ORDER : The petitioner in this writ petition seeks the following prayers: Hold that the appointment of respondent No.4 as the Assistant Manager MIS Systems in the respondent No.1-Society is non est and is completely vitiated by bias and legal malafides and (b) Consequentially direct the respondent No.1-Society to appoint the petitioner to the said post of Assistant Manager MIS and (c) Pass such other orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit, in the interest of justice and equity. In terms of the aforesaid prayer, the petitioner seeks to declare/hold the appointment of respondent No.4 as Assistant Manager MIS in the respondent No.1-Society to be non est and vitiated by bias and malafides. 2. Sans unnecessary details, facts in brief, are as follows:- On 29-02-2016 the respondent No.1/Tumkur Milk Producers Co-operative Societies Union Limited (hereinafter referred to ‘the Society’ for short) issued a notification calling for applications from eligible candidates for appointment to various posts in the Society, one of which was the post of Assistant Manager MIS in GM category who possess MCA and experience in an officer’s post by conduct of written examination and interview. The petitioner and respondent No.4 among others participated in the selection process which resulted in the appointment of respondent No.4 being made ignoring the claim of the petitioner for such appointment. It is this appointment of respondent No.4 that the petitioner calls in question in this writ petition. 3. Heard Sri Abhinay Y.T., learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Varun J.Patil, learned counsel for respondent No.1, Smt Prathima Honnapura, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent No.2 and Sri Chandrakanth R.Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri Abhinay Y.T. would submit that the appointment of respondent No.4 is vitiated by official bias towards the respondent No.4 as respondent No.4 is a person who has complete acquaintance of the respondent No.3, who is the President of the Society. It is his further contention that marks obtained by respondent No.4 in the written examination was so abysmally low, that he was given a boost deliberately in the interview to enable his selection which is on account of his acquaintance with the respondent No.3. He would further submit that the respondent No.3 is impleaded as a party by name alleging bias. 5. He would further submit that the respondent No.3 is impleaded as a party by name alleging bias. 5. On the other hand, Sri.Varun J.Patil, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1-Society would submit that the writ petition is not maintainable and a dispute under Section 70 of the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 has to be raised as it concerns the dispute of an employee of the Co-operative Society. He would further contend that mere acquaintance of the respondent No.4 with the respondent No.3 would not annul the appointment as it is not the respondent No.3 alone who was the Member of the Selection Committee but there were four other Members who have awarded marks to each of the candidates and would submit that the selection of respondent No.4 cannot be annulled on that ground. 6. Learned counsel Sri Chandrakanth R.Patil appearing for the selected candidate-respondent No.4 would toe the lines of submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 and would submit that mere tweet or projecting on face-book with regard to the acquaintance of the respondent No.4 with the respondent No.3 would not annul the appointment. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by the respective learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material on record. 8. At the outset, I deem it appropriate to consider the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 that the writ petition is not maintainable and the petitioner will have to avail alternate, efficacious and statutory remedy of raising a dispute under Section 70 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’ for short). Section 70 of the Act reads as follows: “70. Section 70 of the Act reads as follows: “70. Disputes which may be referred to Registrar for decision.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute touching the constitution, management, or the business of a co-operative society arises,— (a) among members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and deceased members, or (b) between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member or deceased member and the society, its 1[board] or any officer, agent or employee of the society, or (c) between the society or its 2[board] and any past 3[board], any officer, agent or employee, or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs, or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased employee of the society, or (d) between the society and any other co-operative society, 4[or a credit agency] such dispute shall be referred to the Registrar for decision and 5[no civil or Labour or Revenue Court or Industrial Tribunal] shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceeding in respect of such dispute. (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the following shall be deemed to be disputes touching, the constitution, management or the business of a co-operative society, namely:— (a) a claim by the society for any debt or demand due to it from a member or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of a deceased member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not; (b) a claim by a surety against the principal debtor where the society has recovered from the surety any amount in respect of any debt or demand due to it from the principal debtor, as a result of the default of the principal debtor whether such debt or demand is admitted or not; 6[(c) any dispute arising in connection with the election of a President, Vice-President or any office-bearer or Member of board of the society;] 7[(d) any dispute between a co operative society and its employees or past employees or heirs or legal representatives of a deceased employee, including a dispute regarding the terms of employment, working conditions and disciplinary action taken by a co-operative society 1[notwithstanding anything contrary contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947); (e) a claim by a co-operative society for any deficiency caused in the assets of the co-operative society by a member, past member, deceased member or deceased officer, past agent or deceased agent or by any servant, past servant or deceased servant or by its 2[board], past or present whether such loss be admitted or not.] (3) If any question arises whether a dispute referred to the Registrar under this section is a dispute touching the constitution, management or the business of a cooperative society, the decision thereon of the Registrar shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. The petitioner is an applicant pursuant to a notification for appointment and in terms of the notification, he has participated in the selection process and does not get selected. It cannot be said that the petitioner is an employee of the Society and is yet to become an employee and is seeking to challenge the appointment of respondent No.4 into the Society. Therefore, there is no dispute in terms of Section 70 of the Act between the employer and the petitioner which concerns his employment. It cannot be said that the petitioner is an employee of the Society and is yet to become an employee and is seeking to challenge the appointment of respondent No.4 into the Society. Therefore, there is no dispute in terms of Section 70 of the Act between the employer and the petitioner which concerns his employment. It is apposite to refer to the order of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of JYOTIBA YELLAPPA JADHAV AND OTHERS v. THE HUBLI CO-OPERATIVE COTTON SALES SOCIETY LIMITED AND OTHERS, (1970) 2 Mys.L.J 344 wherein the Division Bench has held as follows:- “11. Hence, the exclusion of civil court’s jurisdiction under the Co-operative Societies Act in the light of the provisions already referred to must be limited to the extent of the matters expressly placed within the jurisdiction of special Tribunal or authorities created under the statute; for which purpose, we have to read Section 70, which shows that a dispute to which one of the parties is a person who is not a member of any cooperative society cannot be brought within the scope on Section 70 or be submitted for adjudication by the special authorities under the statute. That such is the intention of the statute is also clear from the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 71 as well as the enumeration of the three different modes for execution of the awards in Section 101 of the Act. The former provision makes it clear that if the presence of a person who cannot be made a party is essential for an effective adjudication he cannot be brought within the scope of the statute and made a party nor can to special authorities functioning under the statute make any effective order. The statute itself requires or indicates that the bar of civil courts’ jurisdiction created by it shall not be given effect to but that despite the bar, the entire matter may be referred to ordinary civil court for a proper and elective adjudication. The idea of providing for three modes of execution is also the same. If the execution can proceed without infringing the rights of anybody other than the member of a cooperative society, it is open to the decree-holder to choose the procedure of getting the property sold with or without attachment by the Registrar himself or an authorized subordinate of his. If the execution can proceed without infringing the rights of anybody other than the member of a cooperative society, it is open to the decree-holder to choose the procedure of getting the property sold with or without attachment by the Registrar himself or an authorized subordinate of his. If he considers that the rights of third parties may arise for adjudication or consideration, it is open to the decree-holder either to select the procedure of revenue sales or the executing authority of the civil courts themselves in both of which, there is full provision for examination of the claims and objections of third parties. The difference between the procedure under the revenue Code and Civil Procedure Code on the one hand and the procedure prescribed under the Co-operative Societies act on the other is that whereas the jurisdiction under the former is relatable to a topic or nature of property, the jurisdiction under the Co-operative Societies Act is limited by membership of the society. (Emphasis supplied) It is further germane to notice the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of BONGAIGAON REFINERY & PETROCHEMICALS LIMITED v. SAMIJUDDIN AHMED, (2001) 9 SCC 557 –wherein the Apex Court holds as follows:- “7. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on Workmen v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate [ AIR 1958 SC 353 ] to submit that in view of Section 2(k) of the ID Act a dispute raised by “any person”, even if not a “workman” stricto sensu is competent. But we are not impressed. In the above-noted case “any person” was an employee appointed on probation and it was doubtful whether he was a workman or not. The case did not relate to a person never employed and yet claiming to be a workman. It was held that “any person” cannot be read without limitation and a person in respect of which the employer-employee relationship never existed and can never possibly exist cannot be the subject-matter of dispute between employers and workmen. The present case does not satisfy the tests laid down vide para 21 of the decision cited so as to warrant the validity of reference being upheld.” The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment holds that any person, as defined under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot mean that an employee who is seeking employment can come within the definition of ‘workman’. 10. 10. Therefore, on a conjoint reading of Section 70, the judgments of the Division Bench of this Court and that of the Apex Court would lead to an unmistakable conclusion that the writ petition by the petitioner who was seeking employment and had not yet become an employee would be maintainable before this Court. Even otherwise, the power of entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away merely because an alternate efficacious remedy is available, as it is a self imposed restriction upon constitutional Courts and not an embargo on this Court. Therefore, I reject this submission of the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 that the writ petition would not be maintainable and proceed to consider the matter on its merits, a caveat, this finding would not be applicable to all circumstances where a non-selected employee would raise a challenge to a recruitment notification or a process of recruitment. It is rendered only on the interpretation of Section 70 as the dispute under Section 70 would be maintainable between the employee and the employer. That having not come about the petition is considered on its merit. 11. The notification issued by the respondent No.1 calling for applications for various posts including that of Assistant Manager MIS was on 29.02.2016. Both the petitioner and respondent No.4 are applicants in response to the said notification to the post of Assistant Manager MIS. Written test for the said post was conducted in terms of the notification on 18.12.2016. The petitioner secures 102 marks in the written test as against 77 marks secured by the 4th respondent. In terms of the notification 85% of marks secured will have to be taken as the marks secured in the written examination. Therefore, in terms of the said percentage, the petitioner secures 43.4 marks and the respondent No.4 secures 32.7 marks. On the very look of it, the marks secured by the respondent No.4 is abysmally low. 12. Interview was conducted after the marks of the written test were out. Therefore, in terms of the said percentage, the petitioner secures 43.4 marks and the respondent No.4 secures 32.7 marks. On the very look of it, the marks secured by the respondent No.4 is abysmally low. 12. Interview was conducted after the marks of the written test were out. Interview was held on 21.04.2017 and the marks secured by the petitioner and the respondent No.4 as awarded by each of the Member of the Selection Committee are as follows: xxxxxxxxx The entire marks secured by the petitioner and the respondent No.4 are as per the chart which depict as follows: “TUMKUR CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS SOCITIES UNION LTD., MALLASANDRA, TUMKUR NAME OF THE POST: ASSISTANT MANAGER (MIS/SYSTEMS) DATE OF INTERVIEW:21-4-2017 MORNING-11.00 AM Interview Marks List of GM (OTHERS) SL. NO. APP No. Name Cat Written Exam Marks Obtained( for 200) Written Exam Marks Reduced to 85% President Board Director KMF Representat ive Deputy registrar MD Total(7+8+9 +10+11) Grand Total(6+12) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 1 2025 MADHUSUDHAN.K GM 77 32.7 2.5 3 3 3 2.5 14 46.7 2 599 CHETHAN G.C. 3B 99 42.1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 4 46.1 3 495 RAGHAVENDRA M.R. 3A 99 42.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 3 45.1 4 402 VENUGOPALA T.B 3A 102 43.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.5 45.9 5 943 MADHU H.S. 3A 69 29.3 A A A A A A A xxx xxx xxx Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- Sd/- MANAGING DIRECTOR MEMBER SECRETARY KMF REPRESENTATIVE MEMBER DRCS MEMBER BOARD DIRECTOR MEMBER PRESIDENT In terms of the chart, the total marks secured by the respondent No.4 become 46.7 and the petitioner is 45.9. The interview marks given to the petitioner are 2.5 and to the respondent No.4 are 14 out of 15. It is the marks given in the interview that have tilted the balance in favour of the respondent No.4, despite him being abysmally low in the marks obtained in the written test. 13. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner with regard to bias qua the marks awarded merits consideration. It is the marks given in the interview that have tilted the balance in favour of the respondent No.4, despite him being abysmally low in the marks obtained in the written test. 13. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner with regard to bias qua the marks awarded merits consideration. The respondent No.4 who had applied pursuant to the notification and had participated in the written test just before the interview was to be conducted displayed certain photographs of him celebrating in glory, birthday of the respondent No.3 who is the President of the Society and the same is widely publicised on facebook – social media which is not disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 or the respondent No.4. The respondent No.3/President who is made a party in the proceedings is served and unrepresented. 14. The display of the acquaintance of the respondent No.4 with the respondent No.3 with the phraseology ‘Midnight celebrations with BOSS’ read with marks that are bolstered in the interview only in favour of the respondent No.4, cannot but lead to an unmistakable conclusion that the appointment of the respondent No.4 is vitiated by personal and official bias as those pictures produced as Annexures-D1 to D4, E1, E2 and F to the writ petition declare the respondent No.3 to be the boss of the respondent No.4 before the interview could be held and the marks awarded as narrated (supra), in the interview would vitiate such appointment on account of bias. 15. The allegation of the petitioner is the selection of the respondent No.4 is vitiated on account of personal bias of the respondent No.3 who was then the Chairman of the Selection Committee. The facts narrated hereinabove would clearly indicate that the marks of respondent No.4 are bolstered on account of his acquaintance or friendship with the Chairman of the Selection Committee. In such circumstances when the allegation of bias is made the Apex court in the case of STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. SHIVANANDA PATHAK, (1998) 5 SCC 513 holds as follows: “32. In such circumstances when the allegation of bias is made the Apex court in the case of STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. SHIVANANDA PATHAK, (1998) 5 SCC 513 holds as follows: “32. The above maxim as also the other principle based on the most frequently quoted dictum of Lord Hewart, C.J. in R. v. Sussex JJ., ex p McCarthy [(1924) 1 KB 256 : 1923 All ER Rep 233] KB at p. 259, that “it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done”. constitute the well-recognised rule against bias. 33. Bias, as pointed out earlier, is a condition of mind and, therefore, it may not always be possible to furnish actual proof of bias. But the courts, for this reason, cannot be said to be in a crippled state. There are many ways to discover bias; for example, by evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case or applying the tests of “real likelihood of bias” or “reasonable suspicion of bias”. de Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 1980 Edn., pp. 262, 264, has explained that “reasonable suspicion” test looks mainly to outward appearances while “real likelihood” test focuses on the court's own evaluation of the probabilities. 34. In Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon [(1968) 1 WLR 815: (1968) 1 All ER 354] it was observed “whether there was a real likelihood of bias or not has to be ascertained with reference to right-minded persons; whether they would consider that there was a real likelihood of bias”. Almost the same test has also been applied here in an old decision, namely, in Manak Lal v. Dr Prem Chand Singhvi [ AIR 1957 SC 425 : 1957 SCR 575 ]. Almost the same test has also been applied here in an old decision, namely, in Manak Lal v. Dr Prem Chand Singhvi [ AIR 1957 SC 425 : 1957 SCR 575 ]. In that case, although the Court found that the Chairman of the Bar Council Tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court to enquire into the misconduct of Manak Lal, an advocate, on the complaint of one Prem Chand was not biased towards him, it was held that he should not have presided over the proceedings to give effect to the salutary principle that justice should not only be done, it should also be seen to be done in view of the fact that the Chairman, who, undoubtedly, was a Senior Advocate and an ex-Advocate General, had, at one time, represented Prem Chand in some case. These principles have had their evolution in the field of administrative law but the courts performing judicial functions only cannot be excepted from the rule of bias as the Presiding Officers of the court have to hear and decide contentious issues with an unbiased mind. The maxim nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa and the principle “justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done” can be legitimately invoked in their cases.” (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, in an allegation of this nature reasonable suspicion of bias and real likelihood of bias are to be arrived at by evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case. As recorded hereinabove, the facts narrated that the marks obtained by the selected candidate in the interview would raise a reasonable suspicion or real likelihood of bias. 16. The Apex Court in the case of G.SARANA (Dr.) v. UNIVERSITY OF LUCKNOW, (1976) 3 SCC 585 holds as follows:- “10. It would be advantageous at this stage to refer to the following observations made by this Court in Manak Lal v. Prem Chand [ AIR 1957 SC 425 : 1957 SCR 575 ]: “Every member of a tribunal that sits to try issues in judicial or quasi- judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially; and the essence of judicial decisions and judicial administration is that judges should be able to act impartially, objectively and without any bias. In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final decision of the tribunal. It is in this sense that it is often said that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done.” 11. Again as held by this Court in A.K. Kraipak's case reiterated in S. Parthasarthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh [ (1974) 1 SLR 427 : (1974) 3 SCC 459 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 580] and followed by the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Farooq Ahmad Bandey v. Principal, Regional Engineering College [1975 J & K LR 427], the real question is not whether a member of an administrative board while exercising quasi-judicial powers or discharging quasi-judicial functions was biased, for it is difficult to prove the mind of a person. What has to be seen is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In deciding the question of bias, human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct have to be taken into consideration. In a group deliberation and decision like that of a Selection Board, the members do not function as computers. Each member of the group or board is bound to influence the others, more so if the member concerned is a person with special knowledge. His bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner.” (Emphasis supplied) After the judgment of the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, the Apex Court in the case of ASHOK KUMAR YADAV v. STATE OF HARYANA, (1985) 4 SCC 417 holds as follows: “16. We agree with the petitioners that it is one of the fundamental principles of our jurisprudence that no man can be a judge in his own cause and that if there is a reasonable likelihood of bias it is “in accordance with natural justice and common sense that the justice likely to be so biased should be incapacitated from sitting”. The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real livelihood of bias. The question is not whether the judge is actually biased or in fact decides partially, but whether there is a real livelihood of bias. What is objectionable in such a case is not that the decision is actually tainted with bias but that the circumstances are such as to create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of others that there is a likelihood of bias affecting the decision. The basic principle underlying this rule is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done and this rule has received wide recognition in several decisions of this Court. It is also important to note that this rule is not confined to cases where judicial power stricto sensu is exercised. It is appropriately extended to all cases where an independent mind has to be applied to arrive at a fair and just decision between the rival claims of parties. Justice is not the function of the courts alone; it is also the duty of all those who are expected to decide fairly between contending parties. The strict standards applied to authorities exercising judicial power are being increasingly applied to administrative bodies, for it is vital to the maintenance of the rule of law in a Welfare State where the jurisdiction of administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid pace that the instrumentalities of the State should discharge their functions in a fair and just manner. This was the basis on which the applicability of this rule was extended to the decision-making process of a selection committee constituted for selecting officers to the Indian Forest Service in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [ (1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 : (1970) 1 SCR 457 ]. What happened in this case was that one Naqishbund, the acting Chief Conservator of Forests, Jammu and Kashmir was a member of the Selection Board which had been set up to select officers to the Indian Forest Service from those serving in the Forest Department of Jammu and Kashmir. Naqishbund who was a member of the Selection Board was also one of the candidates for selection to the Indian Forest Service. Naqishbund who was a member of the Selection Board was also one of the candidates for selection to the Indian Forest Service. He did not sit on the Selection Board at the time when his name was considered for selection but he did sit on the Selection Board and participated in the deliberations when the names of his rival officers were considered for selection and took part in the deliberations of the Selection Board while preparing the list of the selected candidates in order of preference. This Court held that the presence of Naqishbund vitiated the selection on the ground that there was reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection. Hegde, J. speaking on behalf of the Court countered the argument that Naqishbund did not take part in the deliberations of the Selection Board when his name was considered, by saying: (SCC p. 270, para 15) “But then the very fact that he was a member of the Selection Board must have had its own impact on the decision of the Selection Board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the Selection Board when the claims of his rivals ... was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the Selection Board there was a conflict between his interest and duty.... The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased.... There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct.” This Court emphasised that it was not necessary to establish bias but it was sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it could be shown that there was reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or personal friendship or family relationship with the other. The likelihood of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or personal friendship or family relationship with the other. Where reasonable likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relationship, the question would always be as to how close is the degree of relationship or in other words, is the nearness of relationship so great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the authority making the selection. 18. We must straightaway point out that A.K. Kaipak case [ (1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 : (1970) 1 SCR 457 ] is a landmark in the development of administrative law and it has contributed in a large measure to the strengthening of the rule of law in this country. We would not like to whittle down in the slightest measure the vital principle laid down in this decision which has nourished the roots of the rule of law and injected justice and fair play into legality. There can be no doubt that if a Selection Committee is constituted for the purpose of selecting candidates on merits and one of the members of the Selection Committee is closely related to a candidate appearing for the selection, it would not be enough for such member merely to withdraw from participation in the interview of the candidate related to him but he must withdraw altogether from the entire selection process and ask the authorities to nominate another person in his place on the Selection Committee, because otherwise all the selections made would be vitiated on account of reasonable likelihood of bias affecting the process of selection………………. (Emphasis supplied) Later, the Apex Court following the judgment in the case of ASHOK KUMAR YADAV (supra) in the case of JASVINDER SINGH v. STATE OF J & K, (2003) 2 SCC 132 holds as follows: “7. In Mehmood Alam Tariq v. State of Rajasthan [ (1988) 3 SCC 241 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 757: (1988) 7 ATC 741: AIR 1988 SC 1451 ] prescription of 33% as minimum qualifying marks of 60 out of total 180 marks set apart for viva voce examination does not by itself incur any constitutional infirmity. In Manjeet Singh v. ESI Corpn. In Manjeet Singh v. ESI Corpn. [ (1990) 2 SCC 367 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 271: (1990) 13 ATC 686] this Court held that in the absence of any prescription of qualifying marks for the interview test the same 40% as applicable for written examination was reasonable. In Anzar Ahmad v. State of Bihar [ (1994) 1 SCC 150 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 278: (1994) 26 ATC 504] this Court exhaustively reviewed the entire case-law on the subject including the one in Ashok Kumar Yadav case [ (1985) 4 SCC 417 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 88: AIR 1987 SC 454 ] and upheld a selection method which involved allocation of 50% marks for academic performance and 50 marks for the interview. The very observations in Ashok Kumar Yadav case [ (1985) 4 SCC 417 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 88: AIR 1987 SC 454 ] would go to show that there cannot be any hard-and-fast rule of universal application for allocating the marks for viva voce vis-à-vis the marks for written examination and consequently the percentage indicated therein alone cannot be the touchstone in all cases. What ultimately required to be ensured is as to whether the allocation, as such is with an oblique intention and whether it is so arbitrary as capable of being abused and misused in its exercise. Judged from the above the Division Bench could not be held to have committed any error in sustaining the allocation of 25 marks (20%) for viva voce as against 100 marks for written examination for selection of candidates in the present case. The learned Single Judge, in our view, has adopted a superficial exercise and proceeded on a misunderstanding of the real ratio of the decision in Ashok Kumar Yadav case [ (1985) 4 SCC 417 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 88 : AIR 1987 SC 454 ]. Further, the learned Single Judge appears to have applied the ultimate decision in the said case, to the case on hand drawing certain inferences on mere assumptions and surmises or some remote possibilities, without any proper or actual foundation or basis, therefor. 8. Further, the learned Single Judge appears to have applied the ultimate decision in the said case, to the case on hand drawing certain inferences on mere assumptions and surmises or some remote possibilities, without any proper or actual foundation or basis, therefor. 8. The learned Single Judge also seems to have been very much carried away by few instances noticed by him as to the award of higher percentage of marks in viva voce to those who got lower marks in the written test as compared to some who scored higher marks in the written examination but could not get as much higher marks in viva voce. Picking up a negligible few instances cannot provide the basis for either striking down the method of selection or the selections ultimately made. There is no guarantee that a person who fared well in the written test will or should be presumed to have fared well in the viva voce test also and the expert opinion about as well as experience in viva voce does not lend credence to any such general assumptions, in all circumstances and for all eventualities. That apart, the variation of written test marks of those who were found to have been awarded higher marks in viva voce vis-à-vis those who secured higher marks in the written test but not so in the viva voce cannot be said to be so much (varying from five marks and at any rate below even 10) as to warrant any proof of inherent vice in the very system of selection or the actual selection in the case. There was no specific allegation of any mala fides or bias against the Board constituted for selection or anyone in the Board nor any such plea could be said to have been substantiated in this case. The observation by the learned Single Judge that there was a conscious effort made for bringing some candidates within the selection zone cannot be said to be justified from the mere fact of certain instances noticed by him on any general principle or even on the merits of those factual instances alone. The observation by the learned Single Judge that there was a conscious effort made for bringing some candidates within the selection zone cannot be said to be justified from the mere fact of certain instances noticed by him on any general principle or even on the merits of those factual instances alone. Further, the course adopted by the learned Single Judge in directing selection from general candidates of all those who have obtained 56 marks in the written examination cannot be justified at all and it is not given to the Court to alter the very method of selection and totally dispense with viva voce in respect of a section alone of the candidates, for purposes of selection. On a careful and overall consideration of the judgments of the learned Single Judge and that of the Division Bench, we are of the view that the decision of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained for the reasons assigned by him and the decision of the Division Bench cannot be considered to suffer any such serious infirmity in law to call for our interference.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. A cumulative analysis of the facts and the judgments of the Apex Court it becomes unmistakably clear that the selection of respondent No.4 is vitiated by bias as the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4/selected candidate admits that he had posted those posts on social media – face book and does not, however, dispute his relationship with the respondent No.3. It is his defence that merely because there is some relationship or friendship between respondent No.3 and respondent No.4, it would not vitiate the selection as he has been awarded marks by the Selection Committee. The respondent No.3 was the Chairman of the Selection Committee and all the members of the Selection Committee including the Chairman awarded 0.5 marks to the petitioner and 2.5 marks and above each to the respondent No.4. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, as held by the Apex Court in the afore-extracted judgments, the selection of respondent No.4 cannot but be held to be vitiated on account of bias. It is also to be noticed with emphasis that respondent No.3 who was the chairman and generator of the allegations has remained conspicuously absent in these proceedings, perhaps deliberately, as he is served and remains unrepresented for the last four years. It is also to be noticed with emphasis that respondent No.3 who was the chairman and generator of the allegations has remained conspicuously absent in these proceedings, perhaps deliberately, as he is served and remains unrepresented for the last four years. Therefore, it becomes clear that the respondent No.3 has no answer to the allegations levelled against him in the petition. Shooting from either the shoulder of the respondent No.1 or the respondent No.4 would not suffice or be an explanation when he is specifically arrayed as a party respondent imputing bias. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following: ORDER (a) Writ Petition is allowed. (b) The appointment of respondent No.4 stands quashed and the respondent No.1/Society is directed to conduct the interview afresh of the candidates who had been short listed after the written examination and issue appointment order in accordance with law. In the event none would now respond, the appointment may be offered to the petitioner. (c) The aforesaid exercise shall be completed by the respondent No.1 within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.