JUDGMENT K.R. Mohapatra, J. - This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, 'the Arbitration Act') has been filed assailing the judgment and order dated 21.12.2011 passed by learned District Judge, Cuttack in ARBP No.2 of 2002, whereby he dismissed the Arbitration Petition filed by the present appellant under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and confirmed the award dated 16.06.2001 passed by learned Arbitration Tribunal, Odisha, Bhubaneswar in Arbitration Case No. AAD- 8 of 1997. 2. Short narration of facts necessary for proper adjudication of this appeal are as follows: 2.1 The respondent, which is a small scale industry (for short, 'the Contractor') was awarded with the contract for 'Structural Fabrication of C.C. Shop in SMS/inside the RSP' (Sub package No.104-3) by the appellant-Corporation (for short 'the Corporation'), which is a Government of Odisha Undertaking, registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956, with certain terms and conditions mentioned in the work order under Ext.1. On completion of the work assigned, further work orders were issued by the Corporation in favor of the Contractor on 09.03.1994, 18.04.1994, 01.09.1994 and 12.12.1994, which were also executed by the Contractor. The Contractor raised certain disputes alleging non-payment of part of the bill amount after execution of such work, which was delayed till 03.02.1995, non-payment of escalated labour charges, nonissuance of Tax Deducted at Source (TDS) certificate in favour of the Contractor for which it had to pay the Tax again and irregular payment of running bills etc. Several other claims/disputes were also raised. The Contractor although made claim vide letter No. CME/OSIC/96 dated 06.02.1996 (Ext. 10) on the aforesaid irregularities, but its claim was refuted by the Corporation vide letter No.280/OSIC dated 24.02.1996 (Ext.11) alleging that the Contractor had not returned surplus Prime German Steel off-cuts and scrapes, for which the cost of materials was deducted from the account of the Contractor vide its reply to under Ext.12. As the dispute between the parties could not be resolved, the Contractor moved the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of High Court of Orissa in MJC No. 115 of 1997 under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act for appointment of an Arbitrator. As the dispute between the parties could not be resolved, the Contractor moved the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of High Court of Orissa in MJC No. 115 of 1997 under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act for appointment of an Arbitrator. Taking into consideration the letter of the Corporation dated 24th October, 1996 (Annexure-9 to the said MJC) expressing their wishes for adjudication of the dispute, if any, by learned Arbitration Tribunal, Odisha, Bhubaneswar (for short 'Tribunal'), Hon'ble the Chief Justice, by order dated 22.10.1997 referred the matter to learned Tribunal. The Contractor filed a claim of Rs.6,11,658.73 on eight heads along with interest @ 18% per annum from 16.01.1995 till payment. The details of such claim are as under: Claim Item No.1 Running Bill Rs. 03.97,053.00 Claim Item No.2 Escalated labour charges Rs. 43,902.73 Claim Item No.3 Income tax deduction certificate Rs. 02,963.00 Claim Item No.4 Rent paid for hiring of machineries and not issuing release order of the machineries which are lying idle Rs. 88,800.00 Claim Item No.5 Wages to worker which could not finalized the affair, though work was completed on 16.01.1995 to 03.02.1995 Rs. 16,140.00 Claim Item No.6 Keeping the office for guarding machineries for watch and ward of staff which was not released after completion of the work Rs. 52,800.00 Claim Item No.7 To meet expenditure for sending their authorized representatives to Rourkela frequently for ten times for finalization of the same. Rs. 05,000.00 Claim Item No.8 Financial loss sustained in paying the arbitrators and their counsel for referring the matter to approach the Honble Court towards payment of litigation expenses Rs. 05,000.00 3. The Corporation filed its written statement admitting the value of the work to be Rs.14,92,582/-. In the written statement, it is stated that out of the value of the work, 80% was passed for payment, which comes to Rs.11,95,665/- and after making necessary statutory deductions as per the statement, Rs.11,22,977/- was paid to the Contractor as per Clause (iv) of the Work order and the rest amount of the claim could not be paid as the Contractor did not submit the final bill along with material consumption statement along with ESI and EPF documents. It was also stated that there was no delay in payment except for ten days. The Corporation also denied other claims made by the Contractor and contended that the Contractor is not entitled to the same. 4. It was also stated that there was no delay in payment except for ten days. The Corporation also denied other claims made by the Contractor and contended that the Contractor is not entitled to the same. 4. Learned Tribunal in its award dated 16.06.2001 rejected the claim of the Contractor in respect of Item Nos. 2 to 8 and passed an award in respect of the claim Item No.1 only. The award passed by the learned Tribunal was not challenged by the Contractor. However, the Corporation assailed the same by filing an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the learned District Judge, Cuttack, which was registered as Arbitration Petition No.2 of 2002 and the impugned order dated 21.12.2011 has been passed. This appeal has been filed assailing the said order. 5. Mr.J.K.Mohapatra, learned counsel for the Corporation opened his argument referring to Payment Clause of the Agreement, which reads as follows: "PAYMENT (i) No mobilization advance will be paid. (ii) Bills are to be raised and submitted on acceptance of fabricated structures with painting by all inspecting agencies by 25th of every month. Any bills submitted beyond 25th will be considered in the next month. (iii) After the claim bills are certified by our technical wings, payment will be made in the first week of next month. (iv) 80% of the certified bill amount will be released within 30 days of receipt of claim bills with measurement sheet, material consumption statement, ESI & EPF deposit document and wage payment slip duly singed by RSP/ Client/ OSIC Officer. (v) 10% payment will be released after material reconciliation and recovery of materials from party and submission of final bill. (vi) Balance 10% payment will be released on final settlement of bills after completion of work and final acceptance of material reconciliation/ recovery of materials by RSP." 5.1 It is his submission that the dispute is with regard to the payment of bills to the Contractor. Referring to Sub-clauses (iv), (v) and (vi) of Payment Clause, he submitted that as per Clause (iv), 80% of the certified bill amount was to be released within 30 days of receipt of the bills with measurement sheet and material consumption statement etc. Certified bill amount has been clarified in Clause (iii) of the Payment Clause. Referring to Sub-clauses (iv), (v) and (vi) of Payment Clause, he submitted that as per Clause (iv), 80% of the certified bill amount was to be released within 30 days of receipt of the bills with measurement sheet and material consumption statement etc. Certified bill amount has been clarified in Clause (iii) of the Payment Clause. Further, 10% of the bill amount was to be released after material re-conciliation and recovery of materials from the party as well as submission of final bills. As per Clause (vi), the balance 10% of the bill amount was to be released on final settlement of bills after completion of work and final settlement of material reconciliation etc. Thus, the process of final payment of bills starts after submission of the final bill, reconciliation of material etc. In the instant case, after submission of 12th R/A bill, 80% of the said bill amount was released in time, but balance 20% was withheld, which was to be paid after final settlement. The Contractor, however, failed to submit the final bill and material re-conciliation statement. Thus, the payment of said 20% of the bill amount could not be made. The Corporation specifically raised the issue of non-submission of final bill and non-submission of material re-conciliation statement as well as the maintainability of the arbitration proceeding before learned Tribunal. But, neither any issue to that effect was framed by the learned Tribunal nor were the same dealt with in the award passed by the learned Tribunal. In that view of the matter, the impugned award is an unreasonable one and should have been set aside by learned District Judge. 5.2 Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel further submitted that due to non-submission of final bill, the claim of the Contractor cannot be treated as a demand. As such, it can be safely held that there is no dispute in the eyes of law. Thus, initiation of the arbitration proceeding is premature. He relied upon the case law in the case of Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (1988) AIR SC 1007 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows: "Therefore, in order to be entitled to order of reference under section 20, it is necessary that there should be an arbitration agreement and secondly, difference must arise to which this agreement applied. In this case, there is no dispute that there was an arbitration agreement. In this case, there is no dispute that there was an arbitration agreement. There has been an assertion of claim by the appellant and silence as well as refusal in respect of the same by respondent. Therefore, a dispute has arisen regarding non-payment of the alleged dues of the appellant. The question is for the present case when did such dispute arise. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the work was completed in 1980 and, therefore, the appellant became entitled to the payment from that date and the cause of action under article 137 arose from that date. But in order to be entitled to ask for a reference under section 20 of the Act there must not only be an entitlement to money but there must be a difference or dispute must arise. It is true that on completion of the work a right to get payment would normally arise but where the final bills as in this case have not been prepared as appears from the record and when the assertion of the claim was made on 28th February, 1983 and there was non-payment, the cause of action arose from that date, that is to say, 28th of February, 1983. It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders but where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action. A dispute arises where there is a claim and a denial and repudiation of the claim. The existence of dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator under section 8 or a reference under section 20 of the Act. See Law of Arbitration by R.S. Bachawat, 1st Edition, page 354. There should be dispute and there can only be a dispute when a claim is asserted by one party and denied by the other on whatever grounds. Mere failure or inaction to pay does not lead to the inference of the existence of dispute. Dispute entails a positive element and assertion in denying, not merely inaction to accede to a claim or a request. Mere failure or inaction to pay does not lead to the inference of the existence of dispute. Dispute entails a positive element and assertion in denying, not merely inaction to accede to a claim or a request. Whether in a particular case a dispute has arisen or not has to be found out from the facts and circumstances of the case." 5.3 The respondent-Contractor had raised 8 numbers of claims but learned Tribunal only allowed the claim Item No.1, wherein, it had claimed for the amount which was deducted towards non-compliance of contract provision under Payment Clause. It is held by learned Tribunal that claim Item No.1 was the deducted amount of 12th R/A bills (Ext.24) of the Contractor and passed a conditional award holding that the Contractor is entitled to Rs.3,90,550/- on submission of final bill and directed to make the said payment within a period of 120 days. Such finding is patently illegal on the face of the record and contrary to the conditions of the Agreement. Question of payment of the unpaid amount to the Contractor does not arise until the final bill is submitted and the Contractor complies with other requirements of the Payment Clause. The observation of learned Tribunal is imaginary and speculative, inasmuch as, the Contractor had not submitted the final bill by then. Thus, the question of payment of any particular amount and entitlement of the Contractor could not have been assessed by learned Tribunal before submission of the final bill. Further, finding that the payment should be made within a period of 120 days cannot be given effect to in absence of the final bill. 5.4 In furtherance of his argument, it is submitted that by the time the award was passed, the time fixed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice for conclusion of the proceeding had already elapsed. Thus, the mandate had automatically terminated on expiry of the time stipulated and learned Tribunal ceased to have any authority to continue with the arbitration proceeding beyond the time stipulated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. As such, the award passed by learned Tribunal is without jurisdiction. In support of his case, he relied upon a decision in the case of N.B.C.C Ltd. Vs. J.G. Engineering Pvt. Ltd., (2010) AIR SC 640 , which reads as follows: "5. As such, the award passed by learned Tribunal is without jurisdiction. In support of his case, he relied upon a decision in the case of N.B.C.C Ltd. Vs. J.G. Engineering Pvt. Ltd., (2010) AIR SC 640 , which reads as follows: "5. A perusal of the arbitration agreement quite clearly reveals that the arbitrator has the power to enlarge the time to make and publish the award by mutual consent of the parties. Therefore, it is obvious that the arbitrator has no power to further extend the time beyond that which is fixed without the consent of both the parties to the dispute. It is an admitted position that the respondent did not give any consent for extension of time of the arbitrator. Thus given the situation, the arbitrator had no power to further enlarge the time to make and publish the award and therefore his mandate had automatically terminated after the expiry of the time fixed by the parties to conclude the proceedings. The learned counsel contended that the arbitration proceedings involved questions of highly technical and complex issues which would require sufficient amount of time to be decided in a just and proper way. However the records clearly illustrate that even after a passage of over nine years, the matter which was to be decided between the parties by way of arbitration, could not be resolved and the process lingered on. Arbitration is an efficacious and alternative way of dispute resolution between the parties. There is no denying the fact that the method of arbitration has evolved over the period of time to help the parties to speedily resolve their disputes through this process and in fact the Act recognizes this aspect and has elaborate provisions to cater to the needs of speedy disposal of disputes. The present case illustrates that in spite of adopting this efficacious way of resolving the disputes between the parties through the arbitration process, there was no outcome and the arbitration process had lingered on for a considerable length of time which defeats the notion of the whole process of resolving the disputes through arbitration. The contention of the appellant therefore cannot be justified that since the dispute was highly technical in nature, it had to be dealt with elaborately by the arbitrator and thus, he was justified in being late. The contention of the appellant therefore cannot be justified that since the dispute was highly technical in nature, it had to be dealt with elaborately by the arbitrator and thus, he was justified in being late. The High Court had thus correctly fixed the time for the arbitration to be concluded within a period of six months from the appointment of the fourth arbitrator Shri A.K. Gupta considering the time that had been spent for the arbitration process prior to Mr. Gupta's appointment. That apart, even assuming that the arbitration process involved highly technical and complex issues, which was time consuming, even then, it was open for the arbitrator or for the parties to approach the Court for extension of time to conclude the arbitration proceeding which was not done by either by the arbitrator or by any of the parties. As had been correctly noted by the High Court in its impugned judgment, there was no cogent reason for the delay in making and publishing the award by the arbitrator. He already had the relevant materials at his disposal and could base his findings on the observations made by the three arbitrators who were appointed prior to him. The Arbitrator was bound to make and publish his award, within the time mutually agreed to by the parties, unless the parties consented to further enlargement of time. Therefore, the condition precedent for enlargement of time would depend only on the consent of the parties, that is to say, that if the parties agree for enlargement of time. If consent is not given by the parties, then the authority of the arbitrator would automatically cease to exist after the expiry of the time limit fixed. In the present case, the arbitrator had failed to publish the award within the time limit fixed by the parties, and hence, the High Court was justified in terminating the mandate of the arbitrator......... It has been correctly observed by the High Court that the arbitrator had become functus officio in the absence of extension of time beyond 30th of September, 2005 to make and publish the award. After the said date, the arbitrator had no authority to continue with the arbitration proceedings. ......." 6. Learned District Judge at paragraphs-10 and 11 of the impugned judgment has categorically held that learned Tribunal had not completed the arbitration proceeding within the time stipulated. After the said date, the arbitrator had no authority to continue with the arbitration proceedings. ......." 6. Learned District Judge at paragraphs-10 and 11 of the impugned judgment has categorically held that learned Tribunal had not completed the arbitration proceeding within the time stipulated. But, he erroneously proceeded to hold that learned Tribunal does not become functus officio automatically after lapse of the time period fixed. The said finding of learned District Judge is not correct in view of the case of N.B.C.C. Ltd (supra). Although learned Tribunal has passed a conditional award, learned District Judge, erroneously confirmed the same. Further, learned District Judge committed an error of record in holding that the Corporation was given ample opportunity before the Tribunal. When the arbitration proceeding was not concluded within the time stipulated, the Corporation had no scope to remain present in the arbitration proceeding and to produce witnesses, which itself makes it clear that the Corporation was not given opportunity of hearing in the arbitration proceeding. Since learned Tribunal had no authority to continue with the arbitration proceeding without any extension of time, the Corporation was justified in not participating in the arbitration proceeding. The impugned judgment passed by the learned District Judge is also contrary to the provision laid down under Section 28(3) and 31 (3) of the Arbitration Act, wherein it is prescribed that the award should be a reasoned one and in accordance with the terms of the contract. Thus, the award is patently illegal, which should have been set aside by learned District Judge while exercising his jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In support of his case, he relied upon a case law reported in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Saw Pipes Ltd., (2003) AIR SC 2629 and in the case of Hindustan Zinc Ltd. Vs. Friends Coal Carbonisation, (2006) 4 SCC 445 . Hence, he prayed for setting aside of the impugned judgment passed by learned District Judge as well as award passed by learned Arbitration Tribunal. 7. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate, on the other hand, refuted the submissions made by learned counsel for the Corporation. Mr. Mishra, vehemently argued that plea of non-submission of final bill was not raised before learned Tribunal. As such, no issue to that effect was framed. 7. Mr. S.P. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate, on the other hand, refuted the submissions made by learned counsel for the Corporation. Mr. Mishra, vehemently argued that plea of non-submission of final bill was not raised before learned Tribunal. As such, no issue to that effect was framed. The Corporation had never raised any question with regard to the termination of the mandate for want of extension of time. Thus, the same is not available to be raised either in a proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act or in this appeal. It is his submission that the recording of the Court is conclusive. Neither the counsel nor the litigant is allowed to contradict the same before any higher forum, save and except before the Judge himself. In support of his case, he relied upon a case law in the case of State Of Maharashtra vs Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr, (1982) AIR SC 1249 , relevant portion of which reads as follows; "7. ... so the judges, record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may claim to contradict it, except before the judge himself, but nowhere else. 8. Thus, the plea of the Corporation to the effect that learned District Judge did not answer certain issues in the impugned judgment it had raised, is not available to be raised before this Court, as the impugned judgment is silent about raising of such plea before learned District Judge. It was open for the Corporation to file an application for review before that Court itself, if so advised and not in this appeal. 9. In spite of the Corporation being provided with ample opportunity of hearing, it preferred not to avail the same and cooperate in the proceeding before leaned Tribunal. Referring to the order sheet of learned Tribunal learned District Judge has categorically held that the Corporation remained absent time and again by taking the Tribunal for granted. As a matter of fact, on one such occasion, i.e., on 25.06.1998, one of the witnesses was recalled and was further examined by the Corporation. He was also cross-examined by the Contractor. Thus, the Corporation cannot have a grievance of violation of principle of natural justice. The Corporation due to its absence was set ex parte before learned Tribunal and that order was challenged before this Court. He was also cross-examined by the Contractor. Thus, the Corporation cannot have a grievance of violation of principle of natural justice. The Corporation due to its absence was set ex parte before learned Tribunal and that order was challenged before this Court. This Court, however, setting aside the said order allowed the Corporation to participate in the said arbitration proceeding, but for the reasons best known, the Corporation remained absent time and again and in spite of giving opportunity to produce witness, it failed to do so. Learned District Judge has dealt with the matter in detail to that effect and held that the Corporation was given ample opportunity, which he failed to avail. 10. The plea of the Corporation to the effect that the arbitral award was passed after expiry of the period specified by this Court, is misconceived and not tenable in law. In fact, Hon'ble the Chief Justice, vide order dated 11.05.2001 in Misc. Case No.128 of 2000 (arising out of MJC Case No. 115 of 1997), has passed the following order: Misc. Case No. 128 of 2000 11.5.2001 Heard the learned counsel for the parties. Time is granted till the end of the June 2001 for completion of Arbitration Proceeding (AA-D-8/97) pending before the state Arbitration tribunal, Bhubaneswar. Misc. case is disposed of. 10.1 Thus, he submitted that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice had extended the time to conclude the arbitral proceeding till end of June, 2001 and the Arbitration Tribunal passed the award on 16.06.2001, which is wellwithin the time extended by this Court. Once the Hon'ble the Chief Justice extended time till end of June, 2001, the proceeding before learned Tribunal for passing the award has been regularized. Further, such an issue was never raised before learned Tribunal nor any objection/protest to that effect was ever raised by the Corporation before learned Tribunal at any point of time. Be that as it may, when the arbitral award was passed well-within the time extended by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, the same can neither be held to be without jurisdiction nor can it be said that the mandate had terminated. 11. The issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal to proceed with the arbitral proceeding should have been specifically raised before learned Tribunal itself under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act. 11. The issue with regard to the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal to proceed with the arbitral proceeding should have been specifically raised before learned Tribunal itself under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act. At no point of time, the Corporation had raised any issue with regard to the non-submission of final bill by the Corporation before learned Tribunal. Thus, it was not available to be raised by the Corporation either before learned District Judge or in this appeal. He further submitted that learned Tribunal is competent to pass a conditional award, if situation so warrants. Further, the final bill is nothing but the residue of the running bills, which has not been paid. 12. The amount claimed by the Contractor in its bill under Ext.4 was never disputed by the Corporation. On the other hand, accepting the said amount, the Corporation had released 80% of the bill amount withholding 20% to be paid, which was the issue before learned Tribunal and was only directed to be paid. In fact, the Corporation had paid a sum of Rs.10,95,534/-as against the bill amount of Rs.14,92,965/-. Thus, the Corporation has rightly been directed by learned Tribunal to pay the rest amount, i.e., Rs.3,90,550/- to the Contractor on submission of the final bill. Although a plea was taken by the Corporation to the effect that the Contractor was paid a sum of Rs.11,22,977.00, but it failed to substantiate the same by leading cogent evidence to that effect. There is no dispute with regard to the labour escalation charges, which could not have been denied to the Contractor. The material reconciliation statement, ESI/EPF deposits has nothing to do with the labour escalation bill, which was submitted separately. 13. This Court, while exercising power under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, cannot re-asses or re-appreciate the evidence to find out as to whether a different conclusion than that arrived at by learned Tribunal, can be recorded. In support of his case, he relied upon the case of P.R. Shah Shares and Stock Brokers Private Limited v- B.H.H Securities Pvt. Limited and others, (2012) 1 SCC 594 , the case ofRavindra Kumar Gupta and Company v- Union of India, (2010) 1 SCC 409 and the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited v- Datar SwitchGear Limited and Others, (2018) 3 SCC 133 , wherein at Paragraph-51 it is held as follows: "51. .... .... Arbitration Tribunal is master of evidence in finding of facts which are arrived by the arbitrators basing on the evidence on record which are not to be scrutinized as if the court is sitting an appeal. Now stands settled by a catena of judgments pronounced by this Court without any exception thereto" 13.1 In the case of National Highway Authority of India -v- Progressive- MVR (JV), (2018) 14 SCC 688 , it has been held that when two views are possible, a particular view taken by arbitrator if plausible, should not be interfered with. The case of Associate Builder Vs. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49 deals with the scope of challenge of award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In the aforesaid case law taking into consideration the previous case laws it is held as follows; "13. In as much as serious objections have been taken to the Division Bench judgment on the ground that it has ignored the parameters laid down in a series of judgments by this Court as to the limitations which a Judge hearing objections to an arbitral award under Section 34 is subject to, we deem it necessary to state the law on the subject. 14. Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act reads as follows- xx xx xx xx xx xx 15. This Section in conjunction with Section 5 makes it clear that an arbitration award that is governed by part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be set aside only on grounds mentioned under Section 34 (2) and (3), and not otherwise. Section 5 reads as follows: xx xx xx xx xx xx 16. It is important to note that the 1996 Act was enacted to replace the 1940 Arbitration Act in order to provide for an arbitral procedure which is fair, efficient and capable of meeting the needs of arbitration; also to provide that the tribunal gives reasons for an arbitral award; to ensure that the tribunal remains within the limits of its jurisdiction; and to minimize the supervisory roles of courts in the arbitral process. 17. It will be seen that none of the grounds contained in sub- clause 2 (a) deal with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. 17. It will be seen that none of the grounds contained in sub- clause 2 (a) deal with the merits of the decision rendered by an arbitral award. It is only when we come to the award being in conflict with the public policy of India that the merits of an arbitral award are to be looked into under certain specified circumstances. xx xx xx xx xx xx 19. When it came to construing the expression "the public policy of India" contained in Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, this Court in ONGC v. Saw Pipes, (2003) 5 SCC 705 , held- "31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase "public policy of India" used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term "public policy" in Renusagar case, (1994) Supp1 SCC 644 it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. The result would be - award could be set aside if it is contrary to: (a) Fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) The interest of India; or (c) Justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void. 74. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void. 74. In the result, it is held that: (A) (1) The court can set aside the arbitral award under Section 34(2) of the Act if the party making the application furnishes proof that: (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. (2) The court may set aside the award: (i)(a) if the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, (b) failing such agreement, the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal was not in accordance with Part I of the Act. (ii) if the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with: (a) the agreement of the parties, or (b) failing such agreement, the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with Part I of the Act. However, exception for setting aside the award on the ground of composition of Arbitral Tribunal or illegality of arbitral procedure is that the agreement should not be in conflict with the provisions of Part I of the Act from which parties cannot derogate. (c) If the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is in contravention of the provisions of the Act or any other substantive law governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract. (3) The award could be set aside if it is against the public policy of India, that is to say, if it is contrary to: (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality; or (d) if it is patently illegal. (4) It could be challenged: (a) as provided under Section 13(5); and (b) Section 16(6) of the Act. (4) It could be challenged: (a) as provided under Section 13(5); and (b) Section 16(6) of the Act. (B)(1) The impugned award requires to be set aside mainly on the grounds: (i) there is specific stipulation in the agreement that the time and date of delivery of the goods was of the essence of the contract; (ii) in case of failure to deliver the goods within the period fixed for such delivery in the schedule, ONGC was entitled to recover from the contractor liquidated damages as agreed; (iii) it was also explicitly understood that the agreed liquidated damages were genuine preestimate of damages; (iv) on the request of the respondent to extend the time-limit for supply of goods, ONGC informed specifically that time was extended but stipulated liquidated damages as agreed would be recovered; (v) liquidated damages for delay in supply of goods were to be recovered by paying authorities from the bills for payment of cost of material supplied by the contractor; (vi) there is nothing on record to suggest that stipulation for recovering liquidated damages was by way of penalty or that the said sum was in any way unreasonable. (vii) In certain contracts, it is impossible to assess the damages or prove the same. Such situation is taken care of by Sections 73 and 74 of the Contract Act and in the present case by specific terms of the contract." 20. The judgment in ONGC v. Saw Pipes has been consistently followed till date." 13.2 Relying upon the ratio in the case of Shyama Charan Agarwala Vs. Union of India, (2002) 6 SCC 201 , Mr. Mishra submitted that "The aim of the arbitration is to settle all disputes between the parties and to avoid future litigation. There is no legal justification in restricting the scope of arbitration in the manner in which the High Court did in the list of disputes which is annexed to the letter of appointment of the arbitrator......" 13.3 Hence, he submitted that the impugned award in terms of Ext. 24 as well as the judgment passed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act needs no interference. He, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Perused the materials as well as case laws placed before this Court in detail. 24 as well as the judgment passed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act needs no interference. He, accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the appeal. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. Perused the materials as well as case laws placed before this Court in detail. 14.1 Short questions, which require adjudication in this case, are as follows: i) Whether the proceeding before the Arbitration Tribunal was maintainable for nonsubmission of final bill, as alleged by the appellant? ii) Whether the award passed by the Arbitration Tribunal was without jurisdiction? iii) Whether the appellant was given opportunity of hearing before Arbitration Tribunal? Question No.1; 15. Mr. Mahapatra learned counsel for the appellant submitted that due to non-submission of final bill by the respondent-Contractor, the rest 20% of the bill amount was withheld. Thus, the arbitration clause could not have been invoked before submission of the final bill. As such, the arbitration proceeding is not maintainable. 15.1 It is not in dispute that the respondent-Contractor had submitted the bill under Ext.24 before the Corporation. Accepting the same, 80% of the said bill amount was released in favour of the Contractor. There is a dispute with regard to 80% of the amount released in favour of the Contractor. When the Contractor claims that a sum of Rs.10,95,534/- has been released in its favour, the Corporation claimed to have paid a sum of Rs.11,22,977/-. Learned Tribunal referring to the materials available on record, came to a categorical conclusion that in fact the Contractor was paid a sum of Rs.10,95,534/- towards 80% of the bill amount. The Corporation could not substantiate its objection/claim by adducing evidence to that effect. Thus, this Court has no other option but to accept that the Contractor has been paid a sum of Rs.10,95,534/- towards 80% of the bill amount. Taking the aforesaid figure into consideration, a sum of Rs.3,90,550/- towards rest 20% of the bill amount has been directed to be paid to the Contractor, subject to the compliance of Payment Clause as referred to above. 15.2 The Corporation claimed that Ext. 24 is a R/A bill and not a final bill. Thus, the Contractor is not entitled to the rest 20% of the bill amount, as he has not complied with the conditions mentioned in the Payment Clause. 15.3 It is vehemently argued by Mr. 15.2 The Corporation claimed that Ext. 24 is a R/A bill and not a final bill. Thus, the Contractor is not entitled to the rest 20% of the bill amount, as he has not complied with the conditions mentioned in the Payment Clause. 15.3 It is vehemently argued by Mr. J.K. Mahapatra, learned counsel for the Corporation that the said objection was specifically raised by the Corporation at paragraphs 15, 16, 17 and 26 of its written statement, but no issue to that effect was framed by learned Tribunal. On scrutiny of the materials available on record, it appears that although a plea, as aforesaid, was taken by the Corporation in its written statement, but no such objections was raised by the Corporation at the time of settlement of the issues or at any time subsequent thereto, during pendency of the arbitration proceeding. It further appears no contention with regard to framing of issues was raised before learned District Judge. Thus, the same is no more available to be raised by the appellant in this appeal. Further, Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the final bill is nothing but the residue of the R/A bill, which remained unpaid. The ratio in the case of Shyama Charan Agarwala (supra) clearly laid down that the aim of the arbitration is to settle all disputes between the parties under the contract in order to avoid future litigation. There is no justification in restricting the scope of arbitration. Thus, the Tribunal has committed no illegality in directing the Corporation to pay a sum of Rs. 3,90,550/- within 120 days from the date of the award, failing which it would be liable to pay interest @ 20% p.a. on the awarded amount from the date of the award till date of payment, subject to submission of the final bill in accordance with Ext.24. 15.4 It appears that the Corporation had never made any attempt to avail its opportunity provided under Sub-section (2) or (3) of Section 16 of the Arbitration Act. It has also not raised any objection with regard to jurisdiction of the Tribunal or maintainability of the proceeding before it during pendency of the petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. 16. It has also not raised any objection with regard to jurisdiction of the Tribunal or maintainability of the proceeding before it during pendency of the petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. 16. The issue with regard to maintainability of the arbitral proceeding is a mixed question of fact and law which has to be raised at the outset before the Tribunal itself. The Corporation although has raised an objection with regard to non-submission of final bill in its written statement of defence, but failed to raise the same before learned Arbitration Tribunal either at the time of settlement of issues or at any stage of the proceeding subsequent thereto. On the other hand, it participated in the proceeding assailing the claim of the Contractor on merit. Thus, learned Tribunal has committed no error in not framing the issue with regard to maintainability of the proceeding or discussing the same in its award. 17. Taking into consideration the bill submitted by the Contractor under Ext. 24, learned Tribunal has only directed to pay the rest 20% of the said bill amount. Ext. 24 is in effect the final bill submitted by the Contractor, which is only required to be complied with formally as per the direction of learned Tribunal. It is also submitted by Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate that the Contractor has already submitted the final bill in compliance of the direction of learned Tribunal, which was a mere formality, as the Contractor only claims the unpaid amount of Ext.24. Thus, it appears, learned Tribunal has taken note of the Payment Clause (supra) of the Contract and passed an award in consonance thereof. Since non- submission of rest 20% of the bill in question was before the Arbitration Tribunal, it cannot be said that the proceeding was not maintainable as alleged by the Corporation. Thus, the question No.1 is answered against the Corporation. Question No.2; 18. There is no dispute with regard to fact that the matter was referred to the Tribunal for adjudication pursuant to direction of Hon'ble the Chief Justice in MJC No.115 of 1997 and both the parties participated in the proceeding before Hon'ble the Chief Justice in MJC No.115 of 1997. Considering their respective submissions, a direction was made referring the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication in exercise of power under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration Act. Considering their respective submissions, a direction was made referring the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication in exercise of power under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration Act. The said order passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice was never challenged in any higher forum. On the other hand, direction of Hon'ble the Chief Justice has been duly acted upon. 19. An issue is raised by learned counsel for the Corporation that the award was passed beyond the time fixed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. It is submitted by learned counsel for the Corporation that due to lapse of the time stipulated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice, the mandate was terminated. Learned Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to entertain the arbitration proceeding beyond the time stipulated. The contention raised by learned counsel for the Corporation has been strongly refuted by Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the Contractor. He emphatically argued that the time stipulated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice was extended vide order dated 11.05.2001 passed in Misc. Case No.128 of 2000 arising out of MJC No. 115 of 1997. By the said order, time was granted till end of June 2001 for completion of the arbitration proceeding (AA-D-8/97) pending before the Arbitration Tribunal, Bhubaneswar. On verification of the record of MJC No 115 of 1997, it appears that the time for completion of the arbitration proceeding in the instant case was extended till end of June, 2001 and the award by learned Tribunal was passed on 16.06.2001. Thus, it cannot be said that the mandate had terminated for lapse of time stipulated. It further appears that the Corporation had not raised such an issue before learned Tribunal at any point of time and rightly so, as the time for completion of the arbitration proceeding was extended as observed above. By extension of time for completion of the arbitration proceeding, its continuance before learned Tribunal has been regularized. In that view of the matter, there is no force in the submission of Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the Corporation. Accordingly, this question is answered against the Corporation. Question No.3; 20. This issue has been elaborately discussed by learned District Judge in paragraph-10 of the impugned order. On verification of the order sheet, learned District Judge has categorically held that the Corporation did not cooperate with learned Tribunal and consistently remained absent. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the Corporation. Accordingly, this question is answered against the Corporation. Question No.3; 20. This issue has been elaborately discussed by learned District Judge in paragraph-10 of the impugned order. On verification of the order sheet, learned District Judge has categorically held that the Corporation did not cooperate with learned Tribunal and consistently remained absent. It also did not adduce evidence by examining its witnesses in spite of several adjournments. On one occasion, when the Corporation was set ex parte, it moved this Court and this Court while setting aside the ex parte order, allowed the Corporation to participate in the arbitration proceeding. However, the Corporation remained absent subsequently in spite of opportunity of hearing being given to it. Thus, the principle of "audi alteram partem" has duly been complied with in the case at hand. The Corporation has not given any specific instance as to when and how it was deprived of opportunity of hearing. The allegation made by the Corporation is not substantiated by any material on record. Thus, the contentions raised by the Corporation merits no consideration. Accordingly, this question is also answered against the Corporation. 21. The case law relied upon by learned counsel for the Corporation are the settled principles and there cannot be any quarrel over the same. In view of the discussions made above, the case laws cited by the Corporation (supra) in no manner support its case. 22. On the other hand, relying upon the ratio decided in Associate Builder's case (supra), in which Hon'ble Supreme Court relying upon several case laws, has set out the scope of appeal under section 37 of the Arbitration Act, I am of the considered view that the impugned judgment and order as well as the award passed by learned Tribunal, needs no interference. 23. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of any merit stands dismissed. But in the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. The record of MJC No.115 of 1997 be returned to the concerned Section.