ORDER : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. 1. In wake of onslaught of COVID-19, abundant caution is being taken while hearing the matters in Court. 2. The matter comes up on an applications under Article 226(3) of the Constitution of India preferred on behalf of respondent No. 3 & 4 respectively, for vacation of the stay order dated 12.06.2020 passed by this Court. However, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter has been heard finally. 3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition claiming the following reliefs: "A. By an appropriate writ, order or direction order may kindly issued and quashed & set aside the order dated 28.05.2019 (Annexure-5) passed by Senior Civil Judge and order dated 03.02.2020 (Annexure-11) passed by the learned Additional District and Session Judge, in Civil Appeal No. 23/2019. B. by an appropriate writ, order or direction that order may kindly be issued and the application filed by the petitioner under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 C.P.C. against the respondents may kindly be allowed as prayed. C. Any other appropriate writ, order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem it just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be issued. D. Costs of this writ petition may kindly be may kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioner." 4. As the record of the case would reveal, on 27.07.1964, a sale deed was executed by Navlaram (father of the petitioner-plaintiff) and Motiram (uncle of the petitioner-plaintiff), being original khatedar of the land khasra No. 1192 (rakba 35 bigha 2 biswa) situated in erstwhile Village Barmer (as per the present Jamabandi, Rakba 35 bigha 3 Biswa Barani Soyam situated at Revenue Village, Barmer City), in favour of one Smt. Meti Devi w/o Late Shri Lal Chand and their minors sons, namely, Mohan @ Lekhraj and Babu @ Jairam. Defendants No. 1 and 2 - Lekhraj and Jairam are sons of Late Shri Lal Chand. However, thereafter, another sale deed dated 28.05.1973 (registered on 29.05.1973), in respect of the same land in question, was executed by Navla Ram s/o Dana Ram, in favour of Bhanwarlal, Mohanlal, Satyanarayan, Parasmal, Dharmchand, Mewaram, Bhagwandas and Babulal. Defendants No. 1 and 2 - Lekhraj and Jairam are sons of Late Shri Lal Chand. However, thereafter, another sale deed dated 28.05.1973 (registered on 29.05.1973), in respect of the same land in question, was executed by Navla Ram s/o Dana Ram, in favour of Bhanwarlal, Mohanlal, Satyanarayan, Parasmal, Dharmchand, Mewaram, Bhagwandas and Babulal. Thereafter, Satyanarayan s/o Dwarkadas, Parasmal s/o Giriram, Dharmchand s/o Birdichand, Mewaram s/o Hajariram and Bhagwandas s/o Dwarkadas, who were holding 3/4th share in the land in question, pursuant to the concerned sale deed dated 28.05.1973, sold their respective share in the land in question to the respondent-Ms. Golden Dunues Real Estate Private Limited, Jaipur (respondent-Company), through various sale deeds i.e. dated 05.01.2012 and 03.02.2012 respectively, and accordingly, entry No. 3400, as approved on 21.02.2012, was made in its favour in the revenue records, and also the necessary possession was also handed over to the respondent-Company, thereby in the relevant revenue records, 3/4th share in respect of the land in question was recorded in the name of the respondent-Company, and remaining 1/4 share in the name of Babulal s/o Aasulal, and Ratanlal, Suresh and Ganpat (sons of Late Mohanlal). 5. On 06.11.2007, the Public Health and Engineering Department, Government of Rajasthan issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 for acquisition of the land measuring 35.03 bigha of Khasra No. 1192 situated at Barmer, i.e. the land in question. Thereafter, certain objections were filed pursuant to the said notification, and after considering such objections, the PHED, Government of Rajasthan, while issuing another notification dated 22.08.2008, had withdrawn the earlier acquisition notification dated 06.11.2007. 6. In the year 2012, Lekhraj and Jairam - both sons of Late Shri Lal Chand - preferred an appeal before the Court of Sub Divisional Officer, Barmer under Section 75 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 challenging the mutation made pursuant to the concerned sale deed, in favour of Bhanwarlal and others, alleging therein that in view of the earlier sale deed dated 27.07.1964 made in favour of Smt. Meti Devi w/o Late Shri Lal Chand, the subsequent sale deed executed by Nawla Ram was not valid. The said appeal was however, dismissed vide judgment dated 17.08.2012. 7. The said appeal was however, dismissed vide judgment dated 17.08.2012. 7. Aggrieved by the aforementioned judgment dated 17.08.2012, Lekh Raj and Jairam preferred an appeal before the Additional Divisional Commissioner, which, after hearing the concerned parties, too was rejected vide judgment dated 12.04.2013. 8. The aforesaid judgment dated 12.04.2013 also came to be challenged by way of a revision petition before the learned Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer. However, during pendency of the said revision petition, a compromise was arrived at between the concerned parties (Mohan @ Lekhraj s/o Lal Chand & Babu @ Jairam s/o Lal Chand - First Party And M/s. Golden Dunues Real Estate Pvt. Ltd. And Babulal s/o Aasulal - Second Party) on 05.04.2017 and the necessary application in respect of such compromise was moved before the learned Board of Revenue on 05.04.2017 itself for amicable and out of court settlement of the dispute between them. Accordingly, in light of such compromise between the concerned parties, the aforesaid revision petition was decided by the learned Board of Revenue on 26.04.2017. 9. The record of the case would further reveal that before conclusion of the aforesaid proceedings, on 06.08.2014, before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Barmer, a suit bearing No. 10/14 (new suit No. 01/15) was instituted by defendants No. 1 & 2 -Lekhraj and Jairam - both sons of Late Shri Lal Chand - seeking to declare the first sale deed dated 27.07.1964 executed in favour of Smt. Meti Devi w/o Late Shri Lal Chand and their minor sons, in respect of sale of the land in question, as a legal and valid sale, while seeking cancellation of the second sale deed dated 28.05.1973 (registered on 29.05.1973), in respect of the same land in question. However, the said suit was dismissed for want of prosecution on 10.02.2017. 10. Thereafter, on 28.11.2017, the petitioner-plaintiff instituted a suit for cancellation of the sale deeds dated 27.07.1964 as well as 28.05.1973 (registered on 29.05.1973) before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Barmer, on the ground of the concerned sales of the land in question, vide the aforementioned sale deeds, being false, fabricated and forged. Alongwith the said suit, an application seeking temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, 'CPC') was also preferred by the petitioner-plaintiff. Alongwith the said suit, an application seeking temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in short, 'CPC') was also preferred by the petitioner-plaintiff. In the said suit, it was categorically stated that after rejection of the earlier suit, since the defendants concerned in collusion with each other, were threatening to dispossess the present petitioner-plaintiff from the land in question, therefore, he had filed the subsequent suit. 11. In the aforementioned subsequent suit filed by the petitioner-plaintiff, it was stated that the concerned Bhoomi Parcha Lagaan in respect of the land in question was issued, at the time of settlement, in favour of Nawla Ram s/o Dana Ram (father of the petitioner-plaintiff) and Motiram s/o Dana Ram (uncle of the petitioner-plaintiff) being khatedar of the said land. Nawla Ram and Motiram were both real brothers and were members of the joint family. On 17.06.1972, Moti Ram (uncle of the petitioner-plaintiff), who was unmarried, and thus, having no survivor/heir, had expired, and thus, the khatedari rights of Late Motiram, were thereafter vested in Navla Ram, apart from his own khatedari rights in the land in question. However, thereafter on 05.02.1996, petitioner's-plaintiff's father Navla Ram expired, and on 11.08.2007, his mother Smt. Meena Devi also died, as a result whereof, the petitioner-plaintiff became the sole owner and khatedar of the land in question. In the suit, it was also stated that on 03.02.2016, the petitioner-plaintiff came to know about filing of the earlier civil suit only on 03.02.2016, and soon thereafter on 26.04.2016, he had filed an application for his impleadment in the said suit, and accordingly, on 19.10.2016, he was ordered to be impleaded as party in the earlier suit. 12. The learned Senior Civil Judge, Barmer, thereafter, upon hearing all the parties before it, passed an order on 28.05.2019, whereby the aforementioned application filed by the petitioner-plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said order dated 28.05.2019, the petitioner-plaintiff filed an appeal before the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No. 1, Barmer under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC. 13. The learned appellate court vide order dated 01.08.2019, after hearing the parties, passed an interim injunction order with regard to non-alienation/sale of the suit property in question, during pendency of the appeal. 13. The learned appellate court vide order dated 01.08.2019, after hearing the parties, passed an interim injunction order with regard to non-alienation/sale of the suit property in question, during pendency of the appeal. However, on 18.01.2020, an application under Section 24 of the CPC came to be filed by the petitioner-plaintiff before the learned District & Sessions Judge, Barmer seeking transfer of the matter from the Court of learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Barmer to another court of competent jurisdiction, for the reasons mentioned therein. But thereafter, during pendency of the application under Section 24 of CPC, the learned appellate court vide order dated 03.02.2020, had dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner-plaintiff, while affirming the order dated 28.05.2019 passed by the learned trial court. Hence, this writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner-plaintiff. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff submitted that the sale in question, vide the sale deed dated 28.05.1973, was said to be made by Navla Ram (father of the petitioner-plaintiff) s/o Dana Ram, in favour of Bhanwarlal, Mohanlal, Satyanarayan, Parasmal, Dharmchand, Mewaram, Bhagwandas and Babulal; the said sale deed was stated to be registered on 29.05.1973. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that however, at the time of registration of the sale deed dated 29.05.1973, Motiram s/o Dana Ram was introduced as Motiram s/o Navla Ram, whereas it is an undisputed fact that the said Motiram, was the real brother of Navla Ram, and further, Motiram had expired on 17.06.1972, i.e. much before the registration of the sale deed on 29.05.1973. Learned counsel further submitted that the fact of death of Motiram is also clearly evident from the death certificate issued by the competent authority, which was also placed on record before the learned trial court, and in the said death certificate, particular of Moti was mentioned as Moti s/o Dana Ram. Thus, as per learned counsel, the sale in question was forged and fabricated on this count alone, as it is a settled proposition of law that no sale can be executed in the name of a dead person. 16. Thus, as per learned counsel, the sale in question was forged and fabricated on this count alone, as it is a settled proposition of law that no sale can be executed in the name of a dead person. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff also submitted that the matter pertains to passing of the appropriate orders for temporary injunction during pendency of the aforementioned suit; however, the said prayer was declined by the learned trial court, while observing that the petitioner-plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property in question and he has also not filed any suit for recovery of the possession thereof. Learned counsel also submitted that the learned trial court has also erred in rejecting the aforementioned application for temporary injunction on the ground that in absence of the absolute possession of the suit property with the petitioner-plaintiff; the plaintiff-petitioner has not produced any documentary evidence in relation to his possession; and the suit was filed after an inordinate delay of 30 years from the date of the sale in question. Thus, as per learned counsel, such rejection of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC was contrary to the settled legal proposition laid down in respect of temporary injunction. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that against rejection of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC by the learned trial court, the petitioner-plaintiff filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Barmer. However, as per learned counsel, after filing of the said appeal, which was registered on 06.07.2019, the petitioner-plaintiff also filed an application on 18.01.2020 under Order 24 of CPC seeking transfer of the appeal to any other court of competent jurisdiction within the Balotra Judgeship. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that however, despite the aforementioned application under Order 24 of CPC remained pending consideration, the learned appellate court conducted the hearing of the appeal and dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner-plaintiff on 03.02.2020, that too, without appreciating the relevant facts and without considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner-plaintiff. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that however, despite the aforementioned application under Order 24 of CPC remained pending consideration, the learned appellate court conducted the hearing of the appeal and dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner-plaintiff on 03.02.2020, that too, without appreciating the relevant facts and without considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner-plaintiff. As per learned counsel, such dismissal of the appeal was made by the learned appellate court, while observing that the petitioner-plaintiff was not having an absolute possession of the suit property in question, and the mutation was entered in the name of the concerned purchaser, as also the suit was filed after a long period of time, from the date of the sale in question. Such grounds, as per learned counsel, are not in conformity with the principles laid down in the law relating to temporary injunction. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff also harped upon the fact that the reasons assigned in the rejection orders impugned herein are also not correct, as there was a specific pleading in the suit with regard to possession of the petitioner upon the land in question, and such pleading is prima facie substantiated by the document in relation to compromise executed by the respondents before the learned Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer, wherein it was admitted by them that the possession of the land in question remained with Navla (father of the present petitioner) and Late Moti (brother of Navla). Learned counsel thus, submitted that there was prima facie evidence on record before the learned courts below with regard to possession of the petitioner over the land in question; however since the respondents had raised a dispute with regard to such possession, therefore, burden to disprove such fact lies upon the respondents, and not upon the present petitioner-plaintiff. 20. On a specific query being put by this Court to the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to knowledge of the registered sale deed dated 29.05.1973, learned counsel submitted that he has placed on record copy of the plaint (Annexure-13) seeking cancellation of the sale dated 28.05.1973 (registered on 29.05.1973) as well as permanent injunction, instituted by legal heirs (sons) of Late Lal Chand before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Barmer on 06.08.2014 against the other respondents. Learned counsel also submitted that as soon as the petitioner came to know about institution of such suit as well as his non-impleadment therein, the petitioner had filed an application for his impleadment as party-defendant in the said suit; such application was allowed by the learned trial court vide its order dated 09.10.2016, and accordingly, the petitioner was impleaded as party defendant in the suit. However, as per learned counsel since the said suit filed by the legal representatives of Late Lal Chand was dismissed for non-prosecution by the learned trial court on 10.02.2017, therefore, the petitioner-plaintiff had filed the present suit in question on 28.11.2017, on account of the fact that he was threatened by the other defendants that he will be dispossessed from the land in question. 21. As regards the contention of the respondents before the learned court below that a revenue proceeding was initiated by the respondents No. 1 & 2, wherein the petitioner was impleaded as party, learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff submitted that it is an admitted fact that no notice in regard to such proceeding was served upon the petitioner, and thus, the judgment dated 17.08.2012 was an ex parte judgment. Thus, as per learned counsel, the petitioner-plaintiff, came to know about the proceedings as well as the sale, for the first time, on 03.02.2016, whereafter, he had filed an application for impleadment in the suit filed by the legal heirs of Late Lal Chand. 22. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner-plaintiff relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rame Gowda (D) by Lrs. Vs. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by LRs. & Anr., reported in 2004 DNJ (SC) 263, wherein it has been held that it is the settled possession or effective possession of a person, without title, which would entitle him to protect his possession even as against the true owner. Learned counsel thus, submitted that the question of title, as per the said precedent law, will always be subject to the trial of the suit, and without adopting the due process of law, the person, who is in settled possession, cannot be dispossessed from the suit property. 23. Learned counsel thus, submitted that the question of title, as per the said precedent law, will always be subject to the trial of the suit, and without adopting the due process of law, the person, who is in settled possession, cannot be dispossessed from the suit property. 23. Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court at Jaipur Bench in Peer Gulam Naseer vs. Peer Gulam Jelanee (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 657/1986 decided on 28.10.1998), wherein it was held that the lower courts should not have decided the controversy finally raised in the pleadings by the parties at the stage of deciding the application for temporary injunction; serious questions raised regarding succession therein have been raised and the same can be finally decided only after the parties may have led the oral and documentary evidence. Learned counsel, submitted that in the said case it was also held that the finding on the merit of the suit is not required at the stage of temporary injunction, and it can only be decided after the trial of the suit, and till then, by way of status quo order, the suit property needs to be protected. 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court at Jaipur Bench in Narendra Singh Rajawat & Ors. Vs. Thakur Mohan Singh Kanota & Ors., reported in AIR 2002 Raj. 2018, wherein it was held that it is well settled that while granting temporary injunction, the Court cannot be regarded to deal with the suit on merits. It was further held that the proceedings pertaining to grant of temporary injunctions are supplemental proceedings and the Court should refrain from giving a finding on the merits of the case. 2018, wherein it was held that it is well settled that while granting temporary injunction, the Court cannot be regarded to deal with the suit on merits. It was further held that the proceedings pertaining to grant of temporary injunctions are supplemental proceedings and the Court should refrain from giving a finding on the merits of the case. It was also held that a person who seeks a temporary injunction must satisfy the Court as to the insistence of certain conditions, namely, (i) there is a serious question to be tried in the suit and that on the facts before the Court there is a probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by him; (ii) the Court's interference is necessary to protect him from the species of injury which the Court calls irreparable, before his legal right can be established on trial; and (iii) the comparative mischief or inconvenience which is likely to issue from withholding the injustice will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting it. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the petitioner-plaintiff has raised an issue with regard to the fake, fabricated and forged sale, which is executed in the name of a dead person, alongwith a fake identity. Learned counsel also submitted that the sale was not performed by the petitioner's father, as he was an illiterate person and cannot put his signatures, and further, the mutation entry was not made since long, and also, the possession of the suit property in question was never transferred by the petitioner or his parents or other member, including his uncle Motiram, to any other person. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner thus submitted that all the questions involved in the matter can only be settled by the trial court, after taking evidence - documentary as well as oral - during the course of trial of the original suit, and thus, prior to deciding all the issues, if the land is alienated and the petitioner is dispossessed from the suit property in question, the whole purpose of instituting the suit will be defeated. Thus, as per learned counsel, the suit property is required to be protected by way of temporary injunction, until final disposal of the original suit pending before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Barmer. 27. Thus, as per learned counsel, the suit property is required to be protected by way of temporary injunction, until final disposal of the original suit pending before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Barmer. 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner lastly submitted that in view of the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the petitioner, it is clear that the learned courts below have erred in passing the impugned orders, more specifically, when both the parties have raised their rival claims; further, the finding with regard to possession is also erroneous, and the findings with regard to documentary evidence are pre-mature and against the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC, therefore, in such circumstances, the intervention of this Court is warranted in this case. 28. On the other hand, learned counsels for the respondents have raised certain preliminary objections. Learned counsels submitted that the learned courts below have concurrently rejected the application for temporary injunction filed by the petitioner-plaintiff, as no prima facie case was found in his favour. Learned counsels further submitted that the present petition is in the nature of certiorari, wherein the petitioner ought to have pointed out error apparent in the impugned orders; however, the petitioner has completely failed to do so. Learned counsels also submitted that it is a settled proposition of law that without establishing a prima facie case, the injunction cannot be granted against the recorded khatedar/true owner, and thus, the learned trial court was perfectly justified in passing the impugned order, rejecting the application for temporary injunction filed by the petitioner-plaintiff, and also, the learned appellate court was right in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner-plaintiff against the said order passed by the learned trial court dismissing the application for temporary injunction. Learned counsels further submitted that the suit in question was preferred after the expiry of more than 45 years from the date of execution of the sale deed/mutation entry, and therefore, the learned courts below were right in concurrently declining to grant any relief to the petitioner-plaintiff. Learned counsels also submitted that the petitioner has willfully and deliberately not brought the substantial and material facts to the knowledge of this Court, and thus, his conduct in concealing such substantial and material facts, disentitles him from seeking any relief from this Court. 29. Learned counsels also submitted that the petitioner has willfully and deliberately not brought the substantial and material facts to the knowledge of this Court, and thus, his conduct in concealing such substantial and material facts, disentitles him from seeking any relief from this Court. 29. Learned counsels for the respondents further submitted that during the lifetime of Nawla Ram, father of the present petitioner-plaintiff, no dispute was ever raised by the petitioner in regard to the sale of the land in question. Learned counsels also submitted that the petitioner has preferred the suit seeking cancellation of the sale deeds dated 27.07.1964 and 29.05.1973 on the ground that he was having no knowledge about the execution of the said sale deeds; however, the present petitioner-plaintiff was party in all the earlier litigation in regard to the land in question, but despite sufficient service of notice issued by the competent court, the petitioner neither contested the matters, nor raised any objection, whatsoever. Thus, as per learned counsels, the pleading of the petitioner with regard to having no knowledge about the concerned litigation in regard to the land in question is not true, as even the petitioner has not been able to substantiate such a plea by either documentary or oral evidence. 30. Learned counsels for the respondents further submitted that the learned trial court in the impugned order rejecting the petitioner's application under Section (sic Order) 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC has observed that the petitioner is neither having possession over the land in question, nor he has submitted any document/evidence to substantiate his claim regarding possession over the land in question. Learned counsels also submitted that the learned trial court has clearly observed, in view of the Site Commissioner's Report called by the competent court in another suit in respect of the land in question, that the defendants-respondents were having possession over the land in question, and thus, both the learned courts below were perfectly justified in concurrently declining the prayer made by the petitioner-plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction. 31. As per learned counsels for the respondents, even in the aforementioned notification dated 06.11.2007, the land in question was shown in the name of the persons, as owners thereof, from whom the respondent-Company had purchased the land in question, and therefore, such sale in favour of the respondent-Company was valid and lawful. 32. 31. As per learned counsels for the respondents, even in the aforementioned notification dated 06.11.2007, the land in question was shown in the name of the persons, as owners thereof, from whom the respondent-Company had purchased the land in question, and therefore, such sale in favour of the respondent-Company was valid and lawful. 32. Learned counsels for the respondents also submitted that the present petitioner-plaintiff has launched the criminal proceedings vide FIR No. 0167/2017, wherein, after due investigation, the concerned investigating agency has filed final report/closure report i.e. FR No. 01 dated 14.09.2017. As per learned counsels, while concluding such investigation, it was found by the concerned investigating agency that Navla Ram father of the petitioner had sold the property in question once on 27.07.1964 to Smt. Meti Devi, Mohan and Babu, and thereafter, also sold the same land on 28.05.1973 to Bhanwarlal and others. Learned counsels further submitted that the concerned investigating agency also concluded that Navla Ram, father of the petitioner had sold the same property twice to different persons, while taking money as consideration in lieu of such sales, from two different purchasers, and thus, has committed an offence of cheating; however, the concerned investigating authority has filed the final report/closure report on 14.09.2017, on account of demise of Navla Ram on 15.02.1996 (as mentioned in the final report). 33. Learned counsels for the respondents also submitted that the petitioner has preferred an application under Section 24 of CPC without stating any substantial, sufficient and cogent reason therefor, rather on baseless apprehension, with the only motive to delay the adjudication of the appeal before the learned appellate court, and thus, mere pleading on the part of the petitioner-plaintiff regarding pendency of the application under Section 24 of CPC, was not at all a sufficient ground to keep the appeal pending. As per learned counsels, mere pendency of an application under Section 24 of CPC would not preclude the competent court from adjudicating the appeal or any matter pending consideration before it; more so, when the petitioner-plaintiff had even filed the suit after an inordinate and unexplained delay, and had also failed to establish any prima facie case in his favour, on merits. 34. 34. This Court has carefully perused the record as well as considered the submissions made by learned counsels for the parties, and does not find any reason why the concurrent findings arrived at by the learned courts below be disturbed at this stage of the litigation. 35. This Court also takes note of the fact that the petitioner has tried to raise the dispute regarding ownership of the land in question, which was validly transferred by his own father, Navla Ram, after a lapse of more than 45 years from the date of execution of the sale deed and the entries of mutation etc. 36. The learned court below has rightly held that Navla Ram, the father of the petitioner had sold the land on 27.07.1964 to Smt. Meti Devi, and thereafter, had executed another sale deed dated 28.05.1973 in favour of Bhanwarlal, Mohanlal, Satyanarayan, Parasmal, Dharmchand, Mewaram, Bhagwandas and Babulal. The contesting parties between the sale deed have already settled the matter. 37. Thus, this Court is of the firm opinion that the petitioner, who has now stepped into the shoes of his father Navla Ram, cannot retrospectively undo the legal status created by his own father, in respect of the land in question. Moreover, no valid explanation has been given by the petitioner for the cause not having been taken up by him for last 45 years. Thus, the concurrent findings of the learned courts below do not deserve any interference by this Court at this stage. 38. The judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner do not substantiate the case of the petitioner. 39. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. The stay application also stands dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of.