JUDGMENT : The 1st defendant in O.S.No.24 of 1987 on the file of the Court of the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Chittoor is the appellant. The respondents 1 to 7 are the legal representatives of Smt. Rameeza Bi, Wife of Sri Syed Peeru Saheb. 2. Smt. Rameeza Bi as the sole plaintiff instituted the suit against the appellant and the respondents 8 and 9 to declare her right, title and interest to the plaint schedule property and to deliver the same to her. 3. Smt. Rameeza Bi died during pendency of the suit. The respondents 1 to 7 were brought on record as her legal representatives. 4. The plaint schedule described the land in dispute as an extent of Ac.0-81 cents in S.No.372/3 being a wetland at Palamaner of Chittoor District. There are 14 tamarind trees in this land. It shall be hereinafter referred to as ‘the suit land’, for convenience. 5. Sri Ballapalli Muninarayana Chetty, S/o. Sri Changala Chetty was the original owner of an extent of Ac.1-74 cents covered by S.No.372 of Palamaner. This land was sub-divided into S.Nos.372/1, 2 and 3. Sri Muninarayana Chetty had a son Sri Chengaiah Chetty. Sri Muninarayana Chetty was enjoying the above extent. Ac.0-33 cents out of it was given away under a gift admittedly by him to the appellant temple where it is located. Similarly, another extent of Ac.0-60 cents out of the same survey number classified as S.No.372/2 was gifted to this temple by him. 6. The contention of the respondents 1 to 7 is that Smt.Venkatamma, daughter-in-law of Sri Muninarayana Chetty, sold the suit land of Ac.0-81 cents under a registered sale deed on 21.6.1962 in favour of Sri Mohd.Akbar, father of Smt. Rameeza Bi for valuable consideration. Their further contention is that Sri Muninarayana Chetty had gifted away the suit land on 25.02.1938 in favour of his daughter-in-law Smt.Venkatamma. Their further contention is that in the above settlement deed the survey number is described as 372/1 which is shown similarly in the sale deed by her in favour of Sri Mohd.Akbar. Their further contention is that Sri Muninarayana Chetty had gifted away the suit land on 25.02.1938 in favour of his daughter-in-law Smt.Venkatamma. Their further contention is that in the above settlement deed the survey number is described as 372/1 which is shown similarly in the sale deed by her in favour of Sri Mohd.Akbar. Their further contention is that there was conversion of these lands into sub divisions in S.No.372 by the proceedings of the then District Collector, Chittoor in the year 1940 whereby S.No.372/3 which was otherwise shown being an extent of Ac.0-33 cents was rectified as Ac.0-81 cents and S.No.372/1 which was otherwise Ac.0-81 cents was rectified as Ac.0-33 cents. 7. The respondents 1 to 7 further contended that the suit land thus in S.No.372/3 was allotted to Smt. Rameeza Bi in the partition by her father as per the deed of partition dated 07.03.1972 and since then Smt.Rameeza Bi continued to be in possession and enjoyment of this land to which she also acquired right and interest by adverse possession. 8. The respondents 1 to 7 further contended that on behalf of the appellant, the suit land was leased out to third parties including the respondents 8 and 9 since the year 1980 including the tamarind trees without any manner of right. The respondents 1 to 7 further contended that a notice was caused on behalf of Smt. Rameeza Bi dated 01.10.1986 to the Chairman of Board of Trustees of the appellant temple to surrender possession of this land, claiming damages at Rs.4,000/- per annum and since such demand was not complied, she was constrained to lay the suit. 9. The respondents 8 and 9 remained ex parte in the suit. 10. The appellant alone contested the suit questioning its maintainability and that Smt.Venkatamma had no right and title or possession to convey the suit land to Sri Mohd. Akbar under the sale deed dated 21.10.1962. Thus, the appellant questioned the nature of this sale deed being nominal, sham document and that it was never acted upon. The appellant further contended that though Smt.Rameeza Bi had purchased the land in S.No.372/1, making a claim to S.No.372/3 is not valid and that the sub divisions as well as their extents in S.No.372 remained as such that were also reflected in FMB, since time immemorial. The appellant further contended that though Smt.Rameeza Bi had purchased the land in S.No.372/1, making a claim to S.No.372/3 is not valid and that the sub divisions as well as their extents in S.No.372 remained as such that were also reflected in FMB, since time immemorial. The appellant also contended that necessary parties are not added to the suit and thus the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It is further contended that the suit claim is barred by limitation. It also contended that no demand notice was issued on behalf of Smt. Rameeza Bi to them. The appellant also contended that it acquired right, title and interest to the suit land by adverse possession by prescription. 11. The trial Court basing on the pleadings settled the following issues: “1. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title and for possession of the plaint schedule property? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for past and future damages at Rs.4,000/- per annum as prayed for? 5. To what relief?” 12. The parties went to trial. The 1st respondent examined himself as P.W.1, the then Karanam of Palamaner as P.W.2 and Village Administrative Officer, Palamaner as P.W.3, while relying on Ex.A1 to Ex.A8 on behalf of the respondents 1 to 7. On behalf of the appellant, then Executive Officer of Endowments Department at Palamaner was examined as D.W.1 while D.W.2 was then one of the trustees of the appellant temple and D.W.3 was then Executive Officer of the appellant temple, to support its version while relying on Ex.B1 to Ex.B14. 13. On the material and evidence, the trial Court held that the respondents 1 to 7 failed to establish their right, title and interest to the suit land against the appellant-temple and the suit was dismissed with costs. 14. A.S.No.38 of 2009 presented against the decree and judgment of the trial Court on the file of the Court of the learned I-Additional District Judge, Chittoor was allowed granting decree in favour of the respondents 1 to 7 as prayed, for declaration and possession. The appellate Court directed the respondents 1 to 7 to file a separate application for determining past and future mesne profits. 15. In these circumstances, this present appeal is presented. 16. The appellate Court directed the respondents 1 to 7 to file a separate application for determining past and future mesne profits. 15. In these circumstances, this present appeal is presented. 16. Heard Sri M. Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri A.V.Sivaiah, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 7. 17. This second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the suit filed by the respondents is not barred under Sections 87 and 151 of the A.P.Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987? 2. Whether the suit was not barred by limitation? 3. Whether the lower appellate Court was not under obligation to decide as to when the respondents were dispossessed from the land, before granting the relief of declaration of title and delivery of possession of the property?” Re: BAR OF LIMITATION 18. Issue No.2 settled by the trial Court is with reference to bar of limitation in filing the suit. The learned trial Judge held this issue against the appellant, holding that the suit was filed within the period 12 years and thus is not barred by limitation in terms of Article-65 of the Limitation Act. In the course of hearing this second appeal, Sri A.V.Sivaiah, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 7 brought to the notice of this Court that the appellant did not question the above finding including on issue No.1 relating to non-joinder of necessary parties that was held in favour of the respondents 1 to 7, either by means of cross-objections or separate appeal before the appellate Court nor any contentions were advanced in the appellate Court against such findings who while supporting the decree of dismissal passed by the trial Court. The material is justifying such stand. Apparently no contentions were advanced on behalf of the appellant before the appellate Court questioning such findings nor separate appeal or cross-objections was filed questioning the same. 19. Therefore, it is not open for the appellant to raise the question of limitation now in this second appeal nor can it be canvassed basing on the material, as a pure question of law which this Court can consider. Reliance placed on behalf of the appellant in this context in L.C.Hanumanthappa (since dead) represented by his Legal Representatives vs. H.B.Shivakumar, (2016) 1 Supreme Court Cases 332 as such is not of assistance in this backdrop. 20. Reliance placed on behalf of the appellant in this context in L.C.Hanumanthappa (since dead) represented by his Legal Representatives vs. H.B.Shivakumar, (2016) 1 Supreme Court Cases 332 as such is not of assistance in this backdrop. 20. Reliance is also placed by Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, in Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand, AIR 1951 Supreme Court 16 in support of his contention that limitation being the legal plea it can be raised in the second appeal and that Section 100 CPC is not a bar. Not only for the above reasons but also it being a question of fact and law, in these circumstances the appellant cannot raise such plea of bar of limitation. Re: BAR OF JURISDICTION FOR CIVIL COURT TO ENTERTAIN THE SUIT 21. Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, strenuously contended that the appellant is a Religious Institution governed by the provisions of A.P.Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (A.P. Act 30 of 1987, for short) and in view of specific bar under Section 151 of this Act, the civil Court could not have entertained a dispute of this nature. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that in view of the constitution of Endowments Tribunal under Section 162 of this Act, empowered to decide such disputes, in terms of Section 87 thereunder, there is clear bar for the civil Court to consider this dispute. Thus, it is contended that the decrees and judgments of both the Courts below are bad in law. 22. Section 151 of the A.P. Act 30 of 1987 reads thus: “151. Bar of Jurisdiction. - No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matters of dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act.” 23. Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 requires that there shall be a dispute relating to administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matters. Such dispute is amenable for determination or decision under this Act, namely Act 30 of 1987. In such an event, no suit or other legal proceeding in respect thereof shall be instituted in any Court of law. Such dispute is amenable for determination or decision under this Act, namely Act 30 of 1987. In such an event, no suit or other legal proceeding in respect thereof shall be instituted in any Court of law. It further states that except in terms of provisions of this Act such dispute cannot be determined or decided. 24. In order to consider this question of jurisdiction, pleadings play a vital role. As seen from the written statement of the appellant, no objection was raised as a defence as to maintainability of the suit before the trial Court nor any specific issue was settled therefor nor the trial Court or the appellate Court was called upon to consider such question. A faint attempt apparently was made at the trial, as seen from the deposition of D.W.3, then Executive Officer of the appellate temple, where he stated in examined-in-chief that the civil Court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. However, such plea at the trial, is not supported by the pleadings in the written statement. 25. The nature of dispute in this case, requires consideration in this context. Smt. Rameeza Bi instituted the suit questioning possession of the suit land and the manner of leasing it out to third parties by the appellant. She sought declaration of her right, title and interest to this land against the appellant, which after her lifetime is being pursued by her legal representatives, namely the respondents 1 to 7. Thus, the very nature of dispute presented a scenario that it did not relate to any administration or management relating to a religious or charitable institution directly nor an endowment as such. In such an event, the bar of jurisdiction as such for a civil Court to entertain a suit of this nature cannot arise, that too when it is sought to be raised for the first time in this second appeal, without there being any basis in the pleadings nor any foundation laid, either at the trial or later in the appeal. 26. One of the rulings relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in this context is in Executive Officer, Sri Bramaramba Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple, Beeranguda, Patancheru Mandal, Medak District v. Sai Krupa Homes, Karimnagar and others, 2010(6) ALD 207 . 26. One of the rulings relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in this context is in Executive Officer, Sri Bramaramba Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple, Beeranguda, Patancheru Mandal, Medak District v. Sai Krupa Homes, Karimnagar and others, 2010(6) ALD 207 . Referring to application of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act when a similar objection was raised under Section 151 as well as Section 87 of the A.P. Act 30 of 1987, relying on an earlier judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Jaggayya v. Deity of Seetharamaswamy Varu ( 1987(1) ALT 18 ), in para-27 of this ruling it is thus observed: “27. Similar issue was considered by this Court in a Division Bench judgment in Jaggayya's case (supra), which is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court, which considered similar contention with respect to Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowment Act, 1966 wherein similar question with reference to Section 77 of the 1966 Act was considered and the suit was held to be maintainable. The present Section 87 being similar to Section 77 of the 1966 Act, it has to be held that since it is a suit for declaration, the same would not fall within the purview of the authorities under the Act, 30 of 1987 under Section 87. Similarly, Section 151 contains a bar of jurisdiction that no suit or legal proceeding in respect of administration or management of an institution or endowment or any other matters of dispute for determining or deciding, for which the provision is made in this Act, 30 of 1987 shall be instituted in any Court. As a suit for declaration of title is not falling within the parameters of Section 151 of the Act, 30 of 1987 the said contention of the appellants is liable to be rejected and it is accordingly rejected.” 27. Sri Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, further relied on for the same purpose S.Anjana Reddy vs. P.Ranga Reddy and others, 2017(2) ALT 393 and Jampani Trilokeswari and another v. Dharmadaya Tope represented by its fit person and others, 2012(1) ALD 464 . In both these rulings, not only the effect of Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 but also effect of Section 162 as well as Section 87 of this Act is considered. In both these rulings, not only the effect of Section 151 of the Act 30 of 1987 but also effect of Section 162 as well as Section 87 of this Act is considered. In fact, in S.Anjana, when an objection was taken as to trial of an issue relating to jurisdiction as a preliminary issue, observations were so recorded. Any observation in an interlocutory matter cannot be decisive nor can hold the field since such decision is subject to ultimate determination in a cause. 28. Further it has to be borne in mind that Section 162 was introduced by an amendment of Act 30 of 1987 by Act 33 of 2007 with effect from 03.01.2008. Thus constitution of Endowments tribunal in terms of Section 162 of this Act is a subsequent provision brought into effect. Section 87 of this Act was similarly amended, by Act 33 of 2007 with effect from 03.01.2008 whereby the powers which an Endowment tribunal can exercise to decide certain disputes and matters, are enlisted. Predominantly when these two provisions are procedural in nature, they are prospective in operation and can never be made applicable retrospectively. Nor the amended provisions provide for such application specifically. Therefore, contention of Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, on this score cannot stand. 29. Sri Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, tried to persuade this Court that when there is a clear bar in this Act for a civil Court to entertain a suit, the legislative intent has to be given effect to and that it cannot be overlooked. Attempt is made by the learned counsel for the appellant in this context relying on Union Bank of India Calcutta vs. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. and others, (2000) 7 SCC 357 . The question of jurisdiction of High Court of Calcutta on original side, upon constitution of a Debt Recovery Tribunal under Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 came for consideration in the above ruling. Section 31 of this Act referred to transfer of pending cases. Having regard to the effect of this provision in conjunction with Section 18 of the said Act that provided for bar of jurisdiction, it is observed that the High Court could not try the suit and necessarily it has to be transferred to the appropriate tribunal under the above act. 30. Having regard to the effect of this provision in conjunction with Section 18 of the said Act that provided for bar of jurisdiction, it is observed that the High Court could not try the suit and necessarily it has to be transferred to the appropriate tribunal under the above act. 30. Similar is not the situation in the present case. Act 30 of 1987 did not provide for any transitional provisions including for transfer of pending matters as is found in Section 31 of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The appellant cannot rely on in this context the effect of Section 160 of Act 30 of 1987 which provided for overriding effect of this Act. 31. Further, Act 30 of 1987 came into force on 21.04.1987. The suit was instituted in this case on 29.01.1987. Therefore, institution of the suit was prior to coming into force of A.P.Act 30 of 1987. 32. Viewed from these factors and contingencies, the contention of Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, in this respect cannot stand. 33. Further effort is made by Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, referring to The Premier Automobiles Limited vs. Kamalakar Shantaram and others, AIR 1975 SC 2238 (1), wherein dispute was squarely covered by Industrial Disputes Act and in that context the jurisdiction of civil Court to entertain a matter of such nature was not accepted. 34. Another ruling relied on by Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his contention is in Firm of Illuri Subbaraya Chetty vs. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 322 . It is a case where assessment in terms of General Sales Tax Act was in issue and in those circumstances it was held that the civil Court is not competent to entertain a suit where the question is in relation to assessment made under the said Act. 35. Therefore, rejecting the contention of Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, it is held that the civil Court did have jurisdiction to entertain a dispute of this nature. Re: Nature of suit claim vis-a-vis appreciation of material and evidence by the appellate Court qua trial Court 36. The essential relief sought by the original plaintiff Smt.Rameeza Bi in the suit is for declaration of her right, title and interest to the suit land. Re: Nature of suit claim vis-a-vis appreciation of material and evidence by the appellate Court qua trial Court 36. The essential relief sought by the original plaintiff Smt.Rameeza Bi in the suit is for declaration of her right, title and interest to the suit land. The burden of proof in respect thereof is well settled. Since Smt.Rameeza Bi approached the Court for this purpose it was her burden in terms of Section 101 of the Evidence Act to establish her claim by definite and unimpeachable evidence. Any weakness in the case set up by the appellant, who is the 1st defendant cannot be the strength of the plaintiff. 37. Canvassing on this question, Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, relied on Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others, (2014) 2 Supreme Court Cases 269. In para-15 of this ruling it is stated: “15. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff.” 38. Earlier rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this context were also considered in this ruling including Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira, AIR 1959 SC 31 39. Another ruling relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in this respect is Krishna (died) and others v. Indian Institute of Economics, Hyderabad and others, 2011(6) ALD 174 (DB). Referring to the bounden duty of the plaintiff to establish identity of the property in dispute in a declaratory claim, in para-22 of this ruling it is stated: “22. ….. the plaintiff has to give description of the property sufficient to identify it and, if the property can be identified by boundaries, they must be given. This essential rule of pleadings has been given a go-by by the plaintiff…...” 40. The appellant is admittedly in possession of the suit land. Therefore, it is also the burden of the plaintiff who instituted the suit to prove that the appellant is not the owner of the suit property in terms of Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. 41. The appellant is admittedly in possession of the suit land. Therefore, it is also the burden of the plaintiff who instituted the suit to prove that the appellant is not the owner of the suit property in terms of Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. 41. The cause of action set out in the plaint is that it arose in or about the year 1980 when the appellant inducted its tenants into unlawful possession of the suit land for the first time and subsequently when the appellant continued to be in unlawful possession of this property through tenants. 42. Therefore, it is the burden of Smt.Rameeza Bi to further establish that she and her predecessor-in-title were in possession of the suit land from which they were dispossessed in or about the year 1980 at the instance of the appellant. The proof required in this context is affirmative in nature. 43. The entire claim of Smt. Rameeza Bi is based on purchase of the suit land by her father Sri Mohd. Akbar under Ex.A1 sale deed dated 21.06.1962. The land described in Ex.A1 is an extent of Ac.0-81 cents in S.No.372/1. There is a reference in Ex.A1 that the vendor acquired right and interest to the suit land under a settlement deed executed by Sri Muninarayana Chetty in her favour on 25.02.1938. The registration extract of this settlement deed is Ex.A4. 44. The recitals in Ex.A4 are that Sri Muninarayana Chetty intended to gift away property worth Rs.2,000/- in the nature of lands, gold jewellary, silver ware etc., towards maintenance since she happened to be the first wife of his son Sri Chengaiah Chetty, who had passed away by then. This is to support her and towards her maintenance, the recitals in Ex.A4 state that such properties were given to her. It is further recited that they were given in possession to Smt.Venkatamma by the executant. However, the recitals in Ex.A4 state that Sri Muninarayana Chetty retained his life interest to these properties and that the right given to Smt.Venkatamma was restricted, not to alienate including by means of gift or sale. Recitals in Ex.A4 further are that Sri Muninarayana Chetty would pay the cist etc., to the Government for the lands and after his lifetime Smt.Venkatamma was to enjoy these properties, with absolute rights. 45. Recitals in Ex.A4 further are that Sri Muninarayana Chetty would pay the cist etc., to the Government for the lands and after his lifetime Smt.Venkatamma was to enjoy these properties, with absolute rights. 45. The properties covered by Ex.A4 included an extent of Ac.0-81 cents in S.No.372/1 of Palamaner including fruit bearing trees like tamarind etc. 46. Therefore, in terms of this settlement deed (Ex.A4) Sri Muninarayana Chetty had retained his life interest to the properties covered by it. It is not that life interest in respect of these properties, albeit for supporting and maintaining Smt.Venkatamma was conferred thereunder in her favour. Smt.Venkatamma would become absolute owner of these properties with right, title and interest only upon death of Sri Muninarayana Chetty and not otherwise. Till happening of such contingency she did not have any right, title and interest either to alienate or encumber the properties covered by it. 47. The learned appellate Judge did not appreciate the recitals in Ex.A4 in proper perspective and considered as if a life interest was created in favour of Smt.Venkatamma by settlor in respect of these properties. It is in inappropriate application of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. On account of this misapplication and improper appreciation of Ex.A4, the learned appellate Judge held that the right in favour of Smt.Venkatamma became absolute in terms of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. 48. Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, is right in pointing out this fallacy in the reasons assigned by the learned appellate Judge. 49. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, it is not in dispute that Sri Muninarayana Chetty died in the year 1951. It was before advent of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Provisions of this Act are only prospective in nature. They are neither retrospective nor retroactive. 50. Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, rightly relied on in this context in Velamuri Venkayta Sivaprasad (dead) by L.Rs. v. Kothuri Venkateswarlu (dead) by L.Rs. And others, (2000) 2 Supreme Court Cases 139. Considering the application of provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it is observed in Para-16 of this ruling that this Act, 1956 is prospective in its operation and that no element of retrospectivity can be attributed therein. In para-47 of this ruling, it is further stated thus: “47. And others, (2000) 2 Supreme Court Cases 139. Considering the application of provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it is observed in Para-16 of this ruling that this Act, 1956 is prospective in its operation and that no element of retrospectivity can be attributed therein. In para-47 of this ruling, it is further stated thus: “47. Incidentally, be it noted that the Succession Act of 1956 obviously is prospective in operation and in the event of a divestation prior to 1956, the question of applicability of Section 14(1) would not arise since on the date when it applied……...” 51. Therefore, question of application of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 did not arise in this case much less effect of Section 14(1) thereunder. 52. Upon death of Sri Muninarayana Chetty, in terms of recitals in the settlement deed (Ex.A4), in the year 1951 Smt.Venkatamma in usual course, should have been the owner of these properties settled thereunder. It was long prior to the year 1956. 53. However, the matter did not rest at that. Admittedly, Sri Muninarayana Chetty gifted away Ac.0-33 cents and Ac.0-60 cents in S.No.372 to the appellant temple. Ex.B13 is the registration extract of the settlement deed dated 10.06.1940. Under the original of Ex.B13, Sri Muninarayana Chetty gave away certain properties for the purpose of the appellant temple including Ac.0-33 cents in S.No.372/3 (as described therein). Ex.B13 refers to another registered gift deed executed in favour of this temple dated 31.07.1939 by Sri Muninarayana Chetty conferring certain properties including fruit bearing trees like tamarind. Thus, by the years 1939 and 1940, properties were conferred on the appellant temple by Sri Muninarayana Chetty. On behalf of the appellant, for the reasons not known, the registered settlement deed dated 31.07.1939 was not adduced in evidence at the trial. Only Ex.B13 was produced. 54. The omission to produce such document did not have much impact in this case to consider the claim of the appellant. 55. In this context regard should be had to the registered Will executed by Sri Muninarayana Chetty on 16.03.1943 creating a bequest. The recitals in this registered Will (Ex.B2) are that he had recalled the earlier settlement deed executed by him on 25.02.1938 in favour of Smt.Venkatamma. The reason assigned therein was that her husband died on 02.02.1938 and in such anxious moments the original of Ex.A4 was executed by him in her favour. The recitals in this registered Will (Ex.B2) are that he had recalled the earlier settlement deed executed by him on 25.02.1938 in favour of Smt.Venkatamma. The reason assigned therein was that her husband died on 02.02.1938 and in such anxious moments the original of Ex.A4 was executed by him in her favour. It is further stated that it was a mistake on his part to recite in the original of Ex.A4 that the properties were delivered in possession to her, though it was not so. Finally it is stated in this registered Will that the properties referred to therein should be enjoyed by Smt. Venkatamma during her lifetime, thereafter to confer upon her daughter Smt. Visalakshi and after her lifetime these properties should be conferred in favour of Sri Kasivisweswara Swamy temple (appellant). 56. Thus, the recitals in Ex.B2 reflect a situation whereby Sri Muninarayana Chetty had cancelled the gift made under the original of Ex.A4 in favour of Smt. Venkatamma on 16.03.1943 and during his lifetime. Whether such cancellation of gift deed by Sri Muninarayana Chetty is valid or not is not germane for the present purpose. The recitals in Ex.B2 when properly construed, did indicate that the properties were not delivered to Smt.Venkatamma under the original of Ex.A4. 57. It is pertinent to note that on behalf of Smt.Rameeza Bi and the respondents 1 to 7 at the trial when this document was introduced in evidence through D.W.3, there was absolutely no cross-examination including questioning its recitals. Only question offered to D.W.3 in this context was about the original of Ex.B2 and its custody. 58. Therefore, the situation is that the recitals in Ex.B2-Will as such are not questioned on behalf of the respondents 1 to 7 at the trial or at any stage. 59. Even otherwise, Smt.Venkatamma being the primary beneficiary under this Will to whom the properties were conferred for enjoyment during her lifetime, followed by her daughter, it is possible that this Will was not chosen to be questioned or challenged on behalf of the respondents 1 to 7. The properties referred in this will (Ex.B2) did not include any extent covered by S.No.372. 60. The deduction to draw in these circumstances is that there was no land of any extent available for Smt.Venkatamma to convey in S.No.372, after the lifetime of Sri Muninarayana Chetty. The properties referred in this will (Ex.B2) did not include any extent covered by S.No.372. 60. The deduction to draw in these circumstances is that there was no land of any extent available for Smt.Venkatamma to convey in S.No.372, after the lifetime of Sri Muninarayana Chetty. The disposition of the properties apparently was complete by the date he executed the will on 16.03.1943 (Ex.B2). In such circumstances, Smt. Venkatamma did not have any right or interest or possession of any extent in S.No.372 and hence, could not have conveyed any extent in S.No.372 much less Ac.0-81 cents, described as the suit land in favour of Sri Mohd. Akbar under Ex.A1 sale deed dated 21.06.1962. 61. Sri M.Venkata Ramana Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, is right in contending that the burden is on Smt.Rameeza Bi and the respondents 1 to 7 to establish the title of her vendor and right in placing reliance in Executive Officer, Sri Bramaramba Mallikarjuna Swamy Temple referred to above. Mere holding a registered sale deed in the nature of Ex.A1 is not sufficient to establish the title in favour of the plaintiff. 62. In addition, continuous possession and enjoyment of the suit land by Smt. Venkatamma and later by Sri Mohd. Akbar, should be proved and established. It is the predominant requirement in the given facts and circumstances of this case. 63. Both the Courts below entered into any amount of discussion as to identity of the property. The learned trial Judge observed that the respondents 1 to 7 failed to establish the boundaries in order to establish this extent and particularly having regard to the fact that Ex.A1 and Ex.A4 described Ac.0-81 cents being in S.No.372/3. When an entire extent (full extent) is described in a document of this nature, namely registered document, it is not necessary that boundaries should be furnished. However, it is desirable that sufficient description of the property which is subject matter should be stated in a sale deed in order to avoid any controversy in future as to identity. 64. The learned appellate Judge accepted the version of the respondents 1 to 7 basing on the revenue records and held that Ac.0-81 cents in S.No.372/3 alone was the subject matter under the original of Ex.A4 and under Ex.A1. 65. The respondents 1 to 7 relied on the revenue records as well as the testimony of P.W.2 and P.W.3. 64. The learned appellate Judge accepted the version of the respondents 1 to 7 basing on the revenue records and held that Ac.0-81 cents in S.No.372/3 alone was the subject matter under the original of Ex.A4 and under Ex.A1. 65. The respondents 1 to 7 relied on the revenue records as well as the testimony of P.W.2 and P.W.3. The relevant among them is the conversion statement of the extents in S.No.372 reflected in Ex.A8. The contents of Ex.A8, which is an extract of ‘A’ Register where area of the land was converted to metric system, are that there was rectification carried out in relation to S.No.372/1, showing Ac.0-33 cents and S.No.372/3 as of Ac.0-81 cents. Basing on Ex.A7, which is also an extract of ‘A’ register reflecting the extent of S.No.372/3 being Ac.0-81 cents, it is the contention of the respondents 1 to 7 that the suit land in fact is of Ac.0-81 cents in S.No.372/3. 66. P.W.3-VAO of Palamaner deposed in this context. If there is any doubt or suspicion about Ex.A7 and Ex.A8, the appellant should have called for original records from the concerned revenue authorities to challenge these entries. No such effort was made at the trial on behalf of the appellant. Nonetheless, this omission on the part of the appellant has no consequence, particularly when there is deficiency in the case set up by the respondents 1 to 7 in relation to right and competence of Smt.Venkatamma to convey the suit land to Mohd.Akbar under Ex.A1 sale deed. 67. Want of material or evidence to establish that possession of the suit land continued to rest with Smt. Venkatamma and later with Sri Mohd. Akbar assumed significance. The case of the respondents 1 to 7 that the appellant is in possession of this land since the year 1980. But, it appears it is not so. 68. Producing Ex.A9-adangal extract for the years 1993-94 showing as if Smt. Rameeza Bi was in possession of this land, is indicative of false attempt by the respondents 1 to 7. Further, Ex.A6-Land Revenue Receipts also did not advance their case. The reason is that Ex.A6 and Ex.A9 are the documents relate to the period subsequent to the institution of the suit. Further, Ex.A6-Land Revenue Receipts also did not advance their case. The reason is that Ex.A6 and Ex.A9 are the documents relate to the period subsequent to the institution of the suit. In the presence of the case set up by the respondent 1 to 7 that the appellant is in possession of this land, it is clear that they are false and created documents to meet their case. Similar is the fate of Ex.A3 ryotwari passbook and no credence as such can be attached to it. 69. Production of Ex.A5-certified copy of 10(1) account relating to different lands in the name of Sri Mohd.Akbar for patta No.210 that included S.No.372/3 of Ac.0-81 cents is not sufficient nor a substitute to establish his possession of this land since the date of Ex.A1 dated 11.10.1962. 70. On behalf of the appellant, an attempt was made at the trial to rely on Ex.B3-an unregistered lease agreement dated 09.01.1974 of the suit land and other extents in S.No.372/2 and 1 in favour of Sri Markandeya (respondent No.8) for three years. Ex.B4 is the original receipt said to have been issued to respondent No.8 dated 02.02.1971 towards payment of lease amount. Ex.B5 is another original receipt dated 25.04.1985 for the same purpose issued to one Sri S.Muneppa. Ex.B6 to Ex.B11 were also produced at the trial through D.W.3 to prove such fact. But the proof offered on behalf of the appellant in this respect is not sufficient. Had they examined the tenants who paid the lease amounts, it would have been more appropriate. 71. Sri A.V.Sivaiah, learned counsel for the respondent 1 to 7, strenuously contended that production of these original receipts itself cast a doubt about their authenticity since such receipts must be in possession of the tenants. Thus, it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 7 that in the absence of production of their counterfoils, these documents as such need not be considered. Nonetheless, no proof as such is let in in establishing this fact. 72. Sri A.V.Sivaiah, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 7, contended that the contentions on behalf of the appellant are based on fact situation and therefore in terms of Section 100 CPC, this Court is precluded from considering these questions. 73. Nonetheless, no proof as such is let in in establishing this fact. 72. Sri A.V.Sivaiah, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 7, contended that the contentions on behalf of the appellant are based on fact situation and therefore in terms of Section 100 CPC, this Court is precluded from considering these questions. 73. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on Thiagarajan and others v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B.Koil and others, (2004) 5 Supreme Court Cases 762. In Para-26 of this ruling it is observed: “26. To say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on reappreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible.” 74. Further reliance is placed on H.P.Pyarejan vs. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs.and others, (2006) 2 Supreme Court Cases 496 where the essential question is in relation to application of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. In para-16 of this ruling in the context of duty of High Court to interfere under Section 100 CPC, it is stated: “16. …. Under Section 100 of the Code (a amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of law. Interference with finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves reappreciation of evidence (See panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami, (1997)4 SCC 713 and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 )…..” 75. Another ruling relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 7 in this respect is G.Subrahmanyam (died) per L.Rs. v. G.Leela and others, 2011(5) ALT 790 (D.B.) and Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Secunderabad, rep. By its Divisional Manager v. Epuri Prithvisen Reddy, 2015(4) ALT 256 . 76. Considerations in terms of Section 100 CPC arise only when there is substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based on facts. v. G.Leela and others, 2011(5) ALT 790 (D.B.) and Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Secunderabad, rep. By its Divisional Manager v. Epuri Prithvisen Reddy, 2015(4) ALT 256 . 76. Considerations in terms of Section 100 CPC arise only when there is substantial question of law and not mere such questions of law or one based on facts. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 7 is right in placing reliance on these rulings. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in second appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in nature in terms of law. Similar situation is found in the present case where the learned appellate Judge miserably failed to appreciate the documentary evidence let in on behalf of the parties properly. There is complete misapplication and improper appreciation of fact vis-a-vis the law. These circumstances are sufficient for this Court to interfere in terms of Section 100 CPC. 77. May be there are certain questions relating to identity of the suit property and effect of the boundaries in relation thereto. Such questions did not fall within the scope of Section 100 CPC as is observed in V.Narayanaswamy Mudaliar v. Veluru Krishnavenamma, 2007(3) ALT 653 relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 7. On behalf of the appellant, in the same context reliance is placed in Dastagir Ahmd v. Khairunnisa Rahana and others, 2012(3) ALD 13 and Jagannadha Rao vs. Y. Subba Rao, 1985(2) APLJ 149 . 78. Substantial question of law relating to obligation of the appellate Court to decide, when Smt. Rameeza Bi or her father was dispossessed from the suit land holds predominance now. It is one of the substantial questions of law on which this second appeal was admitted. 79. Cause of action as already stated set out by the original plaintiff Smt. Rameeza Bi as if the appellant through its tenants dispossessed from the suit land in the year 1980 is not established. The material on record did not indicate or prove that Smt. Venkatamma or Sri. Mohd. 79. Cause of action as already stated set out by the original plaintiff Smt. Rameeza Bi as if the appellant through its tenants dispossessed from the suit land in the year 1980 is not established. The material on record did not indicate or prove that Smt. Venkatamma or Sri. Mohd. Akbar was in possession of the suit land at any time long prior to the alleged date of cause of action, leading to hold that Smt.Venkatamma had no right or interest to convey the suit land to Sri Mohd. Akbar. Thus, Ex.A1 sale deed, as rightly contended for the appellants, remained a sham and nominal document. Subsequent events like allotment of the suit land in favour of Smt. Rameeza Bi under registered partition deed covered by Ex.A2 on 07.03.1972 did not confer any right or interest to her since Sri Mohd. Akbar had no such right or interest to convey. 80. When these factors were not appreciated by the appellate Court, which has significant bearing to consider nature of possession by the appellant temple, a substantial question of law thus is made out on its behalf. The burden of proof of the respondents 1 to 7 in terms of Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act is not effectively discharged and to hold that the appellant was not the owner of the suit land. 81. Therefore, in the above circumstances, accepting the contention of the appellant the second appeal has to be allowed setting aside the decree and judgment of the appellate Court, restoring the decree of the trial Court. 82. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. Consequently the decree and judgment dated 19.10.2012 in A.S.No.38 of 2009 of the learned I-Additional District Judge, Chittoor are set aside. The decree dated 09.02.2009 in O.S.No.24 of 1987 of the Court of the learned Additional Senior Civil Judge, Chittoor is restored. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout. As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed. Interim Orders, if any, stand vacated.