JUDGMENT : C. Praveen Kumar, J. (Taken up through video conferencing) 1. As both the Writ Appeals filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are interconnected, the same are heard and disposed of by this Common Judgment. 2. As seen from the record, Writ Petition No.5377 of 2008 came to be filed by one Madireddy Venkata Siva Naga Purushotham, seeking issuance of Writ of Mandamus to declare the Award, dated 10.07.2007, passed by the Labour Court, Guntur, in I.D.No.138 of 2003, as illegal, improper and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution of India and consequently to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service, backwages and all other attendant benefits. 3. The averments in the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, would show that the petitioner joined as Motivator in Engineering Section in Tadepalligudem Municipality on 01.04.1988 worked as Motivator in Low Costs Sanitation Works till 31.03.1992 in the very same Municipality. (i) While things stood thus, on 01.04.1992, he was orally terminated from the service without issuing any notice as required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [“here-in-after referred to as “I.D. Act”]. (ii) Since, the action of the respondents was contrary to law, the Writ Petitioner i.e., Madireddy Venkata Siva Naga Purushotham filed I.D.No.138 of 2003 before the Labour Court, challenging his termination from service. After conducting an enquiry, the Labour Court dismissed the I.D. holding that the petitioner cannot claim to be a regular worker or a casual worker as he has not put in 240 days of service preceding the date of termination. It was further held that the order of termination was not in violation of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. (iii) Assailing the same, W.P.No.5377 of 2008 was filed. By an order, dated 04.12.2013, a learned Single Judge of the Combined High Court allowed the Writ Petition, holding that the petitioner has put in 240 days of service in the year prior to his removal and as such, he is entitled for reinstatement as Motivator with continuity of service with all attendant benefits but without backwages. 4. Being aggrieved, the Writ Petitioner filed W.A.No.1262 of 2014 challenging denial of backwages, while the Municipal Commissioner, Tadepalligudem Municipality, filed W.A.No.1263 of 2014 questioning the order of reinstatement with all attendant benefits. 5. 4. Being aggrieved, the Writ Petitioner filed W.A.No.1262 of 2014 challenging denial of backwages, while the Municipal Commissioner, Tadepalligudem Municipality, filed W.A.No.1263 of 2014 questioning the order of reinstatement with all attendant benefits. 5. Sri D. Khasim Saheb, learned Standing Counsel for respondent Municipality mainly submits that there is absolutely no material available on record to show that the petitioner has put in 240 days of continuous service in the year preceding the order of termination. He submits that the burden of proving the period of service, is on the petitioner and as he failed to demonstrate the same, the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the petitioner has put in 240 days of continuous service. He further submits that by no stretch of imagination, the mathematical calculation made by the learned Single Judge in holding that the petitioner has completed 240 days of service in a calendar year, cannot be accepted, in the absence of any evidence being placed to that effect. 6. On the other hand, Sri M. Pitchaiah, learned counsel appearing for the workmen, would submit that the finding of the learned Single Judge in holding that the petitioner has worked continuously for a period of 240 days, is evident from the counter filed by the Municipality itself and as such, no separate evidence need be adduced to prove an admitted fact. He further submits that having reinstated the petitioner, learned Single Judge erred in rejecting the backwages though some of the workmen who stand on the same footing as that of the Writ Petitioner, were ordered to be paid backwages. 7. The point that arises for consideration is, whether the Order impugned in the two Writ Appeals warrants interference and, if so, to what extent? 8. The main plank of the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the Municipality is with regard to violation of Section 25-F of the I.D. Act or in other words, whether the Writ Petitioner has continuously worked for 240 days in the year preceding the order of termination being passed by the Municipality. 9. It is to be noted here that, the action of the Municipality in terminating the service of the petitioner, came to be challenged vide I.D.No.138 of 2003 before the Labour Court which, passed a “nil” Award, upholding the Order of oral termination passed by the respondent authorities. 10. 9. It is to be noted here that, the action of the Municipality in terminating the service of the petitioner, came to be challenged vide I.D.No.138 of 2003 before the Labour Court which, passed a “nil” Award, upholding the Order of oral termination passed by the respondent authorities. 10. It is not in dispute that the petitioner joined as a Motivator in Engineering Section of the Municipality on 01.04.1988 and he was terminated on 01.04.1992, though he discharged his duties to the satisfaction of the management. The question is whether there is any material on record to show that the petitioner continuously worked for 240 days in the year preceding date of termination of service. It is nodoubt true that the initial burden is on the Writ Petitioner to establish that he has put in 240 days of continuous service. In discharge of his initial burden, the petitioner placed on record the Service Certificate issued by the Municipal Commissioner, which would disclose that prior to his termination, the petitioner worked for about 1226 days, between the period 1988 to 1992, as per the Office records. 11. After deducting 52 weekly and 8 National Holidays, the total number of man-days would be 305 days in a year. As the petitioner admittedly worked for four consecutive years, the total number of man-days would be 1220 days out of 1460 days (4 years). Therefore, the fact that the petitioner worked for more than 1220 days (in four years) is evident from the Service Certificate issued by the respondent No.1 Municipality. If the said period is taken into consideration, it stands establishes beyond doubt that the petitioner has put in 240 days of continuous service. 12. Further, the averments in the Paragraph Nos.13 and 14 of the counter filed by the respondent No.1 would reveal that the petitioner worked for a total period of 1226 days on daily wages from 01.04.1988 to 31.03.1992 as per the office records available. Though an averment is made stating that there is break in service during his tenure from 01.04.1988 to 31.03.1992, but the record available with the Municipality, is not placed either before the Labour Court or before the Single Judge. Though an averment is made stating that there is break in service during his tenure from 01.04.1988 to 31.03.1992, but the record available with the Municipality, is not placed either before the Labour Court or before the Single Judge. Further in Paragraph No.14 of the counter, it has been categorically stated that the petitioner is employed on temporary basis and worked continuously for more than 240 days within a period of 12 months preceding the termination on 01.04.1992. It will be appropriate to extract Paragraph Nos.13 and 14 of the counter, which are as under : 13. It is submitted that the petitioner worked as a Motivator in the Engineering Section in a Low Cost Sanitation Scheme on nominal rolls on daily wages for a total period of 1226 days with a break of service with effect from 01.04.1988 to 31.03.1992 as per office records available. Accordingly the services of the writ petitioner are disposed with on 01.04.1992. Therefore the question of follow-up of procedure contemplated under Section 25-F of ID Act does not arise. The services of the writ petitioner are based on availability of the funds by that time. 14. The respondent humbly submit that the petitioner is employed on temporary basis and worked continuously for more than 240 days within a period of 12 months preceding to termination on 01.04.1992, and never worked as prescribed under law and as such oral termination of services are not valid under law. When the averments in the counter run contra to the stand taken by the Municipality, we feel that the finding of the learned Single Judge in holding that the petitioner has put in 240 days of continuous service warrants no interference. 13. The next issue that would fall for consideration is as to whether the petitioner is entitled for backwages. As the payment of backwages is having a discretionary element involved in it has to be dealt with, in the facts and circumstances of each case and no straight-jacket formula can be evolved. Further, the authorities did not adduce evidence to prove that the Writ Petitioner was gainfully employed during the period. The said circumstances, in our view would be a relevant for determining the quantum of backwages to be paid. 14. Further, the authorities did not adduce evidence to prove that the Writ Petitioner was gainfully employed during the period. The said circumstances, in our view would be a relevant for determining the quantum of backwages to be paid. 14. Further, the material on record would show that the Commissioner, Tadepalligudem Municipality issued proceedings dated 16.11.2000 approving the reinstatement of J.B. Sivanand, who was working as a N.M.R. in the Lighting Section of the Tadepalligudem Municipality, on 01.04.1992, by treating as if he has been in Service from 01.04.1992 and to pay backwages at the rate of 50%. Similarly, the material on record would show that the Commissioner, Tadepalligudem Municipality issued proceedings dated 16.11.2000 approving the reinstatement of K.Satyanarayana, who was working as a N.M.R. in the Engineering Section of the Tadepalligudem Municipality, on 30.11.1992, by treating as if he has been in Service from 30.11.1992 and pay backwages at the rate of 50%. 15. Having regard to the orders passed above; as the case of the petitioner stands on the same footing and in view of the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Management of Madhurantakam Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited vs. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193 , and Hindustan Motors Limited vs. Tapan Kumar Bhattacharya and others, (2002) 6 SCC 41 , we direct the respondents to pay 50% of the backwages for the concerned period. Accordingly, Writ Appeal No.1262 of 2014 is allowed to the extent indicated above; while Writ Appeal No.1263 of 2014 filed by Tadepalligudem Municipality challenging the reinstatement of the writ petitioner is dismissed. No order as to costs. All pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.