JUDGMENT : By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Solan, District Solan, Himachal Pradesh in Complaint No. 250/3/04 of 2002, dated 31.8.2007, vide which respondent-accused stand acquitted for commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the appeal are that complainant/appellant is an incorporate, constituted and registered Company with the Registrar of Companies at Jallandhar vide Registration No. 0608245 dated 05.04.1988. Earlier the Complainant-Company was named known as ‘Himalyan Plastic Private Limited’ and later on it was converted into a ‘Limited Company’ under Sections 34 and 44 of the Companies Act, 1956 vide order of the Registrar of Companies dated 05.01.2001. As such, now it is known as ‘Himalyan Plastic Limited’. All the liabilities, rights, assets etc. of M/s Himalyan Plastic Private Limited have been taken over by M/s Himalyan Plastic Limited. The Complainant-Company has its registered office and works at Chambaghat, Tehsil, and District Solan H.P. Sh. Madan Sharma is the Managing Director of the Complainant-Company and being Managing Director of the Company, he has executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of Sh. Sita Ram Verma, S/o Sh. Sant Ram, R/o Tehsil and District Solan HP and gave him the powers to act on behalf of the Company. Sh. Sita Ram Verma is competent and entitled to sign, verify and file the complaint on behalf of the Complainant-Company and to depose on oath by appearing in Court as also to engage service of counsel and to do all other lawful acts, deeds and things which may be necessary for the said purpose. The Complainant-Company deals in the business of manufacturing and sale of HDPE Pipes, fittings, sprinkler, drip irrigation systems, PIR (Silicon coated) HDPE Telecom. Duct. The accused was earlier purchasing the above material on credit basis form the Complainant-Company as per the business practice. In order to discharge the part of the liability and for consideration, the accused issued cheque duly signed by him in favour of Complainant- Company bearing Cheque No. 0098241 on 29.05.2002 for Rs. 14,94,148/- drawn at the Gurgaon Gramin Bank, Nandrampur Bass Branch of his account No. 3150 with the assurance that the same would be honoured on its presentation under its bank in all circumstances. 14,94,148/- drawn at the Gurgaon Gramin Bank, Nandrampur Bass Branch of his account No. 3150 with the assurance that the same would be honoured on its presentation under its bank in all circumstances. Accordingly, complainant deposited the said cheque in the State Bank of India, The Mall Solan for encashment. The said banker of the Complainant-Company forwarded the said cheque to the drawee bank for presentation/realization, but to the utter surprise of the Complainant-Company, the said cheque was returned as unpaid by the drawee bank vide its cheque returning memo dated 28.08.2002, indicating the reason “insufficient balance” and this information was given to the complainant company by the State Bank of India, The Mall Solan vide letter dated 07.09.2002. The said Cheque was dishonoured by the drawee bank due to insufficiency of funds to the credit of accused. After the receipt of the said cheque as unpaid, complainant company issued a registered AD notice dated 14.09.2002 by sending the same on 16.09.2002 at two correct addresses of the accused requiring him to make the payment of the said dishonoured cheque to the complainant company within 15 days from the receipt of the notice. Notice was also sent separately under postal certification. The notices were duly received by the accused on 23.09.2002, but in spite of having received the notices, the accused failed to make the payment of the dishonoured cheque to the Complainant-Company. Period mentioned in the notice expired on 08.10.2002. Since the accused had failed to make the payment of the dishonoured cheque within the 15 days from 23.09.2002 and period mentioned in the notice expired so the accused is guilty of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. It has also been stated in the complaint by the Complainant-Company that the cause of action for filling the complaint arose to the Complainant-Company on 09.10.2002 and further when the accused committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and further on 14.09.2002 when notice was issued on 16.09.2002, which was received by the accused on 23.09.2002. The cause of the action also arose when the accused failed to make payment within 15 days from 23.09.2002. It has, therefore, been prayed that the accused may be summoned, dealt with and punished as per provisions of Section 138 of the Act. 3. The complaint was dismissed by the learned trial Court after due trial. 4. The cause of the action also arose when the accused failed to make payment within 15 days from 23.09.2002. It has, therefore, been prayed that the accused may be summoned, dealt with and punished as per provisions of Section 138 of the Act. 3. The complaint was dismissed by the learned trial Court after due trial. 4. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of learned trial court, the appellant has preferred an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, Solan, District Solan, H.P., wherein at the time of hearing learned counsel for the appellant seeks permission to withdraw the appeal by reserving liberty to him to approach the competent Court of law. The permission, as prayed for, was granted and the appeal was returned back to the learned counsel along with documents. 5. Thereafter, the appellant has maintained the instant appeal before this Court. 6. I have heard Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Jitender Pal, learned counsel for the respondent-accused and also gone through the records of the case. 7. Mr. Romesh Verma learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the learned trial court in para-14 of its judgment has held the complaint to be not maintainable because it was filed after the prescribed period of limitation. He has also argued that the cheque in issue was again presented in the bank and the same was dishonoured on 28.8.2002 for the second time and the information was received on 7.9.2002. He further argued that notice was issued on 14.9.2002 and the complaint was filed on 26.10.2002 within the prescribed period as provided under the Negotiable Instruments Act. He has further argued that taking into consideration the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, in 2013 (1) SCC 177 , titled as MSR Leathers Vs. S. Palaniappan and another, the complaint is required to be allowed. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Jitender Pal, learned counsel for the respondent-accused argued that the complaint is not maintainable, as the complaint is not filed by the authorized person and is liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. He has further argued that Madan Sharma was never the Managing Director of the Company, as no document has been produced or proved on record and the only document is Memorandum of Association i.e. Ext. CW1/B, and the same is nowhere contains the name of Mr. Madan Sharma as Managing Director. He has further argued that Madan Sharma was never the Managing Director of the Company, as no document has been produced or proved on record and the only document is Memorandum of Association i.e. Ext. CW1/B, and the same is nowhere contains the name of Mr. Madan Sharma as Managing Director. He further argued that even the list of Directors, which is allegedly filed is not a copy of the proceedings duly attested and it is simply a typed copy and is totally unreliable in evidence and no reliance can be placed on the same. He further argued that Madan Sharma, Managing Director, allegedly authorizing Mr. Sita Ram Verma to maintain the complaint is without any basis as neither Sita Ram Verma was having any authority nor Madan Sharma was any authority to Sita Ram Verma and even otherwise also there is no alleged authority letter produced or proved on record. He has further argued that Ext. PW1/C is a simple Power of Attorney and nothing more. He further argued that Yash Ram how connected with the affairs of the agency has not been explained by the complainant and in that eventuality also the complaint is not maintainable. He has referred to the statement of Sita Ram Verma and puts emphasis on his examination-in-chief to show that the complaint was not maintainable and the same cannot be pursued and maintained by authorized person. He further argued that there is nothing on record with regard to the amount due for some consideration. He further argued that as per Sita Ram Verma, the transaction took place at Gurgaon and no transaction took place at Solan and even on that count also, the complaint was not maintainable. He further argued that Sita Ram Verma in his cross examination specially admitted that he has no knowledge with regard to the transaction, and the time of transaction, with the respondent-accused, hence the complaint is liable to be dismissed on this count also. 9. Mr. Jitender Pal, learned counsel for the respondent-accused has cited various judgments rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court and Hon’ble High Courts viz. 1999(2) Civil Court Cases 553 (P&H), titled as Meeta Rai Vs. Gulshan Mahajan; 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) 504 (SC, titled as M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr; 2007(2) Civil Court Cases 803 (Madras), titled as Lakshmi Srinivas Savings & Chit Funds Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. Vs. 1999(2) Civil Court Cases 553 (P&H), titled as Meeta Rai Vs. Gulshan Mahajan; 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) 504 (SC, titled as M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr; 2007(2) Civil Court Cases 803 (Madras), titled as Lakshmi Srinivas Savings & Chit Funds Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. Vs. S. Bhojarajan; 2007(4), Civil Court Cases 385, titled as Director, Maruti Feeds & Farms Private Limited, Dharwad Vs. Basanna Pattekar; 2010(1) Civil Court Cases 381 (Rajasthan) (DB), titled as M/s United Construction Co. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors; 2011(2) Civil Court Cases 690 (SC), titled as Milind Shripad Chandurkar Vs. Kalim M. Khan & Anr; 2011(3) Civil Court Cases 619 (Kerala), titled as Santhi Vs. Mary Sherly; 2012(4) Civil Court Cases 807 (Rajasthan), titled as Ashok Leyland Finance Limited Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr; 2013(2) Civil Court Cases 107 (SC) titled as Vijay Vs. Laman & Anr; 2016(1) Criminal Court Cases 364 (Delhi), titled as Hans Kumar Jain Vs. Renu Gandotra @ Poonam; 2016(3) Civil Court Cases 654 (Bombay), titled as Sachin Food Processor Vs. Sanjay T. Pathak (Kulkarni); 2018(2) Civil Court Cases 530 (Kerala), titled as Susamma Raju Vs. K.M. Wilson; 2018(4) Civil Court Cases 619 (Bombay), titled as Ghanshyamdas Lalchand Chandak Vs. Sheikh Hamid Sheikh Gulab & Anr; 2019(3) Apex Court Judgments 732 (SC), titled as B. Krishna Reddy Vs. Syed Hafeez (Died) per LR. Smt. Naseema Begum & Anr; 2020(3) RCR (Criminal) Kerala High Court, titled as Abdulkhader Vs. C. Pankajakshan Nambiar and Ors; 2021(3) Civil Court Cases 724 (Gujarat), titled as M/s Bajaj Finance Limited Vs. Pooja Narayana Khetan and 2021(3) Civil Court Cases 438 (Kerala)(DB), titled as K. Basheer Vs. C.K. Usman Koya. 10. Mr. Romesh Verma, learned counsel for the appellant in rebuttal has argued that presumption is attached as per Section 139 of the Act and the judgments cited by learned counsel for the respondent-accused are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case or of any help to the respondent-accused. He further argued that the respondent-accused has not entered into the witness box to substantiate his case and rather he in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC specifically admitted the issuance of the cheque. He further argued that the respondent-accused has not entered into the witness box to substantiate his case and rather he in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.PC specifically admitted the issuance of the cheque. He further argued that in the cross-examination of Sita Ram Verma to the effect that he is not competent to maintain and pursue the complaint and he is also not authorized by the Company. So the arguments put forth by learned counsel for the respondent-accused are required to be ignored and the present appeal is required to be allowed and the respondent-accused is required to be convicted in accordance with law. 11. In rebuttal Mr. Romesh Verma has also relied two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India i.e. Criminal Appeal No. 271 of 2020, titled as APS Forex Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shakti International Fashion Linkers & Ors and Criminal Appeal No. 292 of 2021, titled as Sumeti Vij Vs. M/s Paramount Tech Fab Industries. 12. The cumulative reading of all the judgments shows that the law already stands settled as on date is that after the presentation of the cheque even after the second time and its dishonoring, the complaint can be maintained after issuing notice as per the provisions under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the same process will start after dishonor of the cheque for the second time as if it has dishonored for the first time till the time the Negotiable Instruments is valid. 13. The cheque should have been issued for consideration and the complainant is required to prove the consideration when in defence it is the case of the accused that the cheque was given not for consideration but as a security only. 14. To appreciate the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and after going through the records of the case wherein Sita Ram Verma, has stated that he was authorized officer of the Complainant-Company and the Company earlier was known as Himalyan Plastic Pvt. Ltd., but now a days it is Himalyan Plastic Ltd. and he was authorized by Sh. Madan Lal Sharma, who was the Managing Director of the Company. Madan Lal Sharma, who was the Managing Director of the Company. In his deposition he has stated that the Complainant-Company deals in the business of manufacturing and sale of HDPE pipes, fittings, sprinkler, drip irrigation systems, PIR(silicon coated) HDPE Telecom Duct and accused had been purchasing the above material on credit basis from it as per business practice. In order to discharge the liability for consideration, accused issued a cheque for Rs. 14,94,148/- on 29.05.2002 drawn at Gurgaon and the same was returned with the remarks ‘insufficient funds’, vide letter dated 7.9.2002. It has also been stated by this witness that the notice was sent to the accused on 16.9.2002 for making payment within 15 days. The notice was duly received by the accused on 23.9.2002, but no payment was made till 8.10.2002 and thereafter the complaint was filed. 15. Ravinder Kumar Yadav, Clerk, Gurgaon, Gramin Bank, Nandrampur Bass Branch District Rewari, Haryana stated that the account of the accused was with the Gurgaon Gramin Bank and the said cheque was presented on 13.6.2002. There was no sufficient funds to the credit of the accused, therefore, it was again presented on 28.7.2002, which was sent to the Bank from the State Bank of India, Solan Branch but the same was dishonored on account of insufficiency of funds. 16. G.S Kanwar, Sr. Assistant State Bank of India, Solan deposed that the complainant Company presented the cheque for payment on 13.8.2002 but the same was returned with the remarks insufficient funds. 17. Arun Kumar, Sr. Manager, State Bank of Patiala, Panchkula has also deposed that on 31.5.2002, cheque Ex.CW1/D was received for deposit in the account of complainant Company for collection to Gurgaon Gramin Bank, which was returned on 28.6.2002 as unpaid. 18. Mr. K.D.S.Hudda has also deposed that he had been conducting some cases of complainant Company and notice Ex.DW2/A bears his signatures. The notice is dated 20.7.2002. He has admitted that registered AD/UPC has been written in this notice. In his cross examination it has been stated by him that he does not know whether notice was delivered because he is not having postal receipt. 19. The notice is dated 20.7.2002. He has admitted that registered AD/UPC has been written in this notice. In his cross examination it has been stated by him that he does not know whether notice was delivered because he is not having postal receipt. 19. After analyzing the evidence on record, it is clear that Sita Ram Verma was not authorized as per the resolution of the Board of Directors’ of the Company nor he was a Principal Officer of the Company and his title to maintain the present complaint was to be considered vis-a-vis his capacity to depose in the Court of law. Though, this Court may proceed with the presumption that he was having authority to proceed with the complaint as he was working with the Company. Then the second question arises whether the onus which shifted on the complainant that the cheque was not issued for consideration and it was only a security amount has been discharged. The answer is that onus was not discharged as the Company which is supposed to maintain the accounts of which are to be maintained in the regular course of business for all intents and purposes should have shown the sale and those documents should have been produced by the complainant company in the Court, as the sale would have been the consideration for the cheque. Failure of the same shows that the cheque was only issued as a security. The witnesses of the complainant nowhere able to prove that the cheque was for the supplies made and it was for consideration. 20. In these circumstances, this Court holds that after applying the law that the findings as recorded by the learned court below call for no interference even after re-appreciating the evidence. 21. It has been held in K. Prakashan vs. P.K. Surenderan (2008) 1 SCC 258 , that when two views are possible, appellate Court should not reverse the judgment of acquittal merely because the other view was possible. When judgment of trial Court was neither perverse, nor suffered from any legal infirmity or non consideration/mis-appreciation of evidence on record, reversal thereof by High Court was not justified. 22. When judgment of trial Court was neither perverse, nor suffered from any legal infirmity or non consideration/mis-appreciation of evidence on record, reversal thereof by High Court was not justified. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in T. Subramanian vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2006) 1 SCC 401 , has held that where two views are reasonably possible from the very same evidence, prosecution cannot be said to have proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. 23. In Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has culled out the following principles qua powers of the appellate Courts while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal : “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1873 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 24. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 24. The net result of the above discussion is that the appellant/complainant-Company has failed to prove the guilt of the accused conclusively and beyond reasonable doubt. There is no illegality and infirmity in the findings, so recorded by the learned trial Court. 25. Accordingly, in view of the observations and analysis, made hereinabove, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. Record of the learned trial Court be sent back forthwith. 26. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stand disposed of.