JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. The trade, including manufacture, storage, distribution, transport, acquisition and disposal of bricks and matters connected therewith, is regulated by the provisions of The Himachal Pradesh Bricks (Control) Act, 1969 (for short, “the Act”). Section 3 of the Act empowers the Government to notify and publish orders for certain specific purposes as under: “3. Powers to control manufacture, storage, distribution etc. of bricks :- If the Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing the supply of bricks or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, it may, by order notified in the Official Gazette, provide- (a) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the manufacture, storage, distribution, transport, acquisition or disposal of bricks; (b) for collecting any information or statistics with a view to the regulating of the aforesaid matters; (c) for the grant or issue of licences, permits or other documents and the charging of fees therefor; (d) for controlling the prices at which bricks may be bought or sold; (e) for requiring dealers or kiln owners to maintain and produce for inspection such accounts and records regarding bricks and to furnish such information relating thereto, as may be specified in the order; and (f) for any incidental and supplementary matters including in particular the entering and search of premises and vehicles and the seizure by a person authorised to make such search of the bricks in respect of which such person has reason to believe that contravention of any order made under this Act has been, is being, or is about to be, committed.” 2. In furtherance of Section 3 of the Act, Government of Himachal Pradesh has issued Bricks (Control) Order, 1970 (for short, “the order”). Clause 3 of the Order reads as under: “3. In furtherance of Section 3 of the Act, Government of Himachal Pradesh has issued Bricks (Control) Order, 1970 (for short, “the order”). Clause 3 of the Order reads as under: “3. Save as hereinafter provided no manufacturer or dealer shall manufacture or sell or offer to store for sale or have in his possession for the purposes of sale or for disposal in any other manner of deposit with or consign to any person for the purposes of sale or for storage for sale, for sale, bricks except under and in accordance with the condition of a license granted under this order: Provided that no license shall be required for manufacturer of bricks in Maidani Bhattis (Awas) if such bricks are manufactured for the personal consumption of the manufacturer. Explanation:- Maidani Bhatti (Awas) means a structure used for burning brick in which neither a chimney is used nor slack coal is consumed as fuel.” 3. Clause 3 of the order was amended on 17.06.2017 and another proviso was added in following terms: Amendment of clause 3. In clause 3 of the Himachal Pradesh Bricks (Control) Order 1970, in the proviso, after explanation, the following new proviso shall be inserted namely:- “Provided further that license shall not be granted to a dealer unless he has his own manufacturing unit/kiln within Himachal Pradesh.” 4. The above noted proviso was deleted from clause 3 of the order vide amendment dated 30.11.2018. 5. Civil Writ Petitions number 1251 of 2019 and 1997 of 2020 came to be filed by manufacturers of bricks in Himachal Pradesh, who felt aggrieved against deletion of proviso from clause 3 of the order. Substantive reliefs prayed in both the petitions were identical and read as under: (a) That impugned Annexure P-3, dated 30.11.2018 may very kindly be quashed and set aside thereby restoring Annexure P-1, dated 17.06.2017, to secure the ends of law and justice. Substantive reliefs prayed in both the petitions were identical and read as under: (a) That impugned Annexure P-3, dated 30.11.2018 may very kindly be quashed and set aside thereby restoring Annexure P-1, dated 17.06.2017, to secure the ends of law and justice. (b) That in the alternative, clause (b) of Section 2 of the Himachal Pradesh Bricks (Control) Act, 1969 being ultra vires the provisions of the Act itself and so also of our Constitutional scheme, may very kindly be ordered to be deleted from the Act; An additional relief prayed in CWP No.1997 of 2020 was as under: - (c) That the respondents may very kindly be directed to act immediately and forthwith in restraining the companies/persons mentioned in para-6, supra, from dealing in the business of bricks. In the alterative, the respondents may very kindly be directed not to allow any person to deal in the business of bricks in District Una, H.P. except brick kiln owners of the District Una, H.P. 6. Parties herein shall be referred to by the status as they held before the writ court. 7. Contentions raised by petitioners, before the writ court, primarily were that only manufacturer could deal with the bricks under the scheme of the Act and the Order. It was sought to be emphasised that “Dealer” as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act could not be construed to be a person other than the one who was owner of brick kiln and was engaged in manufacture of bricks in Himachal Pradesh. As per petitioners, any other interpretation dehors the purpose and spirit of the Act and the order. One of the reasons for this belief of petitioners was that manufacturer under the Act and the Order was required to obtain a number of NOCs, had to spend effort, time and money, whereas it was not the case with other dealers, who would simply open their shops next to the brick kilns of petitioners for selling inferior bricks brought from outside the State, which would be against interest of local people. The deletion of proviso to clause 3 of the Order was alleged to be against the very of object of the Act and the Order and also violative of Articles 14 of the Constitution. 8. The deletion of proviso to clause 3 of the Order was alleged to be against the very of object of the Act and the Order and also violative of Articles 14 of the Constitution. 8. Per contra, respondents contested the claim of petitioners on the grounds that the deletion of proviso to clause 3 of the Order supra was necessitated due to resentment of brick traders other than the manufacturers in Himachal Pradesh. Vide directions issued by this Court on 14.09.2018 in CWP 2261 of 2017 the State was mandated to consider the objections of the petitioners therein by affording opportunity to all concerned. Number of objections were said to have been received. The matter was stated to have been dealt by the concerned department and was placed before the Cabinet, which on 5.11.2018 decided to withdraw the amendment dated 17.06.2017. 9. Learned single judge of this court vide a common judgment dated 15.1.2021 has dismissed both the petitions i.e. CWP No. 1251 of 2019 and CWP No. 1997 of 2020 and the appellants have assailed the judgment, passed by learned single judge, by way of these two appeals. Both these appeals have been heard and are also being decided together being against the common judgment and also involving common questions of facts and law. 10. The only specific ground of challenge that can be made out from the appeals preferred by petitioners, against the impugned judgment, is that the learned Single Judge had not dealt with the submission of the writ petitioners to the effect that throughout the territory of India, in all States, only manufacturers of bricks were entitled to sell the bricks. Except as above, petitioners have assailed the impugned judgment by making a general mention that learned Single Judge had erred in law and facts in passing impugned judgment, thus, the same, is not tenable and is liable to be set aside. At the time of hearing of the matter also learned Senior Advocate representing appellants laid stress on all such grounds which were raised before the Writ Court. 11. At the time of hearing of the matter also learned Senior Advocate representing appellants laid stress on all such grounds which were raised before the Writ Court. 11. Perusal of the judgment passed by learned Single Judge reveals that all the grounds raised by the writ petitioners were duly noticed and thereafter two issues broadly arising therefrom were separately decided as under :- (i) Whether the amendment incorporated in the 1970 order vide notification dated 30.11.2018 (Annexure P-3) is sustainable in the eyes of law or not? (ii) Whether the provisions of Section 2(b) of 1969 Act were ultra vires? 12. While dealing with the first issue, noticed above, learned Single judge held the amendment dated 30.11.2018 (Annexure P-3) to the order to be within legislative competence of the State under Section 3 of the Act. The pleas raised by petitioners were rejected by holding that the amendment (Annexure P-3) was not arbitrary. The learned Single Judge further rejected the claim of petitioners on the ground that the writ court could go into the legalities of Subordinate Legislation and not into its niceties. These findings were returned by learned Single judge after discussing the material on record and by inferring therefrom that prior to 17.06.2017 no exclusive right existed entitling only the manufacturers to sell the bricks. It was only by way of amendment dated 17.06.2017, carried in the order that a special right was created in favour of manufacturers and now by virtue of the amendment dated 30.11.2018 status quo ante has resulted. Learned single judge observed that since the petitioners were not aggrieved with the position as existed prior to 17.06.2021, the grievance against the same situation now appeared to be unreasonable. 13. Learned Single Judge had further held that when the State had power to do something under the Act, it had power/competence to undo the same also. Thus, the amendment (Annexure P-3) was held to be not without any object. Rest of the grounds raised by petitioners were held to be not substantiated. 14. As regards the second issued, we find that learned Single Judge held that the petitioners had failed to establish any adverse effect on them by the definition of “dealer” as it existed in Section 2(b) of the Act. Rest of the grounds raised by petitioners were held to be not substantiated. 14. As regards the second issued, we find that learned Single Judge held that the petitioners had failed to establish any adverse effect on them by the definition of “dealer” as it existed in Section 2(b) of the Act. It has also been held that by simply alleging the contents of Section 2(b) of the Act to be vague would not suffice for petitioners to discharge their burden to prove such statutory provisions to be ultra vires. It has further been held that the definition of dealer in the Act has to be harmoniously read with its aim of the object, which precisely was to regulate the business of bricks in Himachal Pradesh. In such background, no ambiguity was found to exist, by learned Single Judge, in the definition of dealer. The plea of petitioners in this regard was negated by entering into minute details of the relevant provision of the Act and its purpose. 15. We are of the considered view that learned Single Judge while rejecting the contentions of petitioners has gone into and discussed every material detail of the matter and thereafter had arrived at the conclusions, which were supported by sound reasons. No infirmity much less illegality or perversity can be found in the impugned judgment. 16. We further add that the contention of petitioners regarding only manufacturer’s right to deal with the bricks, under the scheme of the Act and the order, on the face of it appears to be fallacious. The Act defines dealer but not the manufacturer. The definition of manufacturer can be found only in 1970 order which has been issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh in order to give effect to certain parts of Section 3 of the Act. The order has been issued only in furtherance of the object of the Act and hence any interpretation of its provisions that militates against the object of the Act cannot be sustained. There is nothing in the Act which suggests that the dealer would only be a person who would be a manufacturer or in other words owner of a brick kiln. 17. There is nothing in the Act which suggests that the dealer would only be a person who would be a manufacturer or in other words owner of a brick kiln. 17. Petitioners further argued that section 3 of the Act provided only for an order for regulating by licenses, permits or otherwise the manufacture, storage, distribution, transport, acquisition or disposal of bricks and thus, the buying or selling was not included. This contention also deserves rejection for the reason that the terms distribution, acquisition or disposal of bricks used in Section 3 (a) of the Act amounts to the dealing in bricks including the purchase and sale whereof. In addition, Section 3(d) also specifically provides for an order for control on the prices at which bricks may be bought or sold. The provisions of the Act have to be read harmoniously. 18. Further the perusal of the provisions of the Act discloses that the Act by itself does not create any substantive right in favour of any person. It empowers the Government to regulate the maintenance or increase in supply of bricks or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair price by issuance of order in the official gazette providing for any of the stipulations carved out in clauses “a” to “f” of Section 3 of the Act. The violations of the restrictions so imposed in pursuance of Section 3 invite penalties under the Act. In this view of the matter also we are of the view that the petitioners were not having right to seek the annulment of amendment (Annexure P-3). 19. The interpretation as sought to be made by petitioners, if upheld, would amount to creating a bar for others to choose and carry an avocation in accordance with law, which definitely will violate Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Looking the matter from another angle, it becomes evident that any such interpretation would also be in violation of the Constitutional right of private respondents and other similar persons under Article 301 of the Constitution of India. 20. The restriction, if any, on the freedom of trade of a person can be imposed by State Government under Article 304(b) of the Constitution of India and for such imposition the pre-requisites are reasonableness of restriction and public interest. 20. The restriction, if any, on the freedom of trade of a person can be imposed by State Government under Article 304(b) of the Constitution of India and for such imposition the pre-requisites are reasonableness of restriction and public interest. In the instant case, the action of State in undoing the effects of amendment dated 17.06.2017 (Annexure P-1) by amendment dated 30.11.2018 (Annexure P-3) is in line with the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 1(g) and constitutional rights granted under Article 301 of the Constitution of India. 21. Now, while dealing with the contention of petitioners that learned Single Judge had not taken into consideration the factum of all other states throughout India considering only manufacturers as dealer, we do not find any material on record which may substantiate this contention. The only document that has been relied upon by the petitioners before the writ Court is an extract from the Punjab Control of bricks Supplies (Price and Distribution Control) Order 1998 which defines dealer under Section 2(c) whereof as under: - “2(c) “dealer” means a person or associations of persons or a firm or a cooperative society engaged in the business of production, manufacture or sale of products at a kiln.” 22. Punjab Control of bricks Supplies (Price and Distribution Control) Order 1998 has been issued in furtherance of section 3 of East Punjab Control on bricks Supplies Act 1949. Section 2(c) of Punjab Act separately defined “dealer” as under: “2(c) “dealer” means any person who deals in bricks or holds stocks of bricks for sale and includes his representative or agent.” Thus, the distinction sought to be drawn between the definition of “dealer” in Himachal Act and Punjab order is highly misconceived especially when in Punjab Act the import of definition of term “dealer” is substantially the same as in Himachal Act. The term dealer has been defined as under in Himachal Act :- “2(b) “Dealer” means any person who is engaged in the business of buying or selling, or otherwise dealing in, bricks, and includes his representative or agent.” 23. The context and relevance of the term “dealer” as defined in Punjab order supra cannot be a source with petitioners to carve out any exception to the definition of term “dealer” under the Himachal Act. The context and relevance of the term “dealer” as defined in Punjab order supra cannot be a source with petitioners to carve out any exception to the definition of term “dealer” under the Himachal Act. Even otherwise no comparison can be drawn in the special legislations of two different states more so in context of the issues raised in writ petitions by the petitioners. 24. The petitioners have also raised a contention that by amendment dated 30.11.2018 (Annexure P-3), the Government of Himachal Pradesh has prejudiced the interest of various stakeholders including the poor consumers in the State of Himachal Pradesh. The petitioners have alleged that after 30.11.2018 persons from neighboring State of Punjab and Haryana bring bricks of inferior quality to the State of Himachal Pradesh and sell them on higher price. Though, no tangible material has been placed on record by petitioners to prove this contention, yet we are of the view that this cannot be the sole ground to test the legality of amendment dated 30.11.2018 (Annexure P-3) and also the vires of definition of dealer in Section 2(b) of the Act. As noticed above, the reasonable restrictions on free trade that can be placed by the State Government under Article 304(b) of the Constitution of India can be held to be valid only when it is reasonable and also in public interest. The ground of “my state might public” can be politically generated but cannot qualify the test of public interest. Reference in this behalf can be made to para 18 of 1993 Volume I SCC 236. “18 The matter may be different where total prohibition has been imposed on the movement of goods or articles from one State to another which have not been declared to be essential commodities or articles. In those cases the State, which has imposed such ban, has to satisfy the Court that in spite of total prohibition it amounts only to regulation of the trade in such articles or that even if it was a restriction it was reasonable within the meaning of Article 304(b) of the Constitution and has been imposed by law as required by Article 304(b). Sometimes it is being said that many artificial barriers on movement of produce or a particular State are being contemplated or imposed only on the consideration of “My-State-My-People”. Sometimes it is being said that many artificial barriers on movement of produce or a particular State are being contemplated or imposed only on the consideration of “My-State-My-People”. This will only amount to the protection of regional interests for political end and not of public interest. This was not conceived by Chapter XIII of the Constitution. In Charles H. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc. while dealing with the commerce clause in the American Constitution, Cardozo, J. observed. “This part of the Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim together and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” 25. In light of these discussions, we do not find any merit in the appeals, hence the same are dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, with no orders as to cost.