ORDER : 1. Learned trial court dismissed the suit filed by the present petitioners as having abated. This judgment has been up-held by the learned first Appellate Court. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have preferred instant petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India. 2. The parties hereinafter are referred to as they were before the learned trial court. 3. Facts: (i) The petitioners filed a civil suit on 31.1.2002 against the respondents/defendants for declaration to the effect that: (a) Land measuring 4 kanal 12 marlas, bearing khewat No. 414, khatauni Nos. 541 and 542, khasra Nos. 1334, 1339 as entered in the jamabandi for the year 1992-93, situate in village Bathu, Sub Tehsil Haroli, Tehsil and District Una has been coming in possession of the plaintiffs as owners to the extent of 20/30 shares and as tenants to the extent of 10/30 shares. (b) The plaintiffs have become owners of 10/30 shares by operation of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. (c) The revenue entries of suit land in the name of defendants in the revenue record more particularly, in the jamabandi for the year 1992-93 as ‘khud kasht’ are wrong, illegal, null, void, ineffective and have no bearing upon the rights, title or interests of the plaintiffs. (d) Consequential relief to restrain the defendants from interfering in the plaintiffs’ possession over the suit land was also prayed for. (ii) Defendant No. 6-Jagdish s/o Basant Ram was proceeded ex-parte in the civil suit vide order dated 1.3.2002. However, on the next date (1.4.2002), power of attorney on behalf of defendants No. 6 and 7 was filed in the court by Shri P.C. Sharma, learned Advocate who prayed time to file written statement on behalf of defendants No. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. The prayer was allowed and the matter was fixed for 15.5.2002. On the next date i.e. 15.5.2002 written statement on behalf of defendants No. 1 to 7 was not ready. Learned counsel appearing for these defendants including defendant No. 6 prayed for adjournment to file the written statement. The prayer was not opposed by learned counsel for the plaintiffs and the matter was fixed on 6.8.2002 for filing of written statement. Written statement was not ready even on 6.8.2002. Further time was granted to the defendants No. 1 to 7 to file the written statement The same was eventually filed on 20.9.2002. The prayer was not opposed by learned counsel for the plaintiffs and the matter was fixed on 6.8.2002 for filing of written statement. Written statement was not ready even on 6.8.2002. Further time was granted to the defendants No. 1 to 7 to file the written statement The same was eventually filed on 20.9.2002. Some relevant orders mentioned above are extracted hereinafter: “1.3.2002 Present: Sh. R.C. Seth, Advocate, for the plaintiff. Sh. R.K. Sharma, Advocate for defendant No. 1, 2, 3 and 5. Defendant No. 7 in person. Defendants No. 4, 6, 8 and 9 served but not present. Hence, they are proceeded as ex-parte. Now to come up for on 1.4.2002. xxx xxx xxx 1.4.2002 Present: Sh. R.C. Seth, Advocate for the plaintiff. Sh. P.C. Sharma, Advocate for defendants no. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7. (Power of attorney of defendants no. 6 and 7 is filed today) Defendant no. 4 already ex-parte. Written statement on behalf of defendants No. 8 and 9 is filed. Written statement on behalf of defendants no. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 not ready. Adjournment is prayed which is granted. Now to come up on 15.5.2002 for written statement. xxx xxx xxx 15.5.2002 Present: Sh. R.C. Seth, Advocate for the plaintiffs. Sh. P.C. Sharma, Advocate for defendants no. 1 to 7. (Power of attorney on behalf of defendant no 4 is filed today) None for the defendants no. 8 and 9 despite the fact that they were personally present on the last date of hearing. Hence the case is ordered to be heard as ex-parte against the defendants no. 8 and 9. Written statement on behalf of defendants no. 1 to 7 not ready. Adjournment is prayed which is granted as not opposed by Ld. for the plaintiffs. Now to come up on 6.8.2002 for written statement.” (iii) During pendency of the civil suit, defendant No. 6 died on 8.9.2009. On 12.8.2011, the plaintiffs moved an application under Order 22 Rule 4(4) of Code of Civil Procedure seeking exemption to bring on record legal representatives of defendant No. 6. The exemption was sought only on the ground that Jagdish Singh defendant No. 6 was proceeded ex-party on 1-3-2002. He failed to appear and contest the suit and had not filed any written statement. The defendants opposed the application by submitting that defendant No. 6 was a contesting defendant. The exemption was sought only on the ground that Jagdish Singh defendant No. 6 was proceeded ex-party on 1-3-2002. He failed to appear and contest the suit and had not filed any written statement. The defendants opposed the application by submitting that defendant No. 6 was a contesting defendant. He had already filed his power of attorney as well as written statement. The defendants prayed for dismissal of the civil suit as having abated since long and also prayed for dismissal of the application moved by the plaintiffs under Order 22 Rule 4(4) CPC. (iv) Learned trial Court after hearing the parties concluded that the plaintiffs had claimed reliefs against all the defendants jointly and not separately. The relief claimed by the plaintiffs was joint and common against all the defendants. Hence death of defendant No. 6 and failure to bring on record his legal representatives would result in abatement of the suit. The legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 6 would be affected by the litigation. Passing of any decree in the facts of the case would be nullity in the eyes of law. The suit was, therefore, held to have been abated and dismissed as such. Accordingly, the application under Order 22 Rule 4(4) CPC was also dismissed vide order dated 28.9.2012. The plaintiffs challenged this order before the learned Additional District Judge under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC. The appeal was also dismissed on 30.7.2014. Aggrieved against the aforesaid two judgments, the plaintiffs have now filed present petition. 4. I have heard Sh. Pramod Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sh. Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. With their assistance, I have also gone through the record. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs submitted that both the learned courts below erred in law in dismissing the suit filed by the petitioners as having abated. The application moved by the plaintiffs under Order 22 Rule 4(4) CPC seeking exemption to bring on record deceased defendant’s legal heirs deserved to be allowed Learned Senior counsel for the respondents/defendants defended the impugned judgments: (i) The first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners was that defendant No. 6 was proceeded as ex-parte vide order dated 1.3.2002. No application was filed by defendant No. 6 for setting aside the order vide which he was proceeded against ex-parte. No application was filed by defendant No. 6 for setting aside the order vide which he was proceeded against ex-parte. The order dated 1.3.2002 was not set aside, therefore, it cannot be said that defendant No. 6 was allowed by the Court to join the proceedings. It was also submitted that written statement filed on behalf of defendants No. 1 to 7 did not bear the signature of defendant No. 6. Under these circumstances, the plaintiffs were entitled to be exempted under the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 (4) CPC from bringing on record his legal representatives. The aforesaid contentions are not tenable on facts for the following reasons: (a) No doubt, defendant no. 6 was proceeded ex-parte by the learned trial Court on 1.3.2002. However, the record shows that Shri P.C. Sharma, learned Advocate filed power of attorney on behalf of defendants No. 6 and 7 in the Court on 1.4.2002. The said power of attorney was taken on record by the Court. No objection to this course was raised by the plaintiffs. (b) Learned counsel appearing for defendant No. 6 prayed for time to file written statement on behalf of defendants No. 1 to 7. This prayer was also not opposed on behalf of the plaintiffs. With the consent of the plaintiffs, time to file written statement on behalf of defendants No. 1 to 7 was granted by the learned trial Court on 1.4.2002 and further enlarged vide orders dated 15.5.2002 and 6.8.2002. The written statement was filed on 20.9.2002 on behalf of defendants No. 1 to 7. (c) The written statement filed on behalf of defendants No. 1 to 7 bears signatures of some of the defendants. Admittedly, it does not bear signature of defendant No. 6. However, learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs could not point out any legal requirement that the written statement has to be signed by all the defendants. The title of the written statement clearly reflects that it has been filed on behalf of defendants No. 1 to 7 including defendant No. 6. In light of above admitted facts, it was not necessary for defendant No. 6 to file a separate application for setting aside the order dated 1.3.2002. The order dated 1.3.2002 has to be deemed to have been set aside in view of subsequent orders passed in the civil suit. In light of above admitted facts, it was not necessary for defendant No. 6 to file a separate application for setting aside the order dated 1.3.2002. The order dated 1.3.2002 has to be deemed to have been set aside in view of subsequent orders passed in the civil suit. (d) The written statement filed by defendants No. 1 to 7 was taken on record. In the written statement, defendants No. 1 to 7 including defendant No. 6 had contested the claim put forth in the plaint. The petitioners/plaintiffs filed replication thereto. Therefore, it cannot be said that defendant No. 6 was not a contesting defendant in the civil suit. His legal representatives, therefore, were required to be brought on record in accordance with the provisions of law. No application was moved by the plaintiffs to bring on record legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 6. In fact learned trial Court in the impugned order dated 28.9.2012 records a factual observation that “in the present case, no application for bringing on record the LRs. of deceased defendant No. 6 aforementioned has been filed either in time prescribed or till date nor the same is sought to be filed even yet.” Not only that the defendants did not file application to bring on record deceased defendant’s legal heirs but also they never offered any explanation for not filing such application within time. Such prayer made during hearing of the present case, cannot be accepted in the facts of the case. The application moved by the plaintiffs under Order 22 Rule 4(4) CPC after more than two years from the date of death of defendant No. 6 seeking exemption to bring on record his legal representatives was clearly misconceived. (ii) The next contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs is that even assuming that legal representatives of defendant No. 6 were required to be brought on record and had not been brought on record within the limitation period then also the suit filed by the plaintiffs could not be dismissed as having abated as a whole. In such situation, the suit should have been dismissed as abated only qua defendant No. 6. It could not be dismissed as abated against remaining defendants. In such situation, the suit should have been dismissed as abated only qua defendant No. 6. It could not be dismissed as abated against remaining defendants. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that it can be easily inferred from the plaint and documents on record that the reliefs claimed against defendant No. 6 was separate and severable from the reliefs claimed against the remaining defendants. Therefore, the entire suit could not have been dismissed as abated. The contention has been vehemently opposed by leaned Senior counsel for the respondents/defendants. Referring to the pleadings and the documents, learned Senior Counsel submitted that in the facts of the case, the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs were joint and common against all the defendants. The cause of action raised in the plaint and the prayers made therein, the grounds for the prayers could not be separated vis-a-vis individual defendants Therefore, no error was committed by the learned Courts below in dismissing the entire suit as abated. (ii)(a) Legal position with respect to the above contention may be considered first. In 2021 (4) SCC 246 , titled Venigalla Koteswaramma versus Malampati Suryamba and others, one of the questions involved for consideration was about the effect and consequences of the fact that legal representatives of defendant No. 2 therein who expired during the pendency of the appeal in the trial court were not brought on record. In Para-42.4 of the judgment it was observed that by virtue of Rule 4 read with Rule 11 of Order 22 of the Code, in case of death of one of the several respondents, where right to sue does not survive against the surviving respondent or respondents as also in the case where the sole respondent dies and the right to sue survives, the contemplated procedure is that the legal representatives of the deceased respondent are to be substituted in his place and if no application is made for such substitution within the time limited by law, the appeal abates as against the deceased respondent. For dealing with the question as to whether the appeal could have been proceeded against the surviving respondents, the Apex Court referred to the relevant principles concerning effect of abatement of appeal against one respondent in case of multiple respondents, as enunciated and explained by the Court in various decisions. For dealing with the question as to whether the appeal could have been proceeded against the surviving respondents, the Apex Court referred to the relevant principles concerning effect of abatement of appeal against one respondent in case of multiple respondents, as enunciated and explained by the Court in various decisions. One of the decisions noted by the Apex Court was the Constitution Bench’s decision in Amarjit Singh Kalra vs. Pramod Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272 . The Apex court noted in paragraph 44.5 that Amarjit Singh Karla’s case supra arose out of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 where different proprietors had different claims concerning their respective land but joined together in appeals against the orders passed in reference proceedings. Some of the appellants expired and no steps were taken within time for bringing on record their respective legal representatives but at some later stage, applications were filed by the heirs of the deceased parties for bringing them on record as legal representatives alongwith applications for condonation of the delay to set aside abatement. These applications were rejected by the High Court. The submission of the remaining appellants that the appeals abated partially qua the deceased appellants only was also not accepted by the High Court. The Constitution Bench did not approve the decision of the High Court after recording a finding that the award/decrees, which were subject matter of challenge before the High Court were not joint or inseparable but in substance, a mere combination of several decrees depending upon the number of claimants and, therefore, were joint and several or separable vis-a-vis the individuals or their claims. The directions passed in Amarjit Singh Karla’s case were noticed in venigalla’s case supra as under: “44.6 Although the appeals were restored for reconsideration of the High Court but, in the process, the Constitution Bench surveyed the relevant case-law including the aforesaid decision in Nathu Ram’s case and laid down the principles for dealing with such matters; and therein, also underscored the consideration about inconsistent decrees coming into operation in case of proceeding with the appeal even after its abatement qua one of the respondents. The enunciations of the Constitution Bench could be usefully noticed as follows: “34. The enunciations of the Constitution Bench could be usefully noticed as follows: “34. In the light of the above discussion, we hold: (1) Wherever the plaintiffs or appellants or petitioners are found to have distinct, separate and independent rights of their own and for the purpose of convenience or otherwise, joined together in a single litigation to vindicate their rights, the decree passed by the court thereon is to be viewed in substance as the combination of several decrees in favour of one or the other parties and not as a joint and inseverable decree. The same would be the position in the case of defendants or respondents having similar rights contesting the claims against them. (2) Whenever different and distinct claims of more than one are sought to be vindicated in one single proceedings, as the one now before us, under the Land Acquisition Act or in similar nature of proceedings and/or claims in assertion of individual rights of parties are clubbed, consolidated and dealt with together by the courts concerned and a single judgment or decree has been passed, it should be treated as a mere combination of several decrees in favour of or against one or more of the parties and not as joint and inseparable decrees. (3) The mere fact that the claims or rights asserted or sought to be vindicated by more than one are similar or identical in nature or by joining together of more than one of such claimants of a particular nature, by itself would not be sufficient in law to treat them as joint claims, so as to render the judgment or decree passed thereon a joint and inseverable one. (4) The question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal as not being properly and duly constituted or rendered incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires to be determined only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-à-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees. For that reason, a decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other.” Para 44.7 of the judgment in Venigalla’s case supra also notices another judgment rendered in (2019) 6 SCC 756 , titled Hemareddi (Dead) through Legal Representatives vs. Ramachandra Yallappa Hosmani and Others, wherein judgment of the High Court holding that the appeal had abated, was affirmed. One of the appellants therein had died during the pendency of the appeal. His legal heirs were not brought on record. The High Court held that the decree that could be granted in appeal, if surviving appellants were successful, would be inconsistent with decree which had attained finality between deceased appellant and the defendants due to abatement. The relevant part from the judgment is as under: “28. Is this a case when the appellant and his brother were having distinct and independent claims and rights and for the sake of convenience they had joined as plaintiffs originally in the suit and as appellants subsequently in the appeal? Is this a case where there is joint decree or is it is a case where the decree is severable? Is it therefore a severable decree or a combination of two decrees? Whether the decree if passed by the appellate court in favour of the appellant would result in a decree which is contradictory to the decree passed by the trial Court. 29. In this case, undoubtedly as we have noted the appellant and his late brother sued as plaintiffs for a declaration that the first defendant was not the adopted son and he has no rights. They also sought a prohibitory injunction. The suit stood dismissed by trial court. Let us take the converse position. 29. In this case, undoubtedly as we have noted the appellant and his late brother sued as plaintiffs for a declaration that the first defendant was not the adopted son and he has no rights. They also sought a prohibitory injunction. The suit stood dismissed by trial court. Let us take the converse position. Assuming that the suit was decreed by the trial court and appeal was carried by the defendants, and pending the appeal by the defendants, if the late brother of the appellant had died and if the defendants had not impleaded the legal representatives of late brother and the appeal abated as against him, would it then not open to the appellant as respondent in the appeal to contend that if the appeal was to be allowed to proceed in the absence of the legal representatives of his late brother and succeed, there would be an inconsistent decree. On the one hand, there will be a decree by the trial Court declaring that the first defendant was not the adopted son and had no interest in the property qua the late brother of the appellant. On the other hand, the appellate court could be invited to pass a decree which should be to the effect that the first defendant was found to be the adopted son and had right and interest over the property and a declaration to that effect would have to be granted. Would not the appellate court then have to necessarily hold though the decree in favour of the deceased brother of the appellant has become final, and under it, a declaration is granted that the defendant No. 1 is not the adopted son and he has no right to claim the property and there is an injunction against him that he is the adopted son opposed to the decree which has been passed by the trial court which has attained finality. We would think that the appellate court would indeed have to refuse to proceed with the appeal on the basis that allowing the appeal by the defendants would lead to an appellate decree which is inconsistent with the decree which has become final as against the deceased brother of the appellant. 30. We would think that the appellate court would indeed have to refuse to proceed with the appeal on the basis that allowing the appeal by the defendants would lead to an appellate decree which is inconsistent with the decree which has become final as against the deceased brother of the appellant. 30. We would think that the situation cannot be any other different, when we contemplate the converse of the aforesaid scenario which happens to be the factual matrix obtaining in this case. The right which was set up by the appellant alongwith his late brother was joint. They were members of the joint Hindu family consisting of their late father and which consisted of late Govindareddi, their father Shriram Reddy and Basavareddi, who was none other than the husband of the second defendant. This is not a case where their claims were distinct claims. This is not the situation which was present in the case dealt with by the Constitution Bench under the land acquisition case. Therein, several persons came together and sought relief in one proceeding. We would think that this is not the position in this case.” (ii)(b) In the background of above legal position, it is now to be seen whether the reliefs claimed by the petitioners/plaintiffs were common or joint against all the defendants or the same were separable and individual against the defendants. Whether even after holding the suit to have been abated against defendant No. 6, could it have continued against the remaining defendants or not? The reliefs prayed by the plaintiffs have been extracted earlier. According to the plaintiffs, suit land has been wrongly and incorrectly reflected in the revenue record (jamabandi for the year 1992-93) in self cultivation (khud kasht) of the defendants. That these revenue entries in favour of the defendants are null and void. The plaintiffs have prayed for decree of declaration that they are owners in possession over the suit land to the extent of 20/30 shares. That they were tenants to the extent of 10/30 shares in the suit land and by operation of law i.e. H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, have become owners of 10/30 shares in the suit land. It is pleaded that they were inducted as tenants by the predecessors of defendants. The declaratory reliefs claimed are common and joint against all the defendants. It is pleaded that they were inducted as tenants by the predecessors of defendants. The declaratory reliefs claimed are common and joint against all the defendants. Plaintiffs also claim that existing revenue entries of the suit land be declared null and void and that defendants have no rights over the joint suit land. Most importantly, the prayers in the civil suit operate in common against all the defendants including defendant No. 6. In view of the pleadings and the documents on record, it cannot be said that the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs are not joint against all the defendants or that the plaintiffs had claimed distinct and separable reliefs vis-a-vis the claim against defendant No. 6 and the remaining defendants. Also, even if for argument sake it is assumed that suit is to be dismissed as abated only qua defendant No. 6, then it might lead to a situation where in respect of same suit land, for the same revenue entries, inconsistent and different positions would be reflected in revenue record qua the different defendants on same set of facts and grounds, which would be impermissible. 6. For all the aforesaid reasons, I find no error committed by the learned Courts below in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs as having abated as a whole. The dismissal of application moved by plaintiffs under Order 22 Rule 4(4) of Code of Civil Procedure seeking exemption to bring on record deceased defendant No. 6’s legal representatives, was also in order. Accordingly, the instant petition fails and is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.