ORDER : 1. Heard the learned counsel Sri.P.P.Hegde for the complainant and Smt. Nirmala appearing for the accused No.1. 2. The instant contempt petition is preferred by the complainant for the alleged disobedience of the interim order dated 30.09.2020 passed in Writ Petition No.147934/2020 in the following manner; “Issue emergent notice to respondents returnable by 21.10.2020. Interim stay as prayed for is granted till next date of hearing. Office objections shall be complied in two weeks”. 3. The interim relief as prayed for in the writ petition is as under; “It is, therefore prayed that pending hearing and disposal of the writ petition, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to stay the operation of the impugned order of removal dated 30.10.2019 issued by respondent No.2, which is produced as Annexure-E, and direct the reinstatement of the petitioner in the interest of justice and equity.” 4. From the above reading of the interim relief, it is apparent that interim relief sought for is in two parts i.e., the first part is, “to stay the operation of the order of removal dated 30.10.2019” and second part is, “to direct the reinstatement of the petitioner in the interest of justice and equity”. 5. The facts in brief are that the complainant was visited with a penalty of removal from services after an inquiry by the competent authority by order dated 30.10.2019. That an appeal came to be preferred to the Appellate Authority and punishment imposed came to be confirmed by the Appellate Authority. Being aggrieved, the complainant has preferred Writ Petition on 21.09.2020, that is, almost a year after her removal from the post of Deputy Chief Medical Officer with the first respondent-Corporation. The writ petition came to be listed on 30.09.2020 and interim order as detailed above came to be passed. 6. It is the case of the complainant that the relief granted by this Court came to be communicated to accused No.2 by e-mail on 03.10.2020, copy of which is produced at Annexure-C and hard copy of request letter was also served on the accused No.2 on the forenoon of 05.10.2020 demanding that she be permitted to join duty. 7. In the similar circumstances, a Co-ordinate Bench headed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice while dealing with a similar situation was pleased to dispose of the contempt petition registered as C.C.C.No.362/2020. 7. In the similar circumstances, a Co-ordinate Bench headed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice while dealing with a similar situation was pleased to dispose of the contempt petition registered as C.C.C.No.362/2020. The observations of the Coordinate Bench at paragraph Nos.3 to 10 are pertinent and relevant for consideration of the instant contempt petition, which reads as under; 3. As can be seen from the order dated 4th December 2019, it is an expartead interim order by which, stay was granted to the order dated 17th September 2019. There is no specific order passed by the learned Single Judge of reinstatement of the complainant into service. 4. The complainant has invoked the contempt jurisdiction of this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short ‘the said Act of 1971’). The job of the complainant comes to an end after bringing to the notice of this Court the alleged incident of breach. Whether an action is to be initiated under the said Act of 1971 is a matter to be decided by the Court. The Court always retains a discretion in such matters. 5. As stated earlier, the complainant was removed from the post of Grama Sahayaka by the order dated 17th September 2019. After a lapse of more than two months, the said order was stayed. The respondents in the writ petition were not heard. The order of removal had become operative when the stay was granted. There is no specific order passed by the learned Single Judge directing reinstatement of the complainant. 6. At this stage, we must make useful reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF J & K vs MOHD. YAQOOB KHAN AND OTHERS. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the said decision are relevant which read thus: “5. We find great force in the argument of Mr Salve that so long the stay matter in the writ petition was not finally disposed of, the further proceeding in the contempt case was itself misconceived and no orders therein should have been passed. Mr Bhandare appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, who is respondent before us, has strenuously contended that the orders passed in the contempt proceedings should be treated to have disposed of the stay matter in the writ petition also. Mr Bhandare appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner, who is respondent before us, has strenuously contended that the orders passed in the contempt proceedings should be treated to have disposed of the stay matter in the writ petition also. He laid great emphasis on the fact that the counsel for the respondents in the writ petition had been heard before the orders were issued. He invited our attention to the merits of the claim. It is argued that the order dated March 19, 1990 must, in the circumstances, be treated to have become final and, therefore, binding on the State and the High Court was right in issuing the further direction by way of implementation of earlier order. 6. We do not agree. The scope of a contempt proceeding is very different from that of the pending main case yet to be heard and disposed of (in future). Besides, the respondents in a pending case are at a disadvantage if they are called upon to meet the merits of the claim in a contempt proceeding at the risk of being punished. It is, therefore, not right to suggest that it should be assumed that the initial order of stay got confirmed by the subsequent orders passed in the contempt matter.” (underlines supplied) 7. There is another decision of the Apex Court in the case of MOHD. IQBAL KHANDAY vs ABDUL MAJID RATHER. Paragraph 14 of the said decision is relevant which reads thus: “4. The law of contempt is based on sound public policy by punishing any conduct which shakesthe public confidence in the administration of justice. The order dated 21- 9-1992 while directing notice also required the appellant to accord promotion to the respondent as Associate Professor. It requires to be noticed here that is the main prayer in the writ petition itself. In such circumstances, the correctness of such an interim order is open to serious doubt. For a moment, it is not to be understood that the court has no power to pass such an order but the question is whether while granting such interim reliefs the discretion of the court has been correctly exercised? If the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the respondent would have gained an undue advantage of getting a promotion undeservedly. But we are not on the merits of the interim order.” 8. If the writ petition is ultimately dismissed, the respondent would have gained an undue advantage of getting a promotion undeservedly. But we are not on the merits of the interim order.” 8. Apart from the interim order dated 4th December 2019 of stay, there is no specific order passed for reinstatement of the complainant. This is a case where it is unjust to initiate contempt proceedings without giving an opportunity to the respondents to contest the prayer for interim order in the writ petition. The order of which the breach is complained of is an ex parte order. Therefore, this is not a fit case to initiate the proceedings under the said Act of 1971. 9. We further make it clear that the observations made in this petition are for the limited purpose of considering whether action deserves to be initiated under the said Act of 1971. None of these observations shall be construed as any expression of opinion on the merits of the controversy in the pending writ petition. 10. Accordingly, the petition is disposed of. 8. In the instant case also, the interim order granted is an ex-parte interim order, staying the operation of order of removal only dated 30.10.2019 and has not directed the reinstatement of the petitioner and that the second part of the interim relief does not appear to have been considered and granted by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has been pleased to grant stay of the order, but there is no specific direction directing re-instatement. The order is one of removal and as on the date of passing of the interim order, the order of removal was in force. 9. In view of the above observations, we do not find any grounds that warrants further consideration of the contempt petition at the hands of this Bench. It is open for the parties to seek for such clarification or modification as they deem fit. The observations are not construed as an expression or an opinion on the merits of the petition. The contempt proceedings are dropped and the petition stands disposed of accordingly.