1989 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Tadepalligudem, West Godavari District, against the judgment and decree dated 20.07.1998. For the ease of convenience, the parties are referred to as they were arrayed in the suit. 2. The facts, according to the plaintiffs in the suit, are as follows: a) Late Sri Jutta Ganga Raju, who was the owner of plaint ‘A’ schedule property, among other properties, passed away on 28.12.1951, intestate, leaving behind his widow late Smt. Jutta Venkatamma, two sons, viz., late Sri Somaraju and late Sri Subbarao, and four daughters, who are defendant Nos.1 to 4 in the suit. The properties of late Sri Ganga Raju devolved on his two sons. Later his widow late Smt. Venkatamma has also executed a registered relinquishment deed in favour of her sons and as such the two sons became the absolute owners of ‘A’ schedule property. The property described in ‘A’ schedule consists of two contiguous items of property, viz.., land admeasuring Ac.0.69 cents in RS.No.129/2, and land admeasuring Ac.1.16 cents in RS.No.129/3 of Kadakatla Village, Tadepalligudem Mandal, West Godavari District. Both the sons of late Sri Gangaraju were desirous of constructing houses in the ‘A’ schedule property and sought advise whether such a house would be Vastu compliant. They were advised that the shape of ‘A’ schedule property was not appropriate for construction and needed to be corrected. On such advise both the sons of late Sri Gangaraju had executed a nominal settlement deed registered on 31.07.1963 in favour of defendants 1 to 4 for the purpose of overcoming Vastu dosha. The land, which was the subject matter of the said nominal settlement deed was Ac.0.69 cents in RS.No.129/2 and Ac.0.14 cents in Rs.No.129/3 aggregating to Ac.0.83 cents. b) The two sons of late Sri Gangaraju having executed such a document did not inform to defendants 1 and 4 about the said transaction and had retained the deed of settlement in their possession and the possession of the property was also not delivered to defendants 1 and 4. Further defendants 1 and 4 never accepted the said deed of gift or asserted any right or claimed possession of the property. A claim of adverse possession was also raised, by the plaintiffs, but does not appear to have been pressed in the course of trial. Further defendants 1 and 4 never accepted the said deed of gift or asserted any right or claimed possession of the property. A claim of adverse possession was also raised, by the plaintiffs, but does not appear to have been pressed in the course of trial. As ‘B’ schedule property forms part of ‘A’ schedule property and was never separated, no reconveyance was obtained and sought from defendants 1 and 4. However, the 4th defendant executed an agreement (kararnama) dated 09.12.1975 acknowledging title and possession of two sons of late Sri Gangaraju. c) Due to certain misunderstandings between the widow and sons of late Sri Gangaraju on one side and the daughters of Sri Gangaraju on the other, two suits came to be filed. Initially, the 2nd defendant filed O.S.No.891 of 1981 on the file of the District Munsif, Tadepalligudem claiming partition of all the properties belonging to late Sri Gangaraju. This included the land, which is described in ‘B’ schedule to the suit. Similarly, the 3rd defendant also filed O.S.No.121 of 1982 on the file of the District Munsif, Tadepalligudem for a declaration and possession that she had inherited Ac.1.00 of land out of ‘A’ schedule property under a oral gift. The claim in this suit included ‘B’ schedule property also. However both the suits were dismissed and the defendants did not take any further steps in these two cases. d) At that stage, the sons of late Sri Gangaraju passed away; Sri Jutta Subbarao died intestate on 02.01.1985 leaving behind his wife, three sons and one daughter, who are shown as plaintiffs 1 to 5. Jutta Somaraju died intestate on 18.02.1987 leaving behind his wife, three sons and four daughters, who are arrayed as plaintiffs 6 to 13. Late Sri Jutta Venkatamma, the widow of late Sri Gangaraju, also died on 27.03.1985 after having executed a registered Will dated 28.08.1982 bequeathing her properties to her two sons, viz., Jutta Subbarao, Jutta Somaraju and their sons. Thus plaintiffs became the absolute owners of the entire ‘A’ schedule properties. e) After the demise of the widow and two sons of late Sri Gangaraju, the plaintiffs came to know that the 1st defendant had executed a registered agreement of sale, marked as Ex. Thus plaintiffs became the absolute owners of the entire ‘A’ schedule properties. e) After the demise of the widow and two sons of late Sri Gangaraju, the plaintiffs came to know that the 1st defendant had executed a registered agreement of sale, marked as Ex. B 16, in respect of 41 ½ cents of ‘B’ schedule property, which is described in schedule ‘C’ to the Plaint, in favour of the 2nd defendant showing as if the property was in the possession of defendants 1 and 4 and a partition had taken place between them. The plaintiffs allege that the property in schedule ‘B’ was never in the possession of defendants 1 and 4 nor was any partition carried out. It was also pleaded that the 2nd defendant did not have the capacity to purchase ‘C’ schedule property for a sale consideration of Rs.1 lakh shown in the said agreement of sale dated 24.11.1988 or pay the advance of Rs.50,000/- shown to have been paid under endorsement on the Ex. B 16 and marked separately as Ex. B 17. f) As all the defendants were threatening to make a forcible entry into the ‘B’ schedule property and have cast a cloud on the title over the ‘B’ schedule property, O.S.No.79 of 1989 was filed before the Senior Civil Judge, Tadepalligudem for the relief of declaration that the plaintiffs have absolute title and possession of the plaint ‘B’ schedule property and for a consequential injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in any manner with the plaintiffs‘ possession and enjoyment of the property. 3. It appears that after the filing of the suit, the 3rd plaintiff had passed away leaving behind his widow and minor daughter as his legal heirs. As these two persons were not willing or interested in joining the litigation, I.A.No.136 of 1994 was filed for impleading them as defendants 5 and 6. This application was allowed on 15.07.1996 impleading them as defendants 5 and 6. The plaint also appears to have been amended for a decree to be passed in favour of plaintiffs and defendants 5 and 6. 4. The defendants 1 and 4 filed their written statement. Thereafter, defendants 2 and 3 filed a separate written statement. In both these written statements the averments in the plaint were denied. The plaint also appears to have been amended for a decree to be passed in favour of plaintiffs and defendants 5 and 6. 4. The defendants 1 and 4 filed their written statement. Thereafter, defendants 2 and 3 filed a separate written statement. In both these written statements the averments in the plaint were denied. The stand taken by the defendants was that the settlement deed, which was marked as Ex.A.12 in the trial, was known to the defendants and that there was separation of plaint ‘B’ schedule properties out of the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties and that the defendants 1 and 4 were in possession of the said property and thereafter a partition had been took place and on the basis of which defendant No.1 had become the absolute owner of her half share of land in ‘B’ schedule property, which was separately described as ‘C’ schedule property in the plaint. It is further averred that defendant No.1 had entered into a registered agreement of sale with defendant No.2, which is a valid document. Defendant No.4 set ex parte. 5. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following 11 issues: 1. Whether the registered settlement deed dated 31.07.1963 executed by Jutta Subba Rao and Somaraju in favour of defendants 1 and 4 is not true and acted upon? 2. Whether the registered relinquishment deed dated 01.03.1985 said to have been executed by late Venkatamma is true, valid and is in accordance with law and is binding on defendants 1 and 4? 3. What is the date of death of late Sri Jutta Gangaraju? 4. Whether Will dated 28.08.1982 said to have been executed by Venkatamma is true, valid and binding on defendants 1 and 4? 5. Whether the agreement dated 09.12.1975 said to have been executed by the 4th defendant is true and valid? 6. Whether the defendants 1 and 4 have got title to and possession of the property covered by settlement deed dated 31.07.63 and also perfected their title? 7. Whether the partition of the property covered by the settlement deed dated 31.07.1963 is true and valid? 8. Whether the agreement of sale dated 24.11.1988 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant is not true? 9. Whether the boundaries given to plaint ‘B’ schedule are correct? 10. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for? 8. Whether the agreement of sale dated 24.11.1988 executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant is not true? 9. Whether the boundaries given to plaint ‘B’ schedule are correct? 10. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for? 11. To what relief? 6. During the course of trial, the plaintiffs examined PWs.1 to 10 and marked Exs.A.1 to A.83. Defendants examined DWs.1 to 4 and marked Exs.B.1 to B.17. 7. The trial Court, after completion of trial and hearing the submissions made on both sides, had held that the registered settlement deed dated 31.07.1963 was never acted upon; the plaint ‘A’ schedule was never divided or separated into schedule ‘B’ or schedule ‘C’ properties; the agreement of sale dated 24.11.1988 (marked as Ex.B.16) was a document set up for the purpose of creating a right and not a genuine document; the agreement of sale dated 24.08.1988 and the relinquishment deed dated 01.03.1985 executed by late Smt. Venkatamma, who is the widow of late Sri Gangaraju, was valid and binding on defendants 1 and 4; no partition of property under the settlement deed dated 31.07.1963 (Ex.A.12); and that the plaintiffs are entitled for the declaration and injunction as prayed for. 8. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the 2nd defendant alone filed the present appeal. Defendants 1, 3 and 4 have not chosen to file any appeal against this judgment and decree. 9. Heard Sri Raja Reddy Koneti, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri S. Subba Reddy learned counsel for the respondents. 10. Sri Raja Reddy Koneti, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the trial Court had misdirected itself in the entire trial and the said judgment and decree requires to be set aside on the following grounds. i) Once Ex.A.12 had been executed, the same is a valid document against which no evidence can be given contradicting the terms and contents of the said document. Such a course is forbidden by Section 92 of the Evidence Act. Further Section 8 of the T.P. Act specifically provides that upon execution of such a document of instance of ownership stand transferred to the beneficiary of the said document and nothing has been placed before this Court to show that there were any statements in Ex.A.12, which exhibit a different intent. Further Section 8 of the T.P. Act specifically provides that upon execution of such a document of instance of ownership stand transferred to the beneficiary of the said document and nothing has been placed before this Court to show that there were any statements in Ex.A.12, which exhibit a different intent. In the circumstances, the trial Court could not have granted a declaration to the plaintiffs that they are the owners of ‘B’ schedule property. ii) The plaintiffs explanation, as to why Ex.A.12 is a nominal document, is irrational. The contention that Vstudosha impended to two sons of late Sri Gangaraju, who executed a settlement deed, is highly improbable as comply of vathudosha has no basis and cannot be a ground for such transaction. Further the plaintiffs, at the time of execution of Ex.A.12 settlement deed, were too young to aware of these facts and such pleadings have to be described as they are based on any personal knowledge of the plaintiffs. iii) Ex.B.5 and Ex.B.6 cist receipts clearly show that the possession of the property is with the defendants and that would be sufficient to hold that defendants 1 to 4 acted upon the settlement deed. iv) Boundaries of ‘A’ schedule, ‘B’ schedule and ‘C’ schedule properties, set out in the schedules attached to the plaint, would show that the boundaries are different and they are not contiguous piece of land. v) Continuous payment of cist by the plaintiffs exhibited under Exs.A.54 to A.83 does not mean that they are in possession of the said land and their claim of possession over the ‘B’ schedule land has to be described. vi) The correct course of action for the plaintiffs is a suit for cancellation of document or a declaration that the document is invalid or nominal. As no such cancellation or declaration is sought, the trial Court would not have allowed the suit granting declaration of ownership and injunction against the defendants 1 to 4. 11. Sri S. Subba Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents disputes the contentions raised by Sri K. Raja Reddy. Sri Subba Reddy submits that the settlement deed of the year 1963 (Ex.A.12) was not in the knowledge of defendants 1 to 4 and nor did they acted upon the said document in any manner. 11. Sri S. Subba Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/respondents disputes the contentions raised by Sri K. Raja Reddy. Sri Subba Reddy submits that the settlement deed of the year 1963 (Ex.A.12) was not in the knowledge of defendants 1 to 4 and nor did they acted upon the said document in any manner. In the circumstances, the said settlement deed would have to be treated as nominal document which has not been acted upon especially in view of Section 122 of the T.P. Act. He relies upon the kararnama executed in the year 1975 by the 4th defendant recognising the ownership of sons of late Sri Gangaraju to contend that the said kararnama demonstrate the fact that the 4th defendant was wholly unaware of Ex.A.12-settlement deed. He also relied upon three judgments to contend that the plaintiffs are not required to seek a cancellation of Ex.A.12 for being granted the reliefs under the suit. These judgments are Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh, AIR 2010 SC 2807 , Shankarlal Ganulal Khandelwal v. Balmukumd Surajmal Bharuka and Ors., AIR 1999 (Bom) 260 , and Sahul Hameed Rowther v. K.C.P. Mohideen Pichai, (1948) 1 MLJ 270 . 12. The entire controversy in the suit arises on the effect of Ex.A.12-settlement deed. There is no dispute that Ex.A.12-settlement deed was executed by the two sons of late Sri Gangaraju in 1963. 13. The issue that now arises for consideration in this appeal is – whether the said document was a nominal document executed solely for the purpose of correcting vastu dosha and was never acted upon. 14. Section 122 of the T.P. Act reads as follows: “122. Gift defined.-“Gift” is the transfer of certain existing moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee. Acceptance when to be made. “Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.” 15. One of the primary requirements for a gift, to take effect under the above provision of law, is the requirement of acceptance by or on behalf of donees. This acceptance would have to be during the life time of the donors. If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.” 15. One of the primary requirements for a gift, to take effect under the above provision of law, is the requirement of acceptance by or on behalf of donees. This acceptance would have to be during the life time of the donors. In the present case, both the donors passed away even before the suit was filed. As such any acceptance of the gift by the donees would have to be before the death of the donors. 16. Nothing in the evidence shows that either defendant No.1 or defendant No.4 was aware of the execution of Ex.A.12-settlement deed. The kararnama executed by the 4th defendant in 1975 admitting the ownership and possession of ‘B’ schedule land in favour of the donors of Ex.A.12 reinforce this finding. The inability of the defendants to demonstrate any action taken in pursuance of Ex.A.12 such as demarcation of ‘B’ schedule land out of ‘A’ schedule land, steps taken for mutation of ‘B’ schedule land in favour of defendants 1 and 4, payment of tax demonstrating their knowledge of Ex.A.12 having been made out before the trial Court or this Court. In the absence of such a consent, the transfer of property under Ex.A.12 would not take place and as such Ex.A.12 would remain a nominal document which has not been acted upon and which cannot be acted upon after the demise of the donors. This court is arriving at this finding for the following reasons: a) The assent required under Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, can be express or by implication. There is no express assent. However, the defendants claim they had knowledge of the settlement deed and their assent can be deduced by the conduct of the parties. b) The defendants claim that after the execution of the settlement Deed, Ex.A.12, the Schedule ‘B’ property has been separated from Schedule ‘A’ property and kattavas were placed to demarcate Schedule ‘B’ property from Schedule ‘A’ property. The plaintiffs demonstrated through the evidence of PW.9 and PW.10, who are neighbours and are owning lands adjacent to ‘A’ schedule property, that ‘A’ schedule property remains undivided and that no physical features are available to show any demarcation of ‘B’ schedule property out of ‘A’ schedule property. The plaintiffs demonstrated through the evidence of PW.9 and PW.10, who are neighbours and are owning lands adjacent to ‘A’ schedule property, that ‘A’ schedule property remains undivided and that no physical features are available to show any demarcation of ‘B’ schedule property out of ‘A’ schedule property. Their evidence on this issue was not shaken in cross-examination nor any circumstance was shown to demonstrate that these witnesses are interested witnesses. c) The original of Ex.A.12 was produced by the plaintiffs and not by the defendants, which would go to show that the document was never given to the defendants and they were probably unaware of the said document. d) Defendants 2 and 3 had filed O.S.Nos.891 of 1981 and 121 of 1982 claiming rights over ‘A’ schedule property in which ‘B’ schedule property was a part. This would also go to show that none of the defendants were aware of Ex.A.12 settlement deed, as defendants 2 and 3 would not have made such a claim if they were aware of such a settlement deed. e) Defendant No.4 having executed Ex.A.13 kararnama confirming the possession and ownership of her brothers over the land, in the year 1975, remained ex parte and no material was placed before the Court to disbelieve the said kararnama. This would again reinforce the plea of the plaintiffs that the defendants 1 to 4 were unaware of the settlement deed. f) Defendant No.3 was unable to demonstrate her possession over the land. Exs.B.5 to B.11, which are said to be cist receipts given in favour of the defendants do not assist her case as these receipts relate to the period after commencement of the litigation. Further, these receipts relate to the period after the demise of the donors and would not meet the requirements of Section 122 of T.P. Act. On the other hand, Exs.A.56 to A.83 marked by the plaintiffs show that tax was being paid by the plaintiffs as owners of the said land, much prior to the filing of the Suit. g) One other way the defendants could have demonstrated that Ex.A.12 settlement deed was acted upon, would be to show some steps which were taken for recording their names in the revenue records. No such steps were taken for mutation of their names. g) One other way the defendants could have demonstrated that Ex.A.12 settlement deed was acted upon, would be to show some steps which were taken for recording their names in the revenue records. No such steps were taken for mutation of their names. h) The agreement of sale dated 24.11.1988 said to have been executed between defendants 1 and 2 also cannot be accepted on the following grounds. i) Defendant No.2, who was examined as DW.1, had deposed that defendants 1 and 4 had partitioned ‘B’ schedule property about 15 days prior to the execution of the agreement of sale (Ex.A.12) between defendants 1 and 2. DW.2, who is the husband of defendant No.2 deposed that partition of ‘B’ schedule property took place after the agreement of sale between defendants 1 and 2. This apparent contradiction raises a doubt as to the partition of the land set out in ‘B’ schedule properties. j) A doubt was raised as to the financial capacity of the 2nd defendant to enter into Ex.B.16 sale agreement. The contention raised in the written statement was that the 2nd defendant raised money through her husband. However, in the subsequent cross-examination, she gave out other source as the source of money for paying Rs.50,000/- i.e., said to have been endorsed on Ex.B.16 as Ex.B.17. This contradiction casts any amount of doubt about the version of defendant No.2. k) Apart from these findings, another aspect of the conduct of the 2nd defendant, which has been raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, is the attempt of the 2nd defendant in trying to obtain mutation of the land described in schedule ‘C’ by manipulating the records of the Court. The trial Judge has recorded that an injunction was granted by the trial Court against the defendants in I.A.No.569 of 1989. An application was made in I.A.No.379 of 1995 for vacating the said injunction order. However, an order was presented to the Mandal Revenue Officer as if the injunction order in I.A.No.569 of 1989 stands vacated. This order was submitted before the Mandal Revenue Officer by the 2nd defendant and the same was admitted by her in her evidence. The consequences of such manipulation of the court record appears to be the subject matter of some separate proceedings which have not been concluded by the time the decree and judgment came to be passed. This order was submitted before the Mandal Revenue Officer by the 2nd defendant and the same was admitted by her in her evidence. The consequences of such manipulation of the court record appears to be the subject matter of some separate proceedings which have not been concluded by the time the decree and judgment came to be passed. No further light could be thrown on this aspect by the learned Counsel and this Court leaves the issue there. 17. Coming to the grounds raised by Sri Raja Reddy Koneti, learned counsel for the appellants, the first ground raised by him was that once there is a valid document, the provisions of Section 92 of the Evidence Act preclude all further oral evidence to the contrary and provisions of Section 8 of the T.P. Act would automatically convey all incidental rights along with main ownership of the property to defendants 1 and 4. This contention cannot be accepted for the reason that Ex.A.12 itself has not been acted upon and consequently, the question of operation of Section 8 of the T.P. Act would not arise. Further Section 8 of the T.P. Act only provides for all other rights to be transferred upon transfer of the main right of ownership. 18. As far as section 92 of the Evidence Act is concerned, the said provision also would not be applicable as the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs was that the document itself was never acted upon. The evidence is not an attempt to contradict the terms of the document but only an attempt to demonstrate that the document was never acted upon. 19. The contention of Sri Raja Reddy Koneti that the correction of vastudosha as the reason for executing Ex.A.12 is irrational. The fact that the people of this region have great belief in Vasthu Shastra is universally acknowledged and judicial notice of such a belief can be taken. The question whether Vasthu is an exact science and whether the fortunes of a person residing in the house built in violation of such principles, would suffer is a matter which is open to question. However what is unquestionable is the fact that these principles are widely accepted and believed. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that execution of a document to comply with the principles of vastu is irrational and is not a sufficient reason for execution of such documents. However what is unquestionable is the fact that these principles are widely accepted and believed. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that execution of a document to comply with the principles of vastu is irrational and is not a sufficient reason for execution of such documents. 20. Sri Raja Reddy Koneti contended that the payment of cist by the defendants under Exs.B.5 and B.6 would be sufficient to show that they are in possession of the land and had acted upon Ex.A.12. this contention is contradicted by his own contention that Exs.A.54 to A.83 marked by the plaintiffs to prove payment of cist by them is not sufficient to raise a presumption of possession over the land. Apart from this, while it is true that payment of cist may not amount to demonstration of possession over the land, the fact remains that defendants 1 and 4 never paid any land revenue over the ‘B’ schedule property till the filing of the suit which would go to show that the presumption that they were aware of Ex.A.12-settlement deed cannot be accepted. 21. Sri Raja Reddy Koneti raised the contention that the issues were not properly framed, since neither cancellation of the document nor a declaration that the said document does not bind them, was sought in the suit, and as such, further declaration of title cannot be permitted. 22. In Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh the Hon‘ble Supreme Court while considering the question of Court fee payable on a plaint had held that a suit for cancellation of a deed can be filed only by the executants and that all persons, other than executants, can only seek a declaration that the document is not binding on them. 23. 23. In Sahul Hameed Rowther v. K.C.P. Mohideen Pichai a Division Bench of High Court of Madras had held as follows: In Thirumalayandi Thevar v. Uthanda Thevar { (1947) 1 MLJ 212 = 60 L.W. 207)}, and Ramanathan Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1946) 2 M.L.J. 114 =59 L.W. 411, it was presumed that the document which purported to transfer property from one person to another was an insuperable obstacle to the granting of a decree for injunction or possession in favour of the person who under that deed purported to convey the property to another; but is such a deed, when it is said to be sham and nominal and is worth nothing more than the paper on which it is written, an insuperable obstacle to the granting of any relief to the person who under that document purports to convey the property to another? In all the cases to which we have been referred and in which this, question has arisen it has been uniformly held, as pointed above, that it is not necessary to set aside a transaction which does not effect any transfer of title at all. If so, then the transaction and the document evidencing it are not insuperable obstacles to the granting of the plaintiff's prayer. If the Court finds that title did pass by the document, then a suit merely praying for a declaration that the transaction was sham and nominal will have to be dismissed, even though the Court might be of opinion that the plaintiff had a right to have the deed cancelled. 24. In the present case since Ex.A.12 was not acted upon, the ratio of the above judgment would apply on all fours and there would be no need to seek the declarations contended by Sri K. Raja Reddy. 25. In these circumstances, it must be held that there are no merits in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.