JUDGMENT : The unsuccessful plaintiff is the appellant. The appellant and the respondents are natural brothers. They are sons of Sri Narayudu. 2. The dispute is in respect of a site of Ac.0-02 cents at Pithapuram within the boundaries mentioned in the plaint schedule. It shall be referred to hereinafter as ‘the suit site’, for convenience. 3. The case of the appellant is that he purchased the suit site under a registered sale deed dated 22.07.1958 and that he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same ever since. He further contended that the respondents without any manner of right, threatened to trespass into the suit site. It is also the contention of the appellant that he constructed a thatched house in this site where he used to reside, for which he was paying municipal taxes time to time. He further claimed that this house collapsed and therefore the site remained vacant. In those circumstances, the appellant claimed that he was constrained to lay the suit for perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit site. 4. The respondents resisted this claim of the appellant and a written statement was filed on behalf of the respondents 2 and 3. They contended that they are co-owners of the suit site and that they were in occupation of two separate portions in that house, when living along with the appellant. Denying that this site was purchased absolutely by the appellant under the sale deed dated 22.07.1958, they further contended that this site was purchased by their father in the name of the appellant since he was eldest among his children. Thus they contended that with the funds pooled up with the joint efforts of all of them this property was purchased in the name of the appellant with the understanding that it is for the benefit of all the brothers. Thus they claimed that it belonged to all of them. They further contended that all of them got constructed a thatched house with their joint funds and a part of it stood collapsed. 5. The respondents further contended that under the guise of ex parte injunction obtained, the appellant was proclaiming to remove the remaining portion of the thatched house. Thus they claimed that it belonged to all of them. They further contended that all of them got constructed a thatched house with their joint funds and a part of it stood collapsed. 5. The respondents further contended that under the guise of ex parte injunction obtained, the appellant was proclaiming to remove the remaining portion of the thatched house. Thus questioning the very maintainability of the suit and claiming a share in the suit site, the respondents contended that the appellant is not entitled for the relief as sought against them. 6. On the pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues : “1. Whether the plaintiff has got title and possession of the plaint schedule property exclusively? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction ? 3. To what relief?” 7. The parties went to trial, where the appellant examined himself as P.W.1 while relying on Ex.A1 to Ex.A12. The respondents 2 and 4 examined themselves as D.W.1 and D.W.2 respectively and D.W.3 is the Advocate Commissioner appointed in the suit. They relied on Ex.B1 to Ex.B6 as well as Ex.C1 to Ex.C3 in support of their contention. 8. On the material and the evidence, the learned trial Judge agreed with the contention of the respondents and did not favour to grant relief in favour of the appellant, leading to dismissal of the suit. 9. In the appeal, the appellant was not successful, where the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge were accepted confirming the decree and judgment. 10. In these circumstances, this second appeal is presented. 11. This second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the burden is on the defendants to establish that the plaint schedule is joint family property to non-suit the plaintiff? 2. Whether there is any property held by a member of a joint family is joint family property?” 12. It is desirable to consider both these substantial questions of law raised by the appellant, since the material on record requires consideration for this purpose together. 13. In a suit for permanent injunction, it is the burden of the plaintiff to establish his claim against the respondents making out his lawful right and interest as well as possession of the property in dispute. He cannot in any manner rely on the weakness or laches in the case set up by the defendants. 13. In a suit for permanent injunction, it is the burden of the plaintiff to establish his claim against the respondents making out his lawful right and interest as well as possession of the property in dispute. He cannot in any manner rely on the weakness or laches in the case set up by the defendants. This settled position of law will not alter even in cases where defences of such nature as a co-owner, claiming a share in the property in dispute or a person in legal or juridical settled possession of such property when he is claiming adverse interest against the plaintiff. 14. Having regard to this limited scope of the dispute in this case, it is desirable to consider the nature of possession and enjoyment of the suit site. 15. The suit site undisputedly stood in the name of the appellant and a title deed in respect of it dated 22.07.1958 stood in his name. It is the original of Ex.A1, the recitals of which show that it was a vacant site purchased for a consideration of Rs.100/- on 22.07.1958 from then lawful owner Sri Vaddadi Maridayya, son of Sri Pydayya. 16. While the appellant is contending that it was purchased by him from and out of his own funds and being its absolute owner, the respondents contended that it was acquired out of the funds pooled up with their joint efforts as seen from the written statement. Whereas at the trial, the defence put to the appellant examined as P.W.1 in cross-examination and from the testimony of D.W.1 and D.W.2 was that it was purchased by their father Sri Narayudu and also pooling up the funds belonging to them. One of the circumstances considered in this context by the learned appellate Judge is purchase of stamp papers in the name of Sri Narayudu, father of these parties, for the purpose of preparing the original of Ex.A1. The contention of the respondents is that it was Sri Narayudu who had given away Rs.100/- towards sale consideration to the appellant, while purchasing this property and who instructed him to get a sale deed. 17. Sri Narayudu was working in Sugar Factory at Pithapuram by then admittedly. The appellant and the respondents had their living on the date of the suit out of manual labour and as agricultural labourers. 17. Sri Narayudu was working in Sugar Factory at Pithapuram by then admittedly. The appellant and the respondents had their living on the date of the suit out of manual labour and as agricultural labourers. The evidence on record also transpires that the respondents 1 and 4 were living in another property belonging to their joint family, which was given away to them by the then Maharaja of Pithapuram. 18. The respondents 2 and 3 specifically contended of their joint possession and enjoyment of the suit site where a thatched hut was erected along with the appellant. The defence so set up by them is appearing more probable. The situation of the suit site leads such an inference. Particularly when the report of the learned commissioner (D.W.3) and his deposition are considered it is the irresistible inference to draw. 19. On the date of the suit, apparently this site did not remain vacant. There was a structure in the nature of a thatched residential premises consisting of different rooms with different entrances. This situation of such premises is indicative of possible enjoyment of this premises not only by the appellant, who was stated to be then in occupation of a large room while the respondents 2 and 3 were in occupation of remaining rooms or a part of varandah (vasara). 20. The appellant produced, to support his contention of possession and enjoyment of this property, Ex.A2 to Ex.A12-property tax receipts/demand notices/special notices while relying on Ex.A1. Thy stood in the name of the appellant. However, the version of D.W.1 and D.W.2 is that they too had contributed for payment of municipal levies, which of course is not their version in the written statement. 21. Significance has to be attached in this context to Ex.B6 which consists of copy of FIR in Crime No.213 of 1989 of Pithapuram P.S. and copy of the charge sheet. This FIR was registered at the instance of the appellant against D.W.1 and their sister for an offence under Section 324 r/w. Section 34 IPC. One of the contents of the complaint to the police by the appellant refers to possession of a part of the suit site by the 2nd respondent. He stated therein that he permitted D.W.1 to live in this premises being his brother and who was trying to put up a fence at this site. One of the contents of the complaint to the police by the appellant refers to possession of a part of the suit site by the 2nd respondent. He stated therein that he permitted D.W.1 to live in this premises being his brother and who was trying to put up a fence at this site. In that context, Ex.B6 makes out that there was an altercation and it was alleged that D.W.1 and his sister had beat the appellant. 22. It is also evident from the record that D.W.1 gave a complaint against the appellant to the police. Both these criminal cases ended in acquittal. 23. The factum of possession of part of the suit site by D.W.1, referred to in Ex.B6 about an year prior to the institution of this suit when the alleged incident occurred on 01.10.1989, is supporting the contention of the respondents that D.W.1 and 3rd respondent were in possession and enjoyment of this suit site prior to the institution of the suit (the suit was filed on 05.10.1990). 24. The respondents also relied on Ex.B1 to Ex.B3-voter identity cards apart from Ex.B4 ad Ex.B5 entries in the voters list of the year 1987 relating to Pithapuram municipality. While the appellant is shown being resident of Door No.1-5-81, D.W.1 and 3rd respondents are described as residents of the premises bearing Door Nos. 1-5-81A and 1-5-81B. The commissioner’s report also reflects to this Door No.1-5-81 appearing on the suit premises. It is one circumstance relied on by the respondents to support their contention of possession and enjoyment of the suit property along with the appellant. 25. When the evidence thus available on record is considered, it is manifest that exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit site claimed by the appellant is difficult to accept. The manner of projecting his claim as if the property in dispute is a vacant site in the plaint, even though there was a thatched structure on the date of institution of the suit, as rightly pointed out for the respondents, appears being a fact suppressed. A party approaching the Court for equitable relief of injunction, should make such attempt with clean hands. Suppression of this material fact is demonstrative of manner of approach by the appellant to the Court with unclean hands. 26. A party approaching the Court for equitable relief of injunction, should make such attempt with clean hands. Suppression of this material fact is demonstrative of manner of approach by the appellant to the Court with unclean hands. 26. Contentions are advanced on behalf of the appellant pointing out that the evidence of respondents is clear and categorical that the respondents 2 and 3 are not residing in any part of the suit site. D.W.1- the 2nd respondent explained this situation stating that he began to live in a rented house after the suit was filed. According to D.W.2, D.W.1 is living in the house of his mother-in-law. It is also the version of D.W.2 that the 3rd respondent is living at Bogarthipalem. He also stated that the appellant has been in possession of this property from the beginning. These statements of D.W.1 and D.W.2 will not in any manner strengthen the contention of the appellant that he has been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of this property when considered with other circumstances pointed out above. 27. Thus, the material on record makes out that by the date of the suit the appellant was not in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit site nor it was a vacant site as such. The respondents did assert their interest in this property, which is also demonstrated by their occupation of part of this property and that the respondents 2 and 3 were sharing this property along with the appellant. 28. When the burden is on the appellant to establish his exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit site to the exclusion of the respondents, the above material makes out that he miserably failed in this context. All these predominant questions of fact were rightly considered by the learned trial Judge and reinforced in the judgment of the appellate Court. 29. However, there are certain observations recorded by both the Courts below relating to nature of acquisition of this site under original of Ex.A1 in the name of the appellant and findings are also recorded as if there is complete and unexceptionable material holding that the respondents are co-owners of this site along with the appellant. Having regard to the nature of dispute and its ambit, both the Courts below could have avoided such findings. Having regard to the nature of dispute and its ambit, both the Courts below could have avoided such findings. It is for these parties to establish their respective claims to this property if it is their joint property either acquired from the source provided by their father or by joint efforts, in a more comprehensive suit. The relief to be sought in such suit shall be left to the discretion of the parties. Such observations recorded by both the Courts below are uncalled for. 30. One of the defences of the respondents is that the appellant should have sought declaratory relief to this property and a mere suit for injunction is not maintainable. 31. The questions raised now, could be considered more in a comprehensive suit, if desired by both these parties in respect of this site in dispute. They do not in fact fall for consideration in this second appeal. 32. Since the entire case is based on questions of fact, there are absolutely no questions of law much less substantial questions for determination in this second appeal in terms of Section 100 CPC. Therefore, this Court is satisfied that no interference is warranted with the decrees of both the Courts below. Rightly the suit was dismissed by the trial Court and was upheld in the appeal. 33. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout. Any findings recorded by both the Courts below with reference to right, title and interest in respect of the suit site (plaint schedule property) shall not affect the claim of the appellant and the respondents, if any suit for comprehensive relief is instituted by them in future. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed. Interim Orders, if any, stand vacated.