ORDER : These petitions are filed by accused Nos.2 to 4 in PCR No.30/2012 praying this Court to quash the complaint and the proceedings in PCR No.30/2012 and consequently quash the FIR in Crime No.57/2012 filed by the second respondent/complainant on the file of XXIII Additional City Civil @ Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act, Bengaluru. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner in Crl.P.No.4133/2012 took Sanyasa Deeksha during the year 1971 and has been managing branch mutt of Shree. Adhichunchanagiri Mahasamsthana Mutt at Mandya. He has been assisting the Peetadhipathi in the matters relating to religious activities. The Swamiji residing at Adhichunchanagiri Mutt taking care of the mutt affairs. The other petitioner in Crl.P.No.4134/2012 is residing at Mutt and helping Peetadhipathi and the petitioner in Crl.P.No.4135/2012 is a resident of Vijayanagar, Bengaluru and the devotee of the Mutt. These petitioners have nothing to do with the management or administration of the trust properties and no specific allegations have been made against them in the complaint and only general and casual remarks have been made against them in the complaint tagging their names in the complaint along with accused No.1. 3. The petitioner in Crl.P.No.4134/2012 is the Managing Trustee of Shri. BGS Education Trust, Bengaluru. He being the disciple of Sri. Sri. Sri. Balagangadhranatha Swamji, is assisting the Peethadhipathi in the matters relating to establishing, maintenance and administration of educational institutions and other religious activities. 4. The petitioner in Crl.P.No.4135/2012 is a Doctor, who has been appointed as a trustee of BGS Health & Education Trust on 18.01.2011 in view of his vast knowledge and experience in the field of health and medicine. He was also not involved in any of the transaction alleged by the complainant except health and medicine field. 5. The first respondent/complainant is an Ex-Councilor of Hulimavu Village, Bannerghatta road for Bommanahalli City Municipal Council. He has filed a complaint before the XXIII Additional City Civil @ Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act, Bengaluru, against the Peethadhipathi and also against the petitioners including other 23 public servants found in different posts. The specific allegation made against them in the complaint that the complainant being Ex-Councilor, a social worker and a responsible citizen and he is concerned with the rise of corruption in the State. The specific allegation made against them in the complaint that the complainant being Ex-Councilor, a social worker and a responsible citizen and he is concerned with the rise of corruption in the State. It is alleged that the public servants in the State are least bothered about the law of the land. But he claims that he deeply interested to uphold the rule of law in society at large. It is also claimed that he is one of the trustees of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Jeernodhaara Trust. Shri. Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple is situated at Hulimavu village from an immemorial period having devotees throughout the State. 6. It is his case that the Government of Karnataka has granted 15 acres and 31 guntas of land in Sy.No.89 and renumbered as Sy.No.92 of Hulimavu Village, Begur Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk under two grant orders bearing No.LND-SR(S)13/86-87 dated 09.03.1981 and No.LND 3(S)CR246/84-85 dated 28.05.1985 in favour of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Trust on certain terms and conditions. 7. The Government of Karnataka has also granted an additional land of 10 guntas in Sy.No.63, the same is renumbered as Re-Sy.No.98 of Hulimavu village vide No.LND(S) CR-20/88-89 dated 07.09.1990. It is alleged in the complaint that without taking any confidence of the devotees and local residents in and around the temple, against the interest of the Temple with Adichunchanagiri Mahasamsthana headed by Sri Sri Bala Gangadharanatha Swamiji, accused No.1 had created a document alleged to be entrusted the trust property without there being any sanctity in the eye of law or proceedings of the general body to accept such resolution. The allegation against other accused, particularly, accused No.5 allowed accused Nos.1 to 4 to get transfer the above stated land by creating the documents. 8. It is also an allegation that one Late Mariyappa Swamiji who proclaimed to be the President of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Trust and created the records in collusion with accused Nos.1 to 4 and 5, transferring the above granted land to accused No.1. The Revenue authorities had mutated the property based on the said fabricated documents. The complainant also would contend in the complaint that there is no Government sanction for transfer of the said land and transfer order dated 02.04.1997 in favour of accused No.1 is a bogus and there is no such order or record. 9. The Revenue authorities had mutated the property based on the said fabricated documents. The complainant also would contend in the complaint that there is no Government sanction for transfer of the said land and transfer order dated 02.04.1997 in favour of accused No.1 is a bogus and there is no such order or record. 9. It is alleged that accused No.1 knowing fully well that the land granted belonging to ‘Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Trust’ sold the granted land and the concerned officials also acted on the behest of the first accused. The specific allegation is that it is a fraudulent act and obtained an order to run the School, wherein, education is inserted without there being any such permission granted by the Government while granting. It is alleged that permission is granted to establish Jnanakendra and the said permission was given following the procedure under the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. But now they are mis-using the said land for the purpose of education and the very object in granting the land in favour of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple has been deviated and they have obtained concocted plan in violation of Section 321(1) & (2) of Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act. The learned Judge after having considered the averments made in the complaint referred the matter for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., and to submit the report. 10. The main contention of the petitioners in all these petitions is that the nature of involvement of each of the petitioner have not been disclosed in the complaint and the very complaint is totally motivated and malafide complaint filed with the sole objective of sullying the image and reputation of the petitioner herein and to harass and wreck vengeance against the petitioner to coerce him into terms. The Trial Court has not applied its mind to the allegations made in the complaint and as to whether the complaint discloses offences which require investigation by the police. In the absence of such a clear finding by the Trial Court, the Trial Court could not have directed investigation by the police. The Trial Court has not applied its mind to the allegations made in the complaint and as to whether the complaint discloses offences which require investigation by the police. In the absence of such a clear finding by the Trial Court, the Trial Court could not have directed investigation by the police. The Trial Court wholly erred in not noticing that a perusal of the very complaint indicates that the complainant/respondent No.2 herein, falsely claims to be a trustee and Secretary of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Trust, though infact he is the trustee of a new trust under the name and style of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Jeernodhaara Trust. The complaint further reveals that the respondent is laying claim on the property in question, even though he has absolutely no right whatsoever thereto. The mala fides is writ large on the very face of the complaint. Though the Trial Court in the course of the lengthy order has not applied its mind to the various averments except to the verbatim reproducing the complaint and the statement made by the counsel for the complainant. 11. The Trial Court wholly erred in not noticing that no sanction has been obtained for filing the complaint or launching the prosecution in question. The allegations made in the complaint regarding the various offences alleged are inseparable amongst the public servant and others. 12. The Trial Court wholly erred in entertaining the complaint against the petitioner. It is contended that the allegation found in the complaint against these petitioners that they got transferred the granted land in collusion with accused No.5 vide Government Order No.RD 234/LGB dated 2.4.1997 and there was a typographical mistake in referring the Government Order No.RD 234 instead of 284 and taking the advantage of the mistake, the complainant with the mala fide intention had approached the Trial Court. The transfer made by Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple in favour of accused No.1 is after obtaining the sanction from the concerned Government and the Government after approving only, the same has been transferred. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that it is not in dispute that the property was granted in favour of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple in between 1981 to 1990 to the extent of 16 acres 1 gunta. The Trust was formed in the year 1991. 13. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would vehemently contend that it is not in dispute that the property was granted in favour of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple in between 1981 to 1990 to the extent of 16 acres 1 gunta. The Trust was formed in the year 1991. Subsequently, resolution was passed on 28.10.1995 to transfer the property in favour of accused No.1. Thereafter, obtained the approval from the Government and sanction was given by the then Hon'ble Chief Minister vide Annexure ‘J’. The Government order is in terms of Annexure ‘H’. The property after transferred to accused No.1 constructed the School, Mediation Centre, Ayurvedic Centre and the permission was obtained in terms of Annexure ‘N’ to establish the School. The complainant made the request for a seat and the said seat was not given to him and his request was rejected. Hence, the complainant was having the ill-will against respondent No.1 formed a Trust on 09.11.2011 terming the same as Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Jeernodhaara Trust in terms of Annexure ‘Q’. The complaint was given on 21.02.2012 immediately after forming the said alleged trust in terms of Annexure ‘R’ and reply was given in terms of Annexure ‘S’ and no action was taken. Hence, a complaint was given to the Corporation and the Corporation has passed an order and the same was questioned before the KAT. The Complainant has not produced the Government Order knowing fully well while filing the private complaint since there was a specific order by the Government giving the sanction to transfer the property. He also got amended the complaint deleting the name ‘Jeernodhaara’ since he made the correction in the complaint stating the said Trust as Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Jeernodhaara Trust earlier. Earlier he claims that he was a trustee of Sri Ramalingeshwara Swamy Temple Trust, but he was not the trustee of Sri Ramalingeshwara Temple Trust. 14. Having considered all these aspects into consideration, it clearly discloses that with the mala fide intention a complaint is filed and all the procedures have been followed while transferring the property in favour of accused No.1. It is nothing but an abuse of process of law invoking the criminal jurisdiction and none of the allegation constitutes an offence, which have been narrated in the complaint. Hence, it requires an interference of this Court. 15. It is nothing but an abuse of process of law invoking the criminal jurisdiction and none of the allegation constitutes an offence, which have been narrated in the complaint. Hence, it requires an interference of this Court. 15. The learned Senior Counsel Sri G. Krishnamurthy for the petitioners in support of his arguments, he relied upon the following judgments: (i) in the case of Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat and others reported in (2008) 5 SCC 668 , wherein, the Apex Court observed that, where a jurisdiction is exercised on a compliant petition filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to apply his mind and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.13 of the judgment, wherein, the Apex Court held that, summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the evidence brought on record and the same is observed in paragraph No.15 of the Judgment. (ii) in the case of Guruduth Prabhu and others v. M.S.Krishna Bhat and others reported in 1999 SCC OnLine Kar 606: 1999 Cri LJ 3909, wherein, the Division Bench held that, If every complaint filed under Section 200, Cr.P.C. is referred to the police under Section 156(3) without application of mind about the disclosure of an offence, there is every likelihood of unscrupulous complainants in order to harass the alleged accused named by them in their complaints making bald allegations just to see that the alleged accused are harassed by the police who have no other go except to investigate as ordered by the Magistrate. The Division Bench further observed in paragraph No.11 that, it is mandatory for the Magistrate to apply his mind to the allegations made in the complaint and only in cases which disclose an offence, the Magistrate gets jurisdiction to order an investigation by the police. The Division Bench further observed in paragraph No.11 that, it is mandatory for the Magistrate to apply his mind to the allegations made in the complaint and only in cases which disclose an offence, the Magistrate gets jurisdiction to order an investigation by the police. (iii) in the case of Baijnath Jha v. Sita Ram and another reported in (2008) 8 SCC 77 , wherein, the Apex Court in paragraph No.8 particularly referring to the judgment in the case State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 SCC (Cri) 426, held that, the background clearly shows that the proceedings instituted were mala fide, based on vague assertions and were initiated with mala fide intents and constitute sheer abuse of process of law. Further observed that the cases at hand fit in with Category (7) of Bhajan Lal case. (iv) in the case of Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar and others reported in (2008) 14 SCC 1 , wherein, the Apex Court invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C., held that the Court is free to consider material that may be produced on behalf of the accused to arrive at a decision whether the charge as framed could be maintained and brought to the notice of this Court particularly in paragraph No.38 of the judgment. 16. Shri. B.S.Prasad, learned Special Public Prosecutor for respondent No.2 in Crl.P.No.4134/2012 and Crl.P.No.4135/2012 would vehemently contend that the documents have to be produced before the Court during the trial and those documents cannot be considered in these proceedings. The learned Spl.PP also would submit that in paragraph Nos.16 and 25, a categorical allegation is made in the complaint that the order is obtained for providing education and grant is made for otherwise. The learned Spl.PP also would submit that in terms of Annexure ‘E’, permission was taken afterwards and there is a violation of condition No.5 to transfer the property. 17. The learned Spl. PP would submit that the grant is not made for continuing the religious activities. The officials have joined with accused Nos.1 to 4 in transferring of the land. The grant is in favour of Temple and the same is transferred in favour of Mutt and the same is not permissible. 18. 17. The learned Spl. PP would submit that the grant is not made for continuing the religious activities. The officials have joined with accused Nos.1 to 4 in transferring of the land. The grant is in favour of Temple and the same is transferred in favour of Mutt and the same is not permissible. 18. The complaint averments are specific and it attracts the ingredients of the offences, which have been invoked against them and whether the ingredients of the offence attract or not, it is a matter of trial. The trial Judge while referring the matter under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., given the reasons and those reasons are also well-reasoned. The petitioners can produce these documents before the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation and the same cannot be looked into at the stage of referring the matter under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. The complaint discloses several allegations not only against accused Nos.1 to 4 and also other officials, who have joined with the hands of accused Nos.1 to 4. 19. Shri. Venkatesh S. Arabatti, learned Special Public Prosecutor for respondent No.2 in Crl.P.No.4133/2012 would vehemently contend that the grant was made in between 1981 to 1990. In spite of the grant was made for particular purpose, the same has been deviated in transferring the land in favour of the petitioners herein. The State also not taken any action with regard to the violation of the original grant conditions. Though they claim that they have established Ayurvedic Centre and it is clear that they are running educational institution. The complainant has not filed any objections in these proceedings and specific allegations are made against the petitioners herein. The contention is that there is no allegation against the petitioners, cannot be accepted and the specific allegations are made that these petitioners are assisting the Peethadhipathi and they are indulged in transfer of property in favour of accused No.1. 20. Learned Spl.PP would submit that they have not filed any objection since the matter is under investigation and the matter has to be investigated and report is to be filed by the Investigating Officer. 21. 20. Learned Spl.PP would submit that they have not filed any objection since the matter is under investigation and the matter has to be investigated and report is to be filed by the Investigating Officer. 21. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for respondent No.2 in support of his arguments, he relied upon the following judgments: (i) in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 and referred the instances for quashing of FIR where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; where the uncontraverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; and where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure or the concerned Act to the institution and continuance of the proceedings. But this power has to be exercised in a rare case and with great circumspection. Learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court, para No.109 of the said decision, wherein it is observed with regard to the note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. (ii) in the case of Vinod Raghuvanshi v. Ajay Arora reported in AIR SCW 6660, wherein the Apex Court has observed in para No.19 that it is settled legal proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings, the Court should not ‘kill a still born child’, and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold, if the allegations have some substance. An investigation should not be shut out at the threshold, if the allegations have some substance. (iii) in the case of State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan reported in (2012) 4 SCC 547 , wherein it is observed with regard to exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court para No.11 of the said decision, wherein it is observed that commencement and completion of an investigation is necessary to test the veracity of the alleged commission of an offence. Any kind of hindrance or obstruction of the process of law from taking normal course, without any supervening circumstances, in a casual manner, merely on the whims and fancy of the Court tantamount to miscarriage of justice. (iv) in the case of Smt. Mona Panwar v. Hon'ble High Court Judicature Allahabad reported in 2011 AIR SCW 1185, wherein it is observed that the discretion exercised by the Court to order for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be interfered with even if another view is possible. Learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court para No.10 of the said judgment. (v) in the case of Madhao and Another v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2013) 5 SCC 615 and brought to the notice of this Court para Nos.14, 17 to 19 with regard to exercising the powers under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., wherein it is observed that before passing the direction for investigation under Section 156(3), he heard the counsel for the complainant, perused the allegations made against the accused in the complaint and the documents annexed therewith. It also shows that taking note of the fact that some of the accused are public officers and after observing that it needs proper investigation prior to the issue of process against the accused under Section 156(3) of the Code and further observed that it is satisfied that the Magistrate has not exceeded his power nor violated any of the provisions contained in the Code. (vi) in the case of Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and Another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and brought to the notice of this Court para No.9, wherein it is observed that it is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. (vi) in the case of Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and Another reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 and brought to the notice of this Court para No.9, wherein it is observed that it is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. (vii) in the case of Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor reported in (2013) 3 SCC 330 and brought to the notice of this Court para No.29 of the judgment, wherein the Apex Court has held that to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charge levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations leveled by the prosecution/complainant. (viii) in the case of S.R.Sukumar v S.Sunaad Raghuram reported in (2015) 9 SCC 609 in relation to the amendment made in the PCR. Learned counsel also brought to the notice of this Court para Nos.17, 18 and 19 of the said decision, wherein it is observed that insofar as merits of the contention regarding allowing of amendment application, it is true that there is no specific provision in the Code to amend either a complaint or a petition filed under the provisions of the Code, but the Courts have held that the petitions seeking such amendment to correct curable infirmities can be allowed even in respect of complaints. 22. 22. Learned counsel referring to these judgments would vehemently contend that the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra is clear that if sufficient material is found in the complaint, the investigation is to be conducted and the Court cannot exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. unless the Court finds existence of abuse of process in order to harass the accused. 23. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 and learned Spl.P.P. for respondent No.2, the points that would arise for the consideration of this Court are:- 1. Whether the Trial Court has committed an error in referring the matter under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. as contended in the Criminal Petitions and whether it requires interference of this Court ? 2. What Order? Points Nos.1 and 2:- 24. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the respective counsel and also on perusal of the material, it is not in dispute that the property measuring an extent of 16 acres 1 gunta was allotted in favour of Sri Ramalingeswara Swamy Temple Trust from the year 1981 to 1990 and the major portion was allotted in the year 1981. It is also not in dispute that the Sri Ramalingeswara Swamy Temple Trust took a decision to transfer the property in favour of accused No.1. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners herein are helping accused No.1-Mutt and looking after its affairs. Accused No.3, who is the petitioner herein is also one of the trustees of accused No.1. The records also disclose that before transferring the property to accused No.1, the Government has accorded sanction on the request of Sri Ramalingeswara Swamy Temple Trust. The main contention of the complainant in the complaint is that the Temple’s Trust Property is transferred and all the accused persons had engaged in getting the Trust property. There is a discrepancy in mentioning the number of the Government Order No.RD 284 LGB 96 Bengaluru dated 2.4.1997, which has been wrongly referred as No.RD 234 and the same has been mainly attributed in the complaint stating that these petitioners have indulged in creating the said document though there is no such Government order. There is a discrepancy in mentioning the number of the Government Order No.RD 284 LGB 96 Bengaluru dated 2.4.1997, which has been wrongly referred as No.RD 234 and the same has been mainly attributed in the complaint stating that these petitioners have indulged in creating the said document though there is no such Government order. It is also the very contention of the complainant before the Trial Court that the grant was made in favour of the Sri Ramalingeswara Swamy Temple Trust for specific purpose and in violation of the grant conditions, the property has been transferred in favour of accused No.1. 25. Having perused the materials available on record, accused No.1 is no more and the case as against accused No.1 has been abated. The petitioners, in two criminal petitions are helping accused No.1 in looking after the affairs of the said Mutt and another petitioner is also one of the trustees of the said Mutt. The main contention of the complainant is that he is the Social Worker and also the Ex-Councilor of Hulimavu Village, Bannerghatta Road for Bommanahalli City Municipal Council, which is also not in dispute. The complainant is not the trustee of Sri Ramalingeswara Swamy Temple Trust, which took a decision and passed the resolution to transfer the property in favour of accused No.1 and thus, approached the Government seeking prior approval for transfer and after obtaining the sanction, the property has been transferred. The sanction was accorded in the year 1997. No doubt, the complainant formed a Trust in the name and style of ’Sri Ramalingeswara Swamy Temple Jeernodhara Trust’ in the year 2011, almost after 4 years of transfer of the said property. The process of transferring the property was initiated and completed from the year 1995 to 1997 and the Government accorded sanction in the year 1997 itself. The petitioners have also produced the photographs along with the petition stating that the complainant had participated in the function of accused No.1-Institution. The petitioners have also placed Annexure-P-the letter written by the complainant to the Principal, B.G.S.N.P.S. School, requesting to accommodate a seat to the candidate in the School and the same has not been considered by accused No.1 and thereafter, the disputes started. The petitioners have also placed Annexure-P-the letter written by the complainant to the Principal, B.G.S.N.P.S. School, requesting to accommodate a seat to the candidate in the School and the same has not been considered by accused No.1 and thereafter, the disputes started. It is clear that the said letter was addressed on 29.10.2011 and whereas the new Trust was formulated by the complainant in the year 2011 after 1 month of the said communication and rejection of the request of the complainant. Hence, the petitioners have contended that this complaint is the offshoot of the rejection of the request made to accommodate a seat to the candidate in the School and complaint is filed with mala fide intention and to wreck vengeance. 26. Having perused these materials available on record, first of all, the complainant is not a trustee of Sri Ramalingeswara Swamy Temple Trust and the said trust took a decision to transfer the property in favour of accused No.1. Only after obtaining the sanction from the Government, the procedure has been followed in transferring the property. If the complainant is having any grievance with regard to the transfer of the property and violation of any conditions of the grant, the same would constitute a dispute of civil in nature. The civil dispute has been given the colour of criminal offence and thus, filed a private complaint. The Trial Judge ought to have taken note of the contents of the complaint while exercising the powers under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. No doubt, it is settled law that while exercising the powers under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Court has to apply its judicious mind whether the allegations found in the complaint sufficient to attract the ingredients of the criminal offence which have been invoked against them. 27. On perusal of the private complaint, the offences invoked in the complaint are for the offences punishable under Sections 9 and 13(1)(b) and (d) and Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and those offences are relating to only the Government officials but these petitioners are not the Government officials. The other offences invoked against these petitioners are for the offence punishable under Sections 114, 119, 120B, 167, 218, 420, 464, 465, 468, 470, 471 of IPC. The transferring of the property in favour of accused No.1 took place in accordance with law and prior approval was also sought from the Government. The other offences invoked against these petitioners are for the offence punishable under Sections 114, 119, 120B, 167, 218, 420, 464, 465, 468, 470, 471 of IPC. The transferring of the property in favour of accused No.1 took place in accordance with law and prior approval was also sought from the Government. Only after obtaining the sanction from the Government, the procedure of transferring the property was made. After completion of the due procedure, the property was transferred in favour of accused No.1. The only discrepancy is with regard to the number mentioned in the Government Order as No.RD 234, but the Government Order as per Annexure-H is clear that the order number is 284 dated 2.04.1997 and that typographical error in the office proceedings cannot be considered as a criminal offence of fabrication of documents. 28. In view of the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra by the respective counsel, no doubt, the Court cannot interfere at the threshold unless the very process is abuse of law. There is a substance in the contention of respondent No.2 counsel that the Court cannot invoke the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. if the materials are found to proceed with the investigation, which is also the settled law as held by the Apex Court in Maksud Saiyed’s case (supra), but at the time of referring the matter under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the learned Judge has to apply his judicious mind. 29. On perusal of the order impugned referring the matter under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., though the order runs into pages, as it is rightly brought to the notice of this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in para No.56, except mentioning that on careful perusal of the materials on record and hearing the complainant, there is no any application of mind by the Magistrate with regard to the contents of the complaint and also the documents to hold that the matter requires to be referred for investigation and also there is no discussion with regard to how the ingredients of the offences which have been invoked in the complaint attracts against the petitioners with regard to the allegations made in the complaint. First the allegations are made against accused No.1 and insofar as these petitioners are concerned, except referring to the act of accused Nos.1 to 4, no specific averments are made against these petitioners as to how they have indulged in the said act of transferring the property, which is nothing but a clear abuse of process in invoking Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. as held by the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal’s case referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.2 himself. 30. The Apex Court, in para No.108 of the said judgment has given the instances under what circumstances, the Court can invoke Section 482 of Cr.P.C. If the complaint does not discloses any offence as invoked and if it is an abuse of process, which leads to miscarriage of justice, the Court can invoke Section 482 of Cr.P.C. This Court would like to extract para No.108 of the said judgment hereunder:- 108. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 31. Having considered the principles laid down in the judgment referred supra and going through the circumstances under which the Court can invoke Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of the complaint and criminal proceedings, it is clear that when the averments made in the complaint/FIR do not constitute an offence, particularly, when the allegations made in the complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which, no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. It is also observed in formulation of point No.7, wherein it is categorically held that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, the Court can exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 32. In the case on hand also, as I have already pointed out the complainant had sought a seat for the candidate in the Institution run by accused No.1 and same was rejected in the year 2011, from where the vengeance started and thus, with a mala fide intention and also with malicious intention instituted a complaint with an ulterior motive for wrecking vengeance on the accused. 33. The Apex Court also in the judgment of Maksud Saiyed’s case has categorically held that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and the criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course and the Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the materials produced on record and then invoke Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. While exercising the power under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to apply his judicious mind. 34. The Apex Court also in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Others reported in (2018) 3 SCC 104 , held that the Court can exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C and examine the question involved in the matter and contents of the complaint/FIR has to be looked into. If the prima facie material is not disclosed and if it amounts to an abuse of process, which leads to miscarriage of justice, then the Court can invoke Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 35. The Apex Court also in the judgment reported in 1977 (2) SCC 699 in the case of State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy and others with regard to exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. held that in exercise of wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. It is also observed that while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. the powers ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. It is the duty of the Court to consider the judicially whether the material warrants the prosecution of a person. 36. The Apex Court also in the judgment reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287 in the case of Priyanka Srivastava and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, particularly with regard to exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., has categorically held that the remedy available under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. is not a routine nature. Exercise of power thereunder requires application of judicious mind. The Magistrate exercising the said power must remain vigilant with regard to nature of allegations made in application and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. It is also further held that while exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in respect of quashing the FIR where the powers under Section 156(3) has been exercised, the Court has to take note of the abuse of process of Court and also miscarriage of justice. 37. The Apex Court also in the decisions in Criminal Appeal No.161/2020 arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3627/2018 between Sardar Ali Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in 2020 (12) SCC 51 , taking note of the civil dispute between the parties and also the private complaint held that there is no allegation of impersonation and forgery of the signatures in the suit filed by respondent No.2 and hence, the respondent No.2 cannot pursue his complaint in criminal proceedings by improving his case. It is further observed that having regard to serious factual disputes which are of civil nature, for which civil suits are pending, allowing the respondent No.2 to pursue his complaint in the criminal proceedings is nothing but abuse of process of law. It is further held that for the aforesaid reasons, we are of the considered view that the criminal proceedings are fit to be quashed by allowing this appeal. In the case on hand, no civil suit is pending, but the factual aspects found in the complaint are mainly the allegations that the property has been transferred in violation of the grant conditions. In the case on hand, no civil suit is pending, but the factual aspects found in the complaint are mainly the allegations that the property has been transferred in violation of the grant conditions. Hence, it is nothing but giving a criminal colour to the civil dispute of violation of grant conditions and also the allegation that the property was transferred in favour of the Mutt i.e., accused No.1 deviating from the purpose for which the land was granted was transferred, which constitute a dispute of civil in nature and records reveal that after obtaining sanction from the Government, the property has been transferred. 38. Having considered the principles laid down in the judgments referred supra and as I have already pointed out that the Court cannot exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. if the materials are found to proceed against the accused persons. In the case on hand, no such materials are found in the complaint and also there is a non-application of mind by the Magistrate while referring the matter under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for investigation, which amounts to an abuse of process and miscarriage of justice. 39. Having perused the materials available on record and also the order of the learned Magistrate, except in para No.56, nothing has been discussed with regard to the material to comes to a conclusion that the Court can invoke Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. and not formed an opinion that the contents of the complaint requires an investigation. Insofar as the allegations made against these petitioners are concerned, except tagging their names along with accused No.1, no specific allegations are made. The sum and substance of the complaint is that the granted land is transferred in violation of grant condition and how the same attracts the criminal offence, shows the non-application of mind by the learned Magistrate. At the most, the said contention can be urged in civil proceedings and not in criminal proceedings. The typographical error in mentioning the number of the Government Order also not attracts the criminal offence and the same is also not disputed by the State. It is not the case of the State that the order has been fabricated. The State also not questioned the transfer of the land. The typographical error in mentioning the number of the Government Order also not attracts the criminal offence and the same is also not disputed by the State. It is not the case of the State that the order has been fabricated. The State also not questioned the transfer of the land. Apart from that the complainant, who filed the complaint, though represented through the counsel not appeared and contested in this proceedings but only the counsel, who represented the I.O., have contested the matter. Under the circumstances, there cannot be a criminal prosecution against the petitioners herein, which leads to an abuse of process and miscarriage of justice. If the Court fails to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in a case, where the complaint is lodged with a mala fide intention and to wreck vengeance against the petitioners, it defeats the very purpose of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 40. It is also the settled law that initiation of the criminal proceedings against the persons is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course and the Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize the materials brought on record. On going through the entire averments of the complaint and the materials available on record, it is nothing but an allegation of violation of grant conditions. Hence, it is clear that a criminal colour is given to a civil dispute which is related to any violation of grant conditions and the same has to be agitated at the most in civil side in a civil proceeding and not converting the same as a criminal prosecution. In the case on hand also, the property was transferred after getting prior approval from the Government in the year 1997 itself and only because of the typographical error found in the correspondence of office proceedings in referring the Government Order, which has been maginified in the complaint and not in Government Order and the same is in order. The very initiation of the criminal proceedings is made with mala fide intention to wreck vengeance. Hence, it is a fit case to exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or otherwise, it amounts to an abuse of process which leads to miscarriage of justice. 41. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) The petitions are hereby allowed. Hence, it is a fit case to exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or otherwise, it amounts to an abuse of process which leads to miscarriage of justice. 41. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following:- ORDER (i) The petitions are hereby allowed. (ii) The order referring the complaint under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. for investigation against these petitioners is hereby quashed. In view of allowing the main petitions, I.As. if any, do not survive for consideration and the same stands disposed of.