JUDGMENT: The plaintiff is the appellant in both these appeals and that he is the petitioner in CRP No.4873 of 2006. Both these appeals are preferred against the decree and judgment dated 27.03.2003 in O.S.No.98 of 1994 in refusing the principal relief sought in the suit for specific performance of contract under the suit agreement for sale dated 14.10.1990 and in allowing the counter claim filed by the deceased 1st respondent and his son 2nd respondent directing delivery of possession of item No.1 of plaint schedule. 2. The relief sought in the suit by the appellant against the respondents 1 to 4 is as under: “(i) to pass a decree in favour of plaintiff and against defendants 1 to 4 to execute a sale deed in favour of plaintiff for item-1 of plaint schedule land and in case they failed to do so the Court to execute the sale deed; (ii) for any reason specific performance of agreement court not be decreed, to grant a decree for Rs.95,000/- representing return of consideration paid and compensation with interest at 12% per annum from date of suit till date of realisation against defendants 1 and 2 (iii) award costs of the suit against defendants 1 and 2 (iv) grant such other reliefs which the Court deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case (v) grant a permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 4 from interfering with plaintiff’s peaceful possession of plaint schedule land property” 3. The plaint schedule property is described as under: “Item-1: East Godavari District, Kajuluru Mandal, Tallarevu Sub-Registry, Aryavatam Village Panchayat, Aryavatam Village Zerayati, Wet land an extent of Ac.5-00 = 2.023 Hectares in S.No.36/2 with the following boundaries: East : Kongodu village boundary West : Raju – Drainage channel North : Kongodu village boundary South: Land sold to Rajahmundry Saheb to some extent and to some other extent the land of Pampana Veerraghavulu Item-II: East Godavari District, Kajuluru Mandal, Tallarevu Sub-Registry, Aryavatam village Zeroyati wet land an extent of Ac.1-50 cents = 0.607 Hectares within the following boundaries East : Land of Chillangi Satyanarayan West : Drainage channel North : Land sold to Rajahmundry Saheb South : Land of Kadiyala Venugopala Rao Items 1 and II making a total of Ac.6-50 cents = 2.630 Hectares within the above boundaries.” 4. The relief in the suit is confined only in respect of Item No.1 of the plaint schedule, which shall be referred to hereinafter as ‘the suit land’, for convenience. 5. During pendency of this appeal the 1st respondent died. A.S.M.P.No.3052 of 2017 was filed by the appellant to bring his L.Rs. on record being the respondents 5 to 8. In A.S.M.P.No.850 of 2014 one of the daughters of the 1st respondent Smt. Vanum Anasuya, W/o. Varahalurao, Resident of Mathukumilli, Kajuluru Mandal, East Godavari District sought himself to be impleaded as a party to this appeal claiming an independent share in the suit property. She is the 5th respondent in A.S.M.P.No.3052 of 2017. A.S.M.P.No.850 of 2014 was ordered on 29.11.2007. 6. No arguments are addressed in respect of bringing L.Rs. of the 1st respondent on record referring to A.S.M.P.No.3052 of 2017. Even otherwise, when two of the L.Rs. representing the estate of the 1st respondent are on record, it is unnecessary to bring other L.Rs. on record now in this appeal. L.Rs. of the 1st respondent are bound by the outcome of this appeal in the circumstances since the appeal was instituted during the lifetime of the 1st respondent and he as well as 2nd respondent raised common contentions in the suit and also in this appeal. Thus, A.S.M.P.No.3052 of 2017 is disposed of. 7. Respondent No.4 is the son of the respondent No.3. The respondents 1 and 2 claim the suit land as well as Item No.2 of the plaint schedule upon purchase from the respondents 3 and 4 under an agreement for sale in respect of which the 1st respondent during his lifetime filed O.S.No.266 of 1984 for specific performance of contract under the agreement by which these properties were sold. It was decreed ex parte on 19.02.1992. The material on record discloses that CMA No.217 of 1988 is pending on the file of this Court against the above order. The questions involved in these appeals relate to enforcement of terms of the suit agreement for sale dated 14.10.1990 between the appellant and the respondents 1 and 2. 8. The terms and conditions in this agreement are not as such in dispute and therefore, it is desirable to refer them now. The questions involved in these appeals relate to enforcement of terms of the suit agreement for sale dated 14.10.1990 between the appellant and the respondents 1 and 2. 8. The terms and conditions in this agreement are not as such in dispute and therefore, it is desirable to refer them now. The respondents 1 and 2 agreed to sell the plaint schedule lands to the appellant on 14.10.1990 at the rate of Rs.27,000/-per acre and for a total consideration of Rs.1,75,000/-. The total sale consideration was to be paid as agreed among them under this agreement as follows: 1. Rs.5,000/-towards advance paid on 14.10.1990. 2. Rs.35,000/-to be paid on or before 30.10.1990 on which day the plaint schedule lands were agreed to be delivered by the respondents 1 and 2 to the appellant. 3. Rs.40,500/-to be paid on or before 01.12.1990, whereupon Ac.1-58 cents representing item No.2 of the plaint schedule was agreed to be registered by the respondents 1 and 2 in favour of the appellants. 4. Balance of Rs.95,000/-was to be paid on or before 31.05.1991 and the appellant should obtain a registered sale deed from the respondents 1 and 2 thereupon. 9. The other conditions in this agreement for sale (Ex.A1) are that the respondents 1 and 2 should be ready the title deeds relating to these lands and to deliver them by 31.05.1991 by the time of registration in terms of this agreement. 10. Another term in this context is in the event of the respondents 1 and 2 failing to produce the title deeds and other documents relating to the plaint schedule lands, Rs.45,000/-was to be paid to the appellant by the respondents 1 and 2 while retaining Rs.50,000/-. 11. Another condition is that the title deed relating to Ac.5-00 of land which is in the name of the 2nd respondent shall be delivered to the appellant as security and in the event the respondents 1 and 2 failing to hand over the title deeds and other documents relating to the plaint schedule lands in terms of this agreement, the 2nd respondent should execute a sale deed and register in respect of the afore stated Ac.5-00 belonging to him in favour of the appellant. 12. 12. The case of the appellant in the plaint was that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract in terms of this suit agreement for sale and that the plaintiff came to know of pendency of O.S.No.266 of 1984 filed by respondents 1 and 2 against the respondents 3 and 4 on the file of the Court of the learned I Additional Subordinate Judge, Kakinada for specific performance of contract, when he was served summons in O.S.No.349 of 1992 where the 1st respondent sought relief of permanent injunction against the appellant in respect of Item No.2 of plaint schedule lands. The appellant also stated in the plaint that he got issued a legal notice to the respondents 1 and 2 on 07.11.1990 demanding performance of contract under this agreement for sale to which they did not offer any reply. 13. It was specifically pleaded in the plaint that on 23.12.1990 the appellant paid Rs.40,000/-to the respondents 1 and 2 which they acknowledged and delivered possession of the suit land of Ac.5-00 to him in consideration thereof. It was also pleaded that the respondents 1 and 2 suppressed the sale transaction of respondents 3 and 4 and the suit filed thereon which was not disclosed to him when the suit agreement for sale was entered into and that they had only a right to obtain a sale deed as well as possession of the plaint schedule lands. He also pleaded that he acted in good faith, being satisfied that the claim of the respondents 1 and 2 since they were in actual possession of the plaint schedule lands in their own right for several years and since they were able to deliver possession of the suit land being its ostensible owners. 14. The appellant also pleaded in the plaint that he is entitled to remain in possession of the suit land in terms of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and since he suspected that the respondents 1 and 2 would interfere with his possession and enjoyment of the suit land he is also entitled for the relief of permanent injunction against them. 15. The appellant also pleaded that he is entitled for compensation of Rs.50,000/-besides sale consideration, as an alternative relief in the absence of grant of the relief of specific performance. 16. 15. The appellant also pleaded that he is entitled for compensation of Rs.50,000/-besides sale consideration, as an alternative relief in the absence of grant of the relief of specific performance. 16. The 1st respondent filed a written statement as well as additional written statement resisting the claim of the appellant contending that the suit agreement for sale was obtained by the appellant exerting undue influence and they did not execute it in his favour willfully. They also contended that the appellant failed to perform his part of the contract under the suit agreement for sale and did not comply with its terms making the payments as stipulated. They also contended that on 23.12.1990 upon receiving Rs.40,000/-from the appellant, only suit land of Ac.5-00 was delivered to him and that on that day the suit agreement for sale was cancelled in respect of item No.2 of the plaint schedule on which the appellant had agreed to return the suit agreement for sale to them. 17. While admitting that legal notice was got issued by the 1st respondent to them on 07.11.1990, they disputed its contents and denied that the appellant was not aware of the sale transaction between the respondents 3 and 4 on the one hand and the respondents 1 and 2 on the other as well as pendency of O.S.No.266 of 1994 in respect of the plaint schedule lands and that knowing full well of these transactions, the appellant had entered into the suit agreement for sale with them. It is also pleaded in the written statement that for such reason alone the 2nd respondent was made to join as one of the executants of the suit agreement for sale who was asked to offer his own property as security. They further pleaded that the appellant is their close relation and hence they reposed confidence on him which he took advantage of to wield influence over them. 18. They further pleaded that the appellant is their close relation and hence they reposed confidence on him which he took advantage of to wield influence over them. 18. The respondents also pleaded that at no point of time the appellant offered to pay remaining balance, since he was aware that he did not have title to the plaint schedule lands and when a dispute was raised by them in the presence of elders, on the same ground and demanded return of the suit agreement for sale, the appellant was reluctant, whereupon the elders asked the appellant to pay the balance consideration with interest at 24% p.a. and to obtain sale deed from them without any covenant which the appellant defaulted. They further contended that the suit claim is barred by time and that without paying the balance sale consideration the appellant began to enjoy the suit land, which is a double crop wetland for four years. 19. The respondents 1 and 2 also pleaded that the appellant cannot take shelter under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act claiming protection of his possession in view of default committed by him to perform its terms and therefore, he is not entitled for any of the reliefs and hence he is bound to deliver the suit land to them. Thus, a counterclaim is raised requesting ejectment of the appellant from the suit land by the respondents 1 and 2. 20. The appellant also filed a rejoinder opposing the counter-claim and asserting his stand in the plaint while contending that the 1st respondent himself defaulted in performing his part of the contract under the suit agreement for sale, that he is entitled for the relief sought in the suit and contending that the 1st respondent is not entitled for the relief of ejectment against him sought in the counter-claim. 21. On the pleadings and material, the learned trial Judge settled the following issues for trial: “1. Whether the plaintiff performed his part of the contract? 2. Whether the suit agreement of sale to the extent of item No.2 of the plaint schedule property, was cancelled by mutual consent of plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 on 23.10.1990? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek specific performance of the sit agreement of sale against defendants 1 to 4? 4. 2. Whether the suit agreement of sale to the extent of item No.2 of the plaint schedule property, was cancelled by mutual consent of plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 on 23.10.1990? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek specific performance of the sit agreement of sale against defendants 1 to 4? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to seek in the alternative recovery of Rs.95,000/- from defendants 1 and 2 representing Rs.45,000/- towards the part consideration paid by plaintiff and Rs.50,000/- towards compensation? 5. To what relief?” 22. At the trial, the appellant examined herself as P.W.1, P.W.2 being his brother, who is also son-in-law of the 1st respondent and P.W.3, the scribe of Ex.A1 while relying on Ex.A1 to Ex.A4 in support of his contention. The 2nd respondent examined himself as D.W.1 and no documents were marked on behalf of any one of the respondents at the trial. 23. On the evidence and material, the learned trial Judge agreed with the contention of the respondents 1 and 2 that the appellant failed to perform his part of the contract on account of his laches in paying the sale consideration as agreed upon under the suit agreement for sale, that he is not entitled for the relief of specific performance and directed refund of Rs.45,000/-with future interest at 12% p.a. thereon from the date of the suit till realisation while dismissing the suit in other respects. The learned trial Judge allowed the counter claim with costs directing the appellant to deliver vacant possession of the suit land to the respondents 1 and 2 within two months from the date of decree and judgment. Thus, the reliefs were ordered by the decree and judgment now under appeal. 24. Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, and Sri Rammohan Polanki, learned counsel for the respondents, addressed arguments. 25. Now, the following points arise for determination: 1. Whether Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale was obtained by the appellant subjecting the respondents 1 and 2 to undue influence? 2. Whether the appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract under the suit agreement for sale by the date of the suit? 3. Whether the respondent No.1 is entitled to seek possession of the suit land from the appellant? 4. 2. Whether the appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract under the suit agreement for sale by the date of the suit? 3. Whether the respondent No.1 is entitled to seek possession of the suit land from the appellant? 4. Whether the appellant is entitled for the relief of specific performance of contract basing on the suit agreement for sale and other reliefs sought in the suit? 5. To what relief? POINT No.1: 26. The specific contention of the respondents 1 and 2 in the written statement was that Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale was obtained exerting undue influence on them by the appellant he being their close relation. Admittedly, P.W.2, who is brother of the appellant, married the daughter of the 1st respondent and thus there is close relationship among the appellant and the respondents 1 and 2. However, the material on record shows that there have been disputes between the 1st respondent and P.W.2 and that, the 1st respondent went to the extent of giving a complaint to the police against him. 27. On behalf of the respondents 1 and 2 only the 2nd respondent had chosen to enter the witness box and deposed referring to their case as D.W.1. Despite their specific stand in the written statement, there is not even a whisper in the testimony of D.W.1 in respect of the so called undue influence exerted on them by the appellant nor any pressure whereby they were forced to execute Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale. 28. On the other hand, there are clear statements in the testimony of D.W.1 which make out that Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale was executed by them consciously and voluntarily. In his examination-in-chief D.W.1 stated that he and his father jointly executed Ex.A1 agreement for sale dated 14.10.1990 and further deposed that they received Rs.5,000/-as advance thereunder. 29. Referring to Ex.A2 endorsement on Ex.A1 agreement for sale, while admitting that they received Rs.40,000/-as a part of sale consideration, D.W.1 clearly stated in examination-in-chief itself that in terms of Ex.A1 suit agreement, he and his father delivered the suit land of Ac.5-00 to the appellant on 23.12.1990. 30. There is also reference to cancellation of that part of Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale in respect of item No.2 of plaint schedule by Ex.A2 endorsement. Ex.A2 endorsement bears all these recitals. 30. There is also reference to cancellation of that part of Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale in respect of item No.2 of plaint schedule by Ex.A2 endorsement. Ex.A2 endorsement bears all these recitals. Its execution as well as transaction thereunder are admitted by both the parties. 31. When a defence of this nature basing on undue influence is set up by a party, the burden is on him to prove and establish the same in clear terms. Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, pointing out these circumstances relied on Jamila Begum (Dead) through Legal Representatives vs. Shami Mohd.(Dead) through Legal Representatives and another, 2019(2) Supreme Court Cases 727, where in this context in paras 28 and 29 it is thus stated: “28. Insofar as the plea of undue influence, merely because the parties are related to each other or merely because the executant was old or of weak character, no presumption of undue influence can arise. The court must scrutinise the pleadings to find out that such plea has been made out before examining whether undue influence was exercised or not. 29. While considering the aspect of plea of undue influence and onus probandi, in Subhas Chandr Das Mushibv. Ganga Prasad Das Mushib[Subhas Chandr Das Mushibv. Ganga Prasad Das Mushib, AIR 1967 SC 878 ], it was held as under: (AIR p. 880, paras 4 & 7) “4. Under Section 16(1) of the Contract Act a contract is said to be induced by undue influence where the relations subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other. This shows that the court trying a case of undue influence must consider two things to start with, namely, (1) are the relations between the donor and the donee such that the donee is in a position to dominate the will of the donor, and (2) has the donee used that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the donor? *** 7. The three stages for consideration of a case of undue influence were expounded in Raghunath Prasad Sahuv. *** 7. The three stages for consideration of a case of undue influence were expounded in Raghunath Prasad Sahuv. Sarju Prasad Sahu[Raghunath Prasad Sahu v. Sarju Prasad Sahu, 1923 SCC OnLine PC 62 : (1923-24) 51 IA 101 : AIR 1924 PC 60 ] in the following words: (SCC OnLine PC) ‘In the first place the relations between the parties to each other must be such that one is in a position to dominate the will of the other. Once that position is substantiated the second stage has been reached viz. the issue whether the contract has been induced by undue influence. Upon the determination of this issue a third point emerges, which is that of the onusprobandi. If the transaction appears to be unconscionable, then the burden of proving that the contract was not induced by undue influence is to lie upon the person who was in a position to dominate the will of the other. Error is almost sure to arise if the order of these propositions be changed. The unconscionableness of the bargain is not the first thing to be considered. The first thing to be considered is the relations of these parties. Were they such as to put one in a position to dominate the will of the other?’” 32. Therefore, accepting the contention on behalf of the appellant in this context in view of the material on record, the inference to draw is that the respondents 1 and 2 failed to establish that Ex.A1 was obtained by the appellant by undue influence from them and taking advantage of their close relationship. 33. Thus, this point is held in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. POINT No.2:- 34. The entire strain of respondents 1 and 2 in respect of suit agreement for sale and the contract thereunder is that the appellant failed to perform his part of the contract, meeting the time schedule of payments stated therein. The appellant is disputing it contending that they are in fact the defaulters who failed to abide by the terms and conditions mentioned in Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale. The sale consideration of Rs.1,75,000/-was agreed to be paid by the appellant to the respondents 1 and 2, as stated in para-7 supra. The 1st payment was on or before 30.10.1990. 35. The sale consideration of Rs.1,75,000/-was agreed to be paid by the appellant to the respondents 1 and 2, as stated in para-7 supra. The 1st payment was on or before 30.10.1990. 35. Ex.A4 legal notice was issued on 06.11.1990 on behalf of the appellant to the respondents 1 and 2. The terms and conditions in Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale are stated in this legal notice. It is specifically 1st stated in this notice that the appellant when approached the respondent on 31.10.1990 to pay Rs.35,000/-in terms of Ex.A1 suit agreement, he refused to accept and evaded to receive. It is also stated in Ex.A4 notice that thereupon the appellant got issued a telegram to the 1st respondent and deposited the said amount in State Bank of India at Gollapalem. Admittedly, no reply was issued to Ex.A4 legal notice on behalf of the respondents. 36. Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, pointed out this circumstance to prove the eagerness of the appellant to pay the balance sale consideration and the conduct of the 1st respondent in evading to receive. However, Sri Rammohan Polanki, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that in support of such version in Ex.A4 no documentary proof is available on record and a copy of the telegram or any record relating to the deposit in bank account was produced at the trial. 37. As seen from the written statement and the testimony of D.W.1 there is no denial that original of Ex.A4 legal notice was not served on them on behalf of the appellant. Ex.A4 copy of legal notice was in fact marked during trial through D.W.1 viz., the 2nd respondent. He did not offer any explanation in respect of the contents of Ex.A4 notice nor dispute its contents denying that they ever received telegram as stated therein nor specifically dispute deposit of Rs.35,000/-in State Bank of India, Gollapalem . In these circumstances, issuance of Ex.A4 notice, within a week of the first instalment stipulated of part payment lends any amount of credence to the contention of the appellant. 38. In these circumstances, issuance of Ex.A4 notice, within a week of the first instalment stipulated of part payment lends any amount of credence to the contention of the appellant. 38. It is established as a fact that when the appellant made efforts to pay Rs.35,000/-on 30.10.1990 the 1st respondent avoided and evaded to receive the same that compelled the appellant to get issued original of Ex.A4 legal notice specifically bringing to the notice of the respondents of the conduct of the 1st respondent in this context and issuance of telegram thereof. Very issuance of telegram indicated the eagerness on the part of the appellant to abide by the terms of this contract under suit agreement for sale. The 1st respondent should blame himself for his conduct in this context and cannot assail the version of the appellant. 39. The 2nd payment was expected by or about 31.12.1990 of Rs.40,500/-. 40. Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, specifically contended that this payment is with reference to performing such part of the contract under Ex.A1 agreement in respect of item No.2 of the plaint schedule and in view of Ex.A2 transaction, on the date on which Rs.40,000/-was paid admittedly to the respondents 1 and 2. Associate transaction of delivery of the suit land of Ac.5-00 on that day is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant in this context proving and establishing the conduct of the appellant as well as the manner in which the respondents 1 and 2 have treated as to how the terms of Ex.A1 suit agreement stood performed. 41. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that Ex.A2 reflected an independent contract by itself and cannot merely be treated an endorsement on Ex.A1 suit agreement having regard to its terms. However, Sri Rammohan Polanki, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that Ex.A2 remained an endorsement on Ex.A1 and did not have the status of the independent contract. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that it reflected only an acknowledgment of belated payment of part of consideration under Ex.A1 suit agreement and nothing more. 42. The terms set out in Ex.A2 reflect that it has drawn its source from Ex.A1 agreement for sale. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that it reflected only an acknowledgment of belated payment of part of consideration under Ex.A1 suit agreement and nothing more. 42. The terms set out in Ex.A2 reflect that it has drawn its source from Ex.A1 agreement for sale. Referring to Item No.2 of the plaint schedule, it recorded that Rs.40,000/-was paid on 23.12.1990 and further recorded that suit land of Ac.5-00 was delivered on that day to the appellant. This fact of delivery of possession of the suit land is stated more than once in the written statement and additional written statement of the respondents 1 and 2. It was carried forward in the deposition of D.W.1. The terms of Ex.A2 further set out that Ac.2-50 cents of land was also offered as security by the respondents 1 and 2 covering the transaction thereunder. 43. Evidence of P.W.1 viz., the appellant and that of D.W.1 point out that these parties treated the suit agreement for sale in respect of Item No.2 of the plaint schedule, as rescinded and cancelled. When terms of Ex.A1 suit agreement referred to such payment by 31.12.1990 of Rs.40,500/-whereafter the respondents should execute a sale deed in respect of item No.2 of the plaint schedule, in the above circumstances, as rightly contended by Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, this part of Ex.A1 lost its significance. It was so recited in connection with item No.2 of the plaint schedule and when once the parties to the contract were at consensusadidemnot to treat this item of the property as a part of the suit agreement for sale and perform their mutual obligations in relation thereto, this factor cannot remain a circumstance for the respondents 1 and 2 to contend that the appellant failed to adhere to this term of the contract. Thus, they cannot contend now that the appellant failed to pay Rs.40,500/-as agreed under Ex.A1 by 31.12.1990. 44. The contention of the appellant is that on account of possession of the plaint schedule property, he was under the impression that the respondents 1 and 2 have been its lawful owners and therefore he agreed to purchase the same from them under Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale. 44. The contention of the appellant is that on account of possession of the plaint schedule property, he was under the impression that the respondents 1 and 2 have been its lawful owners and therefore he agreed to purchase the same from them under Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale. He also pleaded and contended that he was not aware of the sale transaction in the nature of an agreement for sale executed by the respondents 3 and 4 in favour of the respondents 1 and 2 covering the plaint schedule lands and of institution of O.S.No.266 of 1984 on the file of the Court of learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Kakinada for specific performance of the contract. However, Sri Rammohan Polanki, learned counsel for the respondents, contended that the appellant was well aware of these transactions including the pendency of the above suit between the respondents 1 and 2 on the one hand and respondents 3 and 4 on the other and that the contention of the appellant in this context is nothing but false. 45. Both these lands are in Kongodu village. It is the native village of the appellant, where he resides. In cross-examination as P.W.1 the appellant stated that these lands belonged to the 3rd respondent of Mandapeta and that the 1st respondent has purchased the same. He further stated that after coming to know how the 1st respondent held the plaint schedule properties, he entered into Ex.A1 suit agreement for sale with the respondents 1 and 2. These statements support the contention of the respondents 1 and 2 that the appellant was aware by the date of Ex.A1, that these lands belonged to the 3rd respondent. 46. This version of the appellant is also supported by his brother P.W.2 at the trial who stated that he and his brother were aware of the details of the plaint schedule lands. Therefore, it is not open for the appellant to contend that he was not informed of the sale transaction between the respondents interse by the date of Ex.A1 sale agreement. Apparently, he entered into Ex.A1 transaction aware of this background. The 2nd defendant was suggested in the cross-examination on behalf of the appellant as if the appellant had requested them to file a suit against their vendors after Ex.A1 was entered into and that the respondents 1 and 2 procrastinated without pursuing legal remedies. Apparently, he entered into Ex.A1 transaction aware of this background. The 2nd defendant was suggested in the cross-examination on behalf of the appellant as if the appellant had requested them to file a suit against their vendors after Ex.A1 was entered into and that the respondents 1 and 2 procrastinated without pursuing legal remedies. It is a suggestion which is supporting the version of the respondents pointing out that the appellant was aware of the transactions leading to filing O.S.No.266 of 1984 for specific performance by the respondents 1 and 2 against the respondents 3 and 4. 47. Nonetheless, the appellant cannot contend having had known the background as to how the respondents 1 and 2 had possession of the plaint schedule lands. Even otherwise, in a suit for specific performance the purchaser viz., the appellant cannot question the contract as if his vendors have no title or imperfect title in view of section 13 of the Specific Relief Act. 48. In the given facts and circumstances, the impression to gain is that it is not an instance where contract under Ex.A1 as such cannot be specifically enforced against the respondents 1 and 2 by the appellant. 49. Thus, having had entered into Ex.A1 suit agreement between himself and the respondents 1 and 2, the appellant is bound to accept this situation. It should not be lost sight of the fact of delivery of possession of suit land of Ac.5-00 pursuant to Ex.A1, under Ex.A2 endorsement by the respondents 1 and 2. 50. At the same time, insistence of the appellant on the respondents 1 and 2 to produce title deeds of the suit lands is an acceptable reason for withholding payment of balance sale consideration. By then, balance sale consideration of Rs.95,000/-was to be paid and by 31.05.1991, in terms of Ex.A1. The appellant was also expected to pay Rs.45,000/-out of it retaining Rs.50,000/-with him on account of failure of the respondents 1 and 2 to produce title deeds, out of this Rs.95,000/-. It is one of the circumstances, considered by the learned trial Judge pointing out laches on the part of the appellant in performance of part of Ex.A1 agreement for sale and it is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents in this appeal. 51. It is one of the circumstances, considered by the learned trial Judge pointing out laches on the part of the appellant in performance of part of Ex.A1 agreement for sale and it is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents in this appeal. 51. The suit was laid presenting the plaint before the Court of the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada on 27.04.1994. There is no dispute as such that the balance sale consideration was deposited on 04.09.2002. P.W.1 has deposed in respect of it and corroborative support is found in respect of this fact from the testimony of D.W.1. The learned trial Judge has also referred to this fact in his judgment in para-12. 52. One of the contentions of the respondents is that after several years of the institution of the suit, upon enjoying the suit land for many years, depositing balance sale consideration almost at the fag-end of the trial cannot point out that the appellant was eager to obtain sale deed in terms of this contract for sale nor it is an instance of his ready and willingness to perform his part of the contract. 53. It is also contended for the respondents that on account of the terms set out in Ex.A1 agreement for sale the time shall be the essence of contract and that, on account of continuous default of the appellant, he did not meet the requirements of Section 16 of Specific Relief Act. 54. Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant seriously contradicted this contention referring to the material on record and the conduct of the parties. It is further contended that there are clear instances manifesting the conduct of the appellant being always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract under Ex.A1. The learned counsel also pointed out in this context that in view of Ex.A2 transaction in relation to one of the terms of this contract, it is deemed that the respondent waived this right of insistence to pay the balance sale consideration. Thus, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the entire complexion of this contract stood changed and hence according to the learned counsel for the appellant, Ex.A2 itself is an independent contract. 55. As rightly pointed out for the respondents it was never the pleading nor the evidence of the appellant. Thus, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the entire complexion of this contract stood changed and hence according to the learned counsel for the appellant, Ex.A2 itself is an independent contract. 55. As rightly pointed out for the respondents it was never the pleading nor the evidence of the appellant. In so far as this contract in relation to item No.2 is concerned, Ex.A2 has a bearing. That part of payment expected to be made on or before 31.12.1990 whereupon item No.2 of the plaint schedule was accepted to be registered under a regular sale deed in favour of the appellant by the respondents stood waived upon the endorsement under Ex.A2. 56. Explanation-I to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act states that it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court. However, in this case the appellant himself had chosen to deposit the balance sale consideration as stated above. It is an indicator of the conduct of the appellant as such. Delay in making such deposit, cannot bear any significance. 57. Further, it has to be noted that in case of immovable properties, time is not the essence of contract usually. This question was considered in Constitution Bench judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chand Rani (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Kamal Rani (Dead) by Lrs., AIR 1993 SC 1742 . Considering the earlier rulings in Gomathinayagam Pillai and Ors. Vs. PaLL aniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868 , Hind Construction Contractors by its Sole Proprietor Bhikamchand Mulchand Jain (Dead) by Lrs Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 1074 , and Indira Kaur and Ors. Vs. Sheo Lal Kapoor Indira Kaur and Ors.vs. Sheo Lal Kapoor, AIR 1998 SC 1074, in para 24 of this ruling it is stated thus: “ ……. in the case of sale of immovable property there is no presumption as to time being the essence of the contract. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are: 1. from the express terms of the contract; 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract.” 58. Even if it is not of the essence of the contract the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable time if the conditions are: 1. from the express terms of the contract; 2. from the nature of the property; and 3. from the surrounding circumstances, for example: the object of making the contract.” 58. This ruling is relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents contending that the facts and circumstances in the present case on hand are similar to the one considered by the Constitution bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court. 59. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on Govind Prasad Chaturvedi Vs. Hari Dutta Shastri and another, 1977(2) SCC 539 wherein Gomathi Nayagam Pillai was followed observing as under: “It is settled law that the fixation of the period within which the contract has to be performed does not make the stipulation as to time the essence of the contract. When a contract relates to sale of Immovable property it will normally be presumed that the time is not the essence of the contract. Vide Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar [1967] 1 SCR 227. It may also be mentioned that the language used in the agreement is not such as to indicate in unmistakable terms that the time is of the essence of the contract. The intention to treat time as the essence of the contract may be evidenced by circumstances which are sufficiently strong to displace the normal presumption that in a contract of sale of land stipulation as to time is not the essence of the contract.” 60. Another ruling relied on for the appellant in this context is Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap and others vs. Smt. Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar and others, 2019 SCConline SC 1026= AIR 2019 SC 4252 . In this ruling, in para-41 it is observed thus: “41. The question as to whether the Plaintiff seeking specific performance has been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is required to be examined with reference to all the facts and the surrounding factors of the given case. The requirement is not that the Plaintiff should continuously approach the Defendant with payment or make incessant requests for performance. The requirement is not that the Plaintiff should continuously approach the Defendant with payment or make incessant requests for performance. For the relief of specific performance, which is essentially a species of equity but has got statutory recognition in terms of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the Plaintiff must be found standing with the contract and the Plaintiff's conduct should not be carrying any such blameworthiness so as to be considered inequitable. The requirement of readiness and willingness of the Plaintiff is not theoretical in nature but is essentially a question of fact, which needs to be determined with reference to the pleadings and evidence of parties as also to all the material circumstances having bearing on the conduct of parties, the Plaintiff in particular.” 61. A conspectus of material on record in this case leads to infer that there is no laches or lapse on the part of the appellant to abide by the terms of Ex.A1 agreement for sale. As already stated, he pointed out in Ex.A4 legal notice the conduct of the 1st respondent when he avoided receiving balance sale consideration payable by 30.10.1990. The second instalment of payment lead to rescind a part of the contract which was to be performed by 31.12.1990 upon payment of Rs.40,500/-, in view of Ex.A2 endorsement. An intervening circumstance relating to insistence of title deeds for this land by the appellant, needs consideration and admittedly the respondents 1 and 2 were not in a position to meet such demand of the appellant. Even otherwise, probably on legal advice, the appellant had deposited the balance sale consideration to the credit of the suit. When these factors are considered in tandem, the inference so drawn is appropriate. 62. However, several contentions are advanced on behalf of the respondents to the effect that all these circumstances do not in any manner make out that the appellant was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract as on the date of filing the suit and chosen to institute the suit just at the end of the period of limitation. It is also contended that depositing the balance sale consideration at a highly belated stage militates against the requirements in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act to disfavour the claim of the appellant. 63. It is also contended that depositing the balance sale consideration at a highly belated stage militates against the requirements in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act to disfavour the claim of the appellant. 63. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the value of the suit land has increased many fold from the date of Ex.A1 and this factor cannot altogether be ignored, more so when the trial Court in its discretion has refused to grant the equitable relief of specific performance. The learned counsel for the respondents also contended that merely because there are certain circumstances to validate the contract, it cannot automatically lead to grant relief sought by the appellant either in terms of Section 16 or Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. The delay, it is contended for the respondents 1 and 2, reflected by the conduct of the appellant in this respect to meet the performance of this contract, as rightly observed by the learned trial Judge, should lead to refusal of relief in this appeal also. 64. In this context, the learned counsel for the respondents relied on K.S. Vidyanadam and Ors. Vs. Vairavan, AIR 1997 SC 1751 = 1997(3) SCC 1 . In the given facts and circumstances, while referring to the observations of Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chand Rani referred to above, with reference to urban properties in India, their Lordships observed in para-10 as under: “10. …….In other words, the court should look at all the relevant circumstances including the time-limits specified in the agreement and determine whether its discretion to grant specific performance should be exercised. Now in the case of urban properties in India, it is well-known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades-particularly after 1973*. - - - - - - - - We cannot be oblivious to the reality - and the reality is constant and continuous rise in the values of urban properties - fuelled by larger-scale migration of people from rural areas to urban centers and by inflation.” ------------------ 65. Further reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for the respondents in Amarjeet Singh Vs. Nandu Bai and Ors., 1998(5) ALT 412 (DB) and C. Panduranga Rao vs. Syamala Rao and others, 1999(4) ALT 270 . 66. Further reliance is also placed by the learned counsel for the respondents in Amarjeet Singh Vs. Nandu Bai and Ors., 1998(5) ALT 412 (DB) and C. Panduranga Rao vs. Syamala Rao and others, 1999(4) ALT 270 . 66. Another ruling relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents in this context in Chunduru Padmavathi vs. Ch.Narasimha Rao, 2000(1) ALT 613 where, relying on Chand Rani as well as K.S.Vaidyanadham referred to above apart from other rulings including Amarjeet Singh and Satyanarayana v. Yelloji Rao, AIR 1965 SC 1405 , this Court observed in the given facts, that though the suit laid by the plaintiff was not barred by limitation in terms of Article-54 of the Limitation Act, intention of the parties in relation thereto should be gathered to hold that there is intention to performance terms of the contract within a reasonable time or not and if there was undue delay in filing the suit. Further observation in this ruling is that escalation in prices shall also be taken into consideration for agricultural lands, for this purpose. 67. Delivery of the suit land pursuant to this agreement under Ex.A1 attracts Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and whereby the appellant is in its continuous possession and enjoyment legally. It is not illegal and the respondents are bound to accept his legal possession of this land. Right to remain in this land in terms of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act thus stood protected (vide Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another vs. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (Dead) by L.Rs., and others, (2002) 3 Supreme Court Cases 676) 68. However, Sri E.V.V.S.Ravi Kumar, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on Bheemaneni Maha Lakshmi vs. Gangumall a Apparao(since dead) by Legal Representatives, 2019(6) SCC 233 repelling the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the plea relating to escalation of prices and its impact was not raised in the pleadings, which are brought on record only during trial. Thus, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that it cannot now be permitted to be raised, in this appeal. 69. Thus, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that it cannot now be permitted to be raised, in this appeal. 69. Apart from the objection raised by Sri E.V.V.S. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant, the reasons assigned supra pointing out the preparedness of the appellant to perform and abide by the terms of Ex.A1 agreement of sale vis-à-vis conduct of the respondents 1 and 2 bars consideration of this plea of the respondents. When once they consciously entered knowing full well about the impact and consequence of the contract under Ex.A1, they cannot complain that the delay had lead to unnecessarily enriching the appellant, who is in continuous possession of this land and who is trying to grab away the suit land for a song. 70. The conduct of the appellant as such is not blameworthy vis-à-vis Ex.A1 contract. The respondents 1 and 2 did play their role in not only avoiding performance of this contract and to dilute its effect. Therefore, on the material, it has to be held that the appellant proved being ready and willing to perform his part of the contract at all material times by the date of institution of the suit. Therefore, he is entitled for the relief of specific performance thereunder in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge in this context are not based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. Therefore, the findings so recorded by the learned trial Judge requires interference setting aside the same 71. Thus, this point is held in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. POINT No.3: 72. In view of findings on point No.2, since it is held that the appellant is entitled for specific performance of the contract in terms of Ex.A1 agreement for sale, relief of ejectment of the appellant from the suit land sought by the respondents 1 and 2 is not permissible. Even otherwise, as held in point No.2, possession of this land by the appellant stood protected by Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It is another ground on which the relief sought by the respondents 1 and 2 in this context has to be denied. Even otherwise, as held in point No.2, possession of this land by the appellant stood protected by Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. It is another ground on which the relief sought by the respondents 1 and 2 in this context has to be denied. Therefore, the counter-claim raised by the respondents 1 and 2 in the trial Court basing on the material on record and on its re-appraisal should be rejected, setting aside the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge in this respect. 73. Thus, this point is held in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. POINT No.4: 74. In view of the findings on points 1 to 3, the appellant is entitled for relief of specific performance of contract under Ex.A1 agreement for sale. The relief sought by the appellant in the suit has to be granted and against the respondents. POINT No.5 75. In view of the findings on all the above points, both the appeals A.S.No.916 of 2003 and Tr.A.S.No.6 of 2018 have to be allowed setting aside the judgment of the trial Court and granting reliefs sought by the appellant in the suit with costs throughout. 76. C.R.P.No.4873 of 2006 is tagged on to these two appeals. Order in question in this CRP is dated 15.09.2006 in O.S.No.97 of 2004 on the file of the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in respect of request of the respondents 1 and 2 to decide the additional issue as a preliminary issue. This additional issue is with reference to application of Order-2, Rule-2 CPC. It is predominantly based on outcome in O.S.No.98 of 1994. A.S.No.961 of 2003 is also the basis for this purpose since it is preferred against the judgment and decree in O.S.No.98 of 1994. The relief sought in that suit viz., O.S.No.97 of 2004 is for recovery of money for use and occupation of the suit land and as damages. The trial Court rejected such a request of the respondents 1 and 2 against which the CRP is preferred. 77. In as much as the appeal now is allowed setting aside the decree and judgment in O.S.No.98 of 1994 of the trial Court, the basis for O.S.No.97 of 2004 on the file of the Court of the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada is no more existing or continuing. 77. In as much as the appeal now is allowed setting aside the decree and judgment in O.S.No.98 of 1994 of the trial Court, the basis for O.S.No.97 of 2004 on the file of the Court of the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada is no more existing or continuing. In view of it, neither there is any necessity to consider any issue as preliminary issue nor need for the trial Court to consider the application of Order-2 Rule-2 CPC. In view of what is stated above, the CRP has to be disposed of accordingly. 78. In the result, A.S.No.916 of 2003 and Tr.A.S.No.6 of 2018 are allowed. Consequently, the decree and judgment of the Court of the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in O.S.No.98 of 2004 dated 27.03.2003 are set aside. (1) Resultantly, O.S.No.98 of 1994 is decreed directing the respondents to execute a sale deed in terms of the suit agreement for sale dated 14.10.1990 in favour of the appellant (plaintiff) in respect of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property within three (03) months from this day. In the event of failure of respondents to do so, the appellant is at liberty to approach the trial Court for execution of the sale deed taking recourse to due process of law. (2) The respondents are permitted to withdraw the balance sale consideration deposited by the appellant to the credit of the suit including interest, if any, accrued thereon, without furnishing security. (3) Permanent injunction is granted in favour of the appellant (plaintiff) restraining the respondents (defendants) from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. (4) The counter claim of the respondents is dismissed. (5) CRP is disposed of confirming the order of the Court of the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada dated 15.09.2006 in O.S.No.97 of 2004. (6) The respondents (defendants) are directed to pay costs throughout to the appellant (plaintiff) and shall bear their own costs throughout. As sequel thereto, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed. Interim Orders, if any, stand vacated.