ORDER : Conglomeration of these petitions raise a challenge to several imposts/fee imposed by the Bruhath Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike [‘the BBMP’ for short] and the State of Karnataka upon the residents and developers/builders of the city of Bengaluru, all of which come under the precincts of the BBMP. 2. Since these petitions run into several numbers, I deem it appropriate to use the pleadings in W.P.No.36017/2018, W.P.No.4601/2020 and W.P.No.8849/2020, which are the leading petitions for noticing the facts, as all of the actions are challenged in these petitions. All the other petitions raise a common challenge. FACTUAL SCORE: W.P.No.36017 of 2018:- 3. The subject petition is filed by M/s Vaswani Estates Developers Private Limited, [‘the Company’ for short] a developer. The Company claims to be a Private Limited Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 which is in the business of construction/development of several residential and commercial projects in and around the City of Bangalore. It is the claim of the Company that in order to develop certain lands in the property bearing Municipal Nos.1 and 1/1 Madras Tank Road/St.Marks Road with PID No.76-20-35 owned by one Sri P.H. Krishna Reddy, the Land Owner, the Company and the Land Owner entered into a joint development agreement on 11-02-2005 in respect of the aforesaid property to construct a commercial building and registered the same at the jurisdictional sub-registrar. It also transpires that several supplemental joint agreements took place between the Company and the Land Owner which is not the concern or the issue in this petition. 4. The Company intending to construct a commercial building on the property and several agreements having been entered into between the parties, the Company had to and did obtain ‘no objections’ from concerned departments in respect of construction to be undertaken on the property. All no objection certificates obtained from several statutory authorities are also annexed to the petition. 5. As stated above, the Company intending to construct a commercial building on the property (3B+G+9UF) made an application on 20th March, 2018 along with requisite documents prescribed in law to the BBMP and the Town Planning Department of the BBMP. The Company also remitted requisite fee of Rs.68,534/-along with the application. 6. The BBMP approved and granted building licence as also a sanctioned plan to the Company on 04-07-2018. The Company also remitted requisite fee of Rs.68,534/-along with the application. 6. The BBMP approved and granted building licence as also a sanctioned plan to the Company on 04-07-2018. The 3rd respondent/Department of Town Planning of the BBMP issued an endorsement demanding Rs.1,86,86,000/-from the Company under various heads set out in the endorsement and an additional amount of labour cess of Rs.17,16,200/-for the purpose of grant of building licence and sanction of plan. The impugned demands made read as follows: xxxxxxxxx It is these two endorsements and the fee that is levied under various heads in terms of aforementioned endorsement that are the subject matter of challenge in this petition. This petition concerns challenge to (i) ground rent, (ii) licence fee, (iii) lake rejuvenation fee and (iv) scrutiny fee. W.P.No. 4601 of 2020:- 7. The petitioners in this writ petition are Mr. Sunderam Shetty and others. The contention of the petitioners in this petition is akin to what is contended in the aforesaid writ petition. Here again, when documents were submitted to the BBMP, after arriving at a joint development agreement for sanction of plan and grant of building licence for construction of a residential apartment complex, the BBMP made the grant of such permission/licence subject to payment of ground rent and several other demands which run into several crores on various heads. The challenge in this petition is to the following action of levying fee/tax. The prayer of the petitioners reads as follows:- “(i) Issue a writ of certiorari or similar writ or order or direction to quash the demand notice No.BBMP/Addl.Dir/JD North/LP/0048/2014-15 dated 18-02-2020 at Annexure-G issued by the respondent No.3 only in so far as the demand of Rs.77,73,818/-towards ground rent and GST at 18% on the ground rent at Rs.13,99,287/-and scrutiny fee of Rs.5,18,255/-. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction declaring that Bye-law No.3.9 in the Bangalore Mahanagara Palike Building Bye-laws, 2003 as unconstitutional, arbitrary, illegal and ultra vires. (iii) Issue a writ of mandamus or similar writ or order or direction directing respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to issue occupancy certificate pursuant to the demand notice No. BBMP/Addl.Dir/JD North/LP/0448/2014-15 dated 18-02-2020 at Annexure-G without insisting for payment of Rs.77,73,818/-towards ground rent and GST at 18% on the ground rent at Rs.13,99,287/-and scrutiny fee of Rs.5,18,255/-. (iii) Issue a writ of mandamus or similar writ or order or direction directing respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to issue occupancy certificate pursuant to the demand notice No. BBMP/Addl.Dir/JD North/LP/0448/2014-15 dated 18-02-2020 at Annexure-G without insisting for payment of Rs.77,73,818/-towards ground rent and GST at 18% on the ground rent at Rs.13,99,287/-and scrutiny fee of Rs.5,18,255/-. (iv) Issue any other appropriate writ or order or direction as deemed fit in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice and equity.” W.P.No. 8849 of 2020:- 8. In this writ petition, apart from what is challenged by the petitioners in the writ petitions noted hereinabove, the petitioner is seeking to raise a challenge to the demand of Labour Cess imposed by Government of Karnataka under the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Act, 1996[‘Welfare Cess Act’ for short] to be paid to the Welfare Board. The impugned demands made are as follows: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Identical demands are made in all these cases. 9. According to the petitioners, they are legally liable to be pay only betterment fee, compound wall fee and no other levy that is sought to be imposed upon them. Insofar as it concerns this writ petition, it is the case of the petitioners that Government of Karnataka issued corrigendum on 08-01-2007 and 28-02-2007 prescribing the procedure for levy of labour cess. Clause (c) of the Government order dealt with labour cess in respect of construction work which is approved by any legal authority. The demand notice issued by the 3rd respondent/Town Planning Department of the BBMP charge one percent labour cess in a manner that is not sanctioned by law. The learned counsel would contend that petitioners are not liable to pay upfront, labour cess and service charge on labour cess. The demand made by the 3rd respondent is contrary to the Act and the rules as the Rules do not contemplate payment of upfront labour cess. Therefore, broadly, the contention of the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitions is that the fee that is levied upon them is without authority of law, without application of mind and contrary to the Act and the Rules and the Byelaws that empower imposition of fee upon the petitioners and the like. 10. Heard Ms. Nayantara, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 36017/2018, Sri. T.P.Vivekananda, learned counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.4601/2020, Sri. 10. Heard Ms. Nayantara, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 36017/2018, Sri. T.P.Vivekananda, learned counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.4601/2020, Sri. Madhukar Deshpande, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in Writ Petition No.8849/2020, Sri.Sammith.S., learned counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.12570/2020 and Sri C.K.Nanda Kumar, learned counsel appearing for petitioner in Writ Petition No.24906/2019. 10.1. Heard Sri K.G.Raghavan, learned senior counsel appearing petitioner in Writ Petition No.13495/2019, Sri G. Krishnamurthy, learned senior counsel appearing for petitioners in Writ Petition No.57893/2018, Sri Jayakumar S.Patil, learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner in Writ Petition No.16461/2017 and Sri V.Sreenidhi, learned counsel along with Smt. Sinchana.M.R, learned counsel appearing for BBMP. SUBMISSIONS: PETITIONERS: 11. Ms. Nayanatara, learned counsel representing the petitioner in Writ Petition No.36017/2018, spearheading the arguments in all cases, would raise the following contentions: (i) Levy of fee that is challenged is in blatant violation of the power to do so by the BBMP. (ii) Characterization of impugned levy is without authority of law. (iii) It is neither a fee nor a tax as there is no co-relation between what is charged and quid pro quo (iv) The impugned levy is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. (v) All the levies are without authority of law as neither the Statute nor the Bye-laws empower the BBMP. (vi) Imposition of lake rejuvenation fee invoking Section 18(1)(A) of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act is also impermissible as it is imposed by way of a Circular dated 27.01.2017. (vii) Licence fee and scrutiny are imposed invoking the power under the bye-law and bye-laws have no force of law unless the Act empowers such imposition. (viii) The petitioner in this petition is entitled for refund of the entire amount deposited without prejudice. (vii) Licence fee and scrutiny are imposed invoking the power under the bye-law and bye-laws have no force of law unless the Act empowers such imposition. (viii) The petitioner in this petition is entitled for refund of the entire amount deposited without prejudice. The learned counsel Ms.Nayantara would place reliance upon the following judgments: (a) Hutchison Essar South Limited V. Corporation of The City of Belgaum ILR 2011 Karnataka 2631 (b) Wireless -TT Info Services Ltd. and Others V. State of Karnataka and Others 2012 (3) KarLJ 302 (c) Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Others V. Shrey Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. and others (2005) 4 SCC 245 (d) The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras V. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 282 (e) The Corporation of Calcutta and another V. Liberty Cinema AIR (1965) SC 1107 (f) Delhi Race Club Ltd. V. Union of India and Others (2012) 8 SCC 680 (g) Nagar Mahapalika Varnasi V. Durga Das Battacharya AIR 1968 SC 1119 (h) Jindal Stainless Ltd., and another V. State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1 (i) State of Kerala and Others V. PJ Joseph AIR 1958 SC 296 (j) Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority V. Sharad Kumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla and Others AIR 1992 SC 2038 (k) Nagrik Upabhokta M. Manch V. Union of India and Others AIR 2002 SC 2405 (l) M/S Govind Saran Ganga Saran V. Commissioner of Sales Tax and others AIR 1985 SC 1041 (m) Corporation of Calcutta and Another V. Liberty Cinema AIR 1965 SC 1107 (n) Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot V. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others AIR 1958 SC 909 (o) Salonah Tea Company Ltd., V. Superintendent of Texes Nowgong and Others. AIR 1990 SC 772 12. Sri T.P.Vivekananda, learned counsel would also submit on similar lines with regard to the power of the BBMP to impose impugned levies and would further contend that the State Government is not empowered to impose Labour Cess on the petitioners in the case as even the said imposition/demand is without authority of law. The learned counsel Sri.T.P.Vivekananda would place reliance upon the following judgments: (a) N.D.Sirur and Ors Vs. Corporation of the city of Bangalore and ors 1965 (1) MLJ 316 (b) K.Pundalika Nayak Vs. City Municipal Council, Mangalore 1973 (1) MLJ 298 (c) Mysore Kirloskar Ltd. Vs. Hubli Dharwad Municipal Corporation and another 1990(3) KLJ Supp. The learned counsel Sri.T.P.Vivekananda would place reliance upon the following judgments: (a) N.D.Sirur and Ors Vs. Corporation of the city of Bangalore and ors 1965 (1) MLJ 316 (b) K.Pundalika Nayak Vs. City Municipal Council, Mangalore 1973 (1) MLJ 298 (c) Mysore Kirloskar Ltd. Vs. Hubli Dharwad Municipal Corporation and another 1990(3) KLJ Supp. 124 (d) Calcutta Municipal Corporation and Ors Vs. M/s.Shrey Mercantile Pvt. Ltd., and Ors AIR 2005 SC 1879 (e) Om Prakash Agarwal etc., Vs. Giriraj Kishore and Ors AIR 1986 SC 726 13. Sri Madhukar Deshpande, learned counsel who among other common challenges as mentioned hereinabove, challenges Labour Cess and has made elaborate submissions on imposition of Labour Cess being contrary to the procedure stipulated for levy of such cess under the Welfare Act, as the Government order notified in terms of the Act does not speak of levy in the manner that is made. In the said writ petition the demand of Labour Cess though demanded by the BBMP, it is at the direction of the State Government, both of whom do not have any power to impose the said fee in the manner that it is demanded. 14. All other learned counsel who represented the petitioners have reiterated the submissions of the aforesaid learned counsel and therefore, they are not repeated. RESPONDENT-BBMP: 15. Sri V.Sreenidhi, learned counsel appearing for the BBMP, in all these cases, would at the outset contend that the petitioners have filed these petitions under a mistaken notion that the demand made is a tax. According to the BBMP it is a fee that is leviable by the BBMP in terms of powers conferred in it by the byelaws. It is his submission that for maintenance of streets of the City on which materials belonging to the petitioners in all these cases are transported, fee is collected which cannot be termed as unjustified. He would further submit that building materials used for construction are being lavishly placed on roads of the BBMP while undertaking construction for which the petitioners in all these cases are bound to pay for the use of public place to store the materials and hence levy of ground rent. 15.1. He would further submit that building materials used for construction are being lavishly placed on roads of the BBMP while undertaking construction for which the petitioners in all these cases are bound to pay for the use of public place to store the materials and hence levy of ground rent. 15.1. It is his submission that plethora of documents are to be scrutinized by several officers of BBMP and infrastructure that is created for scrutiny of such documents empower the BBMP to charge scrutiny fee and would defend imposition of Labour Cess on the direction of Government and it is only the Government orders issued from time to time under the Welfare Act that are implemented. He would also further contend that the fee that is levied being linked to the guidance value is under re-consideration at the hands of the BBMP. 15.2. Insofar as it concerns imposition of Lake Rejuvenation Fee, the BBMP would submit that it is at the direction of the State in terms of the circular of the Government dated 27.01.2017, the BBMP has issued a circular on 30.03.2017 as directed by the State for collection of Lake Rejuvenation Fee and the betterment charges linked to the guidance value. 15.3. The learned counsel laying emphasis on the presumption of constitutionality of the enactments would rely on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 453 and in the case of Bhanumati v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 1 following Bihar Distillery and would submit that in the light of the activities of the Corporation, the demand of fee and its linking to the guidance value are all valid in law. He further submits that the entire money that is collected goes into the Corporation fund for several functions performed by the Corporation in terms of Sections 58 and 59 of the Act. RESPONDENT -STATE: 16. The learned Government Advocate submitted only on the issue of imposition of labour cess and lake rejuvenation fee. It is his contention that in terms of the Welfare Cess Act and the Rules made thereunder, collection of labour cess at 1% of the construction cost has been in force with effect from 26.09.1996 in terms of Section 3 of the said Act. It is his contention that in terms of the Welfare Cess Act and the Rules made thereunder, collection of labour cess at 1% of the construction cost has been in force with effect from 26.09.1996 in terms of Section 3 of the said Act. Rules formulated in terms of the Act only empower the State to direct the BBMP to collect cess on behalf of the State as it is a local body. He would further submit that the Act being a welfare legislation, the imposition of payment of labour cess upfront at the time when the construction begins cannot be said to be illegal. The functions of the Board constituted under Section 22 of the Act is to maintain the welfare of the labourers coming under the Act. He would further submit that the petitioners have an alternative remedy of filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority under Rule 11 of the Rules and the writ petition insofar as the challenge to imposition of labour cess and seeking its payment upfront ought to be dismissed on account of availability of statutory alternative remedy. He would submit that these are the only areas in which the States answer is required in these petitions and insofar as the other issues are concerned would toe the lines of the learned counsel representing the BBMP. 17. On a cumulative analysis of the pleadings and the submissions made, the impugned imposts/fee that are called in question in the cluster of these petitions are as follows: (1) Ground rent (2) License fee (3) Scrutiny fee (4) Security deposit. (5) Lake rejuvenation fee (6) Service charges at 1% of the amount payable to Palike from out of Building Construction Workers Welfare Cess -labour cess. 18. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by the respective counsel appearing for the parties and in furtherance whereof, the following issue would arise for my consideration: “Whether the impugned imposts/fee (supra) suffer from want of legal sanction?” POSITION IN LAW: 19. Before embarking upon the journey of consideration of the impugned imposts, I deem it appropriate to consider the position in law with regard to imposition of such imposts or a fee. 20. Article 265 of the Constitution is the source of power for the Union and the States to impose taxes in accordance with law. Before embarking upon the journey of consideration of the impugned imposts, I deem it appropriate to consider the position in law with regard to imposition of such imposts or a fee. 20. Article 265 of the Constitution is the source of power for the Union and the States to impose taxes in accordance with law. Article 265 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: “265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law.-No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.” Therefore, an impost can be made only in accordance with or and as authorized by law. 21. Tax or a fee has been a subject matter of interpretation by the Apex Court in several judgments considering several facets of such imposts. A few that are germane, out of the lot that are quoted, for consideration in the lis are as follows: (i) Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005 : AIR 1954 SC 282 “45. A neat definition of what “tax” means has been given by Latham, C.J. of the High Court of Australia in Matthews v. Chicory Marketing Board [60 CLR 263, 276] . “A tax”, according to the learned Chief Justice, “is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered”. This definition brings out, in our opinion, the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in a general sense, are included within it. It is said that the essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it is imposed under statutory power without the taxpayer's consent and the payment is enforced by law [Vide Lower Mainland Dairy v. Crystal Dairy Ltd., 1933 AC 168]. The second characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. The second characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of tax is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual, there is, as it is said, no element of quid pro quo between the taxpayer and the public authority [See Findlay Shirras on Science of Public Finance, Vol. I, p. 203]. Another feature of the taxation is that as it is a part of the common burden, the quantum of imposition upon the taxpayer depends generally upon his capacity to pay. 46. Coming now to fees, a “fee” is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay [Vide Lutz on Public Finance, p. 215]. These are undoubtedly some of the general characteristics, but as there may be various kinds of fees, it is not possible to formulate a definition that would be applicable to all cases. 47. As regards the distinction between a tax and a fee, it is argued in the first place on behalf of the respondent that a fee is something voluntary which a person has got to pay if he wants certain services from the Government; but there is no obligation on his part to seek such services and if he does not want the services, he can avoid the obligation. The example given is of a licence fee. If a man wants a licence that is entirely his own choice and then only he has to pay the fees, but not otherwise. We think that a careful examination will reveal that the element of compulsion or coerciveness is present in all kinds of imposition, though in different degrees and that it is not totally absent in fees. If a man wants a licence that is entirely his own choice and then only he has to pay the fees, but not otherwise. We think that a careful examination will reveal that the element of compulsion or coerciveness is present in all kinds of imposition, though in different degrees and that it is not totally absent in fees. This, therefore, cannot be made the sole or even a material criterion for distinguishing a tax from fees. It is difficult, we think, to conceive of a tax except, it be something like a poll tax, the incidence of which falls on all persons within a State. The house tax has to be paid only by those who own houses, the land tax by those who possess lands, municipal taxes or rates will fall on those who have properties within a municipality. Persons, who do not have houses, lands or properties within municipalities, would not have to pay these taxes, but nevertheless these impositions come within the category of taxes and nobody can say that it is the choice of these people to own lands or houses or specified kinds of properties, so that there is no compulsion on them to pay taxes at all. Compulsion lies in the fact that payment is enforceable by law against a man in spite of his unwillingness or want of consent; and this element is present in taxes as well as in fees. Of course, in some cases whether a man would come within the category of a service receiver may be a matter of his choice, but that by itself would not constitute a major test which can be taken as the criterion of this species of imposition. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden, while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege. Fees confer a special capacity, although the special advantage, as for example in the case of registration fees for documents or marriage licences, is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in the public interest [Vide Findlay Shirras on Science of Public Finance, Vol. I, p. 202]. Public interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is some special benefit which the individual receives. I, p. 202]. Public interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee it is some special benefit which the individual receives. As Seligman says, it is the special benefit accruing to the individual which is the reason for payment in the case of fees; in the case of a tax, the particular advantage if it exists at all is an incidental result of State action [Vide Seligman's Essays on Taxation,p.408] .” (Emphasis applied) The Apex Court has clearly indicated what are the characteristics of a fee distinguishing it from what could be tax. What is held by the Apex Court is that a fee is generally a charge for special service rendered to individuals by Governmental agencies, which is to be uniform, without reference to the capacity of the payer. (ii) Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 “20. The conclusion to which we then arrive is that the levy under Section 548 is not a fee as the Act does not provide for any services of special kind being rendered resulting in benefits to the person on whom it is imposed. The work of inspection done by the Corporation which is only to see that the terms of the licence are observed by the licensee is not a service to him. No question here arises of correlating the amount of the levy to the costs of any service. The levy is a tax. It is not disputed, it may be stated, that if the levy is not a fee, it must be a tax.” The Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgment holds that unless any service of a special kind is rendered resulting in benefits to the person on whom it is imposed, the levy would not be a fee, but a tax. (iii) Nagar Mahapalika v. Durga Das Bhattacharya, (1968) 3 SCR 374 “10. We pass on to consider the next question raised in this appeal, namely, whether there was a quid pro quo for the licence fees realised by the appellant and whether the impost was a fee in the strict sense as contemplated by Section 294 of the Act. A finding has been recorded in the present case by the trial court that a sum of Rs 1,43,741/7/0 was spent by the Municipal Board for providing facilities and amenities to owners and drivers of rickshaws. A finding has been recorded in the present case by the trial court that a sum of Rs 1,43,741/7/0 was spent by the Municipal Board for providing facilities and amenities to owners and drivers of rickshaws. This sum of Rs 1,43,741/7/0 is made up of the following items: “Rs 68,000 spent over the paving of bye-lanes, in these the only conveyance that can operate is a rickshaw. Rs 20,000 spent as expenses for lighting of streets and lanes. Rs 47,741/7/0 spent in making provision for parking grounds. Rs 8000 spent on payment of salary to the staff maintained for issuing licences and inspecting rickshaws”. The High Court was of the opinion that the amount of Rs 68,000 spent for paving of bye-lanes and Rs 20,000 for lighting of streets and lanes cannot be considered to have been spent in rendering services to the rickshaw owners and rickshaw drivers. The reason was that under Section 7(a) of the Act it was the statutory duty of the Municipal Board to light public streets and places and under clause (h) of the same section to construct and maintain public streets, culverts etc. The expenditure under these two items was incurred by the Municipal Board in the discharge of its statutory duty and it is manifest that the licence fee cannot be imposed for reimbursing the cost of ordinary municipal services which the Municipal Board was bound under the statute to provide to the general public (See the decision of the Madras High Court in India Sugar and Refineries Ltd. v. Municipal Council Hospet) [ILR (1943) Mad 521]. If these two items are excluded from consideration the balance of expenditure incurred by the Municipal Board for the benefit of the licensees is Rs 55,741/7/0. In other words, the expenditure constituted about 44% of the total income of the Municipal Board from the licensees. In our opinion, there is no sufficient quid pro quo established in the circumstances of this case and the High Court was therefore right in holding that the imposition of the licence fees at the rate of Rs 30 on each rickshaw owner and Rs 5 on each rickshaw driver was ultra vires and illegal. (Emphasis applied) The Apex Court in the aforesaid case holds that if there is no sufficient quid pro quo established, imposition of fees would become illegal. (iv) Delhi Race Club Vs. (Emphasis applied) The Apex Court in the aforesaid case holds that if there is no sufficient quid pro quo established, imposition of fees would become illegal. (iv) Delhi Race Club Vs. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 680 “35. In the light of the tests laid down in Hingir-Rampur [ AIR 1961 SC 459 : (1961) 2 SCR 537 ] and followed in Kesoram Industries [ (2004) 10 SCC 201 ] , it is manifest that the true test to determine the character of a levy, delineating “tax” from “fee”, is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose intended to be achieved. In the instant case, it is plain from the scheme of the Act that its sole aim is regulation, control and management of horse racing. Such a regulation is necessary in public interest to control the act of betting and wagering as well as to promote the sport in the Indian context. To achieve this purpose, licences are issued subject to compliance with the conditions laid down therein, which inter alia include maintenance of accounts and furnishing of periodical returns; amount of stakes which may be allotted for different kinds of horses; the measures to be taken for the training of the persons to become jockeys, to encourage Indian-bred horses and Indian jockeys; the inclusion and association of such persons as the Government may nominate as stewards or members in the conduct and management of the horse racing. The violation of the conditions of the licence or the Act is penalised under the Act besides a provision for cognizance by a court not inferior to a Metropolitan Magistrate. To ensure compliance with these conditions, the 1985 Rules empower the District Officer or an Entertainment Tax Officer to conduct inspection of the race club at reasonable times. Thus, the nature of the impost is not merely compulsory exaction of money to augment the revenue of the State but its true object is to regulate, control, manage and encourage the sport of horse racing as is distinctly spelled out in the Act and the 1985 Rules. For the purpose of enforcement, wide powers are conferred on various authorities to enable them to supervise, regulate and monitor the activities relating to the racecourse with a view to secure proper enforcement of the provisions. For the purpose of enforcement, wide powers are conferred on various authorities to enable them to supervise, regulate and monitor the activities relating to the racecourse with a view to secure proper enforcement of the provisions. Therefore, by applying the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that the said levy is a “fee” and not a “tax”.” (Emphasis applied) The Apex Court in the afore-said case has again elaborated as to what is a tax and a fee. By considering the services rendered by the Race Club, the Apex Court holds it to be a fee and not a tax. (v) Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2017) 12 SCC 1 “67.2. Secondly, because the concept of compensatory tax obliterates the distinction between a tax and a fee. The essential difference between a tax and a fee is that while a tax has no element of quid pro quo, a fee without that element cannot be validly levied. The difference between a tax and the fee has been examined and elaborated in a long line of decisions of this Court. (See Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri LakshmindraThirthaSwamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 : 1954 SCR 1005 ] , Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa [Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 400 ], Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa [Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1961 SC 459 ], Corpn. of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema [Corpn. of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema, AIR 1965 SC 1107 ] , Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab [Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab, (1980) 1 SCC 416 ], Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd. [Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Orient Paper and Industries Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 655 ], State of Gujarat v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal [State of Gujarat v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal, (2004) 5 SCC 155 ] and State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. [State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201 : AIR 2005 SC 1646 ] )”. (Emphasis applied) A Nine Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case at the outset while considering the difference between a tax and a fee holds that element of quid pro quo is essential for an impost to be considered a fee. POWER TO DEMAND FEES: (vi) Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla, (1992) 3 SCC 285 “7. After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr Goswami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. The facts and circumstances in the case of District Council of Jowai are entirely different. The exercise of powers by the Autonomous Jaintia Hills Districts are controlled by the constitutional provisions and in the special facts of the case, this Court has indicated that the realisation of just fee for a specific purpose by the autonomous District was justified and such power was implied. The said decision cannot be made applicable in the facts of this case or the same should not be held to have laid down any legal proposition that in matters of imposition of tax or fees, the question of necessary intendment may be looked into when there is no express provision for imposition of fee or tax. The other decision in Khargram Panchayat Samiti case [ (1987) 3 SCC 82 ] also deals with the exercise of incidental and consequential power in the field of administrative law and the same does not deal with the power of imposing tax and fee.” 8. The other decision in Khargram Panchayat Samiti case [ (1987) 3 SCC 82 ] also deals with the exercise of incidental and consequential power in the field of administrative law and the same does not deal with the power of imposing tax and fee.” 8. The High Court has referred to the decisions of this Court in Hingir case [ AIR 1961 SC 459 : (1961) 2 SCR 537 ] and Jagannath Ramanuj case [ AIR 1954 SC 400 : 1954 SCR 1046 ] and Delhi Municipal Corporation case [ (1983) 3 SCC 229 : 1983 SCC (Tax) 154 : AIR 1983 SC 617 ]. It has been consistently held by this Court that whenever there is compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for the same and there is no room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr Goswami. Accordingly, there is no occasion to interfere with the impugned decision of the High Court. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. (Emphasis applied) The Apex Court in the afore-said judgment has considered manifold circumstances which would distinguish a tax from a fee and has also held that there can be no implied power in fiscal matters. The power to impose must be specific and such imposition must be within the parameters of the authority to impose. There cannot be incidental or ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. (vii) Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Shrey Mercantile (P) Ltd., (2005) 4 SCC 245 “The short question which arises for determination in these civil appeals by grant of special leave by the Calcutta Municipal whether the imposition for the process of change in the name of the owner in the assessment books of the Corporation is in the nature of “a fee” or “tax”. 17. These well-settled principles have been reiterated by this Court in the case of CCE v. Chhata Sugar Co. Ltd. [ (2004) 3 SCC 466 ] in which it has been held: (SCC pp. 483-86, paras 18-30) “18. The Constitution of India postulates either a tax or a fee. 17. These well-settled principles have been reiterated by this Court in the case of CCE v. Chhata Sugar Co. Ltd. [ (2004) 3 SCC 466 ] in which it has been held: (SCC pp. 483-86, paras 18-30) “18. The Constitution of India postulates either a tax or a fee. However, the use of the expression ‘tax’ or ‘fee’ in a statute is not decisive; as on a proper construction thereof and having regard to its scope and purport, ‘fee’ may also be held to be a tax. xxxx xx xx xx 25. In Liberty Cinema [ (1965) 2 SCR 477 : AIR 1965 SC 1107 ] this Court, while interpreting Section 548 of the Calcutta Municipal Act providing for grant of a licence, observed: (AIR p. 1116, para 18) ‘The reference to the heading of Part V can at most indicate that the provisions in it were for conferring benefit on the public at large. The cinema house owners paying the levy would not as such owners be getting that benefit. We are not concerned with the benefit, if any, received by them as members of the public for that is not special benefit meant for them. We are clear in our mind that if looking at the terms of the provision authorising the levy, it appears that it is not for special services rendered to the person on whom the levy is imposed, it cannot be a fee wherever it may be placed in the statute. A consideration of where Sections 443 and 548 are placed in the Act is irrelevant for determining whether the levy imposed by them is a fee or a tax.’ It was further observed: (AIR p.1116, paras 19-20) 19. xx xx xx xx 20. The conclusion to which we then arrive is that the levy under Section 548 is not a fee as the Act does not provide for any services of special kind being rendered resulting in benefits to the person on whom it is imposed. The work of inspection done by the Corporation which is only to see that the terms of the licence are observed by the licensee is not a service to him. No question here arises of correlating the amount of the levy to the costs of any service. The levy is a tax. The work of inspection done by the Corporation which is only to see that the terms of the licence are observed by the licensee is not a service to him. No question here arises of correlating the amount of the levy to the costs of any service. The levy is a tax. It is not disputed, it may be stated, that if the levy is not a fee, it must be a tax.’ xxxx xx xx xx 26. A regulatory statute may also contain taxing provisions. 27. The decisions of this Court point out towards the need of existence of the element of quid pro quo for imposition of fee; be it to the person concerned or be it to a group to which he belongs; irrespective of the fact as to whether the benefit of such service is received directly or indirectly. 28. The point at issue is required to be considered keeping in view the aforementioned legal position. 29. By reason of the provisions of the U.P. Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964, the trade carried out by the respondents is sought to be regulated. 30. Some service, therefore, was required to be rendered by the State or the statutory authority to the owners of the factory producing molasses or the molasses industries generally if an impost by way of ‘fee’ was to be levied.” 18. Applying the above principles to the present case, we find enumeration of obligatory and discretionary functions of the Corporation in Sections 29 and 30 under which civic services are rendered to the ratepayers for which taxes are leviable as mentioned in Section 170 of the Act. As stated above, the entire Part IV of the Act deals not only with the levy of taxes, it also deals with assessments, valuation, collection and recovery of taxes. The entire machinery for filing of returns, objections and inspection of records and properties comes under the part which deals with taxation. The maintenance of assessment books, annual reports, valuation reports, etc. all come under the part which deals with taxation. Section 183 which deals with notice of transfer also comes under the same part. The entire machinery for filing of returns, objections and inspection of records and properties comes under the part which deals with taxation. The maintenance of assessment books, annual reports, valuation reports, etc. all come under the part which deals with taxation. Section 183 which deals with notice of transfer also comes under the same part. It is true that under Section 183(5), fees are payable for mutation as may be prescribed under the regulations, still as stated above, the primary object of such a charge is to augment the revenue and the levy of such a charge cannot be treated to be a part of the regulatory measure. Further, under the Regulations, the Corporation while prescribing fees has levied fees on ad-valorem basis which is one more circumstance to show that the impugned levy is in the nature of tax and not in the nature of a fee. Further, the quantum of levy indicates that it is a tax and not a fee. The analysis of the various provisions of the Act and the impugned Regulations shows that the impugned levy is in exercise of power of taxation under the said Act to augment the revenues primarily and not as a part of regulatory measure. As stated above, the purpose of mutation is to register the transfer in the records of the Corporation which in turn would help the Corporation to recover taxes from the existing taxpayers. Therefore, no special benefit results to the transferee who is made statutorily liable to inform the Corporation of the change, if any, in the name of the person primarily liable to pay the tax. 21. Now coming to the question of challenge to the levy as arbitrary and discriminatory and violative of Article 14, we find that the functions of the Corporation with regard to mutation remain the same, whether the applicant is a transferee under a conveyance or a lessee or a beneficiary under a Will or an heir in the case of intestate succession. Once an application for mutation is made, the same is examined by the department and after hearing the objections, if any, the record is ordered to be changed. Ultimately, the exercise is for fiscal purpose. Similarly, the property valuation may be below Rs 50,000 or above Rs 2 lakhs, the function of the Corporation in making the mutation entry remains the same. Ultimately, the exercise is for fiscal purpose. Similarly, the property valuation may be below Rs 50,000 or above Rs 2 lakhs, the function of the Corporation in making the mutation entry remains the same. Similarly, whatever may be the cause of mutation, whether it is a case of transfer or devolution, the activity of mutation remains constant in all the cases. The expenses incurred in all the cases also cannot vary, whatever be the value of the property or the cause of mutation. In the circumstances, there is no reason given for charging different rates depending on the value of the property and the cause of transfer. By doing so, the incidence of the levy falls differently on persons similarly situated resulting in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Moreover, the quantum of fees is disproportionate to the so-called “services” which is one more circumstance showing arbitrariness in the levy of such imposition. So far as Article 14 is concerned, the courts in India have always examined whether the classification was based on intelligible differentia and whether the differentia had a reasonable nexus with the object of legislation. (See Om Kumar v. Union of India [ (2001) 2 SCC 386 ] .) 22. Applying the said tests to the impugned levy, we find that the levy is irrational, arbitrary, discriminatory and beyond Section 183(5) of the said 1980 Act. (Emphasis applied) The Apex Court here again elaborately considers the distinction between a fee and a tax and holds that fee can be charged only for services that are rendered. 22. On an analysis of the afore-extracted judgments of the Apex Court, it would become unmistakably clear that certain services that are rendered to the benefit of the individual upon whom the fee is charged such a fee can be charged, failing which, it would take the character of tax. “Even a rupee cannot be taken from a citizen as fee except in accordance with law.” It is on the bedrock of the principles enunciated by the Apex Court, the impugned imposts/fee are required to be considered. Therefore, each of the impugned levy is considered separately. THE KARNATAKA MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1976, ‘Act’ for short: 23. The BBMP has now imposed the impugned demands contending that they are empowered to do so under the Act and the bye-laws. Therefore, each of the impugned levy is considered separately. THE KARNATAKA MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1976, ‘Act’ for short: 23. The BBMP has now imposed the impugned demands contending that they are empowered to do so under the Act and the bye-laws. Therefore, it is germane to notice the existence of power under the Act and the validity of the bye-laws to demand the impugned fees. 23.1. The provision that empowers imposition of the aforesaid fee by the BBMP is under the Act and the Bye-laws. Section 103 of the Act reads as follows:- “103. Taxes which may be imposed.-Subject to the general or special orders of Government, a Corporation shall,- (a) Omitted. (b) at rates not exceeding those specified in this Act, levy any one or more of the following taxes:- (i) a tax on buildings or vacant lands or both situated within the city (hereinafter referred to as the property tax), ……… (vii) a duty on certain transfers of property in the shape of an additional stamp duty”. 23.2. The Act empowers the Corporation to impose tax on buildings or vacant lands or both situated within the city. Section 295 of the Act reads as under: “295. Building bye-laws.-(1) With the approval of the Government the corporation may make bye-laws,- (a) for the regulation or restriction of the use of sites or buildings, and (b) for the regulation or restriction of building. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by clause (b) of subsection (1), bye-laws made under that clause may provide,- (a) that no insanitary or dangerous site shall be used for building, and (c) for the regulation or restriction of the construction of buildings intended for public worship on sites. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by clause (b) of subsection (1), bye-laws made under that clause may provide,- (a) that no insanitary or dangerous site shall be used for building, and (c) for the regulation or restriction of the construction of buildings intended for public worship on sites. (3) Without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by clause (a) of sub section (1), bye-laws made under that clause may provide for the following matters:- (a) information and plans to be submitted together with applications for permission to build; (b) height of buildings, whether absolute or relative to the width of streets; (c) level and width of foundation, level of lowest floor and stability of structure; (d) number and height of storeys composing a building and height of rooms; (e) provision of sufficient open space, external or internal, and adequate means of ventilation; (f) provision of means of egress in case of fire; (g) provision of secondary means of access for the removal of house refuse; (h) materials and methods of construction of external and parting walls, roofs, and floors; (i) position, materials and methods of construction of hearths, smoke escapes, chimneys, staircases, privies, drains, cesspools; (j) paving of yards; (k) restrictions on the use of inflammable materials in buildings; (l) in the case of wells, dimensions of the well, the manner of enclosing it and if the well is intended for drinking purposes, the means which shall be used to prevent pollution of water. (4) Every bye-law made under subsection (1) relating to grant of licence for the construction or reconstruction of a building shall provide that planting of trees and plants in the premises shall be a condition of every licence granted for the construction or reconstruction of any such building. (5) No piece of land shall be used as a site for the construction of a building, and no building shall be constructed or reconstructed otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and of any rules or byelaws made thereunder relating to the use of building sites or the construction or reconstruction of buildings.” 23.3. This section empowers the Corporation to make bye-laws with the approval of Government. Bye laws can be made on various subjects that are enumerated in the said section. This section empowers the Corporation to make bye-laws with the approval of Government. Bye laws can be made on various subjects that are enumerated in the said section. Section 310 deals with ‘completion certificate and permission to occupy or use’ a particular building and reads as follows:- “310. Completion certificate and permission to occupy or use.-(1) Every person shall, within one month after the completion of the erection of a building or the execution of any such work, deliver or send or cause to be delivered or sent to the Commissioner at his office notice in writing of such completion, accompanied by a certificate in the form prescribed in the bye-laws signed and subscribed in the manner prescribed and shall give to the Commissioner all necessary facilities for the inspection of such buildings or of such work and shall apply for permission to occupy the building. (1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where permission is granted to any person for erection of a building having more than one floor, such person shall, within one month after completion of execution of any of the floors of such building, deliver or send or cause to be delivered or sent to the Commissioner at his office, a notice in writing of such completion accompanied by a certificate in the form prescribed in the byelaws, signed and subscribed in the manner prescribed and shall give to the Commissioner all necessary facilities for inspection of such floor of the building and may apply for permission to occupy such floor of the building. (2) No person shall occupy or permit to be occupied any such building or part of the building or use or permit to be used the building or part thereof affected by any work, until,- (a) permission has been received from the Commissioner in this behalf; or (b) the Commissioner has failed for thirty days after receipt of the notice of completion to intimate his refusal of the said permission.” 23.4. For grant of completion certificate or occupancy certificate, compliance with payment of fee imposed under the bye-laws is mandatory. Section 423 of the Act deals with ‘power to make bye-laws’ and reads as follows:- “423. For grant of completion certificate or occupancy certificate, compliance with payment of fee imposed under the bye-laws is mandatory. Section 423 of the Act deals with ‘power to make bye-laws’ and reads as follows:- “423. Power to make bye-laws.-Subject to the provisions of this Act, the rules and regulations, the Corporation may make bye-laws,- (1) for all matters expressly required or allowed by this Act to be provided for by byelaws; ……… (20) (a) for the regulation of burial and burning and other places for the disposal of corpses; (b) for the levy of fees for the use of such burial and burning grounds and crematoria as are maintained by the Corporation; (c) for the verification of deaths and the cause of death; (d) for the period for which corpses must be kept for the inspection; (e) for the period within which corpses must be conveyed to a burial or burning ground, and the mode of conveyance of corpses through public places. (Emphasis applied) The levy of fee under the Act can only be on matters allowed by the Act. What is permitted under the Act is found only in sub-section 20(b) of Section 423 (Supra), which empowers collection or levy of fee for use of such burial, burning grounds and crematoria that are maintained by the Corporation. In no other section of the Act the Corporation is empowered to levy fee. Section 443 of the Act deals with ‘General provisions regarding licences, registrations and permissions’. Here again there is no provision to charge fee. THE BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKE BUILDING BYE-LAWS, 2003: 24. The fee that is charged by the Corporation is claimed to be in terms of the bye-laws. The present byelaw that is obtaining in the Corporation is the one that is notified in the year 2003. Here again there is no provision to charge fee. THE BANGALORE MAHANAGARA PALIKE BUILDING BYE-LAWS, 2003: 24. The fee that is charged by the Corporation is claimed to be in terms of the bye-laws. The present byelaw that is obtaining in the Corporation is the one that is notified in the year 2003. Objects and reasons of Bye-laws read as follows:- “Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 295 read with Section 423 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 14 of 1977), the Bangalore Mahanagara Palike hereby makes the following bye-laws in supersession of Bangalore City Corporation Building Bye-laws, 1983 and the same is hereby published as required by clause (a) of Section 426 of the said Act, for the public inspection.” The bye-laws are made in terms of the powers conferred upon the Corporation under the Act in terms of Section 295 read with Section 423 of the Act. This bye-law is made in supersession of the earlier bye-law of the year 1983. It is at this juncture I deem it appropriate to consider every levy/fee that is imposed by the Corporation qua the corresponding power under the Act, the Rules and the Bye-laws. GROUND RENT: 25. Bye-law Nos.3.8 to 3.13 deal with ground rent and read as follows:- “3.8 Ground rent.-The ground rent for stocking of building materials on public land as prescribed by the Authority without causing obstruction to movement of vehicles and pedestrians subject to the permission of the Authority. Note.-(i) The ground rent charges shall be based on the total floor area of all the floors in the buildings. The ground rent is valid for a period of two years only. If the building is not completed and the occupancy certificate is not obtained within the period of two years, further rent is to be paid at half the rate per annum or part thereof till the building is completed. (ii) The ground rent applies only for the storing of building materials and not for any other purpose. (iii) If the public land is utilised for storing of excavated materials and debris, separate charges will have to be paid at four times the rate fixed as ground rent. 3.9 Ground rent for high rise buildings.-High rise buildings are not exempted from payment of ground rent irrespective of the setbacks and coverage. (iii) If the public land is utilised for storing of excavated materials and debris, separate charges will have to be paid at four times the rate fixed as ground rent. 3.9 Ground rent for high rise buildings.-High rise buildings are not exempted from payment of ground rent irrespective of the setbacks and coverage. 3.10 Exemptions for ground rent.-Ground rent may be exempted in the following cases, namely.- (1) individual residential bungalows with front set back of 6 metres and more with coverage of not more than 55 percent. (2) schools, colleges and other institutions with a front set back of 8 meters and more with coverage of not more than 33.33 per cent. (3) religious and cultural buildings with a front set back of 8 meters and more with coverage of not more than 45 per cent. (4) heavy industries and Government buildings with large extents of land capable of storing the building materials within the periphery of the property. Note.-Exemption shall be granted only on production of undertaking from the applicant on a stamped paper of Rs. 30 that the Corporation land, footpath and road will not be used for stocking building materials as well as depositing debris and in case of violation of this condition, they shall be liable to pay the ground rent at the normal rates in addition to the penalty of 50 % of the amount specified which will be recovered as arrears of tax on land and buildings, etc. 3.13 Revision of licence fee and ground rent.-The Licence fee and ground rent are subject to revision from time to time by the Commissioner without notice.” 25.1. Ground rent is to be imposed for stocking of building materials on public land as prescribed by the authority without causing obstruction to the movement of vehicles and pedestrians subject to prior permission of the authority. Bye-law 3.9 deals with imposition of ground rent for high rise buildings. Bye-law 3.10 exempts certain buildings for imposition of ground rent i.e., individual residential bungalows with front setback for 6 meters; schools, colleges and other institutions with setback of 8 meters; religious and cultural buildings with front set back of 8 meters; and heavy industries and Government buildings with large extents of land for storing building materials. Bye-law 3.13 deals with revision of licence fee and ground rent. 25.2. Bye-law 3.13 deals with revision of licence fee and ground rent. 25.2. Ground rent was so demanded is being demanded apart from it having no backing in the statute with blatant non-application of mind as the petitioners in most of the petitions who have their own space in the construction area to store or stock materials for construction would not be using pubic road or according to the BBMP, the roads maintained by the BBMP. Those who are stocking construction materials in their own land, without using public property/road/pavement are also made to pay ground rent as it is made a condition precedent for either licence, occupancy certificate or a plan sanction. Therefore, an individual house owner using the road for storing construction materials and the owner of multi-storied buildings/apartments storing building materials in their own land for construction cannot be treated alike for the purpose of demand of ground rent. There cannot be a better example of non-application of mind in raising the demand under the impugned levies. 25.3. Payment of ground rent was accepted and paid by citizens hitherto. What became agonizing was the circular dated 04.09.2015 whereby a revised ground rent was demanded by linking to the guidance value. It is at this juncture writ petitions galore challenging the action of the BBMP in demanding ground rent linking it to guidance value, all on the strength of a circular dated 04.09.2015 again without being backed by any statute and contrary to the legal spirit of demand of a fee being “quid pro quo”. LICENCE FEE: 26. The next component of challenge is imposition of licence fee. Bye-law Nos.3.1 to 3.7.3 deal with imposition of licence fee. Bye-law No.3.1 deals with licence to be obtained from the Corporation by those who intend to erect or re-erect a building or make material alteration, by submission of application as specified under Sections 299, 304 and 312 of the Act. For grant of a licence there are various conditions to be fulfilled as obtaining under bye-law No.3.2.10 which reads as follows: 3.2.10. Other certificates.– Certificates from the following authorities, wherever applicable. Agency In respect of 3.2.(10.1) B.D.A. (a) Commencement certificate for the change of land use in the Development Plan of Bangalore as per sections 14 & 15 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. (b)Bifurcation or amalgamation of plot as per Section 17 of KTCP Act 1961. Other certificates.– Certificates from the following authorities, wherever applicable. Agency In respect of 3.2.(10.1) B.D.A. (a) Commencement certificate for the change of land use in the Development Plan of Bangalore as per sections 14 & 15 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. (b)Bifurcation or amalgamation of plot as per Section 17 of KTCP Act 1961. (c) Approval in case of buildings permissible under special circumstances as per Schedule I. (d) Approval of layout plan in case of Group Housing Schemes where sital area of group housing exceeds 4,000 sq. mtrs. (e) In case of civic amenity site, leased out by the Bangalore Development Authority, commencement certificate under sections 14 and 15 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 for construction of the building. 3.2 (10.2) B.W.S.S.B building or group housing N.O.C. in case of high rise building or group housing. 3.2 (10.4) Fire Services Dept. N.O.C. in case of high rise building. (Bye-law 2.45 definition) 3.2(10.5) Airport Authority of India N.O.C. in case of high rise building. 3.2(10.6) Telecommunication Dept. N.O.C in case of high rise building above 7 floors. 3.2(10.7) Kar.Slum Clearance & Imp.Board N.O.C. with regard to noninterference with improvement schemes, in respect of areas notified under Section 3 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1973. 3.2(10.8) District Magistrate N.O.C. in case of permanent and/or semi permanent cinema theatres including drive-in-theaters, and petrol pumps. 3.2(10.9) Director of Fac. & Boilers N.O.C. in case of industrial buildings 3.2(10.10) Controller of Explosives N.O.C. in case of buildings proposed for storage or sale of combustible articles. 3.2(10.11) Railways N.O.C. in case of buildings abutting railway margin.” BUILDING LICENCE FEE: 27. Bye-law 3.7 deals with imposition of building licence fee and reads as follows:- “3.7. Building licence fee.-3.7.1 Every person intending to construct or reconstruct or alter any building under sections 299, 304 and 312 of the Act shall pay to the Corporation fund, the building licence fee as prescribed by the Authority subject to a minimum of Rs. 300/-(Rupees three hundred only). Provided that no licence fee shall be payable by the Central and the State Governments for the construction of buildings by them on their lands. Note.-The fixation of licence fee shall be governed by the following: (a) For re-erection of existing buildings, the fees chargeable shall be the same as for the erection of new buildings. 300/-(Rupees three hundred only). Provided that no licence fee shall be payable by the Central and the State Governments for the construction of buildings by them on their lands. Note.-The fixation of licence fee shall be governed by the following: (a) For re-erection of existing buildings, the fees chargeable shall be the same as for the erection of new buildings. (b) For additions and alterations in the existing buildings the fees shall be chargeable on the added portions only at the same rate applicable to the new building. 3.7.2. Part of the building licence fee which shall not be less than 5% of the licence fee and subject to a minimum of Rs. 50/-(Rupees fifty) only shall be paid together with the application for building licence, as scrutiny fee, which is not refundable. The balance amount of licence fee shall be paid on receipt of demand notice from the Authority. 3.7.3 Licence fee for compound wall at Rs. one only per running meter shall be paid on receipt of demand notice.” In terms of bye-law No.3.7 every person intending to construct or re-construct or alter any building under Sections 299, 304 and 312 shall pay building licence fee, minimum of which is prescribed as Rs.300/-exempting State Government related construction buildings. Bye-law Nos. 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 also deal with imposition of licence fee which is non-refundable. Therefore, the levy of licence fee in the manner that is done is again a fee which pre-supposes to be a charge for a service that is rendered and an element of quid pro quo steps in. For imposition of licence fee again in the manner that is sought by the Corporation also lacks sanction of law. The same goes with scrutiny fee. Scrutiny fee is demanded by the Corporation for scrutinizing the documents submitted for issuance of plan and completion certificate or occupancy certificate. It is submitted on line and permissions taken from all other authorities for issuance of occupancy certificate form part of scrutiny fee. 28. The defence of BBMP is that they have set up computers and several people are working on the job for grant of occupancy certificates after scrutinizing the documents, and therefore, levy on scrutiny fee is valid. This submission is unacceptable as any fee must have a sanction in law. 28. The defence of BBMP is that they have set up computers and several people are working on the job for grant of occupancy certificates after scrutinizing the documents, and therefore, levy on scrutiny fee is valid. This submission is unacceptable as any fee must have a sanction in law. As noticed hereinabove, the ground rent, licence fee and the scrutiny fee are all de hors the power under the Act. 29. The afore-narrated bye-laws are the ones that the BBMP claims to empower them to levy fee for ground rent, licence, building licence, scrutiny and demand of security deposit. Framing of building byelaws is dealt with under Sections 295 and 423. Nowhere the said sections empower framing of bye-laws empowering imposition of any fee by the Corporation. As stated hereinabove, the only place the word ‘fee’ is found in the subjects enumerated in Section 423 which deal with the power to make bye-laws is in case of burial and burning ground or a crematoria that is maintained by the Corporation. 30. Therefore, there is no power under Act to impose the impugned levies i.e., ground rent, licence fee, building licence fee, scrutiny fee and security deposit. It is trite that fee can be imposed only if there is quid pro quo. Quid pro quo in legal parlance is that ’fee’ that can be imposed for a service that is rendered. The principle of quid pro quo or a fee chargeable for a service rendered as considered by the Apex Court (supra), wherein the Apex Court has held that there should be reasonable co-relation for imposition/collection of a fee, apart from the fact that it should be with authority of law. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF FEE: 31. Levy of fee in its exclusiveness has also been a subject matter of judicial interpretation. The Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta considering drainage development fees imposed by Calcutta Municipal Corporation and others held in ASIAN LEATHER LIMITED AND OTHERS v. KOLKATA MUNICIPAL CORPORAITON AND OTHERS, (2007) SCC OnLine Cal 268 as follows:- “12. At this juncture, it will be profitable to refer to the well-known proposition of law that a natural person has the capacity to do all lawful things unless his capacity has been curtailed by some rule of law. It is equally a fundamental principle that in case of a statutory corporation, it is just the other way. At this juncture, it will be profitable to refer to the well-known proposition of law that a natural person has the capacity to do all lawful things unless his capacity has been curtailed by some rule of law. It is equally a fundamental principle that in case of a statutory corporation, it is just the other way. The Corporation has no power to do anything unless those powers are conferred on it by the statutes, which crates it. See: Manimuddin Bepari v. Chairman of the Municipal Commissioner, Dacca reported in MANU/WB/0316/1935: 40 CWN 17. …… … 14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles and after going through the various provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Regulations framed thereunder, referred to by Mr. Mitra, the learned senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant, we do not find that either in the Act or the Rules or the Regulations framed thereunder, any right or authority has been to the Corporation to realize drainage development fees from the owners of the land or the building at the time of sanction of the building plan as condition precedent for grant of permission to raise building. …… … 23. We have already indicated that unless specifically authorized by the statute, a Corporation cannot realize any amount from the citizen and so far, the delegated legislation is concerned, nothing can be implied for the justification of realization of any amount either as tax or as fees, which is not specifically authorized. 32. A Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat (Emphasis applied) again considering imposition of permission fee on installation of mobile communication towers by the Gujarat Urban Development and Urban Housing Department holds in INDUS TOWERS LIMITED v. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS, (2010) SCC OnLine Guj 3777 as follows:- “24. In this regard it may be germane to refer to the provisions of Articles 265 and 243-X of the Constitution which reads thus: 265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law. In this regard it may be germane to refer to the provisions of Articles 265 and 243-X of the Constitution which reads thus: 265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law. “No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.” (a) authorize a Municipality to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits; (b) assign to a Municipality such taxes, duties tolls and fees levied and collected by the State Government for such purposes and subject to such conditions and limits; (c) provide the making such grants-in-aid to the Municipalities from the Consolidated Fund of the State; and (c) provide for constitution of such Funds for crediting all moneys received, respectively, by or on behalf of the Municipalities and also for the withdrawal of such moneys there from, as may be specified in the law. …… … 27. Apart from Article 265 which prohibits levy or recovery of tax except by authority of law, Article 243-X specifically provides that the Legislature of a State may, by law authorize a Municipality to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance such procedure and subject to such limits as may be specified by law. Thus, on a conjoint reading of Articles 265 and 243-X, there is a prohibition against levy and recovery of tax by a Municipality unless the Legislature of the State in exercise of powers under Article 243-X authorizes the Municipality to levy and collect such taxes, fees etc. In the present case, a bare reading of the impugned Government resolution indicates that the same has not been issued in exercise of any statutory power. However, even if the statutory provision under which the power is derived is not mentioned, so long as there is some statutory provision under which such power is derived, the Government resolution would not stand vitiated. In the circumstances it would next be required to be examined as to whether there is any statutory provision which vests in the State or the Municipal Corporations or Municipalities, the power to levy and collect annual permission fees and installation charges for erection of mobile telecommunication towers put up by cellular companies. …… … 29. In the circumstances it would next be required to be examined as to whether there is any statutory provision which vests in the State or the Municipal Corporations or Municipalities, the power to levy and collect annual permission fees and installation charges for erection of mobile telecommunication towers put up by cellular companies. …… … 29. Since the levy in question is termed annual permission fee and installation charge, it may be pertinent to refer to the provisions of Chapter XXII of the BPMC Act which provides for “Licences and Permits”. The said Chapter is subdivided into nine parts as under: 1. Licensing of Surveyors, Architechs or Engineers, Structural Designers, Clerks of Works and Plumbers; 2. Trade licences and other licences for keeping animals and certain articles; 3. Licences for sale in municipal markets; 4. Licences for private markets; 5. Licences for sale of Articles of Food outside of Markets; 6. Licensing of Butchers, etc.; 7. Licensing for diary products; 8. Licences for hawking, etc.; and 9. General provisions regarding licences and permits. …… … 34. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that insofar as Municipal Corporations are concerned, the respondents have not been in a position to point out any statutory force behind the levy of annual permission fee and/or installation charges. The Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Udaipur v. McDowell and Co. Limited (supra) has held thus: “Tax”, “duty”, “cess’ or “fee” constituting a class denotes to various kinds of imposts by State in its sovereign power of taxation to raise revenue for the State. Within the expression of each specie each expression denotes different kind of impost depending on the purpose for which they are levied. This power can be exercised in any of its manifestation only under any law authorizing levy and collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 which uses only the expression that no “tax” shall be levied and collected except authorised by law. This power can be exercised in any of its manifestation only under any law authorizing levy and collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 which uses only the expression that no “tax” shall be levied and collected except authorised by law. It is its elementary meaning conveys that to support a tax legislative action is essential, it cannot be levied and collected in the absence of any legislative sanction by exercise of executive power of State under Article 73 by the Union or Ariticle 162 by the State.” In the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision cited hereinabove, it is apparent that in absence of legislative sanction, the State Government in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 cannot levy and collect annual permission fee and installation charges in relation to mobile telecommunication towers put up by Cellular companies.” (Emphasis applied) It is also germane to notice the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras in the case of SHRINE BASILICA OF OUR LADY OF HEALTH VAILANKANNI v. THE EXECUTIVE OFFICER, (1998) 2 CTC 327 interpreting power of the Municipality to levy, collect and appropriate taxes, tolls and fees, wherein it is held that it can only be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in law. 33. Therefore, the synthesis of the interpretation of a tax or a fee that can be levied by a Corporation upon its citizens as considered in the judgments (supra), would lead to an unmistakable conclusion that a fee is a charge for special service rendered to individuals by a governmental agency; the amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on expenses incurred by Government in rendering service. Fee is uniform and no account is taken of payers’ capacity. Imposition of fee can only be as a quid pro quo. The licence fee that is payable to the BBMP is for approving construction plan and issuing licence. An applicant for approval of a plan would submit a blue print of a plan prepared at his own expense along with no objection and other supporting documents as prescribed in law and the building will have to be constructed only upon a licence being given and plan being approved. Apart from the fact that there is no statutory backing for such a fee, the levy of such fee is even otherwise illegal. Apart from the fact that there is no statutory backing for such a fee, the levy of such fee is even otherwise illegal. Scrutiny fee is again charged for scrutinizing documents submitted for issuance of a licence. It is co-terminus with licence fee and therefore, would lose its legs to stand for the very same reason as that of licence fee. The other fee that is called in question is a Lake Rejuvenation Fee. LAKE REJUVENATION FEE: 34. Lake Rejuvenation Fee is imposed invoking Section 18(1)(A) of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 196117, which reads as under: “(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Planning ‘KTCP Act’ for short Authority while granting permission for development of land or building levy and collect from the owner of such land or building - (i) A Cess for the purpose of carrying out any water supply scheme; (ii) A surcharge for the purpose of formation of ring road; (iii) A Cess for the purpose of improving slums; and (iv) A surcharge for the purpose of establishing Mass Rapid Transport System at such rate but all the above levies together not exceeding one tenth of the market value of the land or building as may be prescribed ….” A bare perusal at the said Section would clearly indicate that the Planning Authority while granting permission for development of land or building, levy and collect a cess for purpose for carrying out water supply scheme, a surcharge for formation of ring road, a cess for the purpose of improving slums, a surcharge for establishing mass rapid transport system. Therefore, Section 18(1)(A) of the KTCP Act empowers the Planning Authority, which is the BDA to collect Lake Rejuvenation Fee on the circumstances narrated therein. This would not even remotely authorize the BBMP to expressly or impliedly charge or levy Lake Rejuvenation Fee. 35. It is to be noticed that Lake Rejuvenation Fee is not imposed in terms of the Act, but on the strength of a circular dated 27.01.2017. The Act itself not authorizing charge of any fee of the kind that is charged by the BBMP, the circular can hardly generate power to impose such fee. 35. It is to be noticed that Lake Rejuvenation Fee is not imposed in terms of the Act, but on the strength of a circular dated 27.01.2017. The Act itself not authorizing charge of any fee of the kind that is charged by the BBMP, the circular can hardly generate power to impose such fee. It is also to be noticed that BBMP has made the levy of Lake Rejuvenation Fee applicable to all applications coming in for a building licence and sanction of plan in terms of their circular dated 30.03.2017. Therefore, both the circulars of the Government and the BBMP would on the face of it become unenforceable as they seek to impose certain impost without any statutory backing for such imposition. LINKING THE IMPUGNED LEVY TO GUIDANCE VALUE: 36. The impugned exorbitant demands now made by the Corporation are all on the strength of certain circulars. Ground rent, licence fee, scrutiny fee, building licence fee and lake rejuvenation fee are linked to guidance value by issuing circulars dated 04.09.2015, 27.01.2017 and 30.03.2017. Guidance value of a property is a value fixed by a Committee constituted under Section 45B of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957. The said guidance value so fixed by the Committee would vary on the location of the property. There can be no relevance to determine the impugned levies made by the Corporation linking ground rent, lake rejuvenation fee, licence fee are all on the basis of the aforesaid circular dated 04.09.2015. Notwithstanding the fact that the circulars cannot seen to impose the impugned levies or link the same to the guidance value, the guidance value of property is a value fixed by a committee constituted under Section 45(b) of the Stamp Act, which is for the purpose of determining the value below which the property cannot be sold based on which registration charges and stamp duty are determined and for detection of cases of undervaluation in terms of Section 45(a) of the Stamp Act. Linking ground rent to the guidance value is of no relevance to determine impugned levies made by the Corporation. The guidance value so fixed by the Committee under the Stamp Act would without any doubt vary on the location of the property. Linking ground rent to the guidance value is of no relevance to determine impugned levies made by the Corporation. The guidance value so fixed by the Committee under the Stamp Act would without any doubt vary on the location of the property. Therefore, imposition of ground rent, linking of licence fee and scrutiny fee to the guidance value are manifestly arbitrary, as the guidance value would vary from place to place. As an illustration the guidance value in the central business district (CBD) of Bangalore has sky rocketed and the guidance value in a remote area on the out-skirts of Bangalore is at a different value which is admittedly lesser. Linking guidance value for the same purpose of imposition of ground rent would result in gross arbitrariness and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is these circulars that linked the demand of the impugned levy to the guidance value that left the citizens bleeding and the business houses fleeing. 37. At the same time it cannot be said that a citizen or any person who uses the public property, can use it without payment of any fee. The fee is chargeable for storing materials on the public property or the Corporation property, at a fee properly determined and not by the guidance value, that too after bringing in suitable amendment to the law and not under the byelaws that are now being used to impose ground rent, licence fee, scrutiny fee and security deposit. The same goes with lake rejuvenation fee that is imposed, which is also linked to guidance value, drawing an imaginary power under the KTCP Act. DEFENCE OF THE BBMP: 38. In the light of the aforesaid analysis, it is now germane to notice the defence of the BBMP in all these cases in justification of the impugned fee. The learned counsel Sri.V.Sreenidhi, representing the BBMP, seeks to justify the impugned levies taking shelter under Section 295 of the Act, with particular reference to subsection (1) (a) and (b) of Section 295. The aforesaid Section reads as follows: “295. Building bye-laws -(1) With the approval of the Government the Corporation may make bye-laws, - (a) for the regulation or restriction of the use of sites of buildings, and (b) for the regulation or restriction of building.” Sub-section (1)(a) deals with regulation or restriction of use of sites or of buildings. The aforesaid Section reads as follows: “295. Building bye-laws -(1) With the approval of the Government the Corporation may make bye-laws, - (a) for the regulation or restriction of the use of sites of buildings, and (b) for the regulation or restriction of building.” Sub-section (1)(a) deals with regulation or restriction of use of sites or of buildings. Section (1) (b) deals with regulation or restrictions of a building. It is unimaginable how the BBMP can impose the fee taking shelter under Section 295. Though Section 295 deals with the power of making bye-laws for regulation of buildings, nowhere empowers the BBMP to impose the impugned levy. The argument of the learned counsel is that funds are required for the BBMP for performing its manifold activities for the benefit of citizens, in the upkeep of roads, to maintain cleanliness of the City, computerization or digitization of all the services which is the reason for imposition/demand of impugned levy is also unacceptable for the reason that the BBMP is collecting fee for such activity under Sections 466 and 467 of the Act. Sections 466 and 467 of the Act read as follows:- “466. Power to declare expenses on certain works as improvement expenses.—If the expenses to be recovered have been incurred or are to be incurred in respect of any work mentioned,— (a) in section 189, section 225, section 227, clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 272, section 283, sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 328, section 332 section 337, section 376 or section 462; or (b) in any rule made under this Act in which this section is made applicable to such expenses, the Commissioner may, if he thinks fit and with the approval of the standing committee, declare such expenses to be improvement expenses. 467. Improvement expenses by whom payable.—(1) Improvement expenses shall be a charge on the premises, in respect of which or for the benefit of which the same shall have been incurred and shall be recoverable in instalments of such amounts, and at such intervals, as will suffice to discharge such expenses together with interest thereon within such period not exceeding twenty years as the Commissioner may in each case determine. (2) The said instalments shall be payable by the owner or occupier of the premises on which the expenses are charged: Provided that when the occupier pays any such instalment he shall be entitled to deduct the amount thereof from the rent payable by him to the owner or to recover the same from the owner.” The aforesaid provision of the Act empowers improvement charges to be collected from citizens by the BBMP which is being collected at rates specified from time to time. It is under these provisions of law improvement charges are being collected from citizens. Therefore, the argument that the City has to be kept clean, roads have to be kept in order and for other manifold activities all the levies are valid as they to into the BBMP’s fund and the fund is regulated under the Act are all rendered unsustainable as power under the Act for imposition of such levy being unavailable. Linking the impugned levies to the guidance value, as stated hereinabove, has led the citizens bleeding. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, the argument advanced by the BBMP for justification of any of the impugned levies to the extent indicated and considered in this order, are unacceptable. 39. Insofar as the judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the BBMP is concerned, the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF BIHAR V. BIHAR DISTILLERY LTD., (1997) 2 SCC 453 holds as follows: “17. Now coming to the reasoning in the impugned judgment, we must say with all respect that we have not been able to appreciate it. The approach of the court, while examining the challenge to the constitutionality of an enactment, is to start with the presumption of constitutionality. The court should try to sustain its validity to the extent possible. It should strike down the enactment only when it is not possible to sustain it. The court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting, much less inexactitude of language employed. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. Indeed, any such defects of drafting should be ironed out as part of the attempt to sustain the validity/constitutionality of the enactment. After all, an Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with. The unconstitutionality must be plainly and clearly established before an enactment is declared as void. The same approach holds good while ascertaining the intent and purpose of an enactment or its scope and application. Now, the result of the impugned judgment is that the Amending Act has become an exercise in futility — a purposeless piece of legislation. And this result has been arrived at by pointing out some drafting errors and some imperfection in the language employed. If only the High Court had looked into the minutes of the meeting dated 15-12-1989 and the two letters of the Commissioner aforementioned, it would have become clear that the Amending Act was doing no more than repeating contents of the said letters and placing the legislative imprimatur on them. As the impugned judgment itself suggests, part of the imperfection of language is perhaps attributable to translation from Hindi to English. Indeed, it is surprising that the Court has not even referred to the long preamble to the Act which clearly sets out the context and purpose of the said enactment. It was put in at such length only with a view to aid the interpretation of its provisions. It was not done without a purpose. To call the entire exercise a mere waste is, to say the least, most unwarranted besides being uncharitable. The court must recognize the fundamental nature and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it, just as the legislature and the executive are expected to show due regard and deference to the judiciary. It cannot also be forgotten that our Constitution recognises and gives effect to the concept of equality between the three wings of the State and the concept of “checks and balances” inherent in such scheme. Following the judgment in the case of BIHAR DISTILLERY, the Apex Court in the case of BHANUMATI V. STATE OF U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 1 has held as follows: “82. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. [ (1997) 2 SCC 453 ] this Court in SCC para 17 at p. 466 : JT para 18 at pp. Following the judgment in the case of BIHAR DISTILLERY, the Apex Court in the case of BHANUMATI V. STATE OF U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 1 has held as follows: “82. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. [ (1997) 2 SCC 453 ] this Court in SCC para 17 at p. 466 : JT para 18 at pp. 865-66 of the Report laid down certain principles on how to judge the constitutionality of an enactment. This Court held that in this exercise the Court should: (a) try to sustain validity of the impugned law to the extent possible. It can strike down the enactment only when it is impossible to sustain it; (b) the Court should not approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or to search for defects of drafting or for the language employed; (c) the Court should consider that the Act made by the legislature represents the will of the people and that cannot be lightly interfered with; (d) the Court should strike down the Act only when the unconstitutionality is plainly and clearly established; (e) the Court must recognise the fundamental nature and importance of legislative process and accord due regard and deference to it. This Court abstracted those principles from various judgments of this Court. 83. In State of Bihar [ (1997) 2 SCC 453 ] this Court also considered the observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher [(1949) 2 KB 481 : (1949) 2 All ER 155 (CA)] and highlighted that the job of a judge in construing a statute must proceed on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament and this must be done (a) not only from the language of the statute but also (b) upon consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it (c) and also of the mischief to remedy which the statute was passed and if necessary (d) the judge must supplement the written word so as to give “force and life” to the intention of the legislature. According to Lord Denning these are the principles laid down in Heydon case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] and is considered one of the safest guides today. This Court also accepted those principles. According to Lord Denning these are the principles laid down in Heydon case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] and is considered one of the safest guides today. This Court also accepted those principles. (See Bihar Distillery Ltd. case [ (1997) 2 SCC 453 ], SCC para 20 at p. 468 : JT para 21 at p. 867 of the Report.) 84. Reliance was also placed on another decision of this Court in Dharam Dutt v. Union of India [ (2004) 1 SCC 712 ]. This judgment is relevant in order to deal with the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that in reducing the period for bringing the no-confidence motion from “two years” to “one year” and then in reducing the required majority from 2/3rd to simple majority, the legislature was guided by the sinister motive of some influential Ministers to get rid of a local leader who, as a Pradhan of Panchayat, may have become very powerful and competitor of the Minister in the State. 85. In Dharam Dutt [ (2004) 1 SCC 712 ] this Court held that if the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. If the legislature has competence, the question of motive does not arise at all and any inquiry into the motive which persuaded Parliament into passing the Act would be of no use at all.” The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF U.P. V. VAM ORGANIC CHEMICALS LTD., (2004) 1 SCC 225 has held as follows: “30. The locus classicus on the distinction between a “fee” and a “tax” is the decision of this Court in Commr., H.R.E. v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [ AIR 1954 SC 282 : 1954 SCR 1005 ] . In that case the subject-matter of challenge was, inter alia, Section 76 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 under which religious institutions were required to make a contribution at 5 per cent of their income towards the services rendered by the Government and its officers. According to the State this annual contribution was a fee for overseeing the working of the religious institutions. According to the religious institutions, the levy was a tax which the State was incompetent to impose. 31. According to the State this annual contribution was a fee for overseeing the working of the religious institutions. According to the religious institutions, the levy was a tax which the State was incompetent to impose. 31. The distinctive characteristics of a tax and fee were laid down. As far as fee is concerned, it was held that: (AIR p. 295, para 44) “[A] fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay…. These are undoubtedly some of the general characteristics, but as there may be various kinds of fees, it is not possible to formulate a definition that would be applicable to all cases.” (emphasis supplied) 33. This Court struck down Section 76 on the ground that the annual contribution was a tax as there was “total absence of any correlation between the expenses incurred by the Government and the amount raised by contribution under the provision of Section 76 and in these circumstances the theory of a return or counter payment or ‘quid pro quo’ cannot have any possible application to this case” (AIR p. 296, para 49). (emphasis supplied) 34. The word “service” in the context of a fee could, therefore, include, a levy for a compulsory measure undertaken vis-à-vis the payer in the interest of the public. This “coercive” measure has been subsequently judicially clarified to mean a “regulatory measure”. But in the case of both kinds of services, whether compulsorily imposed or voluntarily accepted, there would have to be a correlation between the levy imposed and the “counter payment or quid pro quo”. However, correlation ship between the levy and the services rendered is one of general character and not of mathematical exactitude. All that is necessary is that there should be a reasonable “relationship” between levy of the fee and the service rendered. [Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P., (1983) 4 SCC 353 ] Contrariwise when there is no such correlation, the levy, despite its nomenclature is in fact a tax. In Corpn. All that is necessary is that there should be a reasonable “relationship” between levy of the fee and the service rendered. [Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P., (1983) 4 SCC 353 ] Contrariwise when there is no such correlation, the levy, despite its nomenclature is in fact a tax. In Corpn. of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema [ AIR 1965 SC 1107 ] the licence fee charged under Section 548 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 had been challenged on the ground that no service was rendered commensurate with the tax. This Court said that the levy was a tax which the State was competent to impose: (AIR pp. 1116-17, para 20) “[The Act does not provide for any services of special kind being rendered resulting in benefits to the person on whom it is imposed. The work of inspection done by the Corporation which is only to see that the terms of the licence are observed by the licensee is not a service to him. No question here arises of correlating the amount of the levy to the costs of any service. The levy is a tax. It is not disputed, it may be stated, that if the levy is not a fee, it must be a tax.” (emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid judgment the Apex Court has impliedly overruled BIHAR DISTILLERY and has clearly held that the element of quid pro quo cannot be diluted in the charge of a fee, failing which, it would become imposition of tax and not a fee. The aforesaid judgment considers the judgments on the issue and follows SIRUR MUTT and LIBERTY CINEMA (supra). The subsequent judgment relied on by the learned counsel with regard to constitutionality would not be applicable to the facts of the case at hand as it followed BIHAR DISTILLERY which stands impliedly overruled in the judgment (supra). 40. As held by the Apex Court in the case of AHMEDABAD URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (supra), imposition of a tax or a fee by a delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. The authority must act strictly within the parameters of the Act. The theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power, as submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the BBMP cannot be accepted. The authority must act strictly within the parameters of the Act. The theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power, as submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the BBMP cannot be accepted. LABOUR CESS UNDER THE WELFARE CESS ACT: 41. The issue that remains for consideration is imposition of labour cess in terms of the statute. Writ Petition No.8849 of 2020 among other cases is taken up for consideration in so far as it pertains to labour cess, which is called in question in several of the writ petitions. The demand for labour cess is under the Welfare Cess Act and the Rules framed there under. The Welfare Cess Act was promulgated for levy and collection of cess on the cost of construction incurred by employers with a view to augmenting resources of the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Boards constituted under the Welfare Cess Act. Certain provisions in the Welfare Cess Act that are germane for consideration in the subject lis are extracted hereunder for the purpose of quick reference: “3. Levy and collection of cess.—(1) There shall be levied and collected a cess for the purposes of the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 at such rate not exceeding two per cent. but not less than one per cent. of the cost of construction incurred by an employer, as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time specify. (2) The cess levied under sub-section (1) shall be collected from every employer in such manner and at such time, including deduction at source in relation to a building or other construction work of a Government or of a public sector undertaking or advance collection through a local authority where an approval of such building or other construction work by such local authority is required, as may be prescribed. (3) The proceeds of the cess collected under sub-section (2) shall be paid by the local authority or the State Government collecting the cess to the Board after deducting the cost of collection of such cess not exceeding one per cent. of the amount collected. (3) The proceeds of the cess collected under sub-section (2) shall be paid by the local authority or the State Government collecting the cess to the Board after deducting the cost of collection of such cess not exceeding one per cent. of the amount collected. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the cess leviable under this Act including payment of such cess in advance may, subject to final assessment to be made, be collected at a uniform rate or rates as may be prescribed on the basis of the quantum of the building or other construction work involved. …… … 5. Assessment of cess.—(1) The officer or authority to whom or to which the return has been furnished under section 4 shall, after making or causing to be made such inquiry as he or it thinks fit and after satisfying himself or itself that the particulars stated in the return are correct, by order, assess the amount of cess payable by the employer. (2) If the return has not been furnished to the officer or authority under sub-section (2) of section 4, he or it shall, after making or causing to be made such inquiry as he or it thinks fit, by order, assess the amount of cess payable by the employer. (3) An order of assessment made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall specify the date within which the cess shall be paid by the employer. …… … 8. Interest payable on delay in payment of cess.—If any employer fails to pay any amount of cess payable under section 3 within the time specified in the order of assessment, such employer shall be liable to pay interest on the amount to be paid at the rate of two per cent. for every month or part of a month comprised in the period from the date on which such payment is due till such amount is actually paid. …… … 11. Appeals.—(1) Any employer aggrieved by an order of assessment made under section 5 or by an order imposing penalty made under section 9 may, within such time as may be prescribed, appeal to such appellate authority in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) Every appeal preferred under subsection (1) shall be accompanied by such fees as may be prescribed. (2) Every appeal preferred under subsection (1) shall be accompanied by such fees as may be prescribed. (3) After the receipt of any appeal under sub-section (1), the appellate authority shall, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard in the matter, dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible. (4) Every order passed in appeal under this section shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court of law. …… … 14. Power to make rules.—(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the provisions of this Act. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:— (a) the manner in which and the time within which the cess shall be collected under sub-section (2) of section 3; (b) the rate or rates of advance cess leviable under sub-section (4) of section 3; (c) the particulars of the returns to be furnished, the officer or authority to whom or to which such returns shall be furnished and the manner and time of furnishing such returns under sub-section (1) of section 4; (d) the powers which may be exercised by the officer or authority under section 7; (e) the authority which may impose penalty under section 9; (f) the authority to which an appeal may be filed under sub-section (1) of section 11 and the time within which and the form and manner in which such appeal may be filed; (g) the fees which shall accompany an appeal under sub-section (2) of section 11; and (h) any other matter which has to be, or may be, prescribed. (3) Every rule made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification 5 in the rule or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule.” Section 3 of the Welfare Cess Act deals with levy and collection of cess and mandates that cess shall be levied and collected under the Welfare Cess Act at such rate not exceeding 2% but not less than 1% of the cost of construction incurred by the employer as the Central Government or the State Government may specify in this behalf from time to time. 42. The cess levied under sub-section (1) is to be collected from every employer. Two modes of collection are envisaged under sub-section (2). Deduction at source in relation to a building or other construction work of a Government or of a public sector undertaking or advance collection through a local authority where an approval of such building or other construction by such local authority is required, as may be prescribed. The local authority which is empowered to collect cess in terms of the Welfare Cess Act is the BBMP in the case at hand. Under sub-section (3) the proceeds of cess collected is to be paid by the local authority or the State Government who has collected the cess to the Board after collecting the cost of collection of such cess not exceeding 1% of the amount so collected. 43. The assessment of cess is dealt with under Section 5 of the Welfare Cess Act. Section 8 deals with interest payable on delay in payment of cess. Any dispute with regard to the assessment of cess under Section 5 or imposition of interest or penalty under Sections 8 and 9 is appealable under Section 11. 43. The assessment of cess is dealt with under Section 5 of the Welfare Cess Act. Section 8 deals with interest payable on delay in payment of cess. Any dispute with regard to the assessment of cess under Section 5 or imposition of interest or penalty under Sections 8 and 9 is appealable under Section 11. Section 14 of the Welfare Cess Act empowers the Government to make Rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act. The Rules are to be made with regard to the manner and the time within which cess shall be paid and collected under sub-section (2) of Section 3 (supra). 44. In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 14 rules have been framed by the Central Government viz., the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Rules, 1998 (for short ‘the Cess Rules’). Rule 3 deals with levy of cess for collection to be made under Section 3 of the Welfare Cess Act. Relevant rules for the purpose of lis are Rules 3, 4, 8 and 11 which are extracted hereunder for the purpose of ready reference: “3. Levy of cess.-For the purpose of levy of cess under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act, cost of construction shall include all expenditure incurred by an employer in connection with the building or other construction work but shall not include— cost of land; any compensation paid or payable to a worker or his kin under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. 4. Time and manner of collection.- (1) The cess levied under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Act shall be paid by an employer, within thirty days of completion of the construction project or within thirty days of the date on which assessment of cess payable is finalised, whichever is earlier, to the cess collector. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule (1), where the duration of the project or construction work exceeds one year, cess shall be paid within thirty days of completion of one year from the date of commencement of work and every year thereafter at the notified rates on the cost of construction incurred during the relevant period. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule (1), where the duration of the project or construction work exceeds one year, cess shall be paid within thirty days of completion of one year from the date of commencement of work and every year thereafter at the notified rates on the cost of construction incurred during the relevant period. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2), where the levy of cess pertains to building and other construction work of a Government or of a Public Sector Undertaking, such Government or the Public Sector Undertaking shall deduct or cause to be deducted the cess payable at the notified rates from the bills paid for such works. (4) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule (1) and sub-rule (2), where the approval of a construction work by a local authority is required, every application for such approval shall be accompanied by a crossed demand draft in favour of the Board and payable at the station at which the Board is located for an amount of cess payable at the notified rates on the estimated cost of construction: Provided that if the duration of the project is likely to exceed one year, the demand draft may be for the amount of cess payable on cost of construction estimated to be incurred during one year from the date of commencement and further payments of cess due shall be made as per the provisions of sub-rule (2). (5) An employer may pay in advance an amount of cess calculated on the basis of the estimated cost of construction along with the notice of commencement of work under section 46 of the Main Act by a crossed demand draft in favour of the Board and payable at the station at which the Board is located: Provided that if the duration of the project is likely to exceed one year, the demand draft may be for the amount of cess payable on cost of construction estimated to be incurred during one year from the date of such commencement and further payment of cess due shall be made as per the provisions of sub-rule (2). (6) Advance cess paid under sub-rules (3), (4) and (5), shall be adjusted in the final assessment made by the Assessing Officer. …… … 8. (6) Advance cess paid under sub-rules (3), (4) and (5), shall be adjusted in the final assessment made by the Assessing Officer. …… … 8. Return of overpaid cess.—(1) Where the Assessing Officer has passed an order of assessment and the employer decides to withdraw from or foreclose The Building and other construction workers’ Welfare Cess Rules, 19981 works or modifies the plan of construction thereby reducing the cost of construction undertaken or has been forced by other circumstances to call off the completion of the work undertaken, he may seek revision of the assessment order by making an information in Form II to the Assessing Officer giving details of such reduction or stoppage of work. (2) Revision of order of assessment shall be made by the Assessing Officer, in the same manner as the original order, within thirty days of receipt of such information in Form II. (3) Following the revision of assessment as per sub-rule (2), the Assessing Officer shall, wherever necessary, endorse a copy of the revised assessment to the Board or cess collector, as the case may be, for making the refund of excess cess as ordered in the revised assessment. (4) The Board shall, within thirty days of receipt of the endorsement from the Assessing Officer under sub-rule (3), refund the amount specified in the order to the employer through a demand draft payable at the station where the establishment is located. (5) Where the Appellate Authority has modified the order of assessment reducing the amount of cess, refund shall be made within such time as may be specified in that order. …… … 11. Date of payment.—Date of payment of cess shall be the date on which the amount is deposited with the cess collector under sub-rule (1) of rule 4, or the date of deduction at source under sub-rule (3) of rule 4, or the date on which the draft has been deposited with the local authority under sub-rule (4) of rule 4, as the case may be.” In terms of Rule 4 which deals with time and manner of collection of cess it clearly depicts that cess is to be paid where duration of the project or construction work exceeds one year within 30 days of completion of one year from the date of commencement of the work. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 4 directs that an employer may pay in advance an amount of cess calculated on the basis of estimated cost of construction along with the notice of commencement of work. 45. Therefore, two directions emerge from sub-rules (2), (4) and (5) of Rule 4. The cess levied under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act is to be paid by the employer within 30 days of completion of construction or the project or within 30 days on which the assessment of cess is finalized, whichever is earlier to the Cess Collector. Sub-rule (2) begins with a non obstante clause reading notwithstanding the provisions of sub-rule (2) where the duration of the project exceeds one year, the cess can be paid within one month of completion of one year from the date of commencement of work. Sub-rule (4) which again begins with a non-obstante clause mandates that notwithstanding sub-rules (1) and (2) where approval of a construction work by a local authority is required, every application for such approval shall be accompanied by a crossed demand draft in favour of the Board. The amount of cess payable is at the notified rates on the estimated cost of construction. 46. Therefore, whatever sub-rules (1) and (2) have given is taken away by sub-rule (4). At the time when the application is submitted to the BBMP for approval it should contain a demand draft of the amount of cess payable at the notified rates on the estimated cost of construction. Therefore, it is under this provision the BBMP, being a local authority, is empowered to demand labour cess at the notified rate. Sub-rule (4) is accompanied with a proviso. 47. The proviso to sub-rule (4) mandates that if the duration of the project is likely to exceed one year, the demand draft may be for the amount of cess payable on the cost of construction incurred during one year from the date of commencement and payment of cess that would fall due in terms of sub-rule (2). Therefore, the proviso though permits demand of cess from the hands of BBMP it does not mandate payment upfront in advance at a time when application for approval is made. Sub-rule (5) makes it directory and not mandatory as it reads an employer may pay in advance an amount of cess calculated on the basis of estimated cost of construction. 48. Sub-rule (5) makes it directory and not mandatory as it reads an employer may pay in advance an amount of cess calculated on the basis of estimated cost of construction. 48. Rule 8 deals with return of overpaid cess. Rule 11 mandates date of payment. In terms of Rule 11 the date of payment of cess shall be the date on which the amount is deposited in terms of the aforesaid Rules with the local authority. In terms of the afore-narrated provisions of the Welfare Cess Act and the Cess Rules, the impugned demand is required to be noticed and considered. The notice of demand in the case at hand is dated 12.06.2020. The labour cess along with other imposts that is demanded is Rs.2,17,047-00. Subsection (3) of Section 3 of the Welfare Cess Act provides for deducting the cost of collection of cess not exceeding one per cent of the amount collected by the local authority. The contention of the petitioners in so far as labour cess is concerned that it is demanded upfront which is contrary to the Welfare Cess Act and the Cess Rules as the BBMP has included the said demand in the list of imposts for upfront payment of the entire amount of labour cess is contrary to the Welfare Cess Act and the Cess Rules. 49. The contention of the Government Advocate that the petitioners have to file an appeal in so far as it concerns labour cess is misconceived. The demand of cess upfront by the BBMP at the time when approval is to be given for construction of a building, though in the first blush, looks to be in terms of the Welfare Cess Act, the proviso to the Welfare Cess Act dilutes and makes it directory for the employer to pay the cess in advance or to pay the cess 30 days after completion of one year from the date of commencement of work. Therefore, the demand of upfront labour cess in the impugned order is unenforceable against the petitioners, for it being contrary to the Act. 50. The demand now made is undoubtedly payable by the petitioners but on completion of one year of the project within 30 days of such completion which is the mandate of the Welfare Cess Act and is to be strictly adhered to. 50. The demand now made is undoubtedly payable by the petitioners but on completion of one year of the project within 30 days of such completion which is the mandate of the Welfare Cess Act and is to be strictly adhered to. Moreover, in the light of the fact that Rule 7 of the Rules mandates the employer to provide details of estimated cost of construction in Form No.I and the Assessing Officer would pass an order of assessment. A conjoint reading of Rules 4 and 7 makes it unmistakably clear that the local authority may either within 30 days of completion of the project or within 30 days from the date of assessment of cess payable is finalized, whichever is earlier, shall pay cess to the Cess Collector. 51. The justification of Government for upfront demand of cess of one percent of the estimated cost is on the strength of two Government orders dated 18-01-2007 and 26-02-2007 which are issued in furtherance of the Act and the Rules. The Government orders which are issued in furtherance of the Act and the Rules cannot run counter to the Act and the Rules. The mandate of the Act or the Rules cannot be taken away by Government orders. The offending portion of the Government order dated 18.01.2007 reads as follows:- “(c) Where the approval of the construction work by local authority is required, all local authorities mainly Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, and all City Corporations, Municipal Corporations and Town Municipalities, Panchayats etc., shall obtain estimated cost of the construction along with building plans, which are submitted for approval by concerned employees i.e., owners/ contractors/builders etc., such bodies shall collect upfront an amount of 1% of the estimated cost furnished along with building plans, and remit by way of crossed demand draft payable in favour of Karnataka State Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Board, along with forwarding letter within 30 days in terms of Rules 5(3) of the Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Rules, 1998. The local bodies before remitting the amount of cess of the board can deduct 1% of the total amount collected for meeting their administrative expenses.” The said clause of the Government order is modified by issuance of corrigendum dated 28-02-2007 which reads as follows:- “In order portion of the G.O.No.LD 300 LET 2006 dated xx 2007, the para No.(c) is deleted and the following para is substituted: (c) “Where the approval of the construction work by local authority is required, all local authorities mainly Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, and all City Corporations, Municipal Corporations and Town Municipalities, Panchayats etc.; shall obtain estimated cost of the construction along with building plans, which are submitted for approval by concerned employers i.e., owners/ contractors/builders etc.; such bodies shall collect by way of demand draft in favour of Karnataka State Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Board upfront an amount of 1% of the estimated cost furnished along with building plans, and remit the demand draft to the Karnataka State Building and Other Construction Workers Welfare Board along with forwarding letter within 30 days in terms of Rules 5(3) of the Cess Rules, 1998. The Board shall give back 1% of such total collection to the local body for the services rendered.” It is this Government Order that is the fly in the ointment as a demand upfront is made by the State through the BBMP for payment of cess. This runs completely counter to the Act and the Rules which empower demand of cess. The charging provisions are Section 3 and Rule 3 of the Act and Rules respectively, which no where mandate that payment of labour cess should be paid upfront. It is the Government order dated 28.02.2007 which generates such demand. Since the impugned Government order runs counter to the Act and the Rules, it is rendered unenforceable. Therefore, the petitioners are not required to pay labour cess upfront before construction takes place but would not escape such payment as mandated under the Act and as such the demand of labour cess by the BBMP at 1% being valid but the demand of it upfront is invalid. REFUND: 52. Therefore, the petitioners are not required to pay labour cess upfront before construction takes place but would not escape such payment as mandated under the Act and as such the demand of labour cess by the BBMP at 1% being valid but the demand of it upfront is invalid. REFUND: 52. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in particular, the learned counsel in W.P.No.36017/2018 Ms.Nayantara would vehemently argue that if the impugned levies are without authority of law, the petitioners are entitled to a refund and would place reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of U.P.POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD VS. KANORIA AND OTHERS, AIR 2001 SC 787 and in the case of SREE DIGVIJAY CEMENTS COMPANY AND OTHERS VS. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 2003 SC 767 . Though in terms of the judgments relied on by the learned counsel would at the first blush look acceptable, the facts of the case that went into rendering of the aforesaid judgments will have to be considered and if considered, they are distinguishable without much ado. Therefore, a blanket refund cannot be the consequence in the peculiar facts of the case at hand. 53. Holding the impugned demands to be illegal will not preclude or be an impediment for the legislature to bring out suitable legislation for imposition of the said demands. This is in the light of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Wireless -TT Info Services Ltd. and Others V. State of Karnataka and Others, 2012 (3) Kar.LJ 302 “2. The learned Single Judge though has accepted the contention that there is no provision to collect the permission fee and installation charges in respect of communication towers has thereafter held that the structure viz., the telecommunication tower answers the definition of ‘building’ as defined under Section 2(3) and 2(1-A) of the respective Acts. Though the demand notices were quashed, the learned Single Judge was of the view that the quantified amount as fixed by the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike is to be adopted by the other local bodies. A further direction was also issued for framing such law/rules in this regard. The petitioners claiming to be aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge are before this Court in these intra-Court appeals. 14. A further direction was also issued for framing such law/rules in this regard. The petitioners claiming to be aggrieved by the decision of the learned Single Judge are before this Court in these intra-Court appeals. 14. Further in the case of Indus Towers Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (2010-GHJ-24-329) relied on by the appellants, the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat was seized of an identical situation as in the case on hand wherein there was no specific provision for imposing tax on telecommunication equipment, but it had been considered as a ‘building’ and the regulations were enforced, in fact in that case, in the absence of provision in the Act, which is a requirement under Article 265 of the Constitution of India a Government resolution had been issued in exercise of powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India providing for such regulations. The validity of the same had arisen for consideration. The Court after adverting to all aspects of the matter and also keeping in view the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court had quashed the same. However, in the course of the judgment, the Court observed that it would be open for the legislature to make such amendments in the Acts making provision for bringing the technological advances within the purview of the Act. We are in agreement and subscribe to the said view, as otherwise it would not be permissible for the local authorities to regulate, levy and collect taxes or fees in respect of mobile telecommunication towers/posts under the presently subsisting charging section of the Acts under consideration. 15. Having arrived at the above conclusion, the next aspect for consideration is as to whether the learned Single Judge was justified in the instant case in holding that the appellants are liable to pay tax of Rs. 12,000/-p.a. per mobile tower till appropriate Rules are framed for levying taxes on mobile towers by adopting the Rules stated to have been framed by the Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BBMP). Though we do not propose to express any opinion about the validity or otherwise of the Regulations stated to have been framed by the BBMP as the same do not arise for consideration herein, we are of the opinion that the course adopted by the learned Single Judge is not justified in law. 16. Though we do not propose to express any opinion about the validity or otherwise of the Regulations stated to have been framed by the BBMP as the same do not arise for consideration herein, we are of the opinion that the course adopted by the learned Single Judge is not justified in law. 16. The decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred supra is categorical that the tax cannot be levied in the absence of express provision to do so. If there is a void, it is for the legislature to remedy the situation. It is also the well-settled position of law that it is not for the Courts either to legislate or direct the legislature to enact the law in any particular manner. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh v. A parent of a Student of Medical College, Shimla (AIR 1985 SC 010); S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (SMI) ( 2007 (3) SCC 169 ) and Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass ( 2008 (1) SCC 683 ) relied on by the learned senior counsel for the appellants wherein the said position has been succinctly stated. Hence, in the absence of the fiscal demands being backed by law on the subject, tills Court would strike down the same. It is for the legislature to take into consideration all aspects and enact such law as it deems fit in its wisdom.” (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid judgment, it is for the legislature to bring about appropriate law to demand any kind of fee that is now demanded. EPILOGUE: Ergo, on an anatomy of the plethora of judgments of the Apex Court, this Court and other constitutional Courts qua the facts obtaining in the case at hand, the impugned demands made by the BBMP to the extent considered would all be unenforceable in the existing incarnation as they are ultravires the Act. As a logical sequitur, I hold, that the imposition of the impugned imposts is impossible to be countenanced. For the praedictus reasons, I pass the following: ORDER (a) All the Writ Petitions are allowed. (b) The bye-laws under which Ground Rent, Licence Fee, Building Licence Fee, Scrutiny Fee, Security Deposit are all held ultravires the Act and are resultantly rendered unenforceable. For the praedictus reasons, I pass the following: ORDER (a) All the Writ Petitions are allowed. (b) The bye-laws under which Ground Rent, Licence Fee, Building Licence Fee, Scrutiny Fee, Security Deposit are all held ultravires the Act and are resultantly rendered unenforceable. (c) The Circular bearing No. xxxxxxx dated 04.09.2015 stands quashed. (d) The Circular bearing No. xxxxxxxxxxxx dated 27.01.2017 and the Circular bearing No. xxxxxxxxxx dated 30.03.2017 demanding Lake Rejuvenation Fee are quashed. (e) Imposition of labour cess under the Welfare Cess Act is upheld, but its demand for payment upfront in terms of Government Orders dated 18.01.2007 and 28.02.2007 stands quashed. (f) The State or the BBMP is not precluded from bringing in the impugned levies under the provisions of the Act or the Rules by making suitable amendments to the Act and the Rules. (g) Petitioners in all these petitions who have deposited certain amounts in terms of the interim order passed by this Court before this Court are entitled to refund of the amounts so deposited. (h) Insofar as refund in other cases who have paid to the Corporation under protest, they shall be entitled to such refund only if the same is not collected from the consumers of the apartments, businesses as the case would be. (i) Insofar as all other payments made, they would all be at liberty to give representation to the BBMP and the BBMP would consider the refund of the amounts, in accordance with law and the findings of this Court. (j) If representations are made by the petitioners for refund, the BBMP shall pass appropriate orders within 12 weeks from the date of such representations. In view of disposal of the petitions, all pending Interlocutory Applications also stand disposed.