JUDGMENT : S.K. MEDHI, J. 1. The instant appeal has been preferred against a judgment and order dated 29.09.2015 passed by the learned Court of the Sessions Judge, East Sessions Division, Tezu in Sessions Case No. 118(L)/2011. By the impugned judgment, the appellant has been convicted under Section 302 of the IPC and is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. To appreciate the issue involved, it would be convenient if the facts of the case are narrated in brief: (i) The criminal law was set into motion by a verbal information given by one Sushil Chakma (PW-2) regarding the death of one Rajyadan Chakma. Based on the same verbal information, the Police had started the investigation for the death caused at about 3 pm of 18.06.2010 in which the inquest was done, materials were seized and the accused was apprehended. It was thereafter, that a formal FIR was lodged on the same date i.e. 18.06.2010 at about 8.30 p.m. (ii) Admittedly, there was no eye-witness in the present case and the conviction is apparently based on circumstantial evidence. (iii) To bring home the charges, the prosecution had adduced evidence through 15 number of PWs. On the other hand, the accused had adduced evidence as DW-1. (iv) PW-1 is Smti Rangabi Chakma, who is the widow of the deceased Rajyadan Chakma. In her chief examination, she had stated that about 2(two) years back both the accused and her deceased husband along with some other people were taking local “apong” in their house when she had gone out for collecting pig fodder. However, when she had come back, she saw her husband lying on the floor near the bed in a pool of blood and was having cut injuries on his neck. However, the husband was still alive and breathing and the accused person was not there as he fled away. She further clarified that she did not know who had cut her husband in his neck. She had made a categorical statement that the accused had not done anything to her as she was absent at the time of incident. The aforesaid PW-1 was declared hostile by the prosecution. She further clarified that she did not know who had cut her husband in his neck. She had made a categorical statement that the accused had not done anything to her as she was absent at the time of incident. The aforesaid PW-1 was declared hostile by the prosecution. In her cross-examination done by the prosecution after declaring her to be hostile, she had negated the suggestion that she had stated before the Police that the accused had assaulted her husband on his neck by Daw and had also assaulted her and cut her neck with the Daw for which she had received sever injuries on her neck. She had also negated the suggestion of being taken to Namsai for treatment and so far as the injury mark was concerned she had stated that the said was not caused by the accused appellant. However, she had categorically stated that she did not see the incident by her own eyes. (v) PW-2 is one Sushil Chakma, who deposed that on hearing about the incident, he had rushed to the Police Station and had informed the matter to the Officer of Chownkham P.S. thereafter, he had come back to the spot with the Police party. The accused was found loitering in the football field from where he was arrested. Thereafter, he had gone with many other persons to the place of occurrence and he is also one of the seizure witnesses of the material seized including the weapon of assault which is Daw. He had also proved his signature in the materials exhibited which was seized by the Police. In his cross-examination he has categorically admitted that he is not an eye-witness and merely a hearsay witness to the incident. (vi) PW-3 is Smti Rokhini Chakma, who is the wife of Shri Bachodon Chakma (the informant). In her deposition, he had stated that she was the neighbour and while cutting firewood, she had seen 3(three) persons present at the place of occurrence and the deceased full of blood jumping out from the house and falling down on the ground and that he was having a severe Daw cut injury on his neck. The witness also saw the wife of the deceased having a Daw cut injury on her back of neck which she was closing by one hand and holding her child with her other hand. The witness also saw the wife of the deceased having a Daw cut injury on her back of neck which she was closing by one hand and holding her child with her other hand. She then narrates that she took away the child to enable the wife of the deceased to run away and in the meantime she had shouted for her husband who had gone out from the house. She then claims to have seen the accused coming out of the house of the deceased holding two Daws in both the hands and chased her husband away. She claims that the Daws were having blood stains when the accused had gone to the Samchan Ghat and washed the Daws in the water and went towards the football field from where the police had arrested him. She identified the Exhibit-2(a), 2(b), 2(c), which are photographs of the dead-body of the deceased Rajyadhan Chakma and Ext. 2(d) and 2(e), which are photographs of the place of occurrence. In her cross examination, the PW-3, however, clarifies that she did not witness the act with her own eyes and further that the wife of the deceased did not tell the name of the accused. (vii) PW-4 is one Sujiv Chakma, who in his chief-examination submits that he was not a witness to the incident and was a seizure witness. He however, clarifies that the seized materials were not shown to him on the spot. (viii) PW-5 is Parikaram Chakma, who was not put any question as he was declared hostile. (ix) PW-6 is Badsha Dhan Chakma, who is the informant. He narrates that when the incident had taken place in the house of the deceased, he was in his house and on hearing hue and cry of his sister-in-law (wife of the deceased), he had rushed to the house after which the accused had also chased him to attack and he had run away from the place and went to the Police station. He further claims that on his complaint, the Police authority had come with him and arrested the accused. He proves the complaint lodged by him as P.Exh.3. He further states that he was a witness to the seizure and the inquest report. PW-6 in his cross-examination, however, clarifies that he had not seen the incident personally. He further claims that on his complaint, the Police authority had come with him and arrested the accused. He proves the complaint lodged by him as P.Exh.3. He further states that he was a witness to the seizure and the inquest report. PW-6 in his cross-examination, however, clarifies that he had not seen the incident personally. He also further states that there was no specific sign in the Daw identified in the Court that would belong to the accused and that the Daw was seized 2(two) days after the incident. He clarifies that though he was the informant, he was an illiterate who had put his thumb impression and the contents of the F.I.R. were not read out to him. (x) PW-7 is one Shri Charu Chakma, who is simply a seizure witness. (xi) PWs. 8, 9 and 10 Shri Bipileswar Chakma, Shri Ravi Sankar Chakma and Shri Horu Chakma, were declared hostile. (xii) PW-11 is the concerned Doctor who had conducted the postmortem of the body of Rajyadhan Chakma on 19.06.2010 and he found the following injuries on the deceased: (a) A sharp cut injury on the left side of neck, length 15 cm x 5 cm in depth. (b) It was further stated that the body was stained with blood. The post-mortem report was exhibited as P.Exh-5. The PW-11 had also deposed that on 18.06.2010, he also attended an injured lady whose name was Rangabi Chakma, who was having cut injury on the nape of the neck of 10 cm x 2 cm in depth which was caused by a sharp Daw, who was admitted in the hospital for some days. The injury report was exhibited as P.Exh.7 and the injuries were of grievous nature. In his cross-examination, the doctor however, narrates that the Police did not take his statement. (xiii) The depositions of PW-12, Smti Rohim Chakma, PW-13, Subash Chandra Chakma and PW-14 Smti Bakti Chakma are not relevant and material and two of the said witnesses were declared hostile. (xiv) PW-15 is the Investigating Officer whose deposition would be of significance. The said PW-15, Shri W. Ramwa has stated that he was posted at Chongkham Police Outpost and on 18.06.2010 at about 7.30 p.m. he had received a complaint from one Badshadhan Chakma against the present appellant. (xiv) PW-15 is the Investigating Officer whose deposition would be of significance. The said PW-15, Shri W. Ramwa has stated that he was posted at Chongkham Police Outpost and on 18.06.2010 at about 7.30 p.m. he had received a complaint from one Badshadhan Chakma against the present appellant. He however, makes a very important revelation that before receiving the F.I.R. he got verbal information from one Sushil Chakma (PW-2) that the accused had assaulted the deceased and his wife with a Daw. The Investigating Officer then proceeded to the place of occurrence and found the accused at the school ground holding 3 Daws from where he was arrested. On reaching the house of the victim, he already found the victim dead and the lady victim was shifted to Chongkham Hospital. The inquest was conducted there and a rough sketch map of the place of occurrence was prepared. The dead-body was sent for post-mortem examination and he had collected the injury report of the victim lady and the post-mortem report regarding the deceased. The Charge-sheet has been exhibited as P.Exh-9 and the sketch map as P.Exh.8. He further stated that no blood stain was collected by him and that at the time of seizure, the Daws were not containing any blood stains. (xv) The learned Session Judge, East Sessions Division, Tezu had formulated the following points for determination: (a) Whether on 18.06.2010 at about 15.00 hours in the house of deceased at Chakma village no. 1, accused Subhlendu Chakma had committed murder of late Rajyadhan Chakma. (b) Whether on the same date, time and place accused Subhlendu Chakma had attempted to commit murder of Smti Rangabi Chakma. (xvi) The learned Judge after discussion had come to a finding that the prosecution was able to prove their case beyond any reasonable doubt by placing well connected chain of circumstantial evidences against the accused person for committing murder of the deceased person. In this regard the version of PW-1 (wife of the deceased), PW-3 (neighbour), PW-6 were taken into consideration. The testimony of PWs. 12, 13 and 14 regarding evacuating the PW-1 to Chongkham hospital were also taken into consideration. The said testimony was held to have completed a chain of unbroken events leading to the guilt of the accused appellant. Accordingly, the accused has been convicted and sentenced under Section 302 of the IPC. The testimony of PWs. 12, 13 and 14 regarding evacuating the PW-1 to Chongkham hospital were also taken into consideration. The said testimony was held to have completed a chain of unbroken events leading to the guilt of the accused appellant. Accordingly, the accused has been convicted and sentenced under Section 302 of the IPC. So far as the charge under Section 307 of the IPC is concerned, though there were other evidence in support of the same charge of attempting to murder the PW-1 including the version of the doctor as PW-11, since the victim herself gave evidence before the Court that it was not the accused who had caused cut injury on her neck, the accused was acquitted from the charges under Section 307 of the IPC. 3. It is the validity and correctness of the aforesaid judgment dated 29.09.2015 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, East Sessions Division convicting the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC which is the subject matter of challenge. 4. As mentioned above, this appeal has been preferred from jail in which the appellant is represented by the Amicus Curiae, Shri N. Ratan and the State by Shri G. Tado, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 5. Shri Ratan, the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that though there is no dispute to the proposition of law that circumstantial evidence is an accepted mode of proof, the rigours laid down are to be meticulously followed or else there would be grave miscarriage of justice. He submits that in the instant case, though 15 numbers of prosecution witnesses have been examined, the prosecution has failed to establish an unbroken chain of events so as to come to only one conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused. He further submits that all along it is the prosecution’s case that the accused had used 2(two) numbers of daws whereas in the trial, 3(three) numbers of daws were exhibited without any explanation. He further submits that though there is no bar in relying upon certain part of the testimony of a hostile witness, such reliance has to be consistence and reasonable which is not seen to be done in the instant case. The learned Amicus Curiae, accordingly, submits that the impugned conviction is not sustainable in law and liable to be set aside. 6. The learned Amicus Curiae, accordingly, submits that the impugned conviction is not sustainable in law and liable to be set aside. 6. In support of his submission, the learned Amicus Curiae has placed reliance upon the case of Majenderan Langeswaran vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 7 SCC 192 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case has discussed the earlier rulings on the subject of circumstantial evidence. The relevant paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the said judgment are extracted herein-below: “16. Now, we have to consider whether the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court and affirmed by the High court can be sustained in law. As noticed above, the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence as no one has seen the accused committing murder of the deceased. While dealing with the said conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should also be consistent with only one hypothesis i.e. the guilt of the accused, which would mean that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove that the chain of event is complete and not to leave any doubt in the mind of the Court. 17. In the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs. State of M.P. AIR 1952 SC 343 , this Court observed as under: “It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused......” 18. In the case of Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of A.P. 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 706, this Court opined as under: “10. In the case of Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of A.P. 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 706, this Court opined as under: “10. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the offence in question and the prosecution rests its case solely on circumstantial evidence. This Court in a series of decisions has consistently held that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence such evidence must satisfy the following tests: (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established. (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused. (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. [See: Gambhir vs. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 2 SCC 351 ].” 7. Per contra, Shri G. Tado, learned Additional P.P. has supported the judgment by contenting that the chain of events is an unbroken one which leads to the only conclusion of guilt of the accused person. By citing the testimony of PW-3, he has also brought in the theory of “last seen together.” According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the links in the chain are the evidence of PWs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 12, 13 and 14. He submits that the evidence of PW-3 is corroborated by PW-6 regarding the accused holding Daws and chasing. The evidence of PW-6 is also relevant as he is a seizure witness including the Daws and PW-3 elaborates on the aspect of injuries sustained. 8. In support of his submission, the learned Addl. P.P. places reliance upon the case of Ravirala Laxmiah vs. State of A.P. (2013) 9 SCC 283 . By referring to paragraph-15, the learned Addl. P.P. has submitted that if the chain of circumstances is complete, a case is held to be proved. 8. In support of his submission, the learned Addl. P.P. places reliance upon the case of Ravirala Laxmiah vs. State of A.P. (2013) 9 SCC 283 . By referring to paragraph-15, the learned Addl. P.P. has submitted that if the chain of circumstances is complete, a case is held to be proved. For ready reference, paragraph-15 is extracted herein-below: “20. It is a settled legal proposition that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, where no eye-witness’s account is available, the principle is that: “when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation for the same, or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete....” 9. The learned Additional P.P. also relies upon the case of Prithi vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 536 . In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles of the evidentiary value of a hostile witness. For ready reference, paragraphs - 17 and 18 are extracted herein-below: “......25. Section 154 of the Evidence Act, 1872 enables the court in its discretion to permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross- examination by the adverse party. Some High Courts had earlier taken the view that when a witness is cross-examined by the party calling him, his evidence cannot be believed in part and disbelieved in part, but must be excluded altogether. However this view has not found acceptance in later decisions. As a matter of fact, the decisions of this Court are to the contrary. In Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1991) 3 SCC 627 , a 3-Judge Bench of this Court relying upon earlier decisions of this Court in Bhagwan Singh vs. State of Haryana (1976) 1 SCC 389 , Sri. Rabindra Kumar Dey vs. State of Orissa, (1976) 4 SCC 233 and Syad Akbar vs. State of Karnataka, (1980) 1 SCC 30 reiterated the legal position that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. Rabindra Kumar Dey vs. State of Orissa, (1976) 4 SCC 233 and Syad Akbar vs. State of Karnataka, (1980) 1 SCC 30 reiterated the legal position that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on careful scrutiny thereof. 26. In Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai vs. State of Gujarat, (1999) 8 SCC 624 , this Court again reiterated that testimony of a hostile witness is useful to the extent to which it supports the prosecution case. It is worth noticing that in Bhagwan Singh9 this Court held that when a witness is declared hostile and cross-examined with the permission of the court, his evidence remains admissible and there is no legal bar to have a conviction upon his testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence.” 10. Admittedly, the present is a case of circumstantial evidence and therefore, the burden of the prosecution is higher. 11. To apply provisions of law to the present facts, it would be convenient if the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of circumstantial evidence is taken note of. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Biridhichand Sharda vs. State of Maharshtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 has laid down the following guidelines while proceeding in a case based on circumstantial evidence: “......3.1. It is well settled that the prosecution must stand or fall on its own legs and it cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence. This is trite law. However, where various links in a chain are in themselves complete, then a false plea or a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the Court. In other words before using the additional link it must be proved that all the links in the chain are complete and do not suffer from any infirmity. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a Court. 3.3. It is not the law that where there is any infirmity or lacuna in the prosecution case the same could be cured or supplied by a false defence or a plea which is not accepted by a Court. 3.3. Before a case against an accused vesting on circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established the following conditions must be fulfilled as laid down in Hanumat's vs. State of M.P. (1953) SCR 1091. 1. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. 2. The facts so established should be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. 3. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. 4. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. 5. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. These five golden principles constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and in the absence of a corpus deliciti. 3.4. The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence is that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no pure moral conviction.” 12. The said principles which has been followed in all later decisions requires that there should be a chain of events leading to the guilt of the accused. The said chain should be an unbroken one and such chain of events should lead to only one conclusion i.e. accused is guilty of the offence. It may be mentioned that the mode of proof in a criminal case by circumstantial evidence is an accepted mode and the said has got nothing to do with the severity of the punishment imposed, as the same depends upon various other factors. 13. The crucial witness in the instant case is PW-1, the wife of the deceased. The entire prosecution’s case was dependent on her version since she was allegedly present inside the house when the assault had taken place. 13. The crucial witness in the instant case is PW-1, the wife of the deceased. The entire prosecution’s case was dependent on her version since she was allegedly present inside the house when the assault had taken place. However, in her evidence, the said PW-1 did not state that the incident had occurred in her presence and rather said that she had gone out for collecting pig fodder and only on her coming back she could find her husband in an injured condition lying on the ground. The said PW-1 had gone to the extent of testifying that it was not the accused who had caused the stab injury on her neck and on the basis of this testimony alone, the accused was acquitted of the charge of Section 307 of the IPC. 14. Though the said PW-1 was declared hostile and the law relating to a hostile witness is that the testimony can be severed and that part which is favouring the prosecution can be taken in to consideration, what intrigues this Court is that the version of the said witness while proving the charge under Section 307 is accepted and the benefit of doubt has been given to the accused, the same witness has been disbelieved when she had testified that she did not know who had cut her husband in his neck with a further statement that the accused did not do anything to her as she was absent at the time of incident. 15. The version of PW-2 is of crucial importance for deciding this case as it is on the basis of his verbal information that a GD Entry was made and the investigation already started including arresting of the accused, recovery of the dead-body, seizure of the relevant materials, inquest etc. It was thereafter, that the formal FIR was lodged by the PW-6 at 20.30 hours as would be revealed from the FIR itself, which has been exhibited as P.Exh.3. The said version is also corroborated by the evidence of the I.O. (PW-15), who had stated that based on the verbal information of Sushil Chakma (PW-2), the Police team had proceeded to the place of occurrence and had done all the formalities including inquest, sending the dead-body for post-mortem etc. and only thereafter, the formal written complaint was received. 16. The said version is also corroborated by the evidence of the I.O. (PW-15), who had stated that based on the verbal information of Sushil Chakma (PW-2), the Police team had proceeded to the place of occurrence and had done all the formalities including inquest, sending the dead-body for post-mortem etc. and only thereafter, the formal written complaint was received. 16. PW-3, Rokhini Chakma claims that she had shouted for her husband (PW-6-informant) and he had come out and on being chased by the accused with two numbers of Daws, he had run towards the thana for his safety. Juxtaposition, PW-6 in his deposition testified that on hearing hue and cry of his sister-in-law (explained to be the wife of the deceased) that he rushed to their house when the accused had also chased him for which he had run to the police station for his safety. Even presuming that the issue regarding on whose call PW-6 had come out of the house is a minor discrepancy, the version that the accused was present at that time with two Daws is not corroborated by the evidence of PW-1, who had testified that the accused was not there at that time. If the entire testimony of PW-1 was taken to be unacceptable, the matter would have been different. However, in the instant case, the impugned conviction is based on the evidence of PW-1 who was declared hostile. 17. PW-4 is just a seizure witness. PWs. 5, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are declared hostile and otherwise also not relevant. 18. PW-11 is the Doctor, who interestingly had conducted both the post-mortem on the deceased as well as attended to the injuries alleged to have been suffered by PW-1. Apart from the fact that the two Departments are entirely different, even though the injury report of PW-1 was exhibited as P.Exh.7 with a remark that the injury was grievous, the same has not been taken into account and rather brushed aside in view of the categorical testimony of the said PW-1 that the accused did not do anything to her as he was absent at the time of the incident. 19. This Court has also noticed that though 3(three) Daws has been seized, there was no forensic examination done as regards who has used the same. 19. This Court has also noticed that though 3(three) Daws has been seized, there was no forensic examination done as regards who has used the same. Admittedly no serological tests were also done to make an endeavour to connect the use of the same for the alleged offence. Merely by exhibiting 3(three) numbers of Daws in a trial which are otherwise a very common household equipment, the same will not come to the aid of the prosecution in establishing the commission of an offence. 20. This Court has also noticed major inconsistencies in the version of PW-2 and PW-6. While PW-2 narrates that upon his verbal information, the Police had come to the place of occurrence and had completed a major part of the investigation based on a GD Entry, PW-6, the informant says that it was on the information given by him that the Police had come for the investigation. Admittedly, the FIR was lodged at 08.30 p.m. whereas the incident had occurred at about 03.30 p.m. and as per the I.O. who deposed as PW-15, the FIR was lodged after the investigation was done as per the verbal information of PW-2. 21. Another very important aspect appears to be missed out by the learned trial Judge is the aspect of the GD Entry. In the instant case it appears from the testimony of PW-2 and PW-15 (the I.O.) that the investigation was not only carried out but major portion was already completed on the basis of the G.D. Entry and admittedly, it was only thereafter, that the formal FIR was lodged at 20.30 hours on 18.06.2010. Though such course of action is permissible as formal FIR can always be lodged at a later point of time, what is surprising in this case is that the GD Entry does not find any place in the entire records. The said entry was not even proved in the entire trial and no endeavour appears to have been made in this regard. Though there is no dispute to the proposition of law that non-maintenance of a G.D. Entry in the proper manner may not be fatal to the entire prosecution and can be treated as a mere irregularity, in the instant case, what transpires is that the G.D. Entry which is the basis of the investigation was not proved. 22. Though there is no dispute to the proposition of law that non-maintenance of a G.D. Entry in the proper manner may not be fatal to the entire prosecution and can be treated as a mere irregularity, in the instant case, what transpires is that the G.D. Entry which is the basis of the investigation was not proved. 22. Since this point was not a point of determination before the learned trial Court, this Court had granted opportunities to the learned Additional P.P. to look into that aspect of the matter which was accordingly adjourned by a day. 23. Shri G. Tado, learned Addl. P.P. responded on the next date by submitting that since the issue was not raised in the trial Court, the same cannot be raised in the appellate Court. We find the said submission not only to be unsustainable in law but also reflects the naïve conduct of the learned Additional P.P. Apart from the fact, that the appeal is a continuation of the trial and the point raised is a pure question of law, what is more important is that present is an appeal against a conviction with a sentence of life imprisonment, wherein the rights and liberties of the accused are also to be given adequate importance. 24. The Additional P.P. has relied upon the case of State by Lokayuktha Police vs. H. Shrinivas, (2018) 7 SCC 572 , wherein it has been stated that absence of entry in the General Diary concerning the preliminary enquiry would not be per se fatal. The Hon’ble Supreme Court by taking into account the law laid down in earlier cases has held as follows: “......17. In the aforesaid case, this Court while repelling the contention by the learned ASG appearing for the State of Chhattisgarh that recording of the first information under Section 154 in the “book” is subsequent to the entry in the General Diary, held that the concept of General Diary does not flow from the Section 154 of Cr.P.C. 1973 and the same conclusion would be apparent from the departure made in the present Section 154 of Cr.P.C. when compared with Section 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. It may be relevant to extract some paragraphs, which may have bearing on the case concerned: 64. It may be relevant to extract some paragraphs, which may have bearing on the case concerned: 64. The General Diary is a record of all important transactions/events taking place in a police station, including departure and arrival of police staff, handing over or taking over of charge, arrest of a person, details of law and order duties, visit of senior officers, etc. It is in this context that gist or substance of each FIR being registered in the police station is also mentioned in the General Diary since registration of FIR also happens to be a very important event in the police station. Since General Diary is a record that is maintained chronologically on day-to-day basis (on each day, starting with new number 1), the General Diary entry reference is also mentioned simultaneously in the FIR book, while FIR number is mentioned in the General Diary entry since both of these are prepared simultaneously. 65. It is relevant to point out that FIR book is maintained with its number given on an annual basis. This means that each FIR has a unique annual number given to it. This is on similar lines as the case numbers given in courts. Due to this reason, it is possible to keep a strict control and track over the registration of FIRs by the supervisory police officers and by the courts, wherever necessary. Copy of each FIR is sent to the superior officers and to the Judicial Magistrate concerned. 66. On the other hand, General Diary contains a huge number of other details of the proceedings of each day. Copy of General Diary is not sent to the Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction over the police station, though its copy is sent to a superior police officer. Thus, it is not possible to keep strict control of each and every FIR recorded in the General Diary by the superior police officers and/or the court in view of enormous amount of other details mentioned therein and the numbers changing every day. 67. The signature of the complainant is obtained in the FIR book as and when the complaint is given to the police station. On the other hand, there is no such requirement of obtaining signature of the complainant in the General Diary. 67. The signature of the complainant is obtained in the FIR book as and when the complaint is given to the police station. On the other hand, there is no such requirement of obtaining signature of the complainant in the General Diary. Moreover, at times, the complaint given may consist of large number of pages, in which case it is only the gist of the complaint which is to be recorded in the General Diary and not the full complaint. This does not fit in with the suggestion that what is recorded in the General Diary should be considered to be the fulfilment/compliance with the requirement of Section 154 of registration of FIR. In fact, the usual practice is to record the complete complaint in the FIR book (or annex it with the FIR form) but record only about one or two paragraphs (gist of the information) in the General Diary. 70. If at all, there is any inconsistency in the provisions of Section 154 of the Code and Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861, with regard to the fact as to whether the FIR is to be registered in the FIR book or in the General Diary, the provisions of Section 154 of the Code will prevail and the provisions of Section 44 of the Police Act, 1861 (or similar provisions of the respective corresponding Police Act or Rules in other respective States) shall be void to the extent of the repugnancy. Thus, FIR is to be recorded in the FIR book, as mandated under Section 154 of the Code, and it is not correct to state that information will be first recorded in the General Diary and only after preliminary inquiry, if required, the information will be registered as FIR. 19. Thereafter this Court concluded in the following manner: Conclusion/Directions 120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: 120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable offence. 120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes. (b) Commercial offences. (c) Medical negligence cases. (d) Corruption cases. 120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes. (b) Commercial offences. (c) Medical negligence cases. (d) Corruption cases. (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay. The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry. 120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry. 120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above. (Emphasis supplied) 20. In light of the discussion above, the absence of entries in the General Diary concerning the preliminary enquiry would not be per se illegal. Our attention is not drawn to any bar under any provision of Cr.P.C. barring investigating authority to investigate into matter, which may for some justifiable ground, not found to have been entered in the General Diary right after receiving the Confidential Information. It may not be out of context to mention that nothing found in the paragraph 120.8 of the Lalitha Kumari Case (Supra), justifies the conclusion reached by the High Court by placing a skewed and literal reading of the conclusions reached by the Bench therein. It is well settled that judgments are not legislations, they have to be read in the context and background discussions.” 25. As indicated above, there is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition of law but what is required to be seen is that the facts and circumstances are wholly different and distinguishable. 26. It is well settled that judgments are not legislations, they have to be read in the context and background discussions.” 25. As indicated above, there is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition of law but what is required to be seen is that the facts and circumstances are wholly different and distinguishable. 26. The importance of the General Diary entry and the consequence of not proving it by the prosecution have been laid down in a number of decisions. In this connection, the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramlal Lohar vs. State of Assam, 1981 Cri. L.J. 1734 may be referred, the relevant paragraph of which extracted herein-below: “......6. The next circumstance relied on by the learned Judge was the alleged confessional statement made to PW-6. the police officer. A confession made to a police officer is inadmissible in evidence u/s. 26, Evidence Act. However, we leave the question aside. Let us examine as to whether the accused made any such confessional statement before the police at the out-post. In the event of making of such a statement the police would have inevitably recorded the statement in the General Diary. It is the prosecution case that a General Diary Entry No. 420 dated 27.1.1975 was made. It was not produced. What consequence follows? The natural deduction is that if produced the G.D. Entry would have shown something which was bound to go against the prosecution. The only conclusion that we can draw is that there was no such entry where the police recorded any such alleged confession. Under these circumstances. We find it difficult to accept the testimony of PWs. 1, 2 and 4 about the alleged confessional statement made before PW-6, Investigating Officer of the case. It appears from the cross-examination of PW-4 that the accused was handcuffed and in police custody when he arrived at the police station. Therefore, the statement which the accused allegedly made was definitely when he was in police custody. As such it was hit by Section 26, Evidence Act. In any view of the matter, we are not impressed with the evidence about the alleged extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the accused to PW-6. Sri H.K. Deb, S.I. of Police.” 27. As such it was hit by Section 26, Evidence Act. In any view of the matter, we are not impressed with the evidence about the alleged extra-judicial confession said to have been made by the accused to PW-6. Sri H.K. Deb, S.I. of Police.” 27. At this stage the learned Additional P.P. makes a frail attempt by referring to the memo of appeal and submitting that in the said memo of appeal, there is an admission of the guilt by the appellant. Though such submissions are to be rejected at the threshold, factually we do not find that there is any admission. In any case, the present appeal is an appeal from jail wherein the appellant is given State defence. The appellant himself had given his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. as well as DW, wherein no such admission is there. As such, we are unable to accept the said submission. 28. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the materials before us are not sufficient to lead us to a conclusion to hold the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 IPC as convicted of by the learned Sessions Judge, East Sessions Division, Tezu. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated judgment and order dated 29.09.2015 passed by the learned Court of the Sessions Judge, East Sessions Division, Tezu in Sessions Case No. 118(L)/2011 is interfered with and the same is consequently, set aside and quashed. The appellant is accordingly, acquitted of the offence and set at liberty forthwith, if not connected with any other offences. 29. Before parting with the case records, we would like to place on record our appreciation to the learned Amicus Curiae, Shri N. Ratan for his valuable assistance for which he would be entitled to the remuneration/honorarium at the prescribed rate.